DIRECT TAXES, ETC., ETC.

"No capitation, or other direct tax, shall be laid unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken."

See cases cited under Section 2, Article I, ante, p. 8.

In Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat., 317, this question arose. The Act of Congress laid a direct tax on all the States. A later act of the same year laid a direct tax on the District of Columbia, according to the rule of apportionment. This was contested in the above case. It was held that Congress could lay such tax on the District of Columbia; but if laid it must be according to the rule of apportionment. In this opinion occurs the dictum of Chief Justice Marshall that the territories are part of the United States and subject to the same rule as to uniformity of imposts and duties, which is now under public discussion. He decides that the tax laid on the District of Columbia was legal. But he argued if it could not rest on the 9th section, it could rest on the power of exclusive legislation given to Congress over the District.

The "License Tax Cases," 5 Wall., 462, settle the principle that the license taxes imposed by the internal revenue law, and the prohibitions against carrying on business without such licenses, do not violate the Constitution.

The income tax of 1864 (13 Stat. at L., 218) was held not a direct tax; but it was said that "direct taxes" are only capitation taxes and taxes on real estate. Springer v. United States, 102 U. S., 586.

An income tax which levies a tax upon the income of real estate, or upon the income derived from municipal bonds, is invalid. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S., 429; 158 U. S., 601. The reasoning of the court is that the tax on rents of land is a "direct tax;" and that the tax on the income derived from municipal bonds tends to cripple the powers of the subdivisions of the State government.

ARTICLES EXPORTED FROM THE STATES.

"No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State."

The acts of Congress of July 20, 1868 (15 Stat. at L., 157), and June 6, 1872 (17 Stat. at L., 254), so far as they relate to snuff and tobacco intended for exportation, do not impose a stamp tax or duty by stamp on exports within the meaning of that clause of the Constitution which declares that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State." Pace v. Burgess, 92 U. S., 372. The stamp required by the act was intended to prevent fraud and to relieve it from taxation to which other tobacco was subjected. Id. Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U. S., 504. An excise laid on tobacco be

fore its removal from the factory is not such duty on exports. Id. The prohibition has reference to the imposition of duties on goods by reason of or because of their exportation or intended exportation or whilst being exported, and does not affect their taxation as part of the general mass of property in a State. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S., 517.

The provisions of the R. S., Sec. 3330, for the withdrawal of distilled spirits from bonded warehouses for exportation in the original casks, and allowing a tax to be assessed upon the deficiency by evaporation after the giving of an exportation bond, is not a violation of the clause prohibiting a tax upon articles exported from the State, as the property is not yet in process of exportation on the mere giving an exportation bond. Thompson v. United States, 142 U. S., 471.

NO PREFERENCE OF ONE STATE OVER ANOTHER.

"No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another."

This clause does not prohibit a municipal corporation owning improved wharves and other artificial means which it maintains at its own cost, for the benefit of those engaged in commerce upon its public navigable waters of the United States, from charging and collecting reasonable fees for wharfage. Packett Co. v.

Keokuk, 95 U. S., 80; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S., 423; Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S., 559. The wharfage may be charged in proportion to the tonnage of the vessel. Id.

A quarantine tax or fee, for examining the sanitary condition of a ship, does not contravene this provision. Morgan, etc., Co. v. Louisiana, 118 U. S., 455, 467.

The Act of Congress of August 31 (10 Stat. at L., 112), declaring the bridge across the Ohio river at Wheeling a lawful structure, and requiring vessels to be so constructed as not to interfere with it, as then constituted, is not in conflict with the "no preference" clause of the Constitution. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc., Bridge Co., 18 How., 421.

This limitation operates only as a restriction on the powers of Congress, and in no respects affects the States in the regulation of their domestic affairs. The Illinois Constitution of 1870 contained an article declaring warehouses and elevators where grain is stored public, and providing for their regulation, is not repugnant to this clause. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S., 113; Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U. S., 455, 467.

MONEY DRAWN FROM TREASURY.

"No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."

TITLES OF NOBILITY, ETC., FORBIDDEN.

"No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States; and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign State."

PROHIBITIONS ON THE STATES.

SECTION 10. "No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility."

1. What are bills of credit.-Certificates of indebtedness issued by the State of Missouri, in sums not exceeding ten dollars, nor less than fifty cents, receivable in payment of all State, county, and town dues, etc., the faith of the State being pledged for their redemption, are "bills of credit," and can not lawfully be issued. Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet., 410; Byrne v. State of Missouri, 8 Pet., 40.

2. What are not bills of credit.-The Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky was a corporation chartered by the State. The State owned all the stock of