however, for the legislature to make such property taxable in the county in which the corporation resides—that is, the county in which it has its principal office or place of business-although the property may be located in another county.38 So while the real property of railroad companies is sometimes taxed, like other realty, in the counties in which it is located, it is, in other jurisdictions, taxed as an entirety at the place where the company has its principal office.39 § 4610.- Personalty in general. It is "a general rule of the law of taxation of personal property that such property can only be taxed at the residence of the owner, or at such place as it has acquired a situs, which will subject it to the taxing power of the state where found." 40 for Savings v. Gardiner, 4 R. I. 484; American Bank v. Mumford, 4 R. I. 478. 38 Amesbury Woolen & Cotton Mfg. Co. v. Inhabitants of Amesbury, 17 Mass. 461; Amesbury Nail Factory Co. v. Weed, 17 Mass. 53; Salem Iron Factory Co. v. Inhabitants of Danvers, 10 Mass. 514; Goodell Mfg. Co. v. Trask, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 514. 39 As to this, see the following decisions: United States. Huntington v. Central Pac. R. Co., 2 Sawy. 503, Fed. Cas. No. 6,911. California. People v. Placerville & S. Val. R. Co., 34 Cal. 656; People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 459. Connecticut. Osborn v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 40 Conn. 498. Illinois. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Paddock, 75 Ill. 616; Sangamon & M. R. Co. v. Morgan County, 14 Ill. 163, 56 Am. Dec. 497. Indiana. Toledo & W. R. Co. v. Lafayette, 22 Ind. 262. Kentucky. Applegate v. Ernst, 3 Bush 648. Virginia. Orange & A. R. Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Gratt. 176. A railroad company may be taxable in each county through which its road runs, upon the proportion of the whole value of its road which the length of the road in each county bears to the whole length of the road within the state. See State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 23 L. Ed. 663; Huck v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 86 Ill. 352. The inherent value in the property of a street railway company over and above the cost of reproducing its rails, stringers, poles, wires, power house, etc., springs not out of any ownership by the company of an interest in the soil of the highways over which its road passes, but out of its ownership of the franchise to maintain and operate its road over those highways and to collect tolls from all persons traveling on such road, and it is this franchise and not any easement in the soil of the highways which, in this connection constitutes the taxable value, and, when the state alone has the right to tax franchises, the municipality in which the company operates its road cannot tax the basis of the value of the company's property as an interrelated whole on the theory that it is real estate. Newark v. State Board of Taxation, 67 N. J. L. 246, 51 Atl. 67, rev'g 66 N. J. L. 466, 49 Atl. 525. See also North Jersey St. R. Co. v. Jersey City, 74 N. J. L. 761, 67 Atl. 33. 40 State Board Assessors Comptoir Nat. d'Escompte, 191 U. S. of V. In the absence of provision to the contrary, and except in the case of corporeal personalty 41 located in a state different from the one in which its owner resides, 42 the situs of personal property, for the purpose of taxation, follows the person of the owner, and it is taxable at the place where he resides, and this is true of the personal property of a corporation.43 The residence of a corporation for this purpose, as for other purposes, is in the state by or under whose laws it was created, and, in the absence of provision to the contrary, and generally by express provision, in the county or city in which it has its principal office or place of business. This rule, however, applies 44 41Corporeal personal property is conceded to be taxable at the place where it is actually situated." Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133, 44 L. Ed. 701. 42 The Kentucky statute which imposes a tax upon the personal property of domestic corporations whether such property be within or without the state is invalid as to cars of a domestic refrigerator-ear company which are permanently located in foreign states and are employed there in the prosecution of the company's busi ness. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 50 L. Ed. 150, 4 Ann. Cas. 493, rev 'g 26 Ky. L. Rep. 23, 80 S. W. 490. In delivering the opinion of the Federal Supreme Court in this case, Mr. Justice Brown used the following cautionary language: "It is unnecessary to say that this case does not involve the question of the taxation of intangible personal property, or of inheritance or succession taxes, or of questions arising between different municipalities or taxing districts within the same state, which are controlled by different considerations." See also § 4607, supra. 43 Tappan v. Merchants' Nat. Bank of Chicago, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 490, 22 L. Ed. 189; Tost v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 112 Fed. 746; People v. Cald- 45 Illinois. Sangamon & M. R. Co. v. Morgan County, 14 Ill. 163, 56 Am. Dec. 497. Maryland. Baltimore v. Baltimore City Passenger Ry. Co., 57 Md. 31. Michigan. Detroit Transp. Co. v. Board of Assessors City of Detroit, 91 Mich. 382, 51 N. W. 978. New York. Western Transp. Co. v. Scheu, 19 N. Y. 408; People v. MeLean, 17 Hun 204; Peter Cooper's Glue Factory v. McMahon, 15 Abb. N. Cas. 314. Ohio. Pelton v. Northern Transp. Co., 37 Ohio St. 450. Virginia. State Bank of Virginia v. Richmond, 79 Va. 113. Wisconsin. Milwaukee Steamship Co. v. Milwaukee, 83 Wis. 590, 18 L. R. A. 353, 53 N. W. 839. Under a statute providing that all foreign corporations doing business in the state shall be assessed upon all sums invested in the state in its business in the same manner as if they were domestic corporations, a foreign corporation doing business in the state, and having an office therein was held taxable for moneys invested in the state in the town or ward where such principal office is located, and the assessment at such place must be only where there is no provision to the contrary. It is within the power of a state to separate personal property from the person of the owner for the purpose of taxation, and tax it, like real property, in the place where it is situated.46 exclusive, and embrace all property liable to taxation within the state. People v. McLean, 80 N. Y. 254, aff'g 17 Hun 204, 5 Abb. N. Cas. 137. It was held, also, that the place for assessment for the purposes of taxation of a foreign insurance corporation doing business in the state was where the principal business of the corporation was carried on, and not at the residence of the comptroller of the state, even as to securities deposited with him. British Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. Taxes & Assessments, 31 N. Y. 32. Commissioners of Under a statute providing that the personal property of a corporation shall be taxed in the town in which it has its principal place of business. or exercises its corporate powers," the principal place of business of a corporation is the place where the governing power of the corporation is exercised, and not the place where the principal labor of the employees of the corporation is done. Middletown Ferry Co. v. Town of Middletown, 40 Conn, 65. By statute in New York (N. Y. Tax Laws, § 11) it is provided that all the personal estate of every incorporated company liable to taxation on its capital shall be assessed in the tax district where the principal office or place for transacting the financial concerns of the company shall be, or if such company has no principal office, or place for transacting its financial concerns, then in the tax district where the operations of such company thall be carried on. Under such statute, it has been held that the personal property within the state of a foreign corporation doing business in the state is to be taxed at the place where its principal office, within the state, is located, regardless of the actual situs of such property (New York Milk Products Co. v. Damon, 57 N. Y. App. Div. 261, 263, 68 N. Y. Supp. 183; People v. Assessors of Olean, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 461), and that if a foreign corporation has two or more places of business for the sale of goods within the state, it is taxable on its personal property situated or employed anywhere in the state at the place designated by it as its principal office within the state in the certificate required to be filed under a statute prescribing conditions upon which foreign corporations may do business in the state. People v. Barker, 157 N. Y. 159, 51 N. E. 1043. 46 United States. Columbus Southern R. Co. v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470, 38 L. Ed. 238; Tappan v. Merchants' Nat. Bank of Chicago, 19 Wall. 490, 22 L. Ed. 189; Yost v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 112 Fed. 747. Colorado. Denver & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Church, 17 Colo. 1, 31 Am. St. Rep. 252, 28 Pac. 468. Georgia. Armour Packing Co. v. Mayor, etc., City of Savannah, 115 Ga. 140, 41 S. E. 237. Illinois. First Nat. Bank of Mendota v. Smith, 65 Ill. 44, 54; Cook County v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 35 Ill. 460; Mills v. Thornton, 26 Ill. 300, 79 Am. Dec. 377. Maryland. William Wilkens Co. v. Baltimore, 103 Md. 293, 7 Ann. Cas. 1192, 63 Atl. 562. Missouri. State v. Severance, 55 Mo. 378. New York. People v. Barker, 84 App. Div. 469, 83 N. Y. Supp. 33. "For the purposes of taxation, as has been repeatedly affirmed by this "The ancient rule indicated by the maxim, 'Mobilia sequuntur personam,' 47 that personal property is to be regarded as subject to the lex domicilii, has never been of universal application in this country, and in modern times has seldom interfered with the power to levy taxes upon such property. The origin of that doctrine dates from an ancient time, when jewels and gold principally constituted the movable property, and that could be taken by the owner from court, personal property may be separated from its owner; and he may be taxed, on its account, at the place where it is, although not the place of his own domicile, and even if he is not a citizen or resident of the state which imposes the tax." Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 35 L. Ed. 613. Under a Michigan statute, where a lumber company had its principal office in the city of Detroit, but had no yard and paid no taxes there, it was held proper to tax its lumber in a remote township where, by contract with a company which had its mill and storage room there, it was manufactured and piled on the latter's docks, from which, after remaining until it was seasoned, it was taken by purchasers. Manistique Lumbering Co. v. Witter, 58 Mich. 625, 26 N. W. 151. In a recent Massachusetts case it appeared that the defendant, a foreign corporation, "by virtue of a contract with the city of Boston furnished it with fire alarm lamps and with 'boulevard lanterns, burners, domes, and incandescent mantles' for the lighting of public streets, parks, and other public places, all of which were owned by the defendant and placed on lamp posts owned by the city"; that "the defendant also furnished the gas consumed in them''; that it rented a building for storage, for making repairs and renewals, where also it kept needed tools and appliances, owned by it"; that "it also hired an office equipped with its own office furniture"; that "'it owned four horses, three wagons, three carriages, two sleighs, and four harnesses''; that "all this personal property was necessary and used for carrying out its lighting contract with the city," and that "the tax [for which the action was brought] was levied upon all this property.' Declaring the property involved to be taxable in its nature, the court held that it was included within the descriptive words of the Massachusetts statute which subjects to taxation "merchan dise, machinery, and animals owned by foreign corporations and not" taxed under another provision of the law and requires that such merchandise, etc., be assessed to the owner in the city or town'' where located, and that it was also comprehended within the words "goods, wares, merchandise" in the other Massachusetts statute which provides that such goods, etc., when owned by a foreign corporation "shall be assessed in the city or town where it is situated." Parker v. Rising Sun St. Lighting Co., Mass. -; 118 N. E. * 871. * 66 47 The common-law rule embodied in the maxim "mobilia personam sequuntur'' has been said to be "subject to so many exceptions and limitations that it is quite as liable to mislead as to furnish a correct guide, when considered alone." Board Com'rs Kingman Co. v. Leonard, 57 Kan. 531, 34 L. R. A. 810, 57 Am. St. Rep. 347, 46 Pac. 960. one place to another; but such has not been the case in recent times, since, in the continued progress of the world, the accumulated wealth consists in large proportions of personal property, including, not only jewels and gold, but also a great variety of other personal property, much of which is intangible, as franchises, privileges, etc., but nevertheless property representing value, and none of which is immediately connected with the person of the owner, yet over all of which it is incumbent upon government to extend its protection. The constantly increasing variety of such property, perceptible and imperceptible, tangible and intangible, has caused the ancient rule expressed in the maxim to yield more and more to the lex situs; and while it is true that, for many purposes, personal property is subject to the law of the place of the owner's domicile, still the law is well settled that for the purposes of taxation, and for other purposes, such property has its actual situs where it has been brought and used by its owner, and is subject to the law of that place. Hence, if the owner reside in one state, and his movables are taken to another, and used there, they may become the subject of taxation in the latter state. Such property may be separated from its owner; and he may be taxed because of it, at the place where it is found, although not the place of his domicile." 48 Accordingly, it has been held that the 48 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 18 Utah 378, 48 L. R. A. 790, 55 Pac. 639. See also Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 35 L. Ed. 613. "The maxim, mobilia sequuntur personam, has been frequently held to be but a fiction of law, having its origin in considerations of general convenience and public policy, and not to be applied to limit and control the right of the state to tax property within the jurisdiction, it being intended to permit the owner to deal with his personalty according to the law of his domicile, and to make testamentary disposition of it according to the law where he is rather than that of the situs of the property. It was intended for convenience, and not to be controlling where justice does not demand it." State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir VII Priv. Corp.-50 National d'Escompte, 191 U. S. 388, 48 L. Ed. 232. The rule that personal property, as to its situs, follows the domicile of its owner is merely the law of the state which recognizes it; and when it is called into operation as to property located in one state, and owned by a resident of another, it is a rule of comity in the former state rather than an absolute principle in all cases. Taylor v. Secor (State Railroad Tax Cases), 92 U. S. 575, 23 L. Ed. 663. The doctrine "mobilia sequuntur personam" is not allowed to stand in the way of the taxation of personalty in the place where it has its actual situs and the requisite legislative jurisdiction exists. St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. (U. S.) 423, 20 L. Ed. 192. The rule of law that personal property, as to its situs, follows the domi |