corporated under the general corporation statute and conducted for profit, does not become an institution, not conducted for profit, the state and in part from private persons, and by the tuition of its paying pupils; operated without private gain; admitting three classes of pupils, namely, full pay, half pay, and free, and, while giving a preference in the order of admittance to children whose parents are connected with the sponsoring denomination, neither excluding, nor providing peculiar terms for the admittance of, any child because of the denominational connection of its parents, is a purely public charity within the meaning of the provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution which gives the general assembly the power to exempt by general laws institutions of "purely public charity," and is an institution "founded, endowed, and maintained by public or private charity" within the meaning of the statute enacted under the authority of such constitutional provision. Episcopal Academy v. Philadelphia, 150 Pa. St. 565, 25 Atl. 55. Compare, Appeal of Philadelphia, 1 Monag. (Pa.) 1, 15 Atl. 683, no reference to which is made by the court in Episcopal Academy v. Philadelphia, supra. The bill in Appeal of Philadelphia averred that "the academy [the real property belonging to which had been taxed] is maintained from the income derived from such property as has been given to or purchased by it, and from fees for tuition, which are at a much lower rate than institutions of a like grade. No rent is charged for the use of the academy, and all the receipts and income of the incorporation, after defraying the necessary expenses of maintenance, teachers' salaries, etc., are applied to increasing the number of free scholars. The number of free scholars has ranged from sixteen to thirty; and, the court: "What proportion of the amount expended in maintaining the academy is derived from tuition fees does not appear; but it is claimed, and virtually conceded, that the institution is mainly dependent on tuition fees to meet its current expenses; that probably not less than seven-eighths of the amount required is derived from that source. It was incumbent on appellees to show that the institution under their care is at least substantially maintained by public or private charity. This has not been done. On the contrary, it may be fairly inferred that its chief source of maintenance is and has been tuition fees. If so, it cannot, in the constitutional sense, be regarded as an institution of purely public charity. In principle the case is not distinguishable from College v. Mercer Co., 101 Pa. 530, or Miller's Appeals, 10 Wkly. Notes Cas. 168. In the latter, the facts disclosed by the record presented a much stronger claim for exemption than the case now under consideration." See Philadelphia v. Women's Christian Ass'n, 125 Pa. St. 572, 17 Atl. 475, in which Appeal of Philadelphia, supra, and the two cases, referred to by the court in the part of its opinion above quoted, are considered, and in which, although as appears from the figures set out in the merely by reincorporating under the statute relating to associations not for pecuniary profit and by changing its financial system so that, instead of receiving the net income in the form of dividends on his stock, the institution's virtual owner is to receive it in the form of interest on the purchase-money mortgage executed by the new corporation to the old one and assigned by the latter to such owner.77 opinion more than five-sixths of the expenses of the institution involved were met by the receipts therefrom, the court held that the home for young women, maintained by the corporation taxed, was a public charity, and admitted that its views might be in "conflict slightly with what has been said in some of the cases referred to," but declared that "they do not conflict with the points decided in either of them, while they are believed to be in entire harmony with Donohugh's Appeal," 86 Pa. St. 306. 77 Montclair V. State Board of Equalization of Taxes, 86 N. J. L. 497, 92 Atl. 270; Nassau Gas Light Co. v. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 409; Com. v. Edison Elec. Light & Power Co., 170 Pa. St. 231, 32 Atl. 419; Cơm. v. Northern Elec. Light & Power Co., 145 Pa. St. 105, 14 L. R. A. 107, 22 Atl. 839. As to the exemption of corporations organized exclusively for manufacturing, under the Pennsylvania statute, see Com. v. National Oil Co., 157 Pa. St. 516, 27 Atl. 374; Com. v. Savage Fire Brick Co., 157 Pa. St. 512, 27 Atl. 374; Com. v. Juniata. Coke Co., 157 Pa. St. 507, 22 L. R. A. 232, 27 Atı. 373; Com. v. Pottsville Iron & Steel Co., 157 Pa. St. 500, 22 L. R. A. 228, 27 Atl. 371; Com. v. J. B. Lippincott Co., 156 Pa. St. 513, 27 Atl. 10; Com. v. Thackara Mfg. Co., 156 Pa. St. 510, 27 Atl. 13; Com. v. Pittsburgh Bridge Co., 156 Pa. St. 507, 27 Atl. 4; Com. v. Keystone Bridge Co., 156 Pa. St. 500, 27 Atl. 1. plying light, heat, and power by means of electricity are manufac turing corporations, § 88, supra. But it is held that they are not within the Pennsylvania statute. Com. v. Edison Elec. Light & Power Co., 170 Pa. St. 231, 32 Atl. 419; Com. v. Edison Elec. Light Co., 145 Pa. St. 131, 27 Am. St. Rep. 683, 22 Atl. 841, 845; Com. v. Northern Elec. Light & Power Co., 145 Pa. St. 105, 14 L. R. A. 107, 22 Atl. 839; supra, § 88, note 11. The fact that a manufacturing corporation has the ancillary power, by express legislative permission, to engage in mining, or any other pursuit, in aid of its manufacturing enterprises, where it has never used or sought to use such power, does not take it out of the operation of a statute granting exemption from taxation to corporations organized exclusively for manufacturing purposes, and actually carrying on manufacturing within the state. Com. v. Pottsville Iron & Steel Co., 157 Pa. St. 500, 22 L. R. A. 228, 27 Atl. 371. Where the charter of a corporation organized under the law authorizing corporations for manufacturing contains words empowering it, not only to manufacture, but also to engage in a mercantile business, the words empowering it to engage in a mercantile business are mere surplusage. It is a corporation exclusively for manufacturing, and is taxable, under the Pennsylvania statute, on so much of its capital stock only as is invested in the mercantile business. Corporations for the purpose of sup A corporation cannot claim an exemption under a statute exempting manufacturing corporations, unless its business is that of manufacturing.78 Lippincott Co., 156 Pa. St. 513, 27 Atl. 10. Under a statute providing that every foreign corporation doing busi ness in the state except manufacturing or mining corporations carrying on manufacture or mining ores within the state shall be subject to and pay a tax, as a tax upon its corpo1ate franchise or business, it was held that if a foreign corporation was carrying on enough of its manufacturing operations in the state so that it could be said, fairly and reasonably, to be engaged in manufacturing in the state, then it came within the letter and spirit of the exemption clause, and neither the state comptroller nor the courts had the right to hold that, because only a comparatively small portion of all its manufacturing operations were carried on in the state, it was not, for that reason, within the exemption. In other words, if the corporation, in the ordinary and regular course of its business, in good faith, and not for the purpose of evading the law, was actually carrying on any part of its manufacturing operations in the state, that was enough, and it was not left to the taxing officer or the courts to prescribe how much or what percentage of the whole manufacturing business should be done within the state to entitle the corporation to claim the exemption. People v. Wemple, 133 N. Y. 323, 31 N. E. 238, rev'g 62 Hun 619, 16 N. Y. Supp. 602. Under a later statute providing that foreign corporations in order to be entitled to claim the exemption should be wholly engaged in carrying on manufactures within this state," it was held if a foreign corporation was engaged in the manufacture and sale VII Priv. Corp.-58 of its products in the state and also in the purchase and sale of other goods not manufactured by it, was not wholly engaged in carrying on manufactures within the state, and consequently was taxable on the amount of its capital stock employed there. The court said: "If it seems a harsh and unwise rule that imposes upon a foreign corporation a tax upon a large amount of its capital that it brings into this state, and employs in a legitimate and prosperous manufacturing business, which requires for its factory real estate valued at nearly a quarter of a million dollars, and gives employment to four hundred and fifty skilled workmen, it is a subject that should be brought to the attention of the legislature, as courts must enforce the law as written. It would seem that a wise public policy should encourage manufacturers, and so adjust the taxation as to promote the investment of foreign capital within the state in manufacturing enterprises." People v. Campbell, 145 N. Y. 587, 40 N. E. 239, aff 'g SO Hun 466, 30 N. Y. Supp. 472. Foreign silver mining company held not a manufacturing corporation with in the exemption of manufacturing corporations from payment of a li cense tax. Horn Silver Min. Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305, 36 L. Ed. 164. A statute exempting "the stock or property of every incorporated agricultural society" applies as well to such a society which is a joint stock corporation with capital stock as it does to such a society which has no capital stock. Town of West Hartford v. Connecticut Fair Ass'n, 88 Conn. 627, 92 Atl. 432. 78 Dudley v. Jamaica Pond Aque If a grant of exemption actually made to a railroad company is conditional, the conditions must be fulfilled before it will become operative. Thus, if the charter of the company, or some other stat ute, exempts its property from taxation upon completion of its road, there is no exemption before the road is completed.79 § 4641. Property included in exemption-In general. If the legislature has lawfully granted to a corporation an exemption of its property from taxation, without restriction, the exemption certainly includes all tangible property, real or personal, which is held by the corporation for the purpose of carrying on the business for which it was created, and which is reasonably necessary for such purpose.80 An exemption of the property of a corporation exempts its gross receipts or earnings from carrying on its business.81 duct Corporation, 100 Mass. 183; People v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 99 N. Y. 181, 1 N. E. 669. 79 Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. v. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665, 29 L. Ed. 770. Exemption accruing to railroad company by its acquisition by contract with the state of the benefits of charter of potential corporation will be no broader than it would have been had it been exercised by such corporation. See Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 718, 24 L. Ed. 310. 80 Thus an exemption of the property of a railroad company from taxation exempts, not only its roadbed, but also its workshops, station and engine houses, and all other property used in the operation of its road. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Carland, 5 Mont. 146, 3 Pac. 134. An exemption of the property of a cemetery company includes the real estate held or dedicated for burial purposes. Metairie Cemetery Ass'n v. Board of Assessors, 37 La. Ann. 32; Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery v. Tripp, 14 R. I. 199. An exemption of the property of a religious corporation includes the church property. Erie v. First Universalist Church, 105 Pa. St. 278. And Under the New Jersey statute which exempts from taxation "all offices and franchises, and all prop erty used for railroad and canal pur poses, the taxation of which is provided for by any other law of this state," all offices and franchises are exempt whether taxed under any other law or not, the last clause of the statute, as quoted, qualifying only "property used for railroad and canal purposes" and not "offices and franchises.'' North Jersey St. R. Co. v. Jersey City, 74 N. J. L. 761, 67 Atl. 33, rev'g on this proposition 73 N. J. L. 481, 63 Atl. 833. 81 Worth v. Petersburg R. Co., 89 N. C. 301; Worth v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 89 N. C. 291, 45 Am. Rep. 679. A state tax on a railroad company's gross receipts for the transportation of freight and passengers is a violation of the state's contract not to tax the company or its property. Pacific R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 22 L. Ed. 282. A constitutional provision that such property as the general assembly may deem necessary for school purposes may be exempt from taxation is broad enough to permit the granting to a university corporation of an exemption of the rents and profits of land an exemption, if general, applies to property afterwards acquired by the corporation.82 An exemption of particular property, however, cannot be extended by implication to property not clearly included in that specified. Thus, it has been held that an exemption of the capital stock and dividends of a railroad company does not exempt lands granted by the state; 83 and that an exemption of a railroad does not extend to and other property owned by it which rents and profits are devoted to its educational purposes, and does not merely sanction the exemption of such of the corporation's property as is actually occupied by it. Northwestern University v. People, 99 U. S. 309, 25 L. Ed. 387. 82 Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery v. Tripp, 14 R. I. 199. The exemption granted to a railroad company by its original charter as to the road it was then authorized to construct cannot be invoked as to portions of its road constructed or acquired under subsequent enabling acts which did not extend such exemption. Southwestern R. Co. v. Wright, 116 U. S. 231, 29 L. Ed. 626. A university charter, which recites that the university's founder "has donated" a certain sum of money and "has also given" a certain quantity of land, and provides that "the donations of the founder in cluding the plots of ground mentioned, so long as the same are held or used for the purpose of the institution, shall be free and exempt from taxation," exempts only the gifts recited and not the property taken by the university under the founder's will. In re Packer's Estate (Appeal of Lehigh University), 246 Pa. 131, 92 Atl. 75. An exemption, running to an educational institution, of "the cabinet collection and lot of ground on which it is erected belonging to the said institution, with any gifts, bequests, or endowments, so long as the same shall 83 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Land acquired by a college subsequently to the erection of its academic buildings and separated therefrom by a street and used mainly if not entirely for athletic purposes, is not land whereon such buildings are situated, necessary to the fair use and enjoyment thereof, so as to be entitled to exemption under the New Jersey statute. Stevens Inst. of Technology v. Bowes, 78 N. J. L. 205, 73 Atl. 38. The primary object of a statute exempting "all buildings used for charitable purposes, with the land whereon the same are erected, and which may be necessary for the fair enjoyment thereof" is the exemption of the buildings; the words "whereon the same are erected" are words of limitation and exclude land acquired by a charitable organization, subsequently to the erection of its build |