supplant the privilege conferred by the Constitution. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S., 648. The statute of 1893, above referred to, appears to have been passed in view of this decision.

Seizure of private papers to be used as evidence.→ The seizure or compulsory production of a man's private papers to be used in evidence against him is equivalent to making him testify against himself, and in a prosecution for a crime, penalty or forfeiture, is equally within the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S., 616.

The Fourth and Fifth Amendments run into and shed light upon each other. When the thing forbidden in the Fifth Amendment, viz., compelling a man to be a witness against himself, is the object of a search and seizure of his private papers, it is an unreasonable "search and seizure" within the Fourth Amendment. Search and seizure of a man's private papers to be used in evidence to convict him of a crime or recover a penalty or to forfeit his property is totally different from the search and seizure of stolen goods, dutiable articles for unpaid duties, etc., which rightfully belong to the custody of the law. Id.

The 5th section of the Act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stats. at L., 186), which authorizes a court of the United States, on motion of the government attorney, to require the defendant or claimant, in revenue cases, to bring his private books, invoices, and papers into

court, or else that the allegations of the complaint be deemed confessed, held unconstitutional and void, as applied to suits for penalties, or for a forfeiture of the party's goods, as such action for forfeiture or penalty is a "criminal case," within the meaning of that part of the Fifth Amendment which declares that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself." Id.

Not applicable to seizures by State authority.-The arrest of a vessel engaged in taking oysters contrary to the statute of Maryland, held not contrary to the Constitution of the United States, as without "due process of law," as the Fifth Amendment restraining the issue of warrants, but on probable cause, etc., applies only to the United States and not the State authorities. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How., 71.

The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution (relating to criminal prosecutions) were not designed as limits upon the State governments in reference to their own citizens, but are only restrictions upon Federal power. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet., 243; Thorington v. Montgomery, 147 U. S., 490. See, ante, p. 292.

Taking for public use-Sale of liquors may be forbidden. Forbidding the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors is not a taking of property for public use, nor without due process of law. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623.

In condemnation proceedings for taking lands for

public use under a State statute, a published notice of the proceedings, in compliance with the statute, is "due process of law." And where the commissions appointed to appraise have been sworn and acted, the question whether one of them was a freeholder can not be raised collaterally in an action of trespass for entering the land after condemnation. Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. Co., 130 U. S., 559. See, post, p. 374.

The provision of the Fifth Amendment, as to taking private property, is only a limitation of the power of the United States; it is not applicable to the legislation of the several States. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet., 242.

The taking of a toll bridge, owned by a private corporation, may be accomplished for a public highway by eminent domain, and this taking, with compensation, does not impair the obligation of a contract. West Riv. Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How., 507; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How., 84.

The Confiscation Acts of August 6, 1861 (12 Stats. at L., 319), and July 17, 1862 (12 Stats. at L., 588), are an exercise of the war power and not in conflict with the restrictions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Miller v. United States, 11 Wall., 268. But the purchase of the property of a loyal citizen of the late rebel confederacy, under such statutes, is void. Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall., 457.

Laws for the flowing of lands for mill-dams, or other like uses, are constitutional, if they provide for compen

sation; and land sold by the United States, though bordering on navigable streams, is within the protection of the constitutional provision. Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co., 13 Wall., 166.

The right of eminent domain exists in the government of the United States, and may be exercised within the States so far as necessary in the enjoyment of powers conferred upon it by the Constitution. United States, 91 U. S., 367.

Kohl v.

The general grant of legislative power in the Constitution of a State does not authorize the legislature, in the exercise either of the right of eminent domain, or the right of taxation, to take private property, without the owner's consent for any but a public object, and not as a mere donation to a private manufacturing corporation. Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S., 1.

The provision in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, is a limitation on the power of the United States, not upon the legislation of the several States. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet., 243.

Compensation for property taken for public use.-In proceedings taken in behalf of the United States under Act of August 8, 1888 (25 Stat. at L., pp. 400, 411), to condemn the locks and dam of the Monongahela Navigation Company, the latter is entitled under the Fifth Amendment to compensation for its franchise, to take

tolls, as well as for the value of its tangible property. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S., 312.

Twice in jeopardy.—Where a court has imposed fine and imprisonment, where the statute conferred power only to punish by fine or imprisonment, and the fine has been paid, the court can not, even during the same term, modify the sentence by imposing imprisonment instead of the former sentence. Ex parte Lange, 18 How., 163.

The same act or series of acts may constitute an offense equally against the United States and against a State, and subject the guilty party to punishment under the laws of each State. Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S., 132; United States v. Marigold, 9 How., 560, 569; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How., 410, 433; Moore v. Illinois, 14 How., 13, 19; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S., 371, 390. In the latter case it is held that Congress may pass a law to punish a violation of any State law in regard to the election of Representatives to Congress. See, ante, pp. 8, 301.

Where a jury in a criminal case is discharged during the trial because one of the jurymen had sworn on his voir dire that he had no acquaintance with the accused; and this fact had been disputed in a newspaper article, which the jury had read, a re-trial does not put the accused twice in jeopardy within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Simmons, 142 U. S., 148, citing United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat., 979.