grant (of power to lay and collect taxes, etc.) is general, without limitation as to place. It, consequently, extends to all places over which the government extends. If this could be doubted, the doubt is removed by the subsequent words which modify the grant. These words are, 'But all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States.' It will not be contended that the modification of the power extends to places to which the power itself does not extend. The power then to lay and collect duties, imposts, and excises may be exercised, and must be exercised throughout the United States. Does this term designate the whole, or any portion of the American empire? Certainly, this question can admit of but one answer. It is the name given to our great republic, which is composed of States and territories. The District of Columbia, or the territories west of the Mississippi, is not less within the United States than Maryland or Pennsylvania; and it is not less necessary, on the principles of our Constitution, that uniformity in the imposition of imposts, duties and excises, should be observed in the one, than in the other." But it was held that as Congress had power of exercising exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, it had the power to lay direct taxes on the basis of population. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat., 317.

The courts held in the territories by judges appointed by the President are not courts of the United States, but are merely legislative courts created by virtue of the

clause which authorizes Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory, etc. Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall., 434.

The theory upon which the various governments for portions of the territory of the United States have been organized has ever been that of leaving to the inhabitants all the powers of self-government consistent with the supremacy and supervision of national authority, and with certain fundamental principles established by Congress. Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall., 434, 441.

The right of the people of the territories to trial by jury. In a criminal prosecution in the District of Columbia the accused claimed the right of trial by jury. In this case, the Court says: "As the guaranty of a trial by jury, in the third article, implied a trial in that mode and according to the settled rules of the common law, the enumeration in the Sixth Amendment of the rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions is to be taken as a declaration of what these rules were, and is to be referred to the anxiety of the people of the States to have in the supreme law of the land, and so far as the agencies of the general government are concerned, a full and distinct recognition of those rules, as involving the fundamental rights of life, liberty and property. This recognition was demanded and secured for the benefit of all the people of the United States, as well as those permanently or temporarily residing in the District of Columbia as those residing or being in the

several States. There is nothing in the history of the Constitution or of the original amendments to justify the assertion that the people of the District of Columbia may be lawfully deprived of the benefit of any of the constitutional guaranties of life, liberty and property; especially of the privilege of trial by jury in criminal cases." "We can not think that the people of this district have in that regard less rights than those accorded to the people of the territories of the United States." Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S., 540, 549, 550; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S., 343.

An act of the territory of Iowa dispensing with a jury in a certain class of cases was held contrary to the 7th Amendment, and void, the Constitution having been extended to the territory by statute of Congress. Webster v. Reid, 11 How., 437.

The statute of Utah, while a territory, which provided that "in all civil cases a verdict may be rendered on the concurrence therein of nine or more members," is valid; if not so under the 7th Amendment to the Constitution it is so as violating the provisions of the act of Sept. 9, 1850, c. 51, admitting Utah as a territory and extending the Constitution there so far as applicable. Am. Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S., 464; Springville v. Thomas, 166 U. S., 707. It is intimated that Congress could not deprive one of this common-law right even in a territory. Id.; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S., 343.

Where the country occupied by one of the Indian

tribes is not within a State, Congress may enact laws to punish offenses committed there either by whites or Indians. U. S. v. Rogers, 4 How., 567.

Where a provisional government had been erected by the President in California between the date of the treaty of peace (Feb. 3, 1848) and the date when a collector of the post entered upon his duties and under such provisional government duties had been exacted upon imports from foreign countries, they were not illegally exacted and can not be recovered back. Cross v. Harrison, 16 How., 164.

The civil government so erected by the President by virtue of the power of conquest did not cease upon the ratification of the treaty but continued, without violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, until Congress provided otherwise by legislation. Id.,

195.

The following clause in Justice Wayne's opinion is claimed to have some significance. He says, "The assertion rather than argument, 'that there was neither treaty nor law permitting the collection of duties,' has been answered, it having been shown that the ratifieations of the treaty made California a part of the United States, and that as soon as it became so, the territory became subject to the acts which were in force to regulate foreign commerce with the United States, after those had ceased which had been instituted for its regulation as a belligerent right." Id., 198.

Power to sell and dispose of lands.-The power of

Congress to "dispose" of the public lands is not limited to sales, but it may lease them.

tiot, 14 Pet., 526.

United States v. Gra

The term territory as here used is merely descriptive of the one kind of property and is equivalent to the word lands. And Congress has the same power over it as over any other property belonging to the United States, and this power is vested in Congress without limitation, and has been considered the foundation upon which the ter-, ritorial governments rest. Id.

GUARANTIES TO STATES.

SECTION 4, ARTICLE IV. "The United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the Executive (when the legislature can not be convened), against domestic violence."

1. This section provides that "the United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion," etc.

2. Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide what government is established in a State. For as the United States guaranties to each State a republican form of government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is republican or not.