2. The town had appropriated money for this object, and authorized the committee to borrow on its credit all necessary sums. Held, they still had authority to contract for the work and bind the town to pay for it. Ibid.

3. An agent, who expressly obligates himself in his own name, is personally responsible, though he describes himself as agent, and is duly authorized by the principal to make the contract for him, and might have avoided any personal liability by acting in the name of the principal. Ibid.

4. Thus, where a committee, chosen by a town for the above object, made an unsealed contract to rebuild the bridge, in which, after describing themselves as a committee, "said committee❞ agreed to pay a certain sum; held, they were personally liable. Ibid.

5. It seems, in an action against them, the acts and declarations of the contractor, tending to show that he gave credit to the town, are admissible in evidence. Ibid.

6. One empowered, by letter of attorney, to sell and receive the price of real estate, may execute such an instrument as the law requires to effect a sale. - Valentine v. Piper, xxii. 85.

7. Assumpsit, upon a note payable in iron castings, and signed in the names of the defendants by A. It appeared that the defendants were iron manufacturers, and A. was in their employ; that A. was directed by B., the general agent of the defendants, to ascertain what had been paid upon a previous note to the plaintiffs, payable in iron castings, and give a new note in the same terms for the balance; that A. accordingly ascertained as nearly as possible the amount due, gave this note for it, and took up the other, taking also a receipt, which stated that the new note, when paid, should be in full of all demands; and that A. delivered the papers to B., who remarked that the words "when paid " should have been omitted, but made no other objection, and placed the papers on file. Held, B had no authority to empower A. to sign this note, and the defendants were not bound to pay it. Brewster v. Hobart, xv. 302.

8. The signers of a written contract agreed to take an interest in a voyage, in certain proportions, and appointed A. & B., two of their number, their agents, to fit out the vessel and manage the business of the voyage in the United States, ratified their past purchase of the vessel, and gave them full authority to buy a suitable cargo, agreeing that they should charge a certain commission on the amount of invoice and outfits, and on all returns, but none on the purchase or sale of the vessel. It seems, A. & B., had authority to purchase separately. - French v. Price, xxiv. 13.

9. Also, that one who signed the contract, after all the purchases had been made, gained an interest as an original purchaser, by a ratification of the acts of his associates. - Ibid.

10. Also, that the associates were tenants in common of the vessel and cargo, not partners. Ibid.

11. A. purchased goods for the voyage, giving for them his own negotiable note, the vendor knowing, when the goods were delivered and the note taken, but not at the time of sale, that C. and D., were interested in the purchase. Held, whether C. and D. were partners or tenants in common with A., they were originally liable to the vendor, but the note was a payment, and discharged them. - Ibid.

C. Relative rights, liabilities, and duties of principal and agent.

1. A commission-merchant, having received goods for sale at a certain limited price, and made advances upon them, may reimburse himself by selling them at the fair market price, though below the limit, if the consignor has refused, upon application and after reasonable time, to repay the advances. Parker v. Brancker, xxii. 40.

2. Action against foreign commission-merchants, for unskilfulness and negligence in negotiating bills and purchasing a cargo on the plaintiff's account. Evidence was offered, that the defendants negotiated the bills with those of other persons, and averaged the rates of exchange; that, having much back business unfinished, and large sums to draw for against other cargoes, they were bound in justice, in their negotiations, to contemplate all parties, and obliged by circumstances to force their bills on the market, on whatever terms the purchasers offered, and as opportunities occurred, and apportion the whole of their operations afterwards. Held, this evidence was not conclusive upon the question at issue. Savage v. Birckhead, xx. 167.

3. A factor in New Orleans came to Boston, the residence of his principal, and, after settling his account with him, stated, that he was about to negotiate some exchange on New Orleans, and would make the amount large enough to cover the balance due from him upon such settlement, and then pay it. Held, the factor hereby waived the privilege, if he ever had it, of paying the balance in New Orleans, and unconditionally undertook to pay it at Boston.Jellison v. Lafonta, xix. 244.

4. One of several ship-owners, the sole manager of its affairs, and who alone made the necessary advances, settled the account of an adventure, in which all the owners were interested, with the factor to whom the ship and cargo were consigned, but the account was stated as with the owners. Held, all the owners were properly joined, in an action against the factor for the balance due from him upon the settlement.

Ibid.

5. In December, 1832, the plaintiff consigned lumber to the defendant, a resident in Boston, for sale. On the morning of August 1st, or 7th, 1833, a letter was received by A., the agent of B., enclosing an order from the plaintiff, which stated, that the proceeds of the lumber, when sold, were to be deposited in one of the banks in Boston for the use of B. A. thereupon notified the defendant of the contents of the letter, which was also shown to the plaintiff and defendant, who were together at A.'s countingroom, on the 7th of August. The same day, the plaintiff demanded of the defendant the unsold lumber, requested him to render an account, and offered to pay him whatever was due; but the defendant replied, that he had nothing to do with the plaintiff, and requested him to call on A., and see B.'s letter. The same day, the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant, for not rendering an account and paying over the proceeds of the property. Held, the action would not lie, as there had been no unreasonable refusal to account at the time when it was commenced. Torrey v. Bryant, xvi. 528.

6. Upon an indictment for obtaining money from A., by false pretences, with intent to defraud B. & C., alleging that the money belonged to A.; it was proved that the defendant, who had once been authorized by B. & C. to collect bills for them, and whose authority had been revoked, but without notice, presented a bill to A., received payment, receipted it in the name of B. & C., thereby discharging A., and applied the money to his own use. Held, there was no variance. Commonwealth v. Call, xxi. 515.

7. Held, if the defendant, as a sub-agent, collected the debt under a fraudulent contract with the agent to divide the money, or knowing and believing that he intended to misapply it; this was evidence of an intent on the part of the defendant to defraud B. & C. Ibid.

8. Indictment, for obtaining money from A., by false pretences. Proof, that the false representation was made to B., his agent, communicated by him to A., and thereupon, by A.'s order, the money paid by B., from A.'s funds. Held, no variance. — Ibid.

D. Rights, duties, and liabilities of principal and agent, in relation to third persons.

1. A principal is liable, civiliter, for the fraud or deceit of his agent, committed in course of the agent's employment. —Locke v. Stearns, 1 Met. 560.

2. Where a broker makes a sale in the usual line of business, the principal is bound by his representations, though contrary to the express instructions of the principal; unless they are known to the buyer. Otherwise, in case of a particular and special agent. -Lobdell v. Baker, 1 Met. 193.

3. Where a sale is made and credit given to an agent, the principal is not exempt from liability, merely because the vendor at the time of sale might have known, unless he actually did know him. Raymond v. Crown, &c. 2 Met. 319.

4. A. purchased goods, saying they were for the C. & E. mills, and ordering that they be so marked, but they were charged to A. The C. & E. mills were a corporation, so named, and A. was their agent and purchased for them. The vendor brings a suit for the price, and, before service of the writ, the name of the corporation was inserted in it, and it was served upon both A. and the company. The action having come to the Supreme Court by appeal, by leave of Court A.'s name was stricken out from the writ. Held, A.'s informing the vendor, that the goods were for these mills, was not conclusive evidence of his knowing that they were a corporation or other association, and, whether he did know it, was a question for the jury. Also, that the earlier proceedings in the case were no bar to a proceeding against the corporation. Ibid.

5. The plaintiff, holding a negotiable note indorsed in blank, delivered it, without his own indorsement, to an agent, to procure it to be discounted. The agent indorsed it in his own name, and sent it to a bank, by one who represented that the money was wanted for the accommodation of the agent. The bank discounted the

note, passed the proceeds to the credit of the agent, and were afterwards summoned as his trustees. The plaintiff immediately informed the bank that the note was his, and demanded the proceeds. Held, the bank was liable to him therefor. Merrill v. Bank, &c. xix. 32.

6. An agent, employed to collect money in New York, and remit it to the plaintiff, his principal, lent it there to the defendants, his creditors for a larger amount, stating that he could leave it until he should be ready to return home, but not that the money

belonged to the plaintiff. Held, the defendants might retain the money against the plaintiff, even after notice of his title. - Lime Rock, &c. v. Plimpton, xvii. 159.

Probate Court.

The only way of objecting to the allowance made by the Probate Court to a widow, under St. 1805, c. 90, § 2, is by appeal. The correctness of such allowance cannot be questioned, in any collateral proceeding. Litchfield v. Cudworth, xv. 23.

Prohibition.

A writ of prohibition will be issued to an inferior court, only when its jurisdiction has been clearly exceeded. Phillips, 2 Met. 296.

Washburn v.

Promissory Note.

(See Bills of Exchange.)

1. A note, though not expressed as for value received, is admissible evidence, upon a suit for money had and received by the payee against the maker. Townsend v. Derby, 3 Met. 363.

2. A note given by a candidate for an elective office, in payment for services in promoting his election, but not rendered at his request, is void for want of consideration. Dearborn v. Bowman, 3 Met. 155.

3. The owner of a vessel made up an account of a voyage and handed it to the master, with a promissory note for the balance, which was struck in the master's favor. The master took and carried them away, without expressing any dissatisfaction, but returned the note on the same or the next day, and requested the owner to procure an indorser. The owner took the note, and procured a third person to put his name on the back of it. Held, such person was liable as an original promisor and surety. Samson v. Thornton, 3 Met. 275.

4. Where an indorser of a note takes security of the maker, before its maturity, to indemnify him against his liability, and, after its maturity, receives back from the maker the property for