ARTICLE VI.

RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."

The courts of the United States have no common-law jurisdiction of offenses at common law against the United States. United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat., 415. Therefore, they can not take cognizance of a criminal prosecution for a libel against the President and Congress of the United States. United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32. There are no common-law offenses against the United States. United States v. Britton, 108 U. S., 206; United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S., 677. And the Federal courts can punish only such offenses as are defined and made punishable by the statutes of the United States. Id.

The statute of Pennsylvania enacted that "In any indictment for murder or manslaughter it shall not be

necessary to set forth the manner in which, or the means by which, the death of the deceased was caused; but it shall be sufficient in every indictment for murder to charge that the defendant did feloniously, wilfully and of malice aforethought, kill and murder the deceased." A defendant under sentence of death in the court, Oyer and Terminer of Pennsylvania, sued out a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground that the indictment did not sufficiently inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him. Held, (1) That the court has no jurisdiction, as the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not apply to the State governments; (2) that in the opinion of the court, it is doubtful whether such an indictment is sufficient. Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 Wall., 321. In the States which have authorized this form of indictment, it is held sufficient. See, State v. Allen, 85 Wis., 22, and cases cited.

The Supreme Court has not authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to bring up the body of a person committed to jail for a contempt by a circuit court of the District of Columbia. Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat., 38. See, post, p. 387.

The deck of a private American vessel is considered for many purposes constructively as territory of the United States. Yet persons on board such vessels, whether officers, sailors, or passengers, can not invoke the protection of the provisions of the Constitution as

to indictment and trial by jury, until brought within the actual territorial limits of the United States. Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U. S., 453.

ARTICLE VII.

TRIAL BY JURY IN CASES AT LAW.

"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."

"Suits at common law," within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment, include, not merely modes of proceeding known to the common law, but all suits, not of equity or admiralty jurisdiction, in which legal rights are settled and determined. Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet., 433.

The clause in the amendment, "No fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined, than according to the rules of the common law," is a prohibition to the courts of the United States to re-examine any facts tried by a jury in any other manner. The only modes known to the common law to re-examine such facts, are the granting of a new trial by the court where the issue was tried, or to which the record was returnable, or the award of a venire facias de novo, by an appellate court,

for some error of law which intervened in the proceedings. The Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, Sec. 17 (1 Stats. at L., 83), has given to all the courts of the United States "power to grant new trials in cases where there has been a trial by jury, for reasons for which new trials have usually been granted in the courts of law." Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet., 447.

An Act of the State of Maryland incorporating the Bank of Columbia, afterwards included in the District of Columbia, in 1793, gave to the corporation a summary process by execution, in the nature of an attachment against the debtors who have, by an express consent in writing, made the bonds, bills or notes drawn by them negotiable at that bank. This was held not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or the State of Maryland. The Circuit Court of the District of Columbia was empowered by the Act of 1801 (2 Stats. at L., 102), to execute the provisions of this law. Bank of Columbia v. Oakley, 4 Wheat., 235.

When Louisiana was ceded to the United States she had and still retains a practice unlike the common law and more nearly like the civil law. There had been created a territorial district court by act of Congress before the admission of Louisiana into the Union. After the admission into the Union Congress passed an act (4 Stats. at L., p. 62), that the proceedings in civil cases in courts of the United States that now are or hereafter may be established in the State of Louisiana, shall be

conformable to the laws directing the mode of practice in the district courts of that State. This statute also provided for petit jurors in civil and criminal cases. It was held that it did not alter the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or give it power to re-examine the facts once tried by a jury in an action at law. Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet., 433.

A judgment of a State court though authorized by statute, whereby private property is taken for public use without compensation, is wanting in due process of law. Chic., B. & Q. R'y Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S., 226. In this case the city laid a street across the grounds of the company, the jury fixed the damages at one dollar. The Supreme Court of the United States held the verdict conclusive, under the 7th Amendment, though the court might think the jury erred in passing on the facts as proved.

The provision that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law," applies to facts tried by a jury in a State court; and that part of the Act of March 3d, 1863, which provides for the removal of a judgment in a State court, and in which the cause was tried by a jury, to the Circuit Court of the United States for a re-trial on the facts and law, was contrary to this provision, and void. The Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall., 274.

The clause of the Seventh Amendment that "no fact