State or other States or countries doing business in that State, except banks, etc., to pay a tax upon its franchise or business annually, as construed by the highest Court in that State is held not repugnant to the Federal Constitution. New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S., 658.

A tax on franchises of a foreign mining corporation, etc., to be ascertained upon a percentage of its whole capital stock, ascertained as the statute prescribes, held valid. Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S., 305.

An act of New York fixing rate of elevator charges, held valid. Budd v. New York, 143 U. S., 517, adhering to Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S., 113, and explaining Chic., etc., R'y Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S., 418.

A corporation created by one State can exercise its corporate functions in another State only by the comity of the latter, and may be taxed for the privilege of doing business therein. Ins. Co. v. Mass., 10 Wall., 566.

A stipulation in a charter that the company shall pay the State granting the charter a bonus of some of its earnings is not an interference with interstate commerce; nor is it the imposition of a tax or impost on the same, nor a discrimination against the citizens of other States. R. R. Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall., 456.

Internal commerce is under State control, and to encourage the growth of such commerce of the State, it may provide for deepening channels, removing

obstructions, regulate the water flow, and improve them in other ways, and levy a general tax or toll upon those who use the streams to meet the cost of such improvement, providing the free navigation of the waters, as permitted under and by the laws of the United States, is not impaired, and provided, also, that any system for the improvement of their navigation, adopted by the general government, is not defeated. Sands v. Manis

tee Riv. Imp. Co., 123 U. S., 288.

INSTANCES OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATE LAWS, WHICH INTERFERE WITH INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

Unconstitutional taxation of interstate commerce or of the receipts therefrom or instrumentalities thereof. (a) State tax on gross receipts of railroads for business in interstate commerce, void. Michigan levied a tax on the gross receipts of railroads for the carriage. of freights and passengers into, out of, or through the State. Held, a tax on interstate commerce and therefore void. Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S., 231.

(b) A state tax on gross receipts of a railroad company is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, even though such gross receipts are made up in part from freights received from interstate commerce. The court distinguishes between a tax on the freight and a tax on the fruits of such carriage

after it has been commingled with other property. State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall., 284.

(c) A State tax upon the gross receipts of steamship company incorporated under the laws, which receipts are derived from the transportation of persons and property by sea between different States and to foreign countries is void, as a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce. Philadelphia, etc., Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S., 326.

(d) Special tax on railroad and stage companies for every passenger carried out of the State, is a tax on travel from State to State, and as a regulation of commerce void when Congress has acted on the subject. 6 Wall., 35. And is void as an obstruction to citizens traveling, etc., and doing business for the United States. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall., 35.

(e) A railroad, which as a link of a through line running into other States, is engaged in interstate commerce and a tax imposed for the privilege of keeping an office in the State for the use of its officers, etc., is a tax upon commerce among the States and as such repugnant to the Constitution. Norfolk & Western R'y Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S., 114.

(f) A law of Illinois was held void as operating to affect the rates for interstate transportation. Wabash, etc., R'y Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S., 557. This statute attempted to make the charges for "long hauls" and "short hauls" proportionate to the distance of the haul,

and, as construed by the Illinois court, it applied to transportation beyond the State. Thus construed it applied to and interfered with interstate commerce. It also applied the same rule to passenger rates.

(g) Sleeping car tax.—The legislature of Tennessee passed in 1877 a law which imposed a privilege tax of $50 per annum on every sleeping car used or run over a railroad in Tennessee, not owned by the railroad on which it is run or used. This was held void so far as it applied to interstate transportation of passengers. Pickard v. Pullman So. Car Co., 117 U. S., 34.

Taxation of railroads and other transportation companies by the State.-Various attempts have been made by the States to tax railroad and other transportation companies. The State of Pennsylvania in 1864 attempted to impose a tax upon freight taken up within and carried out of the State, or taken without and brought within it. The highest court of the State sustained this tax. The Supreme Court of the United States sent its writ of error to the State court, and reversed this decision, holding that transportation of freight is a constitutional part of commerce, and that a State tax upon freights transported from State to State is an attempted tax on commerce itself. Whenever the transportation of freight or passengers is taxed by States it can only be as to levies on business entirely within the States. State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall.,

The Su

The same principle was early established in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall., 35. Nevada sought to tax specially stage companies, etc., for every passenger carried out of the State by stage or railroad. preme Court held this act void. So in Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S., 230, a State law of Michigan "went by the board." It was not a tax upon business, but disguise it as they would, it was but a tax upon commerce among the States.

A statute of Illinois attempted to enact that railroad companies should be liable to a penalty for transporting freight or passengers at the same or a greater sum for any distance than they charged for a longer distance. This was held invalid so far as it applied to interstate transportation, though valid as to internal commerce. Wabash, etc., Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S., 557.

The Texas statute of May 6, 1882, making it unlawful for a railroad company in that State to charge and collect a greater sum for transportation of freight than is specified in the bill of lading, is, when applied to freight transported into the State from without it, in conflict with the interstate commerce act, and not applicable to interstate shipments. Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S., 98.

The statute of Mississippi, requiring all railroads carrying passengers in that State (other than street railways) to provide equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races, does not violate