the bank, to which the holders of bills could resort for payment. There was no promise that the State would pay. The bank notes of this bank were held not to be bills of credit within the Constitution. Briscoe v. Bank of Commonwealth of Kentucky, 11 Pet., 257.

A like bank was incorporated in Alabama, with capital stock paid in, liable for, and subject to be sued for debts. The State owned all the stock and the legislature elected directors. Its bills were received in payment of public debts and the State pledged its faith for their redemption. Held, not "bills of credit." Darrington v. State Bank of Alabama, 13 How., 12.

In 1836, the legislature chartered a banking corporation. The State was the sole stockholder, and the bills and notes of the bank were made receivable for all debts due the State. Following Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet., 311, these notes were held not bills of credit issued by the State. Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How., 203.

Coupons attached to a State bond and receivable by the terms of the contract for taxes are not "bills of credit" within the meaning of the Constitution. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S., 270; Virginia Coupon Cases, (Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S., 270).

A warrant drawn by State authorities in payment of an appropriation is not "a bill of credit," in violation of the Constitution. Art. I, Sec. 10; Houston v. Texas, 177 U. S., 66.

WHAT ARE EX POST FACTO LAWS?

(See pages 135–139.)

A law changing the place of

trial from one county to another, in the same district, from that where the offense was committed, is not an ex post facto law. Gut v. The State, 9 Wall., 35.

Although the prohibition of the Constitution to pass ex post facto laws is aimed at criminal cases, it can not be evaded by giving a civil form to that which is in substance criminal. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall., 277.

But a State law which, in relation to a particular offense or its consequences, alters the situation of the defendant to his disadvantage is ex post facto. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S., 221. Thus, where the law at time of the offense made conviction on plea of guilty to murder in the second degree, a bar to a prosecution for murder in the first degree, a change in the law to remove such bar is ex post facto.

An act which is not an offense at the time it is committed can not become such by any subsequent independent act of the party with which it has no connection. Acts of bankruptcy or to defraud creditors can not be punished under a statute passed after the act was committed. United States v. Fox, 95 U. S., 570.

An act approved in the afternoon raised the duty on tobacco and provided that a fine should be imposed for removing it from the warehouse, without the stamp to

show payment of the tax. As to tobacco removed in the morning of the same day the act was ex post facto. Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U. S., 381.

Any law passed after the commission of the offense for which the party is being tried is an ex post facto law when it inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime at the time it was committed, or which alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage. Re Medley, 134 U. S., 160. So, a State law which gave power to the warden of the prison to execute a prisoner at any day and hour during a designated week, was held void as to crime previously committed. Id.

IMPAIRING CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS.

Instances in which state laws have been held to impair the obligation of a contract.-A State, unless restricted by its Constitution, may contract to release the taxing power. Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436; Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, 16 How., 369, affirmed.

The Dartmouth College case. The charter granted by the British Crown to the trustees of Dartmouth College, in New Hampshire, in the year 1769, is a contract within the meaning of that clause of the Constitution which declares that "no State shall make any law impairing the obligation of a contract." Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat., 518. The legislature in

this case attempted to alter the charter so as to obtain a practical control of the institution, which the charter gave to trustees, having a perpetual succession and right to fill all vacancies in the board of trustees. The act attempted to place the control under twenty-one trustees instead of the twelve provided by the charter, the trustees to be appointed by the governor and council. In this great leading case it was held that such legislation impaired the contract of the original charter, and the act was held void.

In 1836 the legislature of Arkansas chartered a banking corporation of which the State was to be sole stockholder, which charter provided that the bills and notes of such bank "should be received in payment of all debts due the State." The repeal of this provision impaired the obligation of a contract. Woodruff v. Trap

nall, 10 How., 190.

Where a legislature of a State accepted from banking corporations a "bonus" as consideration for the franchise granted, and pledged the faith of the State "not to impose any further tax or burden upon them during the continuance of their charters," held, that a tax upon the stockholders, by reason of their stock, was a violation of this contract, and the further tax was illegal. Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How., 133.

The charter of a bank fixing a rate of taxation as in lieu of all other taxes, is a contract between the State and the bank, and is impaired by the imposition of

other taxes. Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S., 679; Piqua Branch Bk. v. Knoop, 16 How., 369; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How., 331; Mech. & Traders' Bk. v. Thomas, 18 How., 384; Jefferson Branch Bk. v. Shelly, 1 Black., 436; Franklin Bk. v. Ohio, 1 Black., 474; New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S., 114.

The charter of the Bank of Tennessee provided "that the bills or notes of said corporation, originally made payable, or which shall have become payable on demand in gold or silver, shall be receivable at the treasury of the State and by all tax-collectors and other public officers for taxes or other money due the State." This guaranty was a contract and attached to every note issued while the statute was in force, and a subsequent law limiting the notes that should be thus secured to those only that were passing at par did not repeal the above quoted section. Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall., 44.

A provision in a charter of a corporation, by which a State legislature relinquishes its power to tax the corporation, constitutes a contract which the State can not subsequently impair. Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wall., 244; Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall., 430; Wilmington, etc., R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall., 264, 269; Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S., 679; St. Anna's Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 U. S., 362.

Reserved right to alter or amend.—But where, when the charter is granted, the Constitution or a general