the banking business, maintained a branch office in the state and also branch offices in other states, credits on the books of the corporation at such branch office in the state for monies sent by it to the other offices under instructions from the home office, without any promise or obligation upon the part of such branch offices or the home office to return the money to the office in the state, did not constitute credits within the meaning of such statute.71 § 4612. Property in transit. A tax on freight taken up within a state and carried out of it or taken up out of a state and brought within it, is a tax upon commerce between the states and therefore invalid, and it is immaterial that no distinction is made between freight carried wholly within the state and that brought into or carried through or out of it.72 And property delivered to a carrier for transportation, and in its hands for a reasonable time awaiting shipment to points out of the state is within the protection of this rule and not taxable.73 If the property is purchased by one who is resident abroad, and is distinctly set apart for export, it is not taxable although not yet on shipboard.74 Still more plainly would the property be nontaxable if it were merely in transit through the state.75 proceeds were withheld in the hands of the agent for purposes incidental to the prosecution of its business, and part deposited to the credit of the corporation, subject to the check of its local agent, and also for the prosecution of its business in the state and for such other purposes as the corporation might direct it to be applied to, and the corporation transacted business in the state precisely as did resident business men and firms, it was held that an assessment of the cash in bank of said corporation was proper and warranted by the provisions of a statute providing for the taxation of all property held or controlled by any agent or mandatory, and that the statute shall apply to any person representing business interests that may claim a domicile elsewhere, the intent being that no nonresident, either by himself or through any agent, shall transact business in the state without paying to it a corresponding tax with that exacted of its own citi zens, and that all bills receivable, obligations or credits arising from the business done in the state should be assessable in the state and at the business domicile of such nonresident, his agent or representative. Bluefields Banana Co. v. Board of Assessors, 49 La. Ann. 43, 21 So. 627. 71 London & S. F. Bank, Ltd. v. Block, 136 Fed. 138, rev'g 117 Fed. 900. 72 Case of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 232, 21 L. Ed. 146. See also § 4585, supra. 73 Ogilvie v. Crawford County, 7 Fed. 745; State v. Carrigan, 39 N. J. L. 35. A tax on all coal received by carriers to be carried to points either within or without the state is a tax on commerce. State v. Cumberland & P. R. Co., 40 Md. 22. 74 Clarke v. Clarke, 3 Woods 408, Fed. Cas. No. 2,846; Blount v. Munroe, 60 Ga. 61. 75 Case of State Freight Tax, 15 78 Whether the property is or is not in transit is a question of fact.76 The beginning and ending of the transit which constitutes interstate commerce are easy to mark.77 The first is defined to be the point of time that an article is committed to a carrier for transportation to the state of its destination, or started on its ultimate passage.7 The latter is defined to be the point of time at which it arrives at its destination.79 But intermediate between these points questions may arise.80 Property at an intermediate point between the place of shipment and ultimate destination may cease to be a subject of interstate commerce. Necessarily, however, the length of time and purpose of the interruption of transit must be considered.81 In considering when transit of goods from one state to another ceases, Mr. Justice Brown, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, said: "The law upon this subject, so far as it concerns interference with interstate commerce, is settled by several cases in this court which hold that property in transit is exempt from local taxation, although, if it be stored for an indefinite time during such transit, at least for other than natural causes or lack of facilities for immediate transportation, it may be lawfully assessed by the local authorities. The substance of these cases is that, while the property is at rest for an indefinite time awaiting transportation, or awaiting a sale at its place of destination, or at an intermediate point, it is subject to taxation. But if it be actually in transit to another state, it becomes the subject of interstate commerce, and is exempt from local assessment.” 82 Wall. (U. S.) 232, 21 L. Ed. 146; Burlington Lumber Co. v. Willetts, 118 Ill. 559, 9 N. E. 254; Standard Oil Co. v. Bachelor, 89 Ind. 1; State v. Carrigan 29 N. J. L. 35. Property in course of transportation from one state to another over a navigable river, as over any other public highway, is not subject to taxation in the state as it passes. Burlington Lumber Co. v. Willetts, 118 Ill. 559, 9 N. E. 254. 76 Lehigh & W. Coal Co. v. Borough of Junction, 75 N. J. L. 68, 66 Atl. 923. 77 General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 52 L. Ed. 754. 78 Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 29 L. Ed. 715. 79 Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 29 L. Ed. 257. 80 General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 52 L. Ed. 754; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 557, 19 L. Ed. 999; State v. Carrigan, 39 N. J. L. 35; State v. Engle, 34 N. J. L. 425. 81 General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 52 L. Ed. 754; Diamond Watch Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S. 82, 47 L. Ed. 394; Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577, 39 L. Ed. 538. 82 Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1, 47 L. Ed. 359, quoted in Merchants' Transfer Co. v. Board Review City of Des Moines, 128 Iowa 732, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 662, 5 Ann. Cas. 1016, 105 N. W. 211. Property bought within a state to be shipped out of it, but not yet started on its journey and awaiting a finishing process, is taxable with other property within the state.83 But where property is collected from one or more points by any means of transportation, and is awaiting the necessary preparation and facilities for further transportation, it is to be deemed in transit within the state.8 84 "That merchandise which is actually in transit from one state to another cannot be properly subjected to local taxation in a taxing district through which it is being transported is too well settled for controversy. But when such merchandise comes to a rest which is not a natural, or at least possible, incident of transportation, when transit ceases or is interrupted, and the property is stored or warehoused for an indefinite period for the convenience of the shipper or consignee, the general rule is not applicable and such property is subject to taxation by the state in which it is so stored or warehoused." 85 83 Standard Oil Co. v. Combs, 96 Ind. 179, 49 Am. Rep. 156; Rieman v. Shepard, 27 Ind. 288; Powell v. Madison, 21 Ind. 335; Carrier v. Gordon, 21 Ohio St. 605. Grain bought on commission for shipment is taxable. Walton v. Westwood, 73 Ill. 125. That cattle received by dealers were purchased for export does not constitute them property in transit. Myers v. County Com'rs Baltimore Co., 83 Md. 385, 34 L. R. A. 309, 55 Am. St. Rep. 349, 35 Atl. 144. Cattle owned out of, but for several months pastured in, the state are taxable. Hardesty Bros. v. Fleming, 57 Tex. 395; Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237, 39 L. R. A. 594, 75 Am. St. Rep. 904, 51 Pac. 593. Coal brought into a state for sale is taxable. Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577, 39 L. Ed. 538; Brown v. Houston, 33 La. Ann. 843, 39 Am. Rep. 284, aff'd 114 U. S. 622, 29 L. Ed. 257. Coal shipped from one state and stored in another state to await orders for sale, and then to be transshipped customers purchasing after such storage, is not interstate commerce, to and is taxable at the place of storage in the state. Lehigh & W. Coal Co. v. Borough of Junction, 75 N. J. L. 68, 66 Atl. 923. Where coal mined in a state was sent by rail to another state, where it was deposited on the wharf for separation and assortment for the purpose of being shipped to other markets for the purpose of sale, it was held that the property was not subject to taxation in the latter state. The court said: "Delay within the state, which is no longer than is necessary for the convenience of transshipment for its transportation to its destination, will not make it property within the state for the purpose of taxation." State v. Engle, 34 N. J. L. 425, quoted with approval in General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 52 L. Ed. 754. See to the same effect, State v. Carrigan, 39 N. J. L. 35. 84 Burlington Lumber Co. v. Willetts, 118 Ill. 559, 9 N. E. 254; Standard Oil Co. v. Bachelor, 89 Ind. 1. 85 Merchants' Transfer Co. v. Board Review City of Des Moines, 128 Iowa 732, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 662, 5 Ann. Cas. 1016, 105 N. W. 211, following American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, Where property is collected, even though it may be at the point of final shipment to await indefinitely the owner's pleasure or the rise of markets, or to undergo a partial process of manufacture, or 192 U. S. 500, 48 L. Ed. 538. Continuing, the court said: "It would require a most violent perversion of the plain ordinary meaning of the words to say that goods so held are in any just sense in transit.' The shipments had reached their destination for the time being and become a part of the general property of the state. As such they were subject to the taxing power of the state. In this conclusion we find direct and authoritative support in American the United States this judgment was affirmed. A rule to the same logical effect was also announced by that court in Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 5 Sup. Ct. 1091, 29 L. Ed. 257, and Pittsburg Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577, 15 Sup. Ct. 415, 39 L. Ed. 538. In the latter case a coal company in Pennsylvania consigned several large loads of coal to its agent in New Orleans for sale at that market. As a matter of convenience the barges were stopped and moored in the river before reaching New Orleans, to be held there until forwarded upon order of the agent. While thus detained the local assessor of the taxing district where the boats were tied up listed the property for taxation, and this tax was held to be within the constitutional power of the state. To the same effect, see Burlington Lumber Co. v. Willetts (Ill.), 9 N. E. 254. Quite identical in principle, also, is New York ex rel. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21, 24 Sup. Ct. 202, 48 L. Ed. 325. It must be borne in mind, also, that to invalidate the act of a state, as an unwarranted interference with interstate commerce, such interference with the reserved power of the general government 'must be direct, and not the mere incidental effect of the requirement of the usual proportional contribution to the public maintenance.' N. Y. R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U. S. 439, 15 Sup. Ct. 896, 39 L. Ed. 1043. And we think, if the tax now in question can be said to impose any burden upon interstate commerce, it is only in a very remote and incidental way. There is nothing inherently unjust in a provision of law which compels åll property situated in the state and enjoying its protection to bear its equal and just share Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 24 Sup. Ct. 365, 48 L. Ed. 538. In most of its material features this case is parallel with the one at bar. The plaintiff was a manufacturer of wire. Its sales to dealers in the territory of which Memphis, Tenn., was the commercial center, were negotiated by traveling agents, who canvassed that territory and took orders or contracts for future delivery. The goods necessary to fill these orders were massed in large shipments and forwarded to the Patterson Transfer Company, of Memphis, a corporation carrying on a business similar to that of the appellant in the case at bar. Under its arrangements with the shipper the duty of the transfer company as stated in the opinion was confined to the transfer of the goods so received to the warehouses, the keeping of them in storage, and their subsequent delivery to the customers of the manufacturing company under its general or special orders. Goods thus received and in the possession of the transfer company were assessed for local taxation. The Supreme Court of the state held that such property was not to be treated as in transit, and sustained the validity of the tax. On appeal to the Supreme Court of from any other cause having no relation to the preparation for or facilities or exigencies of transportation it will be held to have acquired a situs, making it subject to taxation.86 In a leading case, the plaintiff was a foreign corporation engaged of the public burdens, the statute in question is clearly within the constitutional power of the state, and the assessor is not shown to have abused or transcended the authority thus given him. Counsel seek to distinguish the American Steel & Wire Co. case to that which we have adverted by suggesting that, owing to some peculiar provisions of the contracts of sale made by the company's agents and the manner in which the business was done, such sales were in fact consummated after the goods had come into the hands of the transfer company. In our opinion it is equally true in the case at bar that no sale was consummated until the appellant, acting upon the order of the manufacturer, assorted out the goods and shipped them from its warehouse to the customers. Up to that time the possession of the common carrier was the possession of the original shipper. No delivery active or constructive had been made to the customer, and no title passes. Whether these goods ciently stated, we hold that when the shipments had reached the consignee, the transfer company, and had been stored in its warehouse subject to the shipper's orders, they had arrived at their destination for the time being, and that the mental purpose of such shippers to have goods thereafter distributed and sent out to their several customers would have no effect to make such property exempt from taxation or clothe it with the peculiar immunities pertaining to interstate commerce. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475, 29 L. Ed. 715; Myers v. Baltimore, 83 Md. 385, 35 Atl. 144, 34 L. R. A. 309, 55 Am. St. Rep. 349." 86 County of Brown v. Standard Oil Co., 103 Ind. 302, 2 N. E. 758. See also General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 52 L. Ed. 754; I. M. Darnell & Son Co. v. Memphis, 208 U. S. 113, 52 L. Ed. 413, rev'g 116 Tenn. 424, 95 S. W. 816; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 48 L. Ed. 538; People v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21, 48 L. Ed. 325; Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S. 82, 47 L. Ed. 394; Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1, 47 L. Ed. 359; Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577, 39 L. Ed. 538; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 29 L. Ed. 257; American Harrow Co. v. Shaffer, 68 Fed. 750; Price Co. v. Atlanta, 105 Ga. 358, 31 S. E. 619; Merchants' Transfer Co. v. Board Review City of Des Moines, 128 Iowa 732, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 662, 5 Ann. Cas. 1016, 105 N. W. 211; Lehigh & W. Coal Co. v. Borough of Junction, 75 N. J. L. 68, 66 Atl. 923; I. M. Darnell & Son Co. v. Memphis, 116 Tenn. 424, 95 S. W. 816, rev'd 208 U. S. 113, 52 L. Ed. 413. should ever be forwarded to the retail dealers, or should remain in the warehouse, or should be diverted to meet other demands of the trade, rested wholly in the will of the shipper. When the order to forward was finally given and the designated goods were again put in course of transportation there was to all intents and purposes a new and independent shipment. But, be this as it may, the answer to the question whether the sales had been consummated is by no means necessarily decisive of the inquiry whether the goods at the date of the assessment were actually in transit, and therefore protected against local taxation. For reasons already suffi |