used), the publication of a libel was enjoined, an extent to which our courts have refused to go, as not being sanctioned by principle.

To sum up in the language of Judge Wm. A Woods: "No decision of the Supreme Court, or of any of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, touching the subject of injunction, can be said to be founded on or to involve any new doctrine, or any application of established principles which was new save in the circumstances and conditions brought under consideration, and with two or three exceptions the same is true of the recent Circuit Court decisions."

An examination of the cases decided in the Federal courts bearing upon this question will show that the courts have clearly recognized the individual and collective right of the employees to cease work when they saw fit, undeterred by judicial process. This is after all but a recognition of the old rule that equity will not specifically enforce a contract for personal service, and therefore will not enjoin the breach of such a contract; this rule seems to have been violated by the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 803, but to that extent the decision has been annulled by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit in Arthur v. Oaks, 24 U. S. App. 239; 11 C. C. A. 209. This is but an example of what has been so well said by Judge Woods, that the scope of equity jurisdiction "has been enlarged and modified to meet the changing conditions of business and civilization, and it is only natural that there should have been instances in which jurisdiction has been exercssed in excess of rightful power, but when error of that kind has occurred it has been promptly corrected, either by direct appeal or by force of contemporary and more authoritative decision, and it is safe to say that no essential departure from recognized principles has become abiding or permanent."

Objections have been made to the summary punishment

of contempts committed in the violation of injunction orders.

Again this is no new exercise of jurisdiction.

The power of courts to punish disobedience of their orders has existed from time immemorial, it has been co-existent with the courts themselves and is absolutely necessary to their existence; it is further within that "due process of law" required by the constitution, which has been well defined as "such an exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims of law sanction and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as these maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs."

The Supreme Court of Mississippi has said: "The power to fine and imprison for contempt from the earliest history of jurisprudence, has been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of a court, without which it could no more exist than without a judge. It is a power inherent in all courts of record, and co-existing with them by the wise provisions of the common law. A court without the power effectually to protect itself against the assaults of the lawless, or to enforce its orders, judgments or decrees against recusant parties before it, would be a disgrace to the legislation, and a stigma upon the age which invented it." (Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331.)

So the Massachusetts court says: "The summary power to commit and punish for contempts tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice is inherent in Courts of Chancery and other superior courts, as essential to the execution of their powers and the maintenance of their authority, and is part of the law of the land, within the meaning of Magna Charta, and of the twelfth section of our Declaration of Rights." (Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230.)

In his opinion in the Debs case Justice Brewer cites numerous Federal cases, as stating the same principle, which is really too axiomatic to need any authority in its support.

If contempts were made triable by a jury the courts would be paralyzed, or suppose, as Judge Woods suggests, the jurors summoned should refuse to attend, it would be necessary to summon other jurors to try them, and if they should refuse others must be summoned to try them, and so on ad infinitum; a court of equity having no jury its contempt cases would have to be sent to a law court, for trial when they could be reached in the course of business, pending which, proceedings in the court of equity must be suspended.

But after these legal difficulties and objections are considered, other practical objections present themselves, which demand that all reasonable restrictions and safeguards be placed upon the use of the injunction, in such cases as those to which we have addressed ourselves.

The power reposed in the courts of chancery is very great, and, such is the weakness of human nature, it is liable to be sometimes abused, and when abused to work great oppression. This abuse should be guarded against with the most sedulous care, not only on account of the injustice in the particular case but because of its affording a handle for those who, for one reason or another, are always ready to attack the courts and judges, and to stir up discontent among the people. It may sound superfluous to say that the law should be followed and adhered to with the greatest strictness, but in such cases as we have been considering it is of vast importance that the judges should see that every requirement of the law is complied with, with the most scrupulous exactness. They should avoid even the shadow of the appearance of overstepping the limits set to their jurisdiction by principle and by law.

For example the United States Circuit Courts are given authority by Act of Congress to grant preliminary injunctions in certain extreme cases without notice; here is a provision, useful and necessary as it sometimes is, which may be made an instrument of oppression and injustice unless the judges act with the greatest care and circumspection, in

such cases they should consider themselves in peculiar charge of the interests of the absent defendants, and should never grant an injunction without notice unless the required "irreparable injury from delay" is clearly shown beyond a doubt, and the day set for hearing should never be postponed beyond the earliest date.

We have too much confidence in our courts of last resort to feel apprehension that there will ever be a permanent enlargement of the jurisdiction of the courts of equity, uncontrolled by law and unsanctioned by principle; but there is at all times a chance that in the mistaken acts of individual judges the proper jurisdictional limits may be overstepped; while ordinarily such mistakes even if uncorrected by an appellate court, might have no result beyond the particular case in which they occurred, yet in some states of popular opinion even an isolated mistake would go far to increase those bitter feelings of which we spoke at the outset, and might aid in undermining that perfect confidence in the integrity and fairness of our courts which is one of the chief foundation stones of our government, and which among a large class of our people now seems to be seriously threatened.

The fact that the injunctive process has in so many cases issued from the Federal courts has made the cry of "government by injunction" more potent than it would otherwise have been in exciting the fears of conservative men. There are not wanting cases however in which the State authorities themselves have been responsible for the resort to the Federal courts, the complainants often having no confidence in the ability and willingness of the local authorities to effectually cope with the difficulties, and sometimes, as for instance in the Chicago riots of 1894, this lack of confidence would seem to have been justified. It has been said that the so-called "usurpations" of the courts are but blazing the way to revolution, but I do not believe that in the sober second thought of the American people any such result is contemplated or threatened. There is danger, however,

that some State legislature, in an effort to restrict the power of the courts, may practically abolish the useful writ of injunction and so necessitate a still more frequent resort to the Federal courts; a result to be deplored by those who, like the writer, believe that Federal assistance, even in courts, should be sought only as a last resort. In this as in all cases when a people, greatly stirred up, attempt to right real or imaginary wrongs, there is danger lest in the methods they may be tempted to try for relief there may lurk greater dangers than are apparent in the status quo.

Efforts have been made to have some legislation by Congress limiting the jurisdiction of the Federal equity courts in matters involving injunctions, but it may well be doubted whether Congress has any authority to do this, as Art. 111, Sec. 2, of the Constitution provides that the judicial power of the Federal courts shall extend to all cases in Law and Equity" arising under the constitution, the laws and treaties of the United States.

Changes could, however, be made in the law in regard to the punishment for contempts. The incongruity of a trial by jury in such cases has already been alluded to. However, those proceedings might well be made compulsory which even now should be followed in all courts, and so far as the writer knows have been generally followed; that is, "that in case of a contempt committed out of the presence of the court there should be a formal procedure upon affidavit showing the facts supposed to constitute the contempt, to which the defendant should be allowed to make answer, and that the trial should proceed upon evidence adduced in open court;" moreover an appeal might be allowed in all cases, and a limit set upon the punishment to be inflicted.

As to the so-called

blanket" or "omnibus" injunctions, it stands to reason that no man can be in contempt by violating an order, notice of the existence of which has not been brought home to him, and if any man has been punished for so doing he has been unjustly punished, the