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of gold or silver in coin or bars or other form, when transported from any point within to any point without the State is in effect a tax upon a class of exports and the law imposing it is void. Almy v. California, 24 How., 169.
Goods, the product of a State, intended for exportation to another State, are liable to taxation as part of the general mass of property of the State of their origin, until started in course of transportation to the State of destination or delivered to a common carrier for that purpose. The carrying them to and depositing them at a depot for transportation is not a part of that transportation. So held as to logs hauled from the place of cutting to the town of E. in New Hampshire, there to be transported upon the river to Lewiston, Maine. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S., 517.
On the day to which a State assessment relates, the property was in products, on shipboard in the course of transportation, and could not be taxed. If on that day it was in money, the subsequent assessment of it could not be set aside, on the ground that when assessment was made it was employed in purchase of products for exportation. People v. Comm’rs, 104 U. S., 466.
NOTE.—Many taxes and impositions by States fall under the head of interference with interstate commerce, or foreign commerce, and the cases are collected under that head.
PROHIBITIONS ON THE STATES.
"No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with an. other State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, anless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.”
What is a tonnage tax?—Although a tax levied, as on property, by a State upon vessels owned by its citizens and based on a valuation of the same are not prohibited by the Federal Constitution; yet State taxes can not be imposed on them by any State at so much per ton of the registered tonnage, and are unconstitutional even though the vessels are owned within the State and engaged exclusively in trade within the State. State Tonnage Cases, 12 Wall., 204.
So much of the act of the legislature of New York, passed May 22, 1862, as amended April 17, 1865, as required ships and vessels which enter the port of New York, or load or unload or make fast to any wharf therein, to pay a certain percentage per ton, on the tonnage as registered, is a tax on tonnage and void. Inman Steamship Company v. Tinker, 94 U. S., 238. Tonnage is a vessel's internal cubical capacity.
The States can not levy a duty of tonnage on ships or vessels, even though they are engaged only in State
commerce, not internal or foreign. Cox v. The Collector (State Tonnage Cases), 12 Wall., 204.
An ordinance of New Orleans which requires of all steamboats, which shall moor or land in any part of the port of New Orleans, a sum measured by the tonnage of the vessel, is a tonnage tax and void. Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall., 577. This was done under pretence of compensation for wharfage; but for the use of wharves owned by a city a reasonable compensation may be charged and received. Id.
A State can not, in order to defray the expenses of her quarantine regulations, impose a tonnage tax on vessels owned in foreign ports and entering her harbors in pursuit of commerce. Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall., 581.
What is not a tonnage tax?-A license of $100 per boat required of the owner of a ferry boat plying across a river between two States is not “tonnage tax," and may be imposed. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S., 365.
The duty of tonnage prohibited by the Constitution is a charge upon a vessel according to its tonnage as the instrument of commerce, for the privilege of entering or leaving a port or navigating public waters. Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S., 543.
Reasonable compensation for the use of artificial facilities for the improvement of navigation is not a tonnage tax. Id.
Wharfage is not tonnage, and can be charged by State authority. Transportation Company v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S., 691. But it must be imposed in good faith, and to the extent of a fair remuneration. Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S., 423. It may be graduated by the size of the vessel. Id. Whether the charge is wharfage or tonnage is a question of law and fact. The intent is immaterial. Trans. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S., 691.
The Vicksburg wharfage regulations were not a duty on tonnage, nor interference with interstate commerce. Vicksburg v. Tobin, 100 U. S., 430.
Taxes levied upon ships, by a State, although enrolled, owned by citizens of the State, based on a valuation of the vessel as property, are not within the Constitutional prohibition against levying duties of tonnage. Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S., 273.
But wharfage may be charged in proportion to tonnage. See, ante, p. 71.
Compact or agreement with other States.-It is not necessary that the consent of Congress be expressed in any particular form; and when Congress consented to the separation of Kentucky and its admission as a State into the Union, it amounted to consent to a compact previously made between them, and gave it the force of a contract, within the 18th section of the first Article of the Constitution. Green V. Biddle, 8 Wheat., 1.
The consent of Congress to an agreement or compact between two States may be implied from circumstances, such as arranging the judicial districts on the basis of a boundary settled by the States, or the forming of a congressional district on the same basis. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S., 504.
"Controversies between (States), arising out of public relations and intercourse, can not be settled either by war or diplomacy, though with the consent of Congress they may be composed by agreement. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Field in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S., 503, 519, there are many matters on which the different States may agree that can in no respect concern the United States, while there are other compacts or agreements to which the Constitution applies. And as to this, he quotes from Mr. Justice Story in his commentaries, Sec. 1408 * * * ‘that its language may be more plausibly interpreted from the terms used (in the previous part of the same section) "treaty alliance or confederation,” and upon the ground that the sense of each is best known by its association (noscitur a sociis) to apply to treaties of a political character; such as treaties of alliance, and treaties of confederation, in which the parties are leagued for mutual government, political co-operation, and the exercise of political sovereignty, and treaties of cession and sovereignty, or conferring internal political jurisdiction, or external political dependence, or