has not asserted any thing, which could not be predicated of himself as sustaining the office of Messiah. He had called God his Father; and as the Jews supposed, or seem to have supposed, in a peculiar and appropriate sense. But it did not follow, that by using this term he meant to assert his divine nature. Rather the contrary appears. "Say ye of him whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world," i. e. the Son of God, &c. Jesus does not undertake, then, to answer the question here, whether he is truly divine; but simply to vindicate the language he had used, against the accusations of the Jews. "If your magistrates are called Elohim, is it presumption in me to call myself the Son of God?" This leaves the question unagitated, as to his divine nature; but vindicates the language which he had used, against the malignant aspersions of the Jews, by an argument drawn from their own Scriptures.

It shows indeed, that the term "Son of God," does not appropriately designate Christ as divine, but as the incarnate Mediator-as him whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world. Did the Father sanctify and send into the world his Son as GOD, who is infinitely perfect and immutable? As Mediator, as Messiah, Christ was sent into the world; as Son he filled, and acted in, a subordinate capacity; how then can his being Son prove him to be divine? Son of God indeed, by usage, has become a kind of proper name; and in this view, designates occasionally a distinction in the Godhead, which I believe to be eternal. In this manner, we very commonly use the term now; and in this way the apostles sometimes use it. (See Heb. i. 1—3.) But this is, in Scripture, only an occasional and secondary use of it. Commonly and appropriately, it designates the incarnate Messiah, as born in a manner supernatural, (Luke i. 35, comp. iii. 38;) as the special object of divine love. (Matt. xvii. 5. Col. i. 13. John iii. 35;) and as exhibiting the best and highest resemblance of the Father, (Col i. 15. Heb. i. 3. John i. 14. x. 38. xiv. 10.) Would theologians keep these ideas in view, I cannot help thinking they might be able to understand each other better, and to reason more conclusively.

I have thus summarily touched upon the principal texts, which are employed by Unitarians, to oppose the doctrines which I have been endeavouring to defend. Whether I

have violated the laws of exegesis in doing this; and whether you or I depart most from them, in explaining the texts which seem to be at a variance with the opinions that we defend, must be left to the judgment of the intelligent reader.

I must observe however, before I close this letter, which concludes what I have at present to advance, in respect to your Sermon, that I do not omit making observations on the rest of the Sermon, because I accede to many things which you profess to believe, or to the mode in which you have represented the sentiments of Trinitarians, in regard to various topics. I might mention the manner in which you accuse us of treating the moral attributes of God; your appropriating to yourself and your party, by implication, the exclusive belief in all that is amiable and excellent in the Deity, (pp. 15-18;) your assertion that the reproaches which you are obliged to encounter, are occasioned chiefly by your zeal to vindicate the dishonoured goodness and rectitude of God, (p. 18;) the manner in which you state our views of the atonement, and by implication appropriate to Unitarians only, many important things in which we all agree, (pp. 18-21;) the appropriation also to Unitarians only, in a similar way, of many views respecting the love of God, rational zeal in religion, and the benevolent virtues; and the intimations that we are opposed to all that is excellent, and rational, and worthy of belief. The manner in which you have treated these topics, I do very much regret; and I cannot think that this is the way to convince opponents, or to terminate disputes. If I have attempted to hold up you, or Unitarians, to ridicule; if I have misrepresented your senti ments; made any effort to use the argumentum ad invidiam; appealed to human authorities to decide the question between us; or appealed to any thing but the sober rules of exegesis; then I desire to know it and be humbled for it. I will not say that I have not transgressed in any of these particulars; for who that knows the human heart does not know that it is deceitful? But I can say sincerely, I did not mean to transgress; and that I will, with all my heart, thank the man, who in the spirit of Christian love will point out my error, and show me wherein I have written in such a way, as to endanger, or render repulsive the cause which I am advocating. That cause I believe to be just: and I

should regret to employ any unfairness to defend it. What real interest have we, but to know the truth? And what but simple argument can lead us to it?

I retire then from the field of review which the remainder of your Sermon presents; for since the pressure of my official duties, that cannot be abandoned or neglected, is so great, I am compelled to relinquish the idea, which I at first entertained, of pursuing the investigation of the topics presented by the remainder of your Sermon.

I have but a few considerations to add, on the subject of the preceding pages; which must be reserved for another Letter.

LETTER V.

Reverend and Dear Sir,

IN page 14 of your Sermon, you inform us of the method, in which you explain those passages, which seem to speak of the divine nature of Christ. The paragraph is as follows:

To

"I am aware, that these remarks will be met by two or three texts, in which Christ is called God, and by a class of passages, not very numerous, in which divine properties are said to be ascribed to him. these we offer one plain answer. We say, that it is one of the most established and obvious principles of criticism, that language is to be explained according to the known properties of the subject to which it is applied. Every man knows, that the same words convey very different ideas, when used in relation to different beings. Thus, Solomon built the temple in a different manner from the architect whom he employed: and God repents differently from man. Now, we maintain, that the known properties and circumstances of Christ, his birth, sufferings and death, his constant habit of speaking of God as a distinct being from himself, his praying to God, his ascribing to God all his power and offices, these acknowledged properties of Christ, we say, oblige us to interpret the comparatively few passages, which are thought to make him the supreme God, in a manner consistent with his distinct and inferor nature. our duty to explain such texts, by the rule which we apply to other texts, in which human beings are called gods, and are said to be partakers of the divine nature, to know and possess all things, and to be filled with all God's fulness. These latter passages we do not hesitate to modify, and restrain, and turn from the most obvious sense, because this sense is opposed to the known properties of the beings to whom they relate; and we maintain, that we adhere to the same principle, and use no greater latitude, in explaining, as we do, the passages which are thought to support the Godhead of Christ.'

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I must hesitate however to adopt this principle, without examining its nature and tendency. On the supposition that you admit the Bible to be a revelation from God, as you aver, permit me to ask, whether it is the object of a revelation, to disclose truths which are NOT known, or are insufficiently established; or whether it is the object of a revelation, to disclose truths already known and established? If you answer, The latter; then your answer denies, of course, that it is a Revelation. What the book of nature exhibits, the Scriptures do not reveal. Is there then, any thing in the Scriptures, which the book of nature does not exhibit? If you concede this; then I ask, How are we, on your ground, to obtain any notion of that thing, which was unknown, before it was revealed? E. g., the resurrection of the body is revealed. Now it is a known property of the human body to corrupt and perish. Shall I construe a passage of Scripture then in such a manner, as to contradict this known property? If not, then I can never suppose the resurrection of the body to be revealed. I however do construe the Scriptures, so as to contradict this apparently known property of the human body-following the obvious assertion of the sacred writers, and not allowing myself to force a constructive meaning upon their language. Yet, if I understand you, I am at liberty, "to restrain, and modify, and turn the words from their most obvious sense," because this sense is opposed to the known properties of the matter, of which our bodies are composed.

The case is just the same, in regard to any other fact or doctrine. What I know already of a thing is, if you are correct, "to modify and restrain, and turn from their obvious sense," the words which are employed in revealing it, because what is revealed, I suppose to be at variance with some known doctrines or properties. Is there not room here, for great caution, and great doubt, as to the correctness of your principle?

According to this principle, moreover, the Scriptures may be construed very differently, by persons of different degrees of knowledge. One man knows the properties of things, far more extensively than his neighbour. He sees, that what is revealed may consist with known properties of things; but his neighbour, who lacks this knowledge, is unable to perceive the consistency of revelation with what he

knows; and this, because his knowledge does not qualify him to judge, or because what he thinks he knows, he is really ignorant of. The same text in the Bible therefore, may be received by one, as a consistent part of Revelation, and rejected by the other. The measure of a man's knowledge, consequently, cannot be a proper test by which the meaning of Scripture is to be proved.

But you will say, "I can never believe in the reality of a revelation, which contradicts my reason." I accede. And here is the very place, where I find the greatest difficulty with your theory of interpretation. You do not seem to me to carry your objections back, to the proper place. If God manifest in the flesh be an absurdity, a palpable contradiction" an enormous tax upon human credulity," as you aver; then the claims of the book which asserts this, are, no doubt, to be disregarded. What is palpable contradiction, we certainly can never believe.

But in determining what the Scriptures have taught, we have no right to say, that because any particular doctrine is repugnant to our views, therefore we will "modify and restrain, and turn from the obvious sense," the words in which it is conveyed. The rules of exegesis are not a mass of wax which can be moulded at pleasure, into any shape that we may fancy. We do as great violence to reason to the first principles of all reasoning, when we reject these rules, as when we admit absurdities to be true.

In case an obscure term is used, I acknowledge that clear passages relating to the same subject, are to be adduced to ascertain its meaning. If Christ had been simply called God, I should allow that this term might be explained, by its use as applied to inferior beings. But when the sacred writers themselves, have explained the meaning which they attach to it, by telling us that Christ is the God, who created and governs the world; who is omniscient and eternal; the object of religious worship and prayer; God over all, or supreme God: (not to mention "the true God," and the "Great God;") there is no law of exegesis, no method of interpretation, which can obscure their meaning, that is not violence-an infringement of the fundamental principles of interpretation, and therefore an abandonment of the first principles of our reason. It does appear to me, therefore, that my only resort in such a case is, to reject

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