not exempt property used merely as the residence of its superintendent; 95 and that an exemption of the property of a cemetery company does not apply to land occupied for a residence and garden by its superintendent or sexton.96 Gas meters, gas mains and pipes of a gas company have been held not to be exempt under an exemption of machinery actually employed and used in the manufacture of gas.97 On the same principle, it has repeatedly been held that an exemption of a religious, charitable or educational corporation from taxation extends to such property only as is held and used by the corporation for religious, charitable or educational purposes,98 and does not apply to property held by it merely as a source of reve 95 Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Cleaver, 46 N. J. L. 467. 96 State v. Lange, 16 Mo. App. 468. 97 Consolidated Gas Co. v. Baltimore, 62 Md. 588, 50 Am. Rep. 237. 98 A Y. M. C. A. building is not a building for public worship, exclusively used for the purpose thereof, when its use for church services is the least use, perhaps not in importance, but in the time which such services occupy and the proportion of the building which they require, to which it is put. Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 113 N. Y. 187, 21 N. E. 86. See also People V. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Peoria, 157 Ill. 403, 41 N. E. 557. And compare Com. v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 116 Ky. 711, 105 Am. St. Rep. 234, 76 S. W. 522. A statute providing that "all buildings used for charitable purposes, with the land whereon the same are erected, and which may be necessary for the fair enjoyment thereof, shall be exempt" from taxation requires that a double test be applied in determining whether a given parcel of land is exempt thereunder: First, is it the very tract upon which the building was erected, or does it include land acquired at a period subsequent to the erection of the building; second, if it is the tract upon which the building was erected, then is all of it necessary for the fair enjoyment of such building? Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth v. Cory, 73 N. J. L. 699, 65 Atl. 500. A charitable corporation charged with a trust to use certain of its property for purposes that are charitable within the meaning of a statute which provides that "all buildings used exclusively for charitable purposes, with the land whereon the same are erected, and the furniture and personal property used therein" shall be exempt from taxation will be entitled to the exemption therein granted only as far as the property involved is actually used for the purposes of the trust at the time fixed by law for the assessment of taxes. Presbyterian Board Relief for Disabled Ministers & Widows & Orphans of Deceased Ministers v. Fisher, 68 N. J. L. 143, 52 Atl. 228. In thus holding, however, the court suggests that "if there was anything in the case to show that preparations were being made before or at the time of the assessment to appropriate and use the property for the purposes of the trust, that plans for that purpose had been adopted and were being carried forward to meet the actual needs of the work, there might have been raised an interesting question whether the prose nue. A building used for a school or college is exempt although cutors were not entitled to the benefit of the exemption." Subsequently, the same court declared (Institute of Holy Angels v. Ft. Lee, 80 N. J. L. 545, 77 Atl. 1035) that any doubt on this score had been removed by the change in the wording of the statute whereby it was made to expressly require that the property be "actually used" for the charitable purpose in order for it to be entitled to the exemption provided. The question of the particular purpose for which a building is being used is one of fact; whether such purpose is a charitable one is a question of law. Sisters of Charity v. Cory, 73 N. J. L. 699, 65 Atl. 500. 99 Illinois. Presbyterian Theological Seminary of Northwest v. People, 101 Ill. 578; People v. Graceland Cemetery Co., 86 Ill. 336, 29 Am. Rep. 32. Iowa. Fort Des Moines Lodge No. 25 v. County of Polk, 56 Iowa 34, 8 N. W. 687; Mulroy v. Churchman, 52 Iowa 238, 3 N. W. 72. Louisiana. New Orleans v. St. Patrick's Hall Ass'n, 28 La. Ann. 512; New Orleans v. Russ, 27 La. Ann. 413. Maryland. Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore v. St. Peter's Academy, 50 Md. 321; Frederick County Com'rs v. Sisters of Charity of St. Joseph, 48 Md. 34. Massachusetts. Old South Society v. Boston, 127 Mass. 378; Trustees of Chapel of Good Shepherd v. Boston, 120 Mass. 212; Trustees of Wesleyan Academy v. Inhabitants of Wilbraham, 99 Mass. 599. Minnesota. County of Hennepin v. Grace, 27 Minn. 503, 8 N. W. 761. New Jersey. Church of Redeemer v. Axtell, 41 N. J. L. 117; State v. Ross, 24 N. J. L. 497. New York. People v. Brooklyn Assessors, 27 Hun 559. Ohio. Cleveland Library Ass'n v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St. 253; Humphries v. Little Sisters of Poor, 29 Ohio St. 201. Rhode Island. St. Joseph's Church v. Providence Assessors of Taxes, 12 R. I. 19. Compare Trustees of Griswold College v. State, 46 Iowa 275, 26 Am. Rep. 138; and cases there collected. In Trustees of Phillips Academy v. Exeter, 58 N. H. 306, 42 Am. Rep. 589, it was held that a building used partly as a dormitory and boarding house for students of an academy, and partly as a public house, was not exempt from taxation as "land for the use of the academy." Such portion of the building of a Young Men's Christian Association as is rented out to others for business purposes is not within a statute exempting property used exclusively for educational, charitable and religious work, and it can make no difference that the rents and profits therefrom are applied to the work of the associa tion. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Omaha v. Douglas County, 60 Neb. 642, 52 L. R. A. 123, 83 N. W. 924. than Ground and buildings owned by a commandery of the Knights Templar, used for the appropriate objects of the organization for not more four days in each year, and at other times as a summer resort for members of such organizations and their fami. lies, but not leased or used for pe cuniary profit, are not within a statute exempting all grounds and buildings used for charitable, benevolent and religious institutions, etc., 'devoted solely to the appropriate object of such institutions, and not leased or otherwise used with a view to pe cuniary profit." Lacy v. Davis, 112 Iowa 106, 83 N. W. 784. It was held in a Massachusetts case that an educational corporation the principal and one of the teachers lives therein with his family. Teachers and necessary servants who occupy rooms in a college building on the premises of college are necessary adjuncts to such an institution, and the building, by reason of such use, does not cease to be used exclusively for college purposes. A corporation which leases property to another, who uses it for a school, cannot claim an exemption of the same from taxation under a statute exempting property used for schools or colleges, etc.2 When the purposes for which a corporation may hold land are specified in connection with an exemption for taxation, the exemp for the purpose of furnishing practical education in agriculture, and giving boys physical development by manual labor, might hold, exempt from taxation, a farm, farm houses, etc., and live stock, where the work on the farm was done, and the live stock tended by the pupils, and the greater part of the product of the farm was consumed by the school, though part of such product and some of the live stock was sold for cash, or bartered for supplies for the school. Mt. Hermon Boys' School v. Inhabitants of Gill, 145 Mass. 139, 13 N. E. 354. An educational corporation does not forfeit its right to an exemption from taxation by leasing its building for a boarding house during vacation. Temple Grove Seminary v. Cramer, 98 N. Y. 121. A statute exempting from taxation all property used exclusively for "school" purposes exempts the property of a joint stock corporation used exclusively for the purposes of a medical college, or for any other institution of learning. Omaha Medical College v. Rush, 22 Neb. 449, 35 N. W. 222. 1 Blackman v. Houston, 39 La. Ann. 592, 2 So. 193. ally occupied for the purposes for which they were incorporated shall be exempt from taxation, actual occupancy is the test of the right to exemption, and property which belongs to the institution but which is occupied for purposes other than those of the institution's incorporation will be taxable notwithstanding the revenues derived from such property are used exclusively for such purposes. Portland Hibernian Benev. Society v. Kelly, 28 Ore. 173, 30 L. R. A. 167, 170, 52 Am. St. Rep. 769, 42 Pac. 3. An answer, which alleges that seven-eighths of the Masonic Hall, claimed to be within the terms of a statute providing that "every building erected for the use of any benevolent or charitable institution, etc., and the tract of land on which such building is situate not exceeding twenty acres' shall be exempt from taxation, is leased for mercantile, theatrical, and similar purposes, is good on demurrer filed by the claimant. Indianapolis v. Grand Master, etc., of Grand Lodge of Indiana, 25 Ind. 518. But the leasing of a church building, which is regularly and statedly occupied for religious worship, for lectures, concerts, readings, and, at times, political conventions, whereby $500 or $600 has annually been secured and devoted to church purposes does not deprive the religious society, owning and occupying such building, of the 2 Armand v. Dumas, 28 La. Ann. 403. Under a statute, providing that such real estate belonging to domestic, literary, benevolent, charitable and scientific institutions as shall be actu tion extends to such land only as is held for one of the purposes specified.3 § 4643. Exemption of stock or capital stock as exemption of prop erty. It would seem clear that, in the absence of anything to show a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature, an exemp tion of the stock or capital stock of a corporation should be held to impliedly exempt the property of the corporation in which its capi tal stock is invested.* An exemption of stock or capital stock, however, does not exempt the corporation's tangible real or personal property, or its accumulated profits and surplus, if there is anything to show that the legis lature may not have intended to use these terms as representing the tangible property.5 Thus, it has been held that a provision in the exemption granted by a statute exempting buildings occupied exclusively as churches. First Unitarian Soc. of Hartford v. Town of Hartford, 66 Conn. 368, 34 Atl. 89. The fact that an incorporated agricultural society has, at times when it was not holding its fairs, leased its grounds for horse and automobile races, the rentals paid having been devoted to the maintenance of such grounds and the advancement of the purposes for which the society was organized, does not deprive the society of the exemption granted by statute to "every incorporated agricultural society." Town of West Hartford v. Connecticut Fair Ass'n, 88 Conn. 627, 92 Atl. 432. 3 Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 104 U. S. 493, 26 L. Ed. 810. 4 See Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Wright, 164 U. S. 327, 41 L. Ed. 454; Nichols v. New Haven & N. Co., 42 Conn. 103; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Shacklett, 30 Mo. 550; State v. Hood, 15 Rich. L. (S. C.) 177. "The general tenor of the authorities is to the effect that where there is a general exemption of the stock or capital stock of a corporation, without other explanatory words, the exemption applies equally to the prop erty of the corporation represented by its shares of stock." Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Wright, 164 U. S. 327, 41 L. Ed. 454. "The capital stock of a corporation may, in a general sense, be said to be all the property in which the capital is invested, so that an exemption of the capital stock, without other words of limitation, may operate to exempt all the property of the corporation." Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 104 U. S. 493, 26 L. Ed. 810. "An exemption of capital stock, without more, may, with great propriety, be considered, under ordinary circumstances, as exempting that which, in the legitimate operations of the corporation, comes to represent the capital." Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697, 24 L. Ed. 1091. 5 Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Wright, 164 U. S. 327, 41 L. Ed. 454; Shelby County v. Union & Planters' Bank, 161 U. S. 149, 40 L. Ed. 650; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697, 24 L. Ed. 1091. In Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Wright, supra, it was said that while, in the absence of any words showing a different intention, an exemption of the stock or capital stock of a corporation may imply and carry charter of a corporation that it shall pay a certain tax annually on each share of its capital stock, in lieu of all other taxes, does not prevent a tax on its surplus and accumulated profits. Whether the exemption of the "capital" or "capital stock" of a corporation is to be regarded as an exemption of the property purchased with or represented by such capital or capital stock may often be determinable only by a construction of the charter as a with it an exemption of the property in which such stock is invested, yet, if the legislature uses language at variance with such intention, the courts, which will never presume a purpose to exempt any property from its just share of the public burdens, will construe any doubts which may arise as to the proper interpretation of the charter against the exemption. "Where the purposes for which a corporation may hold property are specified in connection with the exemption [of its capital stock], the limitation of taxation designated [in the exemption] must be held to apply only to property acquired for such purposes." Bank of Commerce Tennessee, 104 U. S. 493, 26 L. Ed. $10. V. The fact that a grant of lands to a railroad company rendered stock to some extent unnecessary does not make the lands granted stock itself, so as to ipso facto bring them, while they remain unsold, within an exemption of the company's stock and dividends. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Loftin, 98 U. S. 559, 25 L. Ed. 222. See also Memphis & St. L. R. Co. v. Loftin, 105 U. S. 258, 26 L. Ed. 1042. In this case, the court held that "the facts showing why the lands represented the capital must be set forth in the pleading. 6 In Shelby County v. Union & Planters' Bank, 161 U. S. 149, 40 L. Ed. 650 (distinguishing Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, 24 L. Ed. 558), it was held that a provision in the charter of a bank that it should pay a certain annual tax on each share of its capital stock, which should be in lieu of all other taxes, while it limited the amount of tax on the shares of stock in the hands of the shareholders, did not prevent a tax upon the capital stock of the bank, or on its surplus and accumulated profits. In Bank of Commerce V. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134, 40 L. Ed. 645, where the charter of a bank required it to pay a certain annual tax on each share of its capital stock, and provided that such tax should be in lieu of all other taxes, it was held that the shareholders could not be taxed on their shares. And see Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, 24 L. Ed. 558. This decision was modified, on a rehearing, so as to allow taxation of holders of new stock issued by the corporation, under authority conferred by its charter, after the adoption of a constitutional prohibition against exemption from taxation. Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 163 U. S. 416, 41 L. Ed. 211. The fact that the charter of a railroad company vests the capital stock and property of the company in the stockholders in proportion to their respective shares does not make the stock and the property identical to the extent that an exemption of the stock will ipso facto extend to the property. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Loftin, 98 U. S. 559, 25 L. Ed. 222. |