other part-owners, who acknowledged them to be correct. In an action to recover the balance of the accounts, no notice having been given to the defendants to produce the original copies, held, neither copies of such copies, nor the original books from which the accounts were taken, were admissible, to prove the contents of the copies delivered to the defendants.-Vinal v. Burrill, xvi. 401. 3. In an action brought by A. against B., A. notified B. to produce at the trial a letter received by B. from A. on a certain day. The letter not being produced, a clerk of A. testified, that, on that day, he copied a letter from A. to B., which A. thereupon took away with him; and one C. testified, that, soon afterwards, on the same day, he received from A. a letter directed by him to B., and delivered it to B. Held, the copy was evidence of the contents of the letter. Dana v. Kemble, xix. 112. 4. So also a paper, in A.'s handwriting, purporting to be a copy of a letter from him to B.; it being testified by a witness, that he had seen a letter from A. to B., of the same date and similar tenor, it being also proved, that B. received a letter from A. on that day, and afterwards a sum of money from A., in formity with the terms of the paper. · Ibid. con 5. A note being discounted by a bank, the promisor transferred to the bank, as collateral, but in form absolutely, shares in an insurance company. The shares were attached in a suit against the bank before, and sold on execution after, maturity of the note. The bank transferred the note after it was due, and the assignee brings an action thereon against the maker, who offers in evidence a copy of the above execution, without a copy of the judgment. Held, admissible. Held, further, that a copy of the writ and the return, attested by the officer and left with the secretary of the insurance company, was not evidence of the attachment or the time of making it.Potter v. Tyler, 2 Met. 58. 6. An office copy of a deed is evidence, where the party relying upon it is not the grantee, and has not custody or control of the original. Ward v. Fuller, xv. 185. 7. In such case, the execution need not be proved; because the law does not authorize registration without a previous acknowledgment, and, therefore, the recording of a deed is primâ facie proof of authenticity. Ibid. 8. Until the full record is made up, from the minutes made by the clerk of a court upon its docket, such minutes are the record; and if, in the mean time, they are lost, secondary evidence is admissible of their contents, as of a lost record. — Pruden v. Alden, xxiii. 184. 9. It being proved, that an administratrix applied for a license to sell real estate for payment of debts, that she afterwards did sell, by a deed reciting the grant of a license by the Court of Common Pleas in August, 1807, that the purchaser remained in quiet possession over thirty years, that the clerk of that Court in 1807 was inattentive to his duty, and the docket for the August term was lost; held, sufficient proof of a license, though no record thereof was found, and no minute or application remained on the files, from which such record might be made up. — Ibid. 10. A deed must be proved by the subscribing witness, if he can be had; but, if he fail to prove the execution, other evidence is admissible. Whitaker v. Salisbury, xv. 534. 11. After a sale from A. to B., the property was attached as A.'s and replevied by B., C., the subscribing witness to the bill of sale, being a surety in the replevin bond. Upon trial of the replevin suit, C., being offered as a witness, by B., to prove the bill of sale, was objected to on the above ground. B. thereupon offered to procure a new surety, but the defendant would not consent. Held, the instrument might be proved by other evidence than the testimony of C. or of A.-Haynes v. Rutter, xxiv. 242. 12. Assumpsit for the price of fuel, sold and delivered at different times. To prove the delivery, the plaintiff called certain wharfingers, who testified, that they found the charges in question on their books, made in their handwriting to the plaintiff, for fuel delivered by his order to the defendant; that they sent to the defendant all the fuel charged; that the plaintiff ordered them to send the defendant all the articles charged, and they directed their carmen to carry them accordingly, but did not remember the particular instances. They also stated the residence of some of their former carmen, and that they did not know where the rest resided. The plaintiff then summoned and examined the carmen who could be found. Some of them testified, that they remembered taking fuel to the defendant's house, by order of their employers, and all of them, that they always carried all they were ordered to carry, but they could not prove any particular charge. The plaintiff called no servant of the defendant to prove his having received the fuel, nor, previous to the trial, did he use any means to obtain the testimony of the carmen. Held, the above evidence was not secondary, but was competent for the jury. — Chamberlain v. Carter, xix. 188. 13. Whether the loss of a note has been sufficiently proved to justify the admission of secondary evidence, is a question for the Court. Page v. Page, xv. 368. 14. In an action by two executors upon a note given to the testator, an affidavit was made by both of them, and filed in Court in February, stating that the note had never been in their possession. Another affidavit of one of them, dated in the ensuing November, was also read, stating that the other had very little to do with settling the estate, and was then abroad; that the former, after the testator's death, understanding that the defendant had a trunk of the testator, sent for it, and it was sent to him without the key, which the defendant said was not in his hands; that he had carefully looked over the papers in the trunk, and also other papers of the testator, and could not find the note. Held, secondary evidence was admissible. Ibid. 15. The Court charged the jury, that the second affidavit was such evidence of the loss of the note, as to let in secondary evidence of its contents; and, if they should be of opinion upon the whole evidence, that it was not paid to the testator, but remained, at his decease, in the hands and custody of the defendant, this would be sufficient to rebut the presumption of payment, arising from the non-production of the note. Held, the charge was correct, though the affidavit was not read to the jury. — Ibid. - 16. Oral or secondary evidence is not admissible to prove receipts for money, or a written contract, unless it be shown that the instruments are not within the control of the witness or the party seeking to use such evidence. — Van Deusen v. Frink, xv. 449. H. Handwriting, when and how proved. 1. Where the subscribing witness to a bond was interested at the time of attestation, and has since died, the bond cannot be proved by evidence of his handwriting. -Amherst, &c. v. Root, 2 Met. 522. 2. A deed attested by witnesses, who are not within the jurisdiction of the Court, may be proved by evidence of the handwriting of the signer. Ibid. 3. Proved specimens of a person's signature are admissible, to show, by comparison, that a memorandum, not signed, is written by him. Richardson v. Newcomb, xxi. 315. 4. Upon the question as to the genuineness of a signature, the genuine signature of the same person, to a paper not otherwise competent evidence, is admissible to the court and jury, by way of comparison of hands. Moody v. Rowell, xvii. 490. 5. So also the opinion of a writing-master, professing skill in the detection of forgeries, formed from a comparison of hands, without any actual knowledge of the party's handwriting. — Ibid. 6. So his opinion, formed merely from inspection, upon the question whether it is a natural or simulated hand. - Ibid. Exceptions. 1. The doings of the Court of Common Pleas, relative to the laying out of a highway, are not subject to a bill of exceptions. Endicott, &c. xxiv. 339. 2. Under St. 1820, c. 79, a party may remove a case to this Court by exceptions, though he has also the right of appeal. Sale v. Pratt, xix. 191. 3. Exceptions cannot be taken, as matter of right, to the decisions of this court, in a capital trial. Whether, under some circumstances, the Court may not revise such decisions, qu. — Commonwealth v. Buzzell, xvi. 153. 4. Under Revised Statutes c. 138, § 11-14, the Supreme Court has authority, in criminal cases brought up on exceptions from the Court of Common Pleas or Municipal Court, to grant a new trial on other grounds, after overruling the exceptions; or to remand the case to the court below, for the purpose, inter alia, of hearing a motion for a new trial. -Commonwealth v. Peck, 1 Met. 428. 5. In case of a libel, sued as a process in rem for a forfeiture, it seems, either party may file exceptions. Barnacoat v. Gunpowder, 1 Met. 225. A 6. Exceptions must be strictly limited to matters of law. bill of exceptions ought to state that certain facts were proved; nor can the court consider the evidence stated therein, with the view to set aside a verdict; nor found any decision on facts there stated, and not embraced in the issue, or otherwise appearing on the record. -Ibid. - French v. Bancroft, 1 Met. 502. 7. The comment of a judge upon evidence, not involving any opinion or direction in matter of law, is no ground of exception. Davis v. Jenney, 1 Met. 221. 8. Action against the drawer of a bill, drawn for his accommodation. Defence, an alteration of the bill, making it payable in sixty, instead of six days; the only evidence of which, was upon the face of the bill. The jury being instructed, that the question was to be decided upon inspection; held, it was a correct further instruction, that they should consider the probability or improbability of an accommodation bill being made payable in six days. Ibid. 9. Libel for a forfeiture of gunpowder, under St. 1833, c. 151. Upon the issue of not guilty, the jury found a verdict for the defendant, but also that the powder was had, kept and possessed contrary to law, &c. The judge decreed a forfeiture, but refused to allow costs against the defendant. To this refusal, the libellants filed a bill of exceptions, which set forth the evidence; but the exceptions were overruled, and judgment affirmed. - Barnacoat v. Gunpowder, 1 Met. 225. Execution. A. What property is exempt from execution. B. What avoids an execution. C. Sale on execution. D. Return and recording of executions. A. What property is exempt from execution. 1. St. 1805, c. 100, exempts from civil process the beds, bedsteads, bedding and household utensils, of any debtor, necessary for himself, his wife and children, not exceeding one bed, bedstead, and necessary bedding to two persons, and household furniture worth $50. Held, applicable to a householder, having neither wife nor child. Brown v. Wait, xix. 470. 2. Held, the proviso did not apply to such case, but the party might retain one bed with the bedding. Ibid. 3. But not another bed and bedding used by boarders. — Ibid. 4. Under St. 1817, c. 108, a cooking stove is not exempted, unless exclusively used for warming the building. Otherwise, it seems, by the Revised Statutes, c. 97, § 22. - Ibid. B. What avoids an execution. An action was brought against A., an administrator, for his own benefit, but in the name of B. A. suffered a judgment to be ren |