The pardoning power of the President.-In order to ascertain what is meant by the power to grant reprieves and pardons resort must be had to the meaning of these words and the power as used in England under the common law. From these sources it appears that the power includes the right to commute the sentence of the court by substituting a milder punishment as imprisonment in place of sentence of death; and acceptance of such pardon binds the convict to the substituted punishment. Ex parte Wells, 18 How., 307.

Pardon of the President under Act of July 17, 1862 (13 Stat. at L., 592) by proclamation operates to grant oblivion, and removes all consequences of giving aid and comfort to those in rebellion (United States v. Padelford, 9 Wall., 531) and entitles the persons pardoned to a restoration of all rights of property, except slaves, on condition of their taking and keeping inviolate the oath prescribed. United States v. Klein, 13 Wall., 128. See Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U. S., 202.

The President's proclamation of pardon and amnesty unconditionally and without reservation to all who participated, directly or indirectly, in the late rebellion relieves claimants of captured and abandoned property from proof of adhesion to the United States, during the late civil war. Pargoud v. United States, 13 Wall., 156.

A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the

power intrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. It must be brought to the notice of the court by plea or motion. United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150.

A pardon by the President for all offenses arising from participation in the rebellion, relieves the recipient from the necessity of taking the oath required by the Act of January 24, 1865. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall., 333. Such pardon blots out the offense (Armstrong v. United States, 13 Wall., 154; United States v. Padelford, 9 Wall., 531; Knox v. United States, 95 U. S., 149) and restores to the recipient all rights of property lost by the offense, unless it has by judicial process become vested in other persons. Osborn v. United States, 91 U. S., 474; Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall., 147. As to them, it can not affect rights vested in others directly by the execution of the judgment for the offense, or acquired by others while it was in force. Knote v. United States, 95 U. S., 149. The Confiscation Cases, 20 Wall., 92; Semmes v. United States, 91 U. S., 21.

The general pardon of the owner relieves him of so much of the penalty as accrued to the United States

under the Confiscation Act of August 3d, 1861. Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Wall., 766.

The proviso in the general appropriation Act of 1870, which assumes to annul the effect of the President's pardon, in claims pending before the Court of Claims, can have no such annulling effect. United States v. Klein, 13 Wall., 128.

But where the statute prohibits payment of claims to persons not known to be loyal during the war, a pardon does not authorize the payment of such claims. Hart v. United States, 118 U. S., 62.

One convicted by a consular court having jurisdiction, and sentenced to death for murder, but accepting a pardon granted on condition that he be imprisoned for life in a penitentiary is bound by the condition. In re Ross, 140 U. S., 453.

The recital in a pardon that it is granted at the request of the district attorney, in order to restore the competency of the pardoned person as a witness in a murder trial, does not alter the fact that the pardon is full and unconditional. Boyd v. United States, 142 U. S., 450.

TREATY-MAKING POWER-DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENTS.

"He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,

shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other offi cers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments."

Treaties.-Though a treaty is the law of the land, and its provisions must be regarded by courts as equivalent to an act of the Congress when it operates directly on a subject, yet if it be merely a stipulation for future legislation by Congress, it addresses itself to the political power, and the judicial department must await congressional action. Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet., 253. See, post, pp. 283-4.

The statute of the State of Georgia, which subjected to punishment all white people residing within the limits of the Cherokee nation, and authorized their arrest and forcible removal therefrom, was held repugnant to the laws and treaties of the United States. Worcester v. State of Georgia, 6 Pet., 515.

The treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain, concluded on the 3rd of September, 1783 (8 Stat. at L., p. 80) enables British creditors to recover debts, previously contracted to them by our citizens, notwithstanding a payment into a State treas

ury had been made during the war, under the authority of a State law of sequestration. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall., 199.

The treaty with the Cherokee Indians, made Dec. 29, 1835, was made under the treaty-making power vested by the Constitution in the President and Senate. Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall., 211.

Vice-Consuls.-Secs. 1695, 1703, Rev. St., empowering the President to provide for the appointment of vice-consuls, are valid, though not requiring the advice and consent of the Senate. They fall under the class of those inferior officers, whose appointment Congress may vest in the President alone. United States v. Eaton, 169 U. S., 331.

The power of appointment.-The appointment and commission of a collector of internal taxes "until the end of the next session of Congress and no longer," is not continued by a new appointment and commission during the pleasure of the President. The latter is a new appointment distinct from the first and requires a new bond. United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat., 720.

POWER TO FILL VACANCIES.

"The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session."