such tax is valid. N. Y., etc., R'y v. Pennsylvania,

158 U. S., 431. In the case of Telegraph Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S., 688, the statute of Mississippi imposed a tax against telegraph companies organized under the laws of other States, according to the miles of wire within the State, in lieu of taxes directly levied on the property. This act did not put an unconstitutional restraint upon commerce, nor interfere with it.

A stipulation in the charter of a railroad company that it shall pay to the State a bonus or portion of its earnings is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall., 456.

A company was chartered by Georgia to do a general forwarding and express business. It had an office in Mobile and there had an express business extending beyond the limits of Alabama and under the contract so to do. An ordinance of Mobile required a license tax to be paid by such a company. Held, not repugnant to the Constitution. Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall., 479.

A tax on account of transportation from one point to another in the same State though passing during transit through part of another State is not a tax upon interstate commerce, and is valid. Lehigh Valley R'y v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S., 192.

Railway gross receipts taxable.-A statute of a State imposing a tax upon the gross receipts of a railroad company is not a tax on imports or exports nor a regula

tion of interstate commerce, nor a tax upon interstate transportation. "State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts," 15 Wall., 284.

A State statute which levies a tax upon the gross receipts of railroads for the carriage of freight and passengers into, out of, or through the State is a tax upon commerce and therefore void. Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S., 230. The State may tax the money actually within the State, after it has passed beyond the stage of compensation for carrying persons or property, as it may tax other money or property within its limits; but a tax specifically upon receipts for carriage of freights and passengers into, out of, or through the State is a tax upon the commerce out of which it arises, and void. Id.

A State can not under the guise of taxing business within its borders impose a burden upon commerce among the States. Id.

A State tax upon the gross receipts of a steamship company incorporated under its laws, which receipts are derived from the transportation of persons and property by sea, between different States, and to and from foreign countries, amounts to a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce and is void. Phila., etc., Steamship Co. v. Penna., 122 U. S., 326.

A State tax upon freight, transported from one State to another, is a regulation of commerce among the

States, and void. State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall.,

232.

Right of States to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors.-A license tax by the State upon dealers in beer and ale by the cask, which was not manufactured in the city imposing such tax, was held not in conflict with either the clause as to regulating commerce or that protecting the privileges or immunities of citizens of the several States. Downham v. Alexandria Council, 10 Wall., 173.

The right to sell intoxicating liquors is not one of the privileges and immunities of citizens that States have no power to abridge. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall., 129.

The provisions of the statute of Connecticut, leaving the sale of liquors, etc., to County Commissioners do not conflict with the 14th Amendment. Gray v. Connecticut, 159 U. S., 74.

A State law imposing a tax of 50 cents a gallon on all spirituous liquors brought into the State is constitutional where a like tax is imposed on liquors manufactured in the State. Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall., 148. But this is qualified by the rule that the State law must not interfere with the right to sell imported liquor in the original cask or package. Thurlow v. Mass., 5 How., 504.

The power of regulation of the sale of liquor in a State is subject to State Constitution and statutes.

Gi

ozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S., 657; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.

No one has an inherent right to sell intoxicating liquors at retail. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S., 86.

A State law prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating liquors within its limits to be there sold for general use as a beverage violates no right, privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution. Id.

A corporation incorporated as the Boston Beer company in 1828, by act of the legislature of Massachusetts, was given certain powers and privileges of manufacturing corporations granted by an act (1809). That act was repealed in 1829. But it contained a proviso that the legislature might from time to time, on due notice, make further provision and regulations for the management of business of the corporation, or wholly to repeal any act, or part thereof, establishing a corporation. The act of 1869 prohibited the sale of intoxicating and certain malt liquors. Held, (1) That the provisions of the act of 1809, touching the power reserved by the legislature, were adopted in the charter, and part of the contract between the State and the Company.

(2) That the contract was not affected by the repeal of the act of 1809.

(3) Under the company's charter it had no more rights than individuals had to manufacture and sell malt liquors.

(4) The State can prohibit the sale of such liquors under the police power. The doctrine of Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall., 129, reaffirmed. Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S., 25.

A statute prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating liquors is not invalid as a regulation of commerce because it does not except from its operation liquors manufactured for export. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.

The provisions in the legislation of the State of Texas, respecting the taxation of persons engaged in the sale of spirituous, vinous or malt liquors or medicated bitters do not violate the Federal Constitution. Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S., 657.

The ordinary legislation of a State regulating or prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors is not repugnant to the Constitution. Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S., 205; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall., 129.

The mode of prohibition is wholly within the discretion of the State legislatures. Carney v. Iowa, 5 Wall., 480; Thurlow v. Mass., 5 How., 504.

A special license imposed by a city for the privilege of selling beer is not invalid. Downham v. Alexandria, 10 Wall., 173.

The license under an act of Congress imposed under the excise or revenue law of the United States, does not give the right to keep or sell liquors in violation of the State laws, and is no defense to an indictment un