often consist of figures of persons, with labels inscribed with written language coming from their lips; this was a sufficient averment that the words were attributed to him. Ibid. B. What words are slanderous; actions therefor, and defences to such actions. 1. It is actionable to utter words imputing a crime, although under the circumstances of the case the plaintiff could not be guilty of it, unless these circumstances are known or stated to the hearer; as e. g., to charge a tenant in common of a chattel with stealing it, without stating his ownership. - Carter v. Andrews, xvi. 1. 2. In an action of slander, the defendant cannot prove, in mitigation of damages, that he is in the habit of talking much about persons and things, and that what he says is not regarded by the community as worthy of notice, and seldom occasions remark. Howe v. Perry, xv. 506. 3. In an action for slander, evidence is not admissible, in mitigation of damages, that the plaintiff has been long hostile to the defendant, and has proclaimed, that he did not wish to live in peace and on good terms with him. Andrews v. Bartholomew, 2 Met. 509. 4. In an action for words, spoken without allusion to facts, the mention of which would have prevented them from being slanderous; the defendant cannot offer such facts in evidence, to explain the words.. Stone v. Clark, xxi. 51. 5. Thus, where the defendant accused the plaintiff of taking a false oath on a judicial trial, without any explanatory words; held, he could not be allowed to prove, that he meant to impute falsehood only as to immaterial facts, nor what was testified at the trial, for the purpose of showing such immateriality. — Ibid. 6. Slander, for charging the plaintiff with stealing the deed of a farm conveyed to him by the defendant. Defence, the truth of the charge; to prove which, evidence was offered, that the plaintiff, when the charge was made, took the deed from the register's office, and reconveyed to the defendant, and that the second deed contained a recital respecting the "improper delivery" &c. of the first. To rebut the effect of this evidence, the plaintiff was allowed to prove, that a friend advised him to make the second deed, in order to avoid the expense of a suit. Held, this last evidence was rightly admitted. Sperry v. Wilcox, 1 Met. 267. 7. In an action of slander, the defendant offered a notice, pro posing to show, under the general issue, facts proving or tending to prove the truth of the words, and to apply those facts either in justification or mitigation of damages; and stating the facts relied on, which, though admissible in connexion with other evidence as a justification, did not per se prove the truth. Held, the notice was insufficient, and that, either with or without it, the facts were inadmissible, either in justification or mitigation of damages. Brickett v. Davis, xxi. 404, 8. In an action of slander, unless the defendant give notice that he shall rely upon the statute of limitations, the plaintiff may prove words spoken more than two years before suit brought. — Ibid. 9. But, if the declaration allege the speaking to have been on a certain day within two years, and the evidence show that it occured more than two years before suit brought; the defendant may, without terms, file a plea of the statute. Ibid. 10. In an action for slander, the defendant pleaded not guilty, giving notice that he should prove the truth in justification, and offered evidence tending to prove it. Held, it was a correct instruction to the jury, that, if they were satisfied that the defendant made the alleged charge, they should find a verdict against him, unless upon the whole evidence they were satisfied of its truth; that to establish this the burden of proof was on the defendant, and, in case of doubt upon this point, they must find for the plaintiff. Sperry v. Wilcox, 1 Met. 267. License. A. In relation to real estate. B. For sale of spiritous liquors, &c. A. In relation to real estate. 1. In trespass qu. claus. before a justice of the peace, the defendant cannot give in evidence under the general issue a license to enter on the locus in quo. Ruggles v. Lesure, xxiv. 187. 2. A., being the owner of land bounding upon the highway, agreed by parol with B., that he would throw a part of it into the highway, in consideration that B. would set back A.'s wall and prepare the road, as widened, for use. A. fulfilled his part of the contract, and B. set back his wall, and, while engaged in preparing the road, by removing the earth from the land in question, A. forbid him from removing any more. Held, the agreement was merely a license, and revoked by this prohibition. —Ibid. 3. The plaintiff, having a way over the defendant's land, gave him a license to build an arch over such way; but the defendant, in so doing, unnecessarily and unreasonably obstructed the way. Held, the plaintiff might maintain an action on the case for this obstruction. Cushing v. Adams, xviii. 110. B. For sale of spiritous liquors, &c. (See Criminal Pleading.) 1. A statute, prohibiting the retailing of spiritous liquors without license, and requiring an excise for the granting of a license, is not repugnant to the constitution of Massachusetts. wealth v. Blackington, xxiv. 352. Common 2. The provisions in the Revised Statutes, c. 47, that no person shall presume to be a retailer or seller of spiritous liquors in a less quantity than twenty-eight gallons, unless he is first licensed as a retailer of spirits, and that every person thus licensed shall pay $1 therefor; as applied to a sale not made by the importer, nor in the original package in which the spirit was imported, are not repugnant to the clause in the United States' constitution, that no State shall lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except, &c., nor to the clause, that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. - Commonwealth v. Kimball, xxiv. 359. 3. Under St. 1832, c. 66, a license to a person as a common victualler, except in Boston, does not authorize him to sell distilled spirits. (See Revised Statutes, c. 47.) Commonwealth v. Markoe, xvii. 465. 4. One licensed as an innholder, common victualler, and retailer, under the above act, § 8, which provides for licensing "innholders, common victuallers, or retailers or sellers of wine, beer, ale, cider, or any other fermented liquor," cannot, as an innholder and retailer under such license, sell spiritous liquors.Commonwealth v. Jordan, xviii. 288. 5. By the Revised Statutes, c. 47, § 1, a penalty is imposed upon any person presuming to be an innholder, common victualler or seller of wine and spiritous liquors, to be used in or about his house, &c. without license. Held, this act was not repealed by St. 1838, c. 157.-Commonwealth v. Odlin, xxiii. 275. 6. One convicted under this chapter of the Revised Statutes may be sentenced to pay a fine and costs, and to stand committed till the sentence be performed. Harris v. Commonwealth, xxiii. 280. 7. The above statute, § 3, prohibits the sale, without license, of "wine, brandy, rum, or other spiritous liquors, in a less quantity than twenty-eight gallons, and that delivered and carried away all at one time." Held, not applicable to Held, not applicable to a sale of different kinds of spiritous liquors, in less quantities than twentyeight gallons of each, but more in the aggregate, the whole being delivered and carried away at once. Browne v. Hilton, xxiii. 319. 8. The words of the Statute being general, that no person shall presume to be a retailer or seller of spirits in a less quantity than twenty-eight gallons, unless first licensed as a retailer; one indicted under the statute cannot offer as a defence, that the spirit was bought to be used as a medicine; certainly not without proof, that he was an apothecary or druggist, or professed to deal in medicines, and received notice of the purpose of buying at the time of sale. But, it seems, such proof would make no difference. Commonwealth v. Kimball, xxiv. 366. 9. In such a case, the government may prove the defendant's declaration, that he considered the law unconstitutional and meant to sell in disregard of it; though the alleged sale was after he had been convicted on a similar indictment, upon the trial of which the same declaration had been given in evidence. Ibid. 10. A witness for the defendant having testified, that before the alleged sale he had purchased of the defendant all the spirits in his shop, paid for them, and taken a lease of the shop, and that the alleged sale was made by an agent on his account, and not on account of the defendant; held, the defendant might ask the witness, whether the transaction with him was an actual, bonâ fide, or only a colorable and pretended sale. — Ibid. - 11. If the county commissioners are bound, under the Revised Statutes, c. 47, to license one or more persons in each town as retailers; their refusal to license any person does not annul the statute, and authorize every one to sell without license. Commonwealth v. Blackington, xxiv. 352. 12. The certificate of the clerk of the county commissioners, that a person has been licensed by them as an innholder, is not per se a license. —Commonwealth v. Spring, xix. 396. 13. Nor is it conclusive evidence of the granting of a license, but may be controlled by the records. - Ibid. Lien. machine for B., do the work, inknew that C. was Held, C. had no 1. A., having contracted to finish a certain employed C., without the knowledge of B., to forming him of the contract with B., who also performing the work, while it was going on. lien upon the machine, as against B. - Hollingsworth v. Dow, xix. 228. 2. Where the loser of property offers a reward for its restoration, the finder has a lien upon it therefor, and may refuse to restore the property till the reward is paid.— Wentworth v. Day, 3 Met. 352. 3 Revised Statutes, c. 117, give to a person who supplies labor and materials in the erection of a building, under a written and recorded contract, a lien upon the property. Held, such lien existed, though the contract was not recorded till after the death of the owner of the land. - Foster, &c. xx. 542. 4. A., a manufacturer, intrusted goods to B., a common carrier, to be carried from Providence to Boston, and left at the inn where B. usually stopped. A. then went to Boston, presented an invoice to C., his factor, stating that the goods were on their way, and obtained an advance upon them. C. had previously received and made advances upon consignments from A., who was accustomed to deliver the goods at the carrier's ware-house in P., C. usually paying the charges for transportation. The goods being attached while on their way, as A.'s, held, C. had no lien upon them, and the attachment was valid. Baker v. Fuller, xxi. 318. Limitations. A. What cases are within the Statutes of Limitations, and the construction and effect thereof. B. What cases are excepted from the statutes. A. What cases are within the Statutes of Limitations, and the construction and effect thereof. 1. A note given by a deceased person more than six years before his death, though secured by mortgage, and though the holder |