real estate, in order to defray expenses incurred in her support. -Larned v. Bridge, xvii. 339.

6. Devise "I give to my beloved wife, A., the use and improvement of all my estate, both real and personal, so long as she remains my widow; but if she marries again, -- then I give her the one half of my personal estate, after my debts and funeral charges are paid, to be at her own disposal, and the improvement of one third part of my real estate, during her natural life, which is in lieu of her right of dower in my estate; and I do hereby order her to pay all the legacies hereinafter mentioned. Item, I give and devise to my kinsman, B., and to his heirs and assigns, all my real estate; and I will, that he come into possession thereof, at my wife's marriage, and of the other third thereof, at her decease. I also give him the one half of my personal estate, after my just debts and funeral charges are paid; and I will, that he take possession of the same, at my said wife's marriage. But if my said kinsman shall die, before he comes into possession of my estate, above given him, and leave no lawful issue, then I will, that all my estate which I have above given him, shall be and remain to my two kinsmen, E. and G., and to their heirs and assigns, in equal shares; and that they come into possession of the same, at the respective time my kinsman N. is to take possession if he lives. But if either of my kinsmen, E. or G., shall come into possession of said estate, and leave no lawful issue, I will, that my estate, given them as above, shall be and remain to the survivor of them, the said E. or G., and to his heirs and assigns forever." This clause was followed by pecuniary legacies, unequal in amount, to different relatives, but there was no residuary clause. The wife having died, without again marrying, held, the above devise did not create in N. a contingent remainder in the land, two thirds depending on her marriage, and one third, on her death; but an immediate estate in the whole land, subject to the right given to her, and determinable by his death without issue, before the expiration of her estate; that, in case she survived N., E. and G., would take the whole real property by executory devise; that the bequest to N. of one half the personal property, also, did not depend upon the contingency of the widow's marriage, and, although she did not marry, yet N. was entitled to possession as soon as her right to use the property was at an end; and that the other half, when her interest in it expired, went to the testator's heirs. Ferson v. Dodge, xxiii. 287.

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7. A bequest of the use of money, to one for life, and then over, is a gift of the interest only, not of the principal. — Field v. Hitchcock, xvii. 182.

8. A testator gave to his daughter, a feme covert, "the interest of $50,000, from the time of his decease, during her natural

life, at her decease the principal to be equally divided among her children"; and his executors, being residuary devisees and legatees, gave bond to the judge of probate for payment of all the debts and legacies. Held, it was not intended to place this sum in trust for the daughter, and secure her the income, but to give her a fixed annual sum, equal to legal interest on $50,000, to be paid by the executors out of the estate. Swett v. Boston, xviii. 123.

9. Bequest to the testator's wife, of the use for life of certain land, notes, and bank shares. Upon her death, held, her executor was entitled to the rent of the land and interest on the notes, up to that time, though payable subsequently, but to no part of a dividend declared after her decease on the bank shares, because this could not be apportioned. Foote, &c., xxii. 299.

10. A testatrix, after directing a sale of all her real estate, and payment of debts, &c., proceeded thus: "What remains of real and personal estate I give and bequeath as follows: one half thereof to my daughter M." (a married woman) "for her use and disposal during her life, and whatever shall remain at her death, I give the same to her two daughters, D. and S. in equal shares, and the other half to the children of my son. Held, this was

not merely a bequest to M. of the income of one half of such residuary fund, for life; but that she might, in her lifetime, perhaps alone, certainly in conjunction with her husband, dispose of the principal, wholly or in part. - Harris v. Knapp, xxi. 412.

11. Devise to A., the testator's wife, in common with B., his daughter, of the use of certain rooms, and to B., in common with A., of the same rooms, while B. should remain unmarried. Held, after A.'s death, B., not being married, was entitled to the sole use of the rooms. - Jarvis v. Buttrick, 1 Met. 480.

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C. Conditional and contingent devises.

1. Devise of land, "not to be subject or liable to conveyance or attachment." Held, this proviso was void. Blackstone, &c. v. Davis, xxi. 42.

2. Devise: "I will, firstly, that, loth to offend by the word pay, the generous feelings of my friends, whose kindnesses to me have been many and long continued, to H. and his wife I wish their acceptances of twenty-five acres of land," &c. The testatrix, at the time, lived in the family of H., who afterwards brought an action against the executor for her board, which, however, he failed to maintain. Held, this was a conditional devise,

which, by the bringing of such action, H. elected to relinquish ; but that the implied condition did not extend beyond the devise of the land, and H. did not, by bringing the action, forfeit his claim to an independent residuary legacy to his wife. Hapgood v. Houghton, xxii. 480.

3. A testator, after giving pecuniary legacies to eight of his children in full of their several portions, devised to two of them, A. and B., all his real estate in fee, on condition that neither of them should make any claim upon his estate, and if either of them should make such claim, he should have no right under the will. A. having made such claim, and received payment from the executor; held, A. and B. took as tenants in common, upon condition subsequent, by breach of which A. forfeited his moiety, and it passed to the heirs at law. Sackett v. Mallory, 1 Met. 355.

4. Devise of a fractional part of certain land, "to be taken by the devisee where he shall choose or select, at its just or proportionate value." Held, this clause did not constitute a condition precedent to the vesting of the estate, but the devisee became a tenant in common, with a right of selection, which he might or might not exercise. - Brown v. Bailey, 1 Met. 254.

5. Devise: "I give, &c., to my nephew A., my dwellinghouse and lot, provided he will support my sister B. during her life. If he does not consent to support her, I give her the improvement of my upper chamber, and the rent of the rest of the house to be paid her her lifetime. And after her decease, I give my nephew C. the improvement of the lower tenement in my house and the privileges belonging to the same, during his life after the death of my sister. I give my house and lot to A., excepting C.'s improvement of the lower tenement." Held, the first clause was a devise to A. of an estate in fee, on condition of his supporting B. for life, and not of an estate for her life; and, therefore, upon his performing such condition, the devise to C. for life became inoperative. -Bradford v. Perkins, xxiii.

183.

6. A testator bequeathed to his wife "the use of thirty shares in the O. bank; said shares, at her decease, to be equally divided between his heirs." He left several children. Held, the reversionary interest of any one of them in these shares was contingent, and not attachable, in the executor's hands, upon a suit against the heir. Rich v. Waters, xxii. 563.

7. Devise: "I order that A. shall have a decent support out of my estate, so long as she remains at my house where she now is. I give, &c., to my two sons, B. and C., all my lands and buildings, and also my right in a saw-mill, and my right in a pew in the meeting-house in D., and also all my farming tools, to

be divided equally between them if they should live to become of age, otherwise it is my will it should go to one of them." Held, the two sons took a vested estate in fee, determinable, as to the one who should die first, upon the contingency of his dying a minor; that the heirs of the eldest son, who died after coming of

but during his brother's minority, who had since come of age, were entitled to one half of the real estate so devised; and that division of such estate, under a warrant from the Probate Court, during the minority of the youngest son, the eldest being of age, was valid. Packard v. Packard, xvi. 191.

D. Devises in trust.

1. Devise, of the residue of the testator's real and personal estate to his son's children, born and to be born, subject to the charge of an annual sum, to be paid the son during his life. The will also appointed a trustee to manage the property, and "from the rents and profits thereof to appropriate such annual sum towards the support of the son, and the residue to account for with said grand-children and their guardian, the trust to cease upon the death of the son." Held, the trustee must account annually with the grand-children for the surplus of the income. - Pool v. Ward, xxi. 398.

2. Bequest to the wife of the testator of an annuity, to be paid her by a trustee; the remainder of his estate, after payment of debts, to his daughters, their heirs, and assigns; if all of them die under age and without issue, all the estate given them and with which the trustee shall be chargeable, to his wife if living, her heirs and assigns, that she may live comfortably, support and educate her said children, and if, in any one year, the annuity, in the judgment of the trustee, shall be insufficient for those purposes, he shall pay her an additional sum for that year; and if she shall marry, the trustee shall not pay the annuity thereafter accruing, unless the husband shall give bond to each of the children then living and under age, for their support and education, and, in default of giving or performing the bond, the trustee to apply such part of the funds in his hands as he may deem proper to this object; and when either of them shall come of age, such child to receive payment or possession of her devise or legacy, reserving a sufficient fund for paying the annuity or otherwise compounding for the same, as the trustee shall be able to do. The defendant was constituted both executor and trustee; and, as executor, directed and empowered, at his discretion, to sell a certain portion of the land. Most of the property was real, and the personal was insufficient to pay the debts.

Held, there was a devise by implication to the trustee of the real estate, and he was liable to an action by the widow for her annuity. Walker v. Whiting, xxiii. 313.

3. Where the use and possession of personal property was bequeathed to an only son for life, with a contingent limitation over, and he was made an executor and a trustee for his sisters, with the request that no bonds should be required of him as trustee; held, he was not bound, before taking possession of L the property, to give security that it should be forthcoming at his death, upon the happening of the specified contingency. Security is required, only upon proof of danger that the property will be wasted, secreted, or removed by the first taker. Such proof being offered, it may be required at any time during his life. Homer v. Shelton, 2 Met. 194.

4. Devise:

"Further, my will is, that my said trustees shall receive and hold all the property, rent and income, not herein-before particularly disposed of, for the benefit of my two sisters, A. and B., and their children and their husbands respectively, in manner following: namely, to pay to each of my said sisters, for and during the term of their respective lives, $150 annually, and, after the decease of either of them, to her husband, if he survive her, $75 annually for his life or till his second marriage; and, at the decease of A., one half of said fund is to be held by my said trustees for the use of her children, and paid or conveyed to her children and grand-children as follows one half of her said share to her daughter C., wife of D., or to her children then living; the other half to the children of E., son of C., if any he have living, and, if he have no children living, then to go to such person or persons as would be his legal heirs if he were deceased." A. died, after her husband, and leaving C. and C.'s children, and E. and his children. Held, C. took one half the share, to the exclusion of her children. Sawyer v. Baldwin, xx. 378.

5. A testatrix devised her estate to A., in trust to receive the rents and profits, and divide them among her children, &c., and authorized A. to associate with him, in the execution of the trust, such person as he might deem fit; or, if A. should desire to be wholly discharged from the trust, he might substitute a trustee in his place. She also empowered and desired the trustee or trustees to relinquish the trust, if her children should request it in writing, and authorized the judge of probate, in such case, to appoint a trustee or trustees. In a subsequent clause, the will conferred on A., and any other trustee or trustees he might appoint, full power to sell and convey the real estate devised to A. in trust, when recommended and advised by the major part of her children. A. died without making any conveyance, or nominating any asso