of the corporation is not penal; and full effect should be given to the liability in another State. Id. The courts of the United States, exercising original jurisdiction take judicial notice, without proof, of the laws of the several States of the United States; but the Supreme Court, exercising appellate jurisdiction, regards as matter of fact whatever was matter of fact in the State court. Chicago, etc., R'y Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U. S., 615.

Objection that a record of authentication is incomplete must be raised in the court below; it can not be raised for the first time in the appellate court. Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S., 87.

No other authentication is necessary than that prescribed by the act of Congress. The seal of the State is sufficient to an act of the legislature. United States

v. Amedy, 11 Wheat., 392. See, R. S. U. S., Sec. 908. When the courts of one State construe the statutes of another State differently from their construction at home, it does not justify removal to the Federal court, but the remedy is by writ of error from the Supreme Court, when full faith is not given to the acts, etc., of the other State. Chicago, etc., R'y Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 108 U. S., 18.

In a proceeding in a Federal court to enforce a liability created by a State statute, the same effect will be given to a judgment of a State court either as evidence or as a cause of action, as is given to it in the courts of

the State whose laws are invoked in the enforcement.

Chase v. Curtis, 113 U. S., 452.

S. sued a railway company in Kansas for wages in justice's court and recovered all he claimed. The company appealed to the district court. When called for trial the company asked continuance on the ground that a creditor of Sturm had sued him in an Iowa court, of which State the company was also a corporation, and recovered a judgment there from which an appeal had been taken which was still pending and that in that action the defendant corporation had been garnisheed for the same debt as that on which the suit was brought. Motion for stay and for new trial denied. Held, that the Iowa court had jurisdiction and the Kansas courts did not give the Iowa proceedings due faith and credit, for which reason judgment was reversed. Chicago, etc., R'y Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S., 710.

In an action begun in New York by the plaintiff against a former husband to recover alimony awarded by a decree of a court of New Jersey, the New York court denied the relief on the ground that the decree was erroneous, according to the law and practice of New Jersey. Held, that the New York court should have given full faith and credit to the judgment, leaving the defendant to seek his remedy of reversal for errors in the courts of New Jersay. Laing v. Rigney, 160 U. S., 531.

Liability of stockholders for debts of corporation, when enforcible by courts of other States.-1. The

liability of a stockholder, fixed by the laws of the State of the domicile of the corporation of another State, is contractual and not penal in its nature and may be sued for in the Federal courts of another State where the stockholder resides. Whitman v. Oxford National Bank, 176 U. S., 559. See, ante, p. 249.

2. And when the judgment of a court of the State of domicile of the corporation has been rendered and is conclusive upon the stockholder who is liable, the courts of other States must give full faith and credit to such judgments. Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S., 640. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S., 657.

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS.

SECTION 2. "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."

NOTE.-What are privileges and immunities?—The Supreme Court will not describe and define these privileges and immunities in a general classification, preferring to decide each case as it arises. Conner v. Elliott, 18 How., 591; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall., 418, 430; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S., 248.

The privileges and immunities of citizens guarantied by the Constitution did not (as the Constitution was prior to the late amendments) apply to free negroes,

whose ancestors were brought to this country and sold as slaves. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How., 393.

It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them in other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into them and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them in other States the equal protection of their laws. It has been justly said no provision of the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall., 168, 180..

The privileges and immunities which this clause secures are those common to the citizen, not such special privileges as a State may give its citizens or some of them, such as the right to fish in public waters. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall., 168.

This clause does not vest the citizens of one State with any interest in the common property of the citizens of other States. The citizens of a State may be authorized to plant oysters in the soil of tide waters within the

State, and citizens of other States may be forbidden. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S., 391.

This clause does not prevent a State from imposing a tax on all sales made by auction in it (except by importers of imported goods in the original packages), and where such tax is imposed on its own citizens, it may be imposed in the same manner and to the same extent on citizens of other States. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall., 123. So an ordinance of a city imposing a license tax of $200 upon dealers in beer or ale by the cask, not manufactured in that city, is valid. It does not discriminate against citizens of other States. Downham v. Alexandria, 10 Wall., 173.

Instances of statutes repugnant to this section, as depriving citizens of their privileges and immunities.-It is not in the power of a State, when establishing regulations for the conduct of private business of a particular kind, to give its own citizens essential privileges which it denies to other States. Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S., 239.

A law of a State which provides that in case of foreign corporations carrying on business in the State, and becoming insolvent, resident creditors shall be preferred to non-resident creditors, is repugnant to this provision of the Constitution. Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S., 239.

This case (Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S., 239) was again before the court in 176 U. S., 59, the judgment