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in such self-inflicted comatose condition we are relieved in the nighttime of our worldly goods by a guest or servant while under the roof of "mine host," we point with pride and safety to the doctrine of Cunningham against Buckey, and remember that the landlord must respond in damages.

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And thus while by common law our bibulous habits do not militate against us, while under the "protecting aegis' of the landlord, and are not considered acts sufficient to show contributory negligence on our part in such cases, the statutory law, sanctioned and strengthened by the court's decision, and the very constitution itself being brought to the aid of both, lays down the rule, can it be called sumptuary, that no matter what we may drink or smoke, nor whatever else we may eat, yet like certain fashionable teas, we shall legally be served with our oleomargarine only when it is of the shade of pink.

These and like decisions of apparent light vein, sometimes settle very important questions, and the humorous side is often overbalanced by graver results which follow.

While as before stated there is little to criticise in the year's decisions, it cannot but be noticed that our Supreme Court as well as the courts of last resort in various other States, is taking liberties with the doctrine of stare decisis, that but a few years ago would be viewed with more serious apprehension than in these progressive days. A tendency seems to prevail to disturb well settled principles by frequent overruling opinions and decisions, and thus lay the court open to attack on the ground of assuming legislative functions, and to criticism more or less just of promulgating "court made law." In my opinion this is to be regretted. The law which the court announces to-day should be the law to-morrow, unless changed during the night by the Legislative power. The law as pronounced by the court in your case on yesterday should be so pronounced in my case to-day. And when the same court has for years in repeated decisions, announced and fixed and settled a principle of law upon which parties are expected to act, are bound to act, and do act in the most important

business affairs of their lives, a sudden and uncalled for reversal of that fixed principle is very much to be deplored.

Ever since the question was first presented to our Supreme Court, the doctrine of "superior servant," or "vice-principal," has been firmly fixed and adopted in this State. Employer and employé have alike contracted with regard to, and acted upon, that settled doctrine.

The departure from this settled principle, as now announced by the court in the case of Jackson v. Norfolk & Western Railroad Company, overruling at least half a dozen prior well considered cases, and thus changing a well settled principle, is greatly to be regretted, as a tendency towards confusion, towards unstableness, and towards, may we say, an usurpation of legislative functions.

No decision of recent years has so utterly and totally unsettled a well fixed principle as in this instance, and no decision handed down by our court within the year, is deserving, in my opinion, of such adverse criticism, and solely, it is here urged, on the ground of abandonment of the doctrine of stare decisis.

The very question before the court was fully discussed and entirely settled as late as 1893, in the case of Haney v. R. R. Co., as it had been previously settled in Daniels v. Railway Co., and in other cases even prior to that. And little less than a year before the decision in the Jackson Case, the same question, notwithstanding frequent rulings by the court, was again presented, and pressed by counsel upon the attention of the court, and the court was asked to reverse its former position. This appeal to the court to change its ruling was made in the case of Flannegan v. Railway Co., reported in 40th W. Va. The court refused to disturb its former rulings, and again held to the doctrine of vice-principal and superior servant as the settled law in West Virginia. We might not all agree that the principle announced was as good policy as that held in some other States, but we were guided by it, and respected it as the law, and were governed by it.

It is insisted here that if a change in the law were desir

able, the appeal for such change should have been made to, and action taken by, the legislative branch of our government and not the judicial.

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This course has been pursued elsewhere. In England they have the Employers' Liability Act," which defines the duty of a master toward his servant, and affirms the master's liability for injuries to the servant by reason of the negligence of a vice-principal, and the act defines who is a vice-principal, and adopts the law as formerly announced by our Supreme Court.

The Legislature of Pennsylvania many years ago defined who were fellow-servants, enacting in effect that railway mail agents were fellow-servants as to their right to recover for injuries, with employés on a train on which they traveled.

The State of Ohio has recently passed a statute defining vice-principals, and holding the master liable for injuries to servants caused by the negligence of such vice-principal, and adopting the rule as formerly laid down by our Supreme Court.

Is it not sound doctrine announced in the dissenting opinion in the case of Jackson v. Railway Co., now under consideration, that it is better to have the law settled, even though it operate harshly, than to have a state of confusion produced by a continual abandonment of former maturely considered principles ?"

And if the law so fixed and settled does operate harshly, should we not appeal to the assembled representatives of the people and ask to have the harsh law modified or changed? Disturbing" former maturely considered principles," as the decision in the Jackson case does, is what leads us here to repeat: "The rule of stare decisis applies with impregnable force in this instance, and from which there is no way of escape, even if the court were so inclined, unless by an utter and reprehensible disregard of all precedent.'

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My brethren, this may appear strong language; it is strong language, but it is not my language. It is the language of our own Supreme Court in the Flannegan case

above referred to, in reply to the argument of counsel, asking for a change of the old rule.

In criticism therefore of this disturbing decision, I borrow thus much from the court, and say, that the departure in the Jackson Case from the old rule is an utter and reprehensible disregard of all precedent." The Legislature and not the court should have made the change, if a change was demanded and desirable. And that a change was either demanded by the people, or the best interest of the State, or was desirable, is a debatable and extremely doubtful proposition.

The legislative branch of our government has also held a session since our last meeting, and the laws adopted by that body some nine months ago, and just now being promulgated from the mysterious dark room of the public printer, are proper subjects for our consideration.

Outside of those acts of an administrative, economic and a benevolent character, the written laws enacted are fewer, perhaps, than usual. A legislative session which did not deal largely with the Game and Fish Law, Delinquent Land Laws, the County Roads and the School Book Question, would be regarded as not equaling its predecessors, and so to prevent such reflection upon its reputation, the recent session gave us a new edition upon each of those subjects. Too frequent handling will wear out silver," was an old copy from which we learned to write. Many chapters of our statute law are being severely tested by that same process, and none perhaps more sorely, than those embracing the questions just mentioned.

Many provisions enacted by the last Legislature have found a place in our laws which in time, if not now, will be acknowledged by us all to be of much good. Among them we might mention those to prevent lobbying, extending the time within which to complete railroads, regulating the practice of dentistry, permitting executions to issue on judgments of justices within ten years, regulating the granting of licenses to practice law, of which this association is the proud mother, the compulsory school law and

others. It may be suggested that perhaps the act providing for a punishment for lobbying on the floor of the legislative halls, while the Legislature is in session, was intended to catch within its meshes some overzealous member or committee of this association, too assiduous in the performance of a duty, and in pointing out to the average legislator the error of his ways. Nevertheless, whatever or whoever may have been the object sought or aimed at, the end to be attained is a good one. The law is to be commended, will wear well, and is a tree that will bear good fruit.

Nor are we to be outdone by the enacting of laws that the press and our legal periodicals see fit to collate under the head of "freak laws," and "crank legislation."

While we are not so far advanced in that particular science of statesmanship as some of our sister States are credited with being, yet we have at the last meeting of the legislative body placed ourselves on record as willing to start a nucleus for further advancement.

While a legislator of a certain State is charged with having introduced a bill to prevent the wearing of “bloomers," we have thus far contented ourselves with taking from the cities and towns the power of regulating the running of bicycles on the streets and sidewalks, where the power obviously belongs, and giving the power mainly, to the State authorities, where it is a misfit in many particulars. We may yet go a step farther, as is alleged was proposed in a neighboring State, by adopting as a part of our statute law the ten commandments, with an amendment, to be called section 11, no doubt, reading, “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's bicycle."

We have not yet proposed, as it is said a certain other legislator did, a bill making it a misdemeanor to play football, which would seem to be a direct attack on the higher institutions of learning in this country, but we have adopted another chapter to our criminal law, regarding the regulation of the altitude of headgear at certain places of amusement. However much it may be claimed that this high hat law applies to all persons, "regardless of age,

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