branch lines afterwards constructed. But a general exemption of a corporation from taxation exempts the franchises of the corporation. Thus, an exemption of a railroad company from taxation, without limitation or restriction, exempts its franchise as well as its real estate, rolling stock and other tangible property.85 ing, even though it adjoin the land on which the building stands and is devoted to charitable uses, such land not being land on which the building was erected. Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth v. Cory, 73 N. J. L. 699, 65 Atl. 500. 84 Wilmington & W. R. Co. v. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 279, 36 L. Ed. 972, aff 'g 110 N. C. 137, 14 S. E. 652. In this case it was held that a branch railroad was not entitled to a property exemption similar to that granted the main line, although the statute incorporating the company and authorizing the construction of the branch road as well as the construction of a main line provides, in effect, that the subscribers to the stock of the two lines shall constitute but one company; that their rights of property and estate shall be in common and not separate, and that all of the powers, rights and privileges conferred upon the company, in respect to the main road and the lands through which it may pass are to extend in every respect to the company and the president and directors thereof in the laying out, construction, use and preservation of the branch road. Wilmington & W. R. Co. v. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 279, 36 L. Ed. 972. "We do not deny," said the court, "that exemption from taxation may be construed as included in the word 'privileges,' if there are other provisions removing all doubt of the intention of the legislature in that respect (Pickard v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co., 130 U. S. 637, 642 [32 L. Ed. 1051]) but we have none such here.'' An exemption of the stock of a railroad company does not extend to stock issued in aid of the construetion and in the name of a branch road when, although the company was authorized by its charter to build such branch roads as it deemed proper, it did not construct the road involved until after its formal acceptance of a general statute, enacted after the adoption of a constitution forbidding the exemption of railroad property, which, in effect, made a branch road, constructed under its provisions, a distinct line that was to be operated, albeit by a common board of directors, solely with reference to the interests and pursuant to the directions of its stockholders, who constituted a sepa rate organization, without regard to the necessities of the main line, and which did not provide for the exemp tion of stock issued for the benefit of the branch road. Chicago, B. & K. C. R. Co. v. Guffey, 120 U. S. 569, 30 L. Ed. 732. Wil 85 Raleigh & G. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 269, 20 L. Ed. 570; mington & W. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 264, 20 L. Ed. 568; Worth v. Petersburg R. Co., 89 N. C. 301; Worth v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 89 N. C. 291, 45 Am. Rep. 679. An exemption of the "property" of a railroad company extends to its necessary real estate and rolling stock and to its franchise, and the state cannot tax such real estate, rolling stock or franchise without impairing the obligation of its contract. mington & W. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 264, 20 L. Ed. 568. Wil § 4642. -Use of property. A right to exemption from taxation may be granted to a corporation in such terms as to include all the property of the corporation, without regard to use to which it is put.86 So, where an exemption of all of the property, real and personal, belonging to a charitable corporation, from all taxation by the state and by the parish or city in which it is situated, appears in the corporation's charter after a number of allusions to property which it is supposed the corporation may acquire, other than that which will be directly used in administering the charity, such exemption will be held to extend to all property lawfully and properly possessed by the corporation.87 A grant of exemption, however, should never be so construed unless such an intention on the part of the legislature is very clear. Generally such a grant is in express terms limited to property which is held by the corporation for the purposes for which it was created or organized; and, even when there is no such express limitation, a grant of exemption from taxation should not be construed as applying to property of a corporation. which is not necessary for or used in the business or object for which it was created, even though it may be possible that it may 88 86 In Osborn v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 40 Conn. 491, it was held that a charter or general law requiring a railroad company to pay a certain tax upon the market value of its capital stock, and upon its funded and floating debt, and providing that this tax should be in lieu of all other taxes, exempted all the property of the corporation from any other taxation, including its real property, whether used for railroad purposes or not. Two judges, however, dissented from this holding. In Town of New Haven v. City Bank, 31 Conn. 106, it was held that, where the charter of a bank exempted its property from taxation, the fact that a building erected by the bank was not needed for the purposes of its business, and was therefore erected in violation of its charter, did not render the building subject to taxation, but that it merely rendered the bank liable to a proceeding by the state for violation of its charter. See, however, St. Anna's Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 U. S. 362, 26 L. Ed. 1128, in which it was held that an exemption of the property of a corporation does not extend to property, the holding of which is ultra vires the corporation. 87 St. Anna's Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 U. S. 362, 26 L. Ed. 1128. A college which, by its testimony, brings certain land belonging to it within the terms of an exempting statute is entitled to the exemption of such land when such testimony is not contradicted. Stevens Inst. of Technology v. Bowes, 74 N. J. L. 80, 70 Atl. 730. 88 United States. Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 104 U. S. 493, 26 L. Ed. 810. Illinois. People v. Graceland Cemetery Co., 86 Ill. 336, 29 Am. Rep. 32. Minnesota. Ramsey County v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 537, 24 N. W. 313. New Jersey. Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Cleaver, 46 N. J. L. 467; New Jersey R. & Transp. Co. v. New become necessary at some future time,89 or though there may be an intention to use it at some future time for purposes which will render it exempt.90 ark Collectors, 25 N. J. L. 315; Camden & A. R. & Transp. Co. v. Commissioners of Mansfield, 23 N. J. L. 510. Pennsylvania. Lackawanna Iron & Coal Co. v. Luzerne County, 42 Pa. St. 424. "It has been frequently decided that a general exemption of the property of a corporation from taxation is to be construed as referring only to the property held for the transaction of the business of the company." Ford v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 164 U. S. 662, 41 L. Ed. 590. In order that property of a corporation may come within a statute exempting the property of such a corporation from taxation, it need not be necessary, in the sense of "indispensable," to the carrying on of the business of the corporation. It is enough if it be "obviously appropriate and convenient" to enable the corporation to carry into effect the franchise granted. New Jersey R. & Transp. Co. v. Hancock, 35 N. J. L. 537, limiting Camden & A. R. & Transp. Co. v. Commissioners of Mansfield, 23 N. J. L. 510. A limitation on the taxation of a railroad itself does not prevent the imposition of a tax on certain lands owned by the company but not necessary nor used in the operation of the road especially when the matter of the exemption of such lands is expressly taken care of in another portion of the same act. Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 527, 22 L. Ed. 805. half of one per cent upon its annual net income, and no municipal or other corporation shall have power to tax the stock of said company, but may tax any property, real or personal, of the said company, within the jurisdiction of said corporation in the ratio of taxation of like property," only by sustaining the right of municipalities to tax any property of the company within their respective jurisdictions and not by limiting their power of taxation to property of the company other than the railroad and its appurtenances. Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Wright, 164 U. S. 327, 41 L. Ed. 454. 89 County of Ramsey v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 537, 24 N. W. 313. In this case it was held that lands owned by a railroad company, but not occupied by it, were not exempt, although they would probably become necessary at some future time. 90 Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Omaha v. Douglas County, 60 Neb. 642, 52 L. R. A. 123, 83 N. W. 924. Mere temporary use for a not within the exemption, as purpose where a Grove school building is leased during vaca tion for a boarding house, does not defeat the exemption. Temple Seminary v. Cramer, 98 N. Y. A building in the course of 121. erection and merely intended to be used for a charitable purpose is not ‹‹ actually meaning of the New Jersey exemption used" for such purpose within the statute. Institute of Holy Angels v. Borough of Ft. Lee, 80 N. J. L. 545, See also Borough of clause of a railroad charter, provid- Longport v. Max & Sarah Bamberger Full effect can be given to the ing that the "railroad, and the appurtenances of the same shall not be subjected to be taxed higher than one 77 Atl. 1035. Seashore Home, Atl. 633. N. J. Eq 102 Thus, it has been held that an exemption of the property of a corporation from taxation, although in general terms, does not apply to property held, not for use in carrying on its business, but for the purpose of selling or leasing the same, or for mere convenience; 92 that an exemption of the property of a railroad company from taxation does not exempt property owned by it, but not necessary for nor used in the operation of its line; 93 that an exemption 91 United States. Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404, 29 L. Ed. 680. Georgia. Ordinary of Bibb County v. Central Railroad & Banking Co., 40 Ga. 646. Illinois. In re Swigert, 119 Ill. 83, 59 Am. Rep. 789, 6 N. E. 469; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Irvin, 72 Ill. 452. Mississippi. Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Moseley, 52 Miss. 127. Missouri. State v. Lange, 16 Mo. App. 468. New Jersey. Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Cleaver, 46 N. J. L. 467; New Jersey R. & Transp. Co. v. Hancock, 35 N. J. L. 537; Camden & A. R. & Transp. Co. v. Commissioners of Mansfield, 23 N. J. L. 510, 57 Am. Dec. 409. North Carolina. Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Alamance County Com'rs, 76 N. C. 212. Pennsylvania. Railroad v. Berks County, 6 Pa. St. 70. Where the charter of a banking corporation provides that the corporation "may purchase and hold a lot of ground for the use of the institution as a place of business, and at pleasure sell and exchange the same, and may hold such real or personal property and estate as may be conveyed to it to secure debts due the institution, and may sell and convey the same,' and that the corporation shall pay to the state, in lieu of all other taxes, an annual tax of a certain per cent on each share of capital stock, the exemption granted extends only to such property, owned by the corpora tion, as is necessary for its business, and not to property which it owns but which it has leased to third persons, nor to property which it has bought in, at the sale under a trust deed, for the purpose of securing a part of the loans made by it to the grantors in the deed and which it holds for sale as soon as practicable. Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 104 U. S. 493, 26 L. Ed. 810. 92 People v. Graceland Cemetery Co., 86 Ill. 336, 29 Am. Rep. 32; Lackawanna Iron & Coal Co. v. Luzerne County, 42 Pa. St. 424; Railroad v. Berks County, 6 Pa. St. 70. 93 In re Swigert, 119 Ill. 83, 59 Am. Rep. 789, 6 N. E. 469; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Irvin, 72 Ill. 456 (where it was held that steamboats owned by a railroad company were not exempt); Camden & Amboy Railroad & Transp. Co. v. Commissioners of Mansfield, 23 N. J. L. 510, 57 Am. Dec. 409 (where it was held that certain dwelling houses and lots of land owned by a railroad company, and let by it to workmen and mechanics in its employ, were not exempt); Railroad v. Berks County, 6 Pa. St. 70. In an Illinois case, where the charter of a railroad company, after providing for a limited tax upon its stock, property, and assets, declared that it should be exempt from "all taxation of every kind" except as therein provided, it was held that this broad language should be construed, not alone but with reference to and in connection with the objects and purposes of the whole act; and that, of manufacturing corporations from taxation does not exempt property of such a corporation not used nor invested in its manufacturing; that an exemption of the property of a canal company does as the company was authorized to acquire and use all such real and other property as might be necessary for the consruction of its railway and stations, and such other accommodations as might be necessary to accomplish the objects of its creation, the property intended to be exempted was such as that described, that is, such as was necessary for the construction and operation of its road. It was held, therefore, that a grain elevator erected by the company on its right of way, and leased by it to private parties, who received tolls and compensation for all grain stored therein, was not within the exemption. In re Swigert, 119 Ill. 83, 59 Am. Rep. 789, 6 N. E. 469. An exemption of property of a railroad company from taxation does not exempt large tracts of timberlands purchased by it for the purpose of taking timber therefrom, and converting it into ties and lumber for its own use. County of Todd v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 38 Minn. 163, 36 N. W. 109. It has been held, however, that a statute exempting the property of a railroad company from taxation exempts a tract of gravel land, purchased by the company to provide material for the repair of its road, and a branch road connecting such tract with its road. New Jersey R. & Transp. Co. v. Hancock, 35 N. J. L. 537. It seems that, where the mainterance of inns and boarding houses by railroad companies at their stations for the use of persons arriving and departing on their trains appears to be necessary for the safety and convenience of the traveling public, the property employed exclusively for that purpose might be held exempt under a statute exempting property of railroad companies necessarily used in operating their roads. But if such an inn is kept for the accommodation of all persons applying to become guests, and not merely for the accommodation of persons arriving and departing on the company's trains, the property is taxable. In such a case, the courts cannot hold distin et portions of the premises taxable, and the residue exempt, but the whole is taxable. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Crawford County Sup'rs, 29 Wis. 116. Even if an exemption contained in the charter of a railroad company is properly construed as applying not only to the property necessary for the company's business but also to all other property which by the terms of its charter the company was at liberty to acquire, such exemption will not extend to property, not necessary for its business, which the company ac quired under the authority of a subsequent act of the legislature which act contained no exemption clause. Ford v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 164 U. S. 662, 41 L. Ed. 590. 94 Com. v. Mahoning Rolling-Mill Co., 129 Pa. St. 360, 18 Atl. 135; Ap peal of Commonwealth, 129 Pa. St. 338, 18 Atl. 132, 129 Pa. St. 346, 18 |