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does not mean that what may be a privilege and immunity in one State must of necessity be so in another. McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S., 684.

Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of this section.—Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall., 168; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall., 410; Norfolk, etc., R’y Co. v. Penn., 136 U. S., 114; Phila. Fire Asso. v. New York, 119 U. S., 110; Pembina Mining Co. v. Penn., 125 U. S., 181.

“That invisible, intangible, artificial being, that mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate, can not sue or be sued in the courts of the United States, unless the rights of members in this respect can be exercised in their corporate name." Bank of U. S. v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch, 61, 86.

An averment that the defendant is a natural citizen of the United States, and resides in Louisiana, and that the plaintiff is a citizen of France, is sufficient to give jurisdiction to a Circuit court. Gassies v. Ballon, 6 Pet., 761.

A corporation can not act outside the State of its creation, but by the permission of the State or county where it seeks to act. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet., 519; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Mass., 10 Wall., 566.


SECTION 2, Art. IV. “A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.”

This clause of the Constitution was intended to include any offense against the law of the State in which it was committed. The right is absolute and the duty correlative; but it is not within the power of Congress nor the executive or judicial department to compel its enforcement. The duty rests solely on the honor and good faith of the States. Kentucky v. Dennison, Governor of Ohio, 24 How., 66; Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S., 642; Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S., 537.

Congress by the Act of February 12th, 1793 (1 Stat. at L., 392, c. 7), provided the method by which this provision could be carried into execution; and declares that, on due evidence, the nature of which is described, "It shall be the duty" of the executive to whom demand is made to give up the fugitive. These words are not mandatory but merely give expression to the moral obligation of the executive of the State to obey the Constitution on the subject. Id.

The prisoner was indicted on two indictments "for being a common cheat and swindler” in Georgia. Requisition was made for his person on the governor of New York, for the crime charged in such two indictments. When delivered up, he was before trial upon those indictments, tried and convicted of forgery. He moved to quash the indictment on the ground that the offense charged in it was not the same for which he had been extradited from the State of New York. Held, that there was nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent such trial; that there was between the States no right of asylum in the international sense. Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S., 537.

Under extradition treaties with foreign States (R. S., Secs. 5272, 5275) extradition must be negotiated through the Federal government; and under the treaty with England, a person can, when extradited, be tried only on the offense charged in the extradition papers. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S., 407.

Holmes was arrested in Vermont on a warrant or order issued by Governor Jennison of that State, directed to the sheriff of a county of Vermont setting forth that an indictment had been found in Quebec, Lower Canada, for murder, and commanding the sheriff to arrest Holmes, convey his body to some place on the border and there deliver him to the Canadian authority which might be there to receive him. A writ of habeas corpus was sued out of the Supreme Court of Vermont, and on the hearing the court held the imprisonment lawful.

The Supreme Court of the United States was of the opinion that the State of Vermont had no right to surrender the prisoner to a foreign State. Yet the majority of the court decided that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction and dismissed the writ of error. Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet., 540.


"No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."

The Constitution (as originally adopted) clothes the owner of a slave with entire authority to seize and recapture his slave in any State of the Union, whenever he can do so without any breach of the peace or illegal violence. Prigg v. Penn., 16 Pet., 539.

An act of the State of Pennsylvania made it criminal to "take and carry away, or cause to be taken and carried away,” or by fraud or false pretense "seduce or cause to be seduced,” or to "attempt to take, carry away, or seduce any negro or mulatto from any part or parts of this commonwealth to any other place or places whatsoever, out of this commonwealth, with a design and intention of selling and disposing of, or of keeping and detaining or of causing to be kept or detained, such negro, or mulatto as a slave or servant for life or for any term whatsoever; every such person or persons or abettors” were punishable. This act held repugnant to the Constitution. Id.

The last clause of the second section of the fourth article confers on Congress the exclusive power to legislate concerning the extradition of fugitive slaves. Id.

The fugitive slave act of 1793 (1 Stats. at L., 308) held constitutional. Id.; Jones v. Van Zandt, 5 How., 215.

A State law which makes it a crime to harbor a fugitive slave is not in conflict with the Constitution. The act of harboring may be an offense both against the State law and the laws of the United States. Moore v. Illinois, 14 How., 13.

The question whether slaves held in a slave State are made free by going into a free State with the permission of their masters is purely a question of local law, over which the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction, under. the Constitution, before the amendments abolishing slavery. Strader v. Graham, 10 How., 82.

The ordinance of 1787 ceased to be of force after the adoption of the Constitution. Id.

Persons, whose ancestors were negroes of the African race imported into this country and held as slaves, can not though emancipated or born of free parents, become citizens of the United States, in the sense in which that

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