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LONGSTREET ON HAND-BATTLE OF GAINESVILLE.

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toward Leesburg; and to Porter, | ing, of King's abandonment of the whom he supposed to be now at Gainesville road, had sent orders to Manassas Junction, to move upon Sigel, at Groveton, to advance and Centerville at dawn, he confidently attack vigorously at daylight, supexpected to have Jackson inclosed ported by Reynolds; while Heintzeland early in the morning assailed by man, with Hooker's and Kearny's 25,000 on either side, who were to divisions, was to push forward from crush him before Longstreet could Centerville toward Gainesville; Reno possibly arrive. following, with orders to attack promptly and vigorously. Fitz-John Porter, with his own corps and King's division, was to move from Manassas upon the Gainesville road with all speed, with intent to turn Jackson's flank at the intersection of the Warrenton turnpike.

But he was reckoning without his host-or rather, without the other one. Gen. Longstreet's advance had reached Thoroughfare Gap at 3 P. M.," and passed through it; but encountered on this side a superior force, strongly posted, by which it was easily repulsed. As there was no time to be lost, Gen. D. R. Jones, with two brigades, was sent in at once; while Hood, with two others, following a mountain foot-path, attempted to turn our right; and Wilcox, with two more, making a circuit through Hopewell Gap, three miles north, was to come in on our rear.

Ricketts's single division was of course unable to stand against Longstreet's heavy corps, and was driven off with loss, commencing its retreat just at dark. Longstreet's whole force was pushed rapidly through the pass, and, early next day," its van was in Gainesville, pressing on to the rescue of Jackson, its steps quickened by the roar of cannon, and meeting no resistance to the desired concentration; McDowell and King having got out of the way during the night, retreating on Manassas Junction. When Longstreet, before noon, came rapidly into action on the right of Jackson, already hotly engaged, the Rebel army was once more reunited, and felt itself invincible.

Sigel, who was nearest the enemy, with the division of Schurz forming his right, that of Schenck his left, and the brigade of Milroy between them, advanced, by order, at 5 A. M., and was fully engaged before 7; gaining ground by hard fighting till half past 10, when Milroy and Schurz had advanced a mile, and Schenck two miles, though obstinately resisted by the enemy. But the Rebel strength in their front was constantly increasing, and now assumed the offensive, hurling heavy masses of infantry against our right; which held its ground firmly by the aid of its batteries, but not without heavy loss.

Schenck, being now ordered by Sigel to strike the Rebel assailants in flank and rear, was soon briskly engaged; the enemy attempting to flank him in turn. At this moment, Gen. Kearny's division of Ileintzelman's corps arrived on the field, by the Sudley Springs road, and went in on Sigel's right; while Reno, coming up by the Gainesville turnpike,

Pope, apprised, just before morn-supported our center; and Reynolds,

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PLAN OF SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN, INCLUDING THE MORE IMPORTANT POSITIONS OCCUPIED FROM AUGUST 27 TO SEPTEMBER 1.

Explanations.

AA-(arrow-heads)-indicate the route pursued by Jackson's forces, viz.: to Manassas Junction, Aug. 27; via Centerville to Groveton and Sudley Springs on the 28th, and on the 1st of September to near Germantown.

The position of Hooker's and Ewell's forces in their engagement on the 27th, near Bristow, is shown; while the position of the commands of McDowell and Sigel, at Gainesville, and Reno and Kearny, at Greenwich, as held that night, are also shown, being indicated by the respective initials, viz.:

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forced by McDowell and Reno, and confronted by Jackson (a, b, c), who was afterward reenforced by Longstreet, Aug. 29.

The same position substantially, but extending farther to the left, was held on the 30th, by Heintzelman, Reno, Porter, Sigel, and Reynolds (named in order from right to left), supported by McDowell.

No attempt is made to represent the changes of posttion which occurred during the two days of severe fighting.

The position of the several commands at Centerville on the 31st August, and near Germantown on the 1st September, are indicated by initials, where the full name does not occur, viz.:

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BATTLE OF GAINESVILLE, OR SECOND BULL RUN. 185

with the Pennsylvania Reserves, | the left, advanced by order, charged came into position, at noon, on our the enemy's left and swept back his extreme left. About 2 P. M., Gen. first line, rolling it up on his center Hooker, with Heintzelman's remain- and right. King's division was sent ing division, came down the Sudley into the fight about sunset, and adSprings road on our extreme right; vanced considerably beyond our genand his troops immediately went in eral line of battle; but, soon finding to the aid of the wasted and hungry itself confronted by a heavier force commands of Schurz and Milroy, of the enemy, was brought to a stand. who were thus enabled to refill their Meantime, Hood charged in turn, cartridge boxes and obtain some with a fresh division of Longstreet's much needed food and rest. corps, which had marched through the Gap that day and been sent by Lee to the relief of Jackson, now clearly outnumbered. Hood's famous Texas brigade and that of Law rushed forward with great intrepidity, repulsing Kearny's most advanced regiments, taking 1 gun, 4 flags, and 100 prisoners. Darkness arrested the conflict, either army resting on the. field of battle; but Pope, with some reason, claiming the advantage, in that he held some ground which had been wrested from the enemy during the day. The losses on either side were probably not far from 7,000 men.

The fighting thence till 4 P. M. was desultory-a succession of heavy skirmishes from point to point along the front; either General being intent on his approaching rëenforcements, and trusting to time as his friend. At 4, McDowell being announced as at hand, Pope sent a peremptory order to Porter to go into action on the enemy's right, turning it if possible; and, an hour later, presuming this order obeyed, directed Heintzelman and Reno to attack the enemy in front; which order was gallantly obeyed."

But Pope was really beaten, though he did not yet know it. His aim had been to overwhelm Jackson before

And now, though Fitz-John Porter was still missing, and King's division did not reach the field till near sunset, our army was for once superior in numbers; Kearny's and Hook-Lee, with Longstreet, could come to er's fresh regiments pressing forward and crowding back the enemy's left, which had been skillfully disposed for a good part of the day behind the embankment of an abandoned railroad, which served most effectively as a breast-work. At 5 P. M., Kearny, bringing up nearly his entire division, and changing his front to

"Pope, in his official report, says:

"In this attack, Grover's brigade of Hooker's division was particularly distinguished by a determined bayonet-charge, breaking two of the ene my's lines, and penetrating to the third before it could be checked"

his assistance; and in this he had conspicuously failed. Had his entire army been in hand and in line of battle by 9 o'clock that morning, his success would have been certain and easy; but, dropping in by brigades and divisions throughout the day, and Porter not even getting into action at all," he had barely held his

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own; and now his opportunity had vanished. Longstreet's corps had been arriving throughout the day, and was now all present-much of it perfectly fresh, so far as fighting was concerned, and ready for most effective service on the morrow.

ing him that rations would be loaded in the available wagons and cars at Alexandria so soon as he would send back a cavalry escort to bring out the trains. If cavalry had been ever so necessary to the guarding of railroad trains, he had probably not then a regiment that could have gone to Alexandria and back within 48 hours. He had received no rëenforcements or supplies since the 26th, and had no assurance that any were on the way. To retreat was difficult; to stand still and famish unadvisable; so he ordered Porter, supported by King, to advance down the Warrenton turnpike and attack; while Heintzelman and Reno, supported by Ricketts's division, were to assail and turn the enemy's left.

Porter's attack was feeble; and not unreasonably so, since he encountered the enemy in greatly superior

and checked by the destruction of this large force as to have been no longer in condition to prosecute further operations of an aggressive character."

Pope, so often disappointed and baffled, found his fighting force reduced by casualties and by straggling, on the morning of that eventful morrow, to about 40,000 men." These had had a surfeit of marching and fighting, with very little eating, for the two preceding days; while his artillery and cavalry horses had been ten days in harness, and two days without food. To his appeal of the 28th to Gen. Halleck for rations, for forage, and fresh horses, he had that morning at daylight" received an answer from Gen. Franklin, written by direction of Gen. McClellan, and dated 8 P. M. of the 29th, inform-numbers, and was speedily thrown arms, within sight and sound of the battle during the whole day. So far as I know, he made no effort whatever to comply with my orders or to take any part in the action. I do not hesitate to say that, if he had discharged his duty as became a soldier under the circumstances, and had made a vigorous attack on the enemy, as he was expected and directed to do, at any time up to 8 o'clock that night, we should have utterly crushed or captured the larger portion of Jack-of son's force before he could have been by any possibility sufficiently renforced to have made an effective resistance. I did not myself feel for a moment that it was necessary for me, having given Gen. Porter an order to march toward the enemy, in a particular direction, to send him in addition specific orders to attack; it being his clear duty, and in accordance with every military precept, to have brought his forces into action wherever he encountered the enemy, when a furious battle with that enemy was raging during the whole day in his immediate presence. I believe-in fact, I am positive-that at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the 29th, Gen. Porter had in his f ont no considerable body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sure now, that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson, and to have fallen upon his rear; that, if he had done so, we should have gained a decisive victory over the army under Jackson before he could have been joined by any of the forces of Longstreet; and that the army of Gen. Lee would have been so crippled

31 In his official report. he says:

"At that time, my effective force, greatly reduced by losses in killed, wounded, missing, and broken down men. during the severe operations

the two or three days and nights previous; the sharp actions of Hooker, King, and Ricketts on the 27th and 28th, and the furious battle on thic 29th, were estimated by me and others asfllows: McDowell's corps, including Reynolds's division, 12.000 men; Sigel's corps, 7,000; Reno's corps, 7,000; Heintzelman's corps, 7,000; Porter's corps, which had been in no engagement, and was, or ought to have been, perfectly fresh, I estimated at about 12,000 men, including the brigade of Piatt, which formed a part of Sturgis's division, and the only portion that over joined me. But of this force the brigades of Piatt and Griffin, numbering, as I understood, about 5,000 men, had been suffered to march off at daylight on the 30th for Centerville, and were not available for operations on that day. This reduced Porter's effective force in the field to about 7,000 men; which gave me a total force of 40,000 men. Banks's corps, about 5,000 strong, was at Bristow Station, in charge of the railroad trains, and of a portion of the wagon trains of the army, still at that place."

32

Aug. 30.

POPE DEFEATED AT GAINESVILLE.

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charge, followed by the divisions of Evans, R. H. Anderson, and Wilcox, sustained by those of Kemper and D. R. Jones; the Rebel artillery doing fearful execution on our disordered and recoiling infantry. At dark, our left had been forced back considerably, but still stood firm and unbroken, and still covered the turnpike which was our only safe line of retreat. At 8 P. M., Pope sent written instructions to his corps commanders to withdraw deliberately toward Centerville, designating the route of each, and the position he was to take; while Reno was ordered to cover the retreat; which was made slowly, quietly, and in good order: no pursuit across Bull Run being attempted."

back in confusion; the Confederates | Hood's two brigades again led the pursuing eagerly and joining battle along the entire front, but struggling especially to overwhelm and turn our left, where Schenck, Milroy, and Reynolds, soon rëenforced by Ricketts, maintained the unequal contest throughout the afternoon; while Porter's weakened corps was rallied, reformed, and pushed up to their support; rendering good service, especially the brigade of regulars under Col. Buchanan. Gen. Tower led his brigade, of Ricketts's division, into action, in support of Reynolds, with eminent skill and gallantry; its conduct being such as to elicit enthusi astic cheers from our entire left wing. Reno's corps, also, being withdrawn from our right center, was thrown into action on our left, and displayed conspicuous gallantry.

But the fates were against us. The enemy was aware of his advantage, and resolved to press it to the utmost. Our attack on his left, under Jackson, for a time promised success; until our advancing troops were mowed down by the cross-fire of 4 batteries from Longstreet's left, which decimated and drove them back in confusion. Jackson, seeing them recoil, immediately ordered an advance; which Longstreet supported by pushing forward his whole command against our center and left.

"Lee, in his official report, says:

"The obscurity of night and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull Run rendered it necessary to suspend operations until morning; when the cavalry, being pushed forward, discovered that the enemy had escaped to the strong position of Centerville, about four miles beyond Buil Run. The prevalence of a heavy rain, which began during the night, threatened to render Bull Run impassable, and impeded our movements. Longstreet remained on the battle-field to engage the attention of the enemy, and cover the burial of the dead and the removal of the wounded; while Jackson proceeded by Sudley's lord to the Little River turnpike, to turn the

Franklin's corps, from McClellan's army, reported 8,000 strong, was, unknown to Pope, throughout this mournful day, a little cast of Centerville." Pope reached that point between 9 and 10 P. M., and at once made his dispositions for resisting a Rebel attack. But none was attempted. Sumner, as well as Franklin, from McClellan's army, joined him here, raising his total force to fully 60,000 men; which was probably more than the enemy could now bring against him.

Pope evidently expected to be at

enemy's right and intercept his retreat to Washington. Jackson's progress was retarded by the inclemency of the weather and the fat gue of his troops; who, in addition to their arduous marches, had fought three severe engagements in as many days. He reached Little River turnpike in the evening, and the next day, September 1st, advanced by that road toward Fairfax Court House."

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