and jurisdiction of any particular State, and is within the power and jurisdiction of the United States. The right to govern may be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory. Which ever may be the source whence the power is derived, the possession of it is unquestioned." Id.

(1) The power of Congress over the territory is general and plenary, arising from the right to acquire them; which right arises from the power of the government to declare war and make treaties of peace, and also, in part arising from the power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property of the United States.

(2) This plenary power extends to the acts of the legislatures of the territories and is usually expressed in the organic acts of each by an express reservation of the right to disapprove and annul the acts of the legislature thereof.

(3) Congress has the power to repeal the act of incorporation of the Mormon Church, by virtue of its general power and, also, its reserved right in the organic act of the Territory of Utah. Mormon Church v. United

States, 136 U. S., 1.

Subject to the limitations expressly or by implication imposed by the Constitution, the Congress has full and complete authority over a territory and may directly legislate for its government, and may nullify its enactments. The act organizing a territory is its funda

mental law and binding upon the territorial authorities. Nat. B'k v. Yankton Co., 101 U. S., 129.

"Doubtless Congress, in legislating for the territories, would be subject to those fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights, which are formulated in the Constitution, but these limitations would exist by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution from which Congress derives its powers rather than by any express and direct application of its provisions." Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S., 44.

The personal and civil rights of the inhabitants of the territories are secured to them as to other citizens, by the principles of constitutional liberty which restrain all the agencies of government, State and national; their political rights are franchises which they hold as priviliges in the legislative discretion of Congress. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S., 44. The people of the United States, as sovereign owners, have supreme power over the territories.

In the exercise of this sovereign dominion, they are represented by the government of the United States, to whom all the powers of government over that subject have been delegated, subject only to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution or are necessarily implied in its terms, or in the purposes and object of the power itself; for it may well be admitted in respect to this, as to every other power of society over its members, that it is not absolute and unlimited. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S., 44.

"The power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States is not more comprehensive than the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the power of the government. Yet all admit the constitutionality of territorial government which is a corporate body. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316, 422.

The Dred Scott decision.-The clause in the Constitution authorizing Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property of the United States, applies only to territory within the chartered limits of some of the States when they were colonies of Great Britain, and which was surrendered by the British government to the old confederation in the treaty of peace, but has no application to territory acquired by the present Federal government. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How., 393.

In the territory acquired by the people of the United States for their common benefit, Congress can not prohibit the citizen of any particular State from going there and taking up his home, while it permits citizens of other States to go there; and each may take his property there, and as the Constitution recognizes property in slaves, the slave owner may take his property there and hold it, the same as the owner of other chattels can take them there. Congress can not prohibit this. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How., 393.

The United States, under the present Constitution,

can not acquire territory to be held as a colony, to be governed at its will and pleasure. But it may acquire territory which, at the time, has not a population that fits it to become a State, and may govern it as a territory, until it has a population which in the judgment of Congress entitles it to be admitted as a State into the Union. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How., 393.

Power over territories.-Upon the acquisition of a territory by the United States, by treaty, cession from the States, a discovery and settlement, the same title and dominion passes to the United States for the benefit of the whole people and in trust for the States to be ultimately created out of the territory. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S., 48.

By the treaty of March 14th, 1855, between the United States and the Cherokee nation certain lands were ceded to them, and it was provided that the lands ceded "shall in no future time be included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any State or territory. But they shall secure to the Cherokee nation the right of their national councils to make and carry into effect all such laws as they may deem necessary for the government and protection of persons and property within their own country belonging to their people, or such persons as have connected themselves with them; provided, always, that they shall not be inconsistent with the Constitution of the United State and such acts of Congress as have been or may be passed, regulating

trade and intercourse with the Indians," etc. Held, that the Cherokee nation are so far under the protection of the laws of the United States, as a State or territory, for the purpose of suing in the District of Columbia, on an administrator's bond. Mackey v. Coxe, 18 How., 100.

A person appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate to be the judge of the district court of Alaska, under the provisions of the act of May 17th, 1884 (23 Stat. 24, c. 53, Sec. 3), is not a judge of the courts of the United States within the meaning of the tenure of office act. R. S. U. S., Sec. 1768; McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S., 174.

Under the provision as to the trial of offenses committed within the jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, the accused was tried in Maryland for a murder committed on Mavassa island, a small island in the Carribean sea, over which the United States had exercised jurisdiction since 1859, it being occupied by an American company, for its phosphates or guano deposits. Jones v. United States, 137 U. S., 202.

In 1815 Congress levied a direct tax on the States. By a later act, of the same session, a direct tax was also levied upon the District of Columbia. This tax was held valid, as Congress has power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises. In the course of the opinion Chief Justice Marshall uses these words: "This