bank is incorporated provides that a certain per cent of the dividends, required to be declared semiannually, shall be set off to the state and that "the sum or amount so set off shall be in lieu of all taxes to which the company, or the stockholders therein, would otherwise be subject," the legislature cannot subsequently make the capital stock, surplus, and contingent fund of such bank taxable for the same purposes, to the same extent and in the same manner as other personal property, the tax provision of the creative statute being a contractual one and not merely a rule of taxation which is subject to change at the will of the legislature.51 On the other hand, however, since an exemption will never be presumed, the fact that the charter of a corporation contains no provision at all for taxation, and that there is no reservation of the power to alter, amend or repeal the same, does not prevent the state from afterwards taxing the corporation.52 And the mere fact that the charter of a corporation, or an amendment thereof, provides a certain mode for ascertaining the tax to be paid by a corporation, or specifies a particular rate of taxation, does not exempt the corporation from the power of the legislature to afterwards prescribe a different mode by which the tax will be increased, or from otherwise changing the rate.53 A provision in the charter of a corporation The in any year, and the stock actually which does not touch in any way the 51 Piqua Branch of State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. (U. S.) 369, 14 L. Ed. 977. See also Franklin Branch of State Bank v. Ohio, 1 Black (U. S.) 474, 17 L. Ed. 180; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black (U. S.) 436, 17 L. Ed. 173; Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Debolt, 18 How. (U. S.) 380, 15 L. Ed. 458; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. (U. S.) 331, 15 L. Ed. 401. 52 Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 514, 7 L. Ed. 939; Com. v. Lancaster Sav. Bank, 123 Mass. 493; Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252; Bank of Pennsylvania v. Com., 19 Pa. St. 144. 53 Union Passenger Ry. Co. v. Philadelphia, 101 U. S. 528, 25 L. Ed. 912, aff 'g 83 Pa. St. 429; Bailey v. Magwire, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 215, 22 L. Ed. 850; Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 206, 21 L. Ed. 888; Deposit Bank of Owensboro v. Daviess County, 102 Ky. 174, 44 L. R. A. 825, 39 S. W. 1030; Erie Ry. Co. v. Com., 66 Pa. St. 84, 5 Am. Rep. 351. The designation in the act, permitting a foreign railroad company to go through the state, of taxes to be paid does not prevent the subsequent imposition of another or greater tax. Erie that it shall pay annually into the treasury of the state a tax of a certain per cent upon its capital stock, where there is no provision that this shall be in lieu of all other taxes, does not prevent the leg islature from afterwards imposing a further or different tax. The provision is only a declaration of the tax payable until a different rate is established.54 A provision in a charter that the shares of stock in the corpora tion shall be taxed a certain amount does not preclude the state from imposing a tax on dividends.55 And a stipulation that a street railroad company shall pay the city annually a real estate tax does not exempt the company from the power of the city to impose a license or franchise tax.56 A provision that a street railroad corporation shall pay a certain license tax on each car run by it does not prevent the legislature from afterwards requiring it to pay a larger license tax.57 And the fact that the charter of a water or gas company imposes restrictions as to the amount it may charge consumers, or the city in which it is located, does not exempt it from the subsequent imposition of a license tax.58 But it has been held that a provision in a corporate charter that the corporation and its stockholders may enjoy all of the immunities which have been conferred upon an exist ing corporation and its stockholders confers upon the new corpora Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall. (U. 6.) 492, 22 L. Ed. 595. 54 Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 206, 21 L. Ed. 888, quoting Com. v. Easton Bank, 10 Pa. 442, 451. "In many, if not in most, acts of incorporation, however special in their nature, there are various provisions which are matters of general law and not of contract, and are, therefore, subject to modification or repeal. Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609, 28 L. Ed. 837, quoted in People v. Cook, 148 U. S. 397, 37 L. Ed. 498. Designation in amendment to charter of mode for ascertaining tax due state is not a contract. Bailey v. Magwire, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 215, 22 L. Ed. 850. The statement in an amendment to the charter of a railroad company that the company should thereafter pay the same annual tax to the state C tion and its stockholders such exemptions from taxation as have been granted to the old corporation and its stockholders.59 So also the grant to a railroad company of all of the powers, rights and privileges, granted by the charter of another such company to that company, confers upon it the exemption from taxation contained in the prior act amending the other company's act of incorporation.60 But the charter of a railroad company which invests the company "with all the rights and powers necessary to the construction and repair" of its road, and provides that, "for this purpose," the company "may have and use all the powers and privileges, and shall be subject to the same obligations" enumerated in certain specified sections of the charter of another railroad company does not grant to the company all of the powers and privileges vested in the other company by such sections of its charter, but only such ones thereof as are necessary to carry into effect the objects for which the new company is incorporated, and, exemption from taxation being a privilege not necessary to the construction, repair or operation of a railroad, the exemption granted to the older company by one of the specified sections of its charter does not vest in the new company, and it is immaterial, as far as this matter is concerned, that the state is to be the largest stockholder in the new company and is, to some extent, to be preferred in the division of profits made by such company.61 So also the provision in the charter of a railroad company whereby the company is "invested, for the purpose of making and using said road, with all the powers, rights, and privileges" that have been conferred upon a certain other company is a grant not of all of the rights and privileges of such other company but only of such ones thereof as are necessary to the grantee for the purpose of making and using its road, or, in other words, a grant of the franchises of the other company, and hence does not include an exemption from taxation similar to that vested in such other company, such exemption not being a franchise.62 Again, a corporation which is granted all of the "rights and privileges" of another corporation which has, antecedently, been granted all of the "rights, privileges, and immu 59 Nichols v. New Haven & N. Co., 42 Conn. 103, 128. 60 Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 244, 21 L. Ed. 326. Railroad company vested by reference with powers and privileges of a similar company held vested with such company's exemption from taxa tion. Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 139, 29 L. Ed. 833. 61 Annapolis & E. R. R. Co. v. County Com'rs Anne Arundel County, 103 U. S. 1, 26 L. Ed. 359. 62 Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697, 24 L. Ed. 1091. nities," of still a third corporation will be held not to take an exemption from taxation similar to that vested in such third corporation.63 66 § 4639. Construction of exemption in general. A grant to a corporation of exemption from taxation is to be strictly construed against the corporation and in favor of the state, and the extent of the exemption is strictly limited by the terms of the grant.64 This principle," however, "has never been carried so far as to require courts to be governed by the strict letter of the grant, ignoring its manifest import, or so far as to justify bad faith in the making of such contracts." 65 To the contrary, "in construing statutes which are binding on states as contracts, the words employed are, if possi 63 Phoenix Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 174, 40 L. Ed. 660. Whether the grant to a consolidated railroad company, by the general statute authorizing the consolidation, of the franchises and privileges" of its constituent companies would be sufficient to pass to it the exemption vested in one of such companies, quaere. Keokuk & W. R. Co. v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 301, 38 L. Ed. 450. 64 United States. Ford v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 164 U. S. 662, 41 L. Ed. 590; Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Wright, 164 U. S. 327, 41 L. Ed. 454; Winona & St. P. Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526, 40 L. Ed. 247; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black 436, 17 L. Ed. 173. Illinois. In re Swigert, 119 Ill. 83, 59 Am. Rep. 789, 6 N. E. 469. Nebraska. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Omaha v. Douglas County, 60 Neb. 642, 52 L. R. A. 123, 83 N. W. 924. New Jersey. Presbyterian Board Relief for Disabled Ministers & Widows & Orphans of Deceased Ministers v. Fisher, 68 N. J. L. 143, 52 Atl. 228. Oregon. Hibernian Benev. Society v. Kelly, 28 Ore. 173, 30 L. R. A. 167, 52 Am. St. Rep. 769, 42 Pac. 3. "Exemptions from taxation are regarded as in derogation of the sover the meaning of such language. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 718, 24 L. Ed. 310. For circumstances in which it was held that the rule of strict construc tion did not apply with its full force, see Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Crawford County Sup'rs, 29 Wis. 116. A statute exempting from taxation shares of stock in a corporation which is required to list or return "its capital and property" for taxation in the state, does not prevent the taxing of shares of stock in a foreign corporation which lists a small part of its property for taxation in the state, the statute contemplating only where the corporation is required to return all or substantially all of its capital and property. Sturges v. Car. ter, 114 U. S. 511, 29 L. Ed. 240. 65 Nichols v. New Haven & N. Co., 42 Conn. 103, 125. a case ble, to be given the same meaning they had in the minds of the parties to the contract when the statute was enacted. In this respect there is no difference between a contract of a state and a contract of a natural person. If the words employed are capable of more than one meaning, that meaning is to be given them which, taking the whole statute together, it is apparent the parties intended they should have." 66 Moreover, a clause, in a corporate charter, which is claimed to grant an exemption from taxation, should be read in the light of the public policy entertained, and the purposes sought to be accomplished at the time the charter was granted and not according to the ideas and theories prevailing at a later period.67 § 4640. Corporations entitled to exemption. Charitable corporations, institutions and associations have been among the commonest objects of grants of exemption. In such cases, the grant is made upon the ground that the grantee performs a service to the public and to some extent at least relieves the state from expense to which it would otherwise be put.68 The fact that the property claimed to be exempt is owned by a charitable organization and is devoted to charitable uses does not exclude it from the operation of the rule that an exemption must be construed most strictly against the grantee, and that the scope thereof cannot be permitted to extend further than the terms of the granting statute clearly require.69 66 Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 129, 29 L. Ed. 830. The inference deducible from the fact that the legislature makes the additional capital stock, authorized by it subsequently to the granting of the charter, subject to taxation is almost as conclusive that the original capital stock is not subject to taxation as an express declaration to that effect would have been. Nichols v. New Haven & N. Co., 42 Conn. 103, 129. 67 Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486, 38 L. Ed. 793. 68 New England Theosophical Corporation v. Board of Assessors, 172 Mass. 60, 42 L. R. A. 281, 51 N. E. 456. If a corporation, charged with the trust of conducting a charitable hospital, fails to discharge such trust, the remedy is not by placing upon the tax duplicate the corporation's property which, were it administered for charitable purposes, would be exempt from taxation, but by an action to enforce a proper execution of the trust, or by the revocation of the charter of the corporation for abuse of its corporate franchise and the appointment of another trustee to administer the trust. O'Brien v. Physicians' Hospital Ass'n, 96 Ohio St. 1, L. R. A. 1917 F 741, 744, 116 N. E. 975. That a grant of exemption in general terms to charitable corporations does not apply to foreign corporations, see In re Prime, 136 N. Y. 347, 18 L. R. A. 713, 32 N. E. 1091. 69 Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth v. Cory, 73 N. J. L. 699, 65 Atl. 500. In order that a corporation may |