that during the examination of Mr. Max Nydegger as a witness in some case or cases pending in 1926, which are not involved with those at bar, it was sought to be offered by counsel for appellee in those cases (the Government was therein the appellee), and upon the sustaining of objections by appellant's counsel to its reception, Government's counsel had it marked "Exhibit A for identification." It is an unsigned, unverified, unproved document, purporting to be a copy of a deposition of the manufacturer and seller, Hilscher, taken under section 508 of the Tariff Act of 1922. Said section 508 reads as follows: Collectors, appraisers, general appraisers, and boards of general appraisers may cite to appear before them or any of them and to examine upon oath, which said officers or any of them are hereby authorized to administer, any owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person upon any matter or thing which they, or any of them, may deem material respecting any imported merchandise then under consideration or previously imported within one year, in ascertaining the classification or the value thereof or the rate or amount of duty; and they, or any of them, may require the production of any letters, accounts, contracts, invoices, or other documents relating to said merchandise, and may require such testimony to be reduced to writing, and when so taken it shall be filed and preserved, under such rules as the Board of General Appraisers may prescribe, and such evidence may be given consideration in all subsequent proceedings relating to such merchandise. It will be observed from an analysis of the above that the use of such anticipatory evidence seems to be confined to proceedings "relating to such merchandise." This would seem to confine its use strictly to the shipments or entries under consideration in the case or cases in which such evidence is taken, but we do not deem it necessary specifically to construe the section in this case nor to determine whether the original would have been admissible in this case. It was not offered. That which was offered was what was claimed to be a copy. There was no effort to prove or verify it except such as was contained in a few questions asked Nydegger, who seems to have acted as interpreter at the time of the alleged taking of the original. The court could not consider as evidence a document purporting to be a copy without that copy being proven in proper manner to be what it is claimed to be, and there was no error in the proceedings below whereby it was rejected. It is not improper to say that an examination of the rejected matter discloses that even if admitted it would not have convinced this court that there was error in the findings of fact by the court below, upon this phase of the controversy. In arguing this case before this court counsel for the Government has presented a contention or theory which he stated at bar was not presented in the court below, because, as we understand it, the idea was not then in counsel's mind. This contention is that in converting the value of these machines, as expressed in marks, into United States currency value, the mark was treated as being worth only 20 cents, whereas its legal value, as declared by the Secretary of the Treasury under paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 522 of the Tariff Act of 1922, was 23.8 cents. These paragraphs read as follows: (a) That section 25 of the Act of August 27, 1894, entitled "An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other purposes," as amended, is reenacted without change as follows: SEC. 25. That the value of foreign coin as expressed in the money of account of the United States shall be that of the pure metal of such coin of standard value; and the values of the standard coins in circulation of the various nations of the world shall be estimated quarterly by the Director of the Mint and be proclaimed by the Secretary of the Treasury quarterly on the 1st day of January, April, July, and October in each year. (b) For the purpose of the assessment and collection of duties upon merchandise imported into the United States on or after the day of the enactment of this Act, wherever it is necessary to convert foreign currency into currency of the United States, such conversion, except as provided in subdivision (c), shall be made at the values proclaimed by the Secretary of the Treasury under the provisions of section 25 of such Act of August 27, 1894, as amended, for the quarter in which the merchandise was exported. We have not found in the record anywhere a statement of the value or price of any one of these machines expressed in terms of marks. The invoices forwarded by the shipper to the importer give the prices in terms of United States currency-that is, dollars and cents. In the particular entry which we are considering (reappraisement 77020-A), the invoice price in dollars is given as $3,516.40. This, plus the 11⁄2 per cent home (German) consumption tax of $52.60, making a total of $3,589, was found by the court below to have been the foreign value, and the manufacturer's list price, no discount having been made. Converted into marks, giving the mark its legal United States value of 23.8 cents, this would make the list price (found by the court below to be the foreign value, which is agreed by the parties to be the correct value upon which to assess duty in these cases), expressed in terms of German currency, 14,995 marks. In order to bring the sum total up to the amount which it was believed the local appraiser would hold the dutiable value to be, the importer withdrew the entry and added $573 under duress. Expressed in terms of German currency this addition (value of mark, 23.8 cents) amounted to 2,407 marks, thus making a total of 17,402 marks. It appears from the yellow sheet, referred to in the briefs and argument of the case, which was attached to the invoice upon entry, that the importer understood 17,400 marks (of the value of 23.8 cents per mark) or $4,142 to be the local appraiser's idea of the correct entry or dutiable value of the merchandise involved in 77020-A, and he made the duress addition of $573 accordingly. Had the 61732-29-VOL 56 calculation been made upon the basis of a 20-cent mark value, the total amount, as will readily be seen, would have been 20,710 marks. If there be deducted from the $4,142 entry 15 per centum thereof ($621.30) there will remain $3,520.70, or just $4.20 in excess of the $3,516.50 which appears as the price of the machine upon the invoice filed and used as the basis of the entry. We are unable to find from the record in the case evidence of any material miscalculations made in the conversion of German currency prices into United States currency prices, and we think the court below was correct in holding the dutiable value to be as expressed by Justice Fischer: Foreign value: Appraised value affirmed less additions made on entry under section 489 of the Tariff Act of 1922. The judgment of the Customs Court is affirmed. (T. D. 43472) UNITED STATES v. METRO BAG WORKS (No. 3173) 1. HAND BAGS-DUTIABILITY. Ladies' unfinished hand bags in chief value of beads, with loops of beads suspended from the bottom of the bags, are dutiable as "articles * * * ornamented with beads" under paragraph 1430, Tariff Act of 1922, rather than as "articles not ornamented with beads" under paragraph 1403. 2. ARTICLES ORNAMENTED WITH BEADS. An article may be said to be ornamented with beads where the beads are added to or superimposed upon the article in such way as to constitute purely an ornamentation. The beaded loops attached to the involved hand bags are ornamental in character and form no essential part of the bags in question. Such bags are articles ornamented with beads in the sense of the language of paragraph 1430. United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, June 14, 1929 APPEAL from the United States Customs Court, T. D. 43064 [Reversed and remanded.] Charles D. Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General (Fred J. Carter, special attorney, of counsel) for the United States. Siegel & Mandell (Sharretts, Coe & Hillis of counsel) for appellee. [Oral argument May 14, 1929, by Mr. Carter and Mr. Sharretts] Before GRAHAM, Presiding Judge, and BLAND, HATFIELD, and GARRETT, Associate Judges 1 GARRETT, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: The appellee in this case imported merchandise consisting of ladies' unfinished hand bags composed in chief value of beads. Duty was 1 LENROOT, Judge, did not participate in this decision, the case having been argued before he took his seat. assessed by the collector at the rate of 75 per cent ad valorem under that part of paragraph 1430, Tariff Act of 1922, which reads: * * PAR. 1430, * * * fabrics and articles embroidered in any manner or tamboured, appliquéd, scalloped, or ornamented with beads, bugles, or spangles, * when composed wholly or in chief value of yarns, threads, filaments, tinsel wire, lame, bullions, metal threads, beads, bugles, spangles, 75 per centum ad valorem. * * The importer made protest which was sustained by the Customs Court and which contended that the assessment should be made under paragraph 1403 of the Tariff Act of 1922, the pertinent part of which reads: PAR. 1403. * * fabrics and articles not ornamented with beads, spangles or bugles, nor embroidered, tamboured, appliquéd, or scalloped, composed wholly or in chief value of beads or spangles valorem. The Government has appealed. * * 60 per centum ad The issue turns upon the question whether certain threads, strung with exactly the same type of beads used in producing the body of the bag, and hanging in loops from the bottom thereof, bring the bags within a classification where they should be declared to be "ornamented with beads." If so, the assessment made by the collector of 75 per centum ad valorem, based upon the local appraiser's classification, is correct. If not, they fall under paragraph 1403 and should be assessed at 60 per centum ad valorem. The process of manufacture was described by a witness in the proceedings had in the second division of the United States Customs Court, and, on the trial of the case there, two samples of the merchandise were introduced in evidence, which are now before this court. The evidence and the samples disclosed that the bags are made of strands of beads, each strand being composed of a number of small, uniform beads, strung upon a thread. In making each bag, extra strands are woven into or attached to the body of the bag at the same time the bag is made, in such a way as to form a succession of loose, pendulous loops along the bottom of the bag. These give an ornamental or finished look to the bag. The loops can be broken or detached from the body of the bag and leave the bag intact, as a bag. The Government contends that the hanging beads on the bottom ornament the bags, being placed there solely for the purpose of ornamentation, and that the bags are, therefore, articles "ornamented with beads," while the importer insists that, notwithstanding the hanging beads are ornamental, they are used as a component material in the manufacture of an ornamental article and can not, therefore, be said to be an ornamentation. It is further insisted that an article wholly of beads can not be ornamented with beads so as to bring it within the scope of said paragraph 1430. Paragraph 1430 includes "articles. beads beads * * * * ornamented with composed wholly or in chief value of * * * 75 per centum ad valorem." Paragraph 1403 includes "articles not ornamented with beads * * * composed wholly or in chief value of beads 60 per centum ad valorem." There is no ambiguity in the language of either paragraph. Obviously, it was the purpose of Congress to make dutiable all articles composed of beads and to graduate the duty according to whether they were ornamented with beads or otherwise, as mentioned in the paragraphs. It must appear to any mind that there may be articles made of common beads which may have superimposed upon them or connected with them elaborate beaded ornamentation, made of beads. in imitation of precious stones, or other beads, much different from and more ornamental than the beads composing the body of the article. There is no appealing reason suggested why such or similar articles may not be said to be articles composed of beads, ornamented with beads. Referring now to the beaded bags here involved, the only remaining issue is whether the loops of beads suspended from the bottom of the bags are sufficient to constitute an ornamentation thereof. In this connection, attention is called to two cases. United States v. Heller, 13 Ct. Cust. Appls. 227, T. D. 41178, and United States v. Saks & Co., 13 Ct. Cust. Appls. 367, T. D. 41259. In the first of these cases, hatpins having steel stems and large heads made of paper pompons thickly covered with black spangles were involved. The contesting claims were under said paragraphs 1403 and 1430. The court said, in finding the goods to be dutiable under said paragraph 1403, in part: Paragraph 1403 provides for articles and fabrics not ornamented with spangles, composed wholly or in chief value of spangles, thereby recognizing that articles. may be composed wholly or in chief value of spangles and not be ornamented with spangles, while paragraph 1430 provides for articles ornamented with spangles. In other words, it is plain that Congress contemplated that an article might be composed wholly or in chief value of spangles, but not be ornamented therewith, and if not so ornamented, that it should take classification under paragraph 1403, while if so ornamented it should be classified under paragraph 1430. An examination of the typical samples of these hatpins and of the evidence leads us to the conclusion reached by the board that, although they are composed in chief value of spangles, they are not ornamented with them. They are, therefore, clearly within the quoted part of paragraph 1403. In the Saks case shoe buckles were involved. These were each composed of a metal back or frame covered with cloth and with a narrow strip of metal across the back which was used to attach the article to a shoe. The faces of the buckles were made up of glass beads so arranged as to give them an ornamental character. They |