2 Court of the United States will recognize the necessity to the state of the power to tax and will not be eager nor quick to hold invalid a particular exercise of that power. Fearless in declaring void a tax statute that is clearly unconstitutional, the Federal Supreme Court will yet not go out of its way to find ground upon which a means adopted by a state for raising revenue can be held to be in conflict with the Federal Constitution. "There is," says such court, "no general supervision on the part of the nation over state taxation, and, in respect to the latter, the state has, speaking generally, the freedom of a sovereign, both as to objects and methods."95 The mere impolicy of a state tax statute does not concern the Supreme Court of the United States; such a statute may be hard, impolitic and unjust and yet not be unconstitutional.96 The Federal Constitution is not effective in all cases to protect persons and property from unjust or oppressive taxation by the state. If such taxation is to be adjudged invalid, it must often be merely because of some provision in the state constitution or statutes.97 "It is not enough to justify the overthrow, by judicial decision, of a state law imposing taxation, simply to show that such law operates unjustly. So far as the courts of the Union are concerned, they must recognize and, when necessary to do so in cases within their jurisdiction, enforce the statutes of the several states, unless those statutes encroach upon legitimate national authority, or violate some right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States." 98 The state is free to choose its own methods of taxation and its form and manner of enforcing payment of the taxes imposed subject only, as far as the federal power is concerned, to the limitations and restrictions of the Federal Constitution.99 "It is not for us to suggest 95 Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U. S. 245, 50 L. Ed. 744. 96 Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. Ed. 1037. "If business done wholly within a state is within the taxing power of the state, the courts of the United States cannot review or correct the action of the state in the exercise of that power" even though hardship result to the owner of the business from such action. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City Council of Charleston, 153 U. S. 692, 38 L. Ed. 871. 97 Memphis Gas-Light Co. v. Taxing Dist. of Shelby Co., 109 U. S. 398, 27 98 New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U. S. 628, 38 L. Ed. 846. 99 Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140, 55 L. Ed. 137. Where the state has the power to tax, "the extent and the proportion to which it is carried belongs to the judgment and discretion of the state only. It is beyond our [Federal Supreme Court's] examination.'' Erie Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 492, 22 L. Ed. 595. in any case," says the Supreme Court of the United States, "that a more equitable mode of assessment or rate of taxation might be adopted than the one prescribed by the legislature of the state; our only concern is with the validity of the tax; all else lies beyond the domain of our jurisdiction."1 § 4585. Regulation of interstate or foreign commerce-In general. Interstate commerce is not a matter of grace on the part of the states, but "is a right which every citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of the United States; and the accession of mere corporate facilities, as a matter of convenience in carrying on their business, cannot have the effect of depriving them of such right, unless Congress should see fit to interpose some contrary regulation on the subject."2 Under the Constitution of the United States, Congress has the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states. This power is certainly supreme over any power 1 Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 54 L. Ed. 688, quoting Minot v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. (Delaware Railroad Tax), 18 Wall. (U. S.) 206, 21 L. Ed. 888. 2 Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 35 L. Ed. 649, quoted in Western U. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 21, 54 L. Ed. 355. The interstate commerce carried on by corporations is entitled to the same protection against state taxation as is the interstate commerce carried on by natural persons. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 29 L. Ed. 158. 3 U. S. Const. art. 1, § 8. Congressional power over interstate commerce is as absolute as it is over foreign commerce. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 35 L. Ed. 649. See also Western U. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 54 L. Ed. 355. 4 In delivering the opinion of the court in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 419, 6 L. Ed. 678, 689, Chief Justice Marshall said: "We admit this power [of a state to tax] to be sacred; but cannot admit that it may be used so as to obstruct the free 4 course of a power given to Congress. "It is well settled and requires no 2 in the premises possessed by any one of the several states, and has review of the decisions of this court to that effect that the power of Congress over interstate commerce is supreme under the Federal Constitution, and that the states may not burden such commerce, it being the purpose of the Constitution of the United States to bring commerce of this character under one supreme control, and to vest the exercise of authority over it in the general government." Baltic Min. Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68, 58 L. Ed. 127. ently with the Constitution of the United States, they were yet valid because they also exercised an intrinsically local power. But this view can only be sustained upon the assumption that the limitations of the Constitution of the United States are not paramount but are subordinate to and may be set aside by state authority as the result of the exertion of a local power. In substance, therefore, the proposition must rest upon the theory that our dual system of government has no existence because the exertion of the lawful powers of the one involves the negation or destruction of the rightful authority of the other. But original discussion is unnecessary since to state the proposition is to demonstrate its want of foundation and because the fundamental error upon which it rests has been conclusively established. Indeed the cases referred to were concerned in various forms with the identical questions here involved and authoritatively settled that the states are without power to use their lawful authority to exclude foreign corporations by directly burdening interstate commerce as a condition of permitting them to do business in the state in violation of the Constitution, or because of the right to exclude, to exert the power to tax the property of the corporation and its activities outside of and beyond the jurisdiction of the state in disregard, not only of the commerce clause, but of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Citing to these statements Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280, 285, 56 L. Ed. 436, Ann. Cas. 1913 C 1050; InternationalText-Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 54 L. Ed. 678, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 493, 18 Ann. Cas. 1103; Ludwig v. Western U. Tel. Co., 216 U. S. 146, 54 L. Ed. 5 In Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178, 62 L. Ed. 230, a case in which a corporation, incorporated in Illinois. but doing business in Texas, attacked the permit and franchise taxes imposed by the latter state, the Federal Supreme Court, affirming the order of the Federal District Court (218 Fed. 260), awarding the corporation an interlocutory injunction, said: "It may not be doubted under the case stated that intrinsically and inherently considered both the permit tax and the tax denominated as a franchise tax were direct burdens on interstate commerce and moreover exerted the taxing authority of the state over property and rights which were wholly beyond the confines of the state and not subject to its jurisdiction and therefore constituted a taking without due process. It is also clear, however, that both the permit tax and the franchise tax exerted a power which the state undoubtedly possessed, that is the authority to control the doing of business within the state by a foreign corporation and the right to tax the intrastate business of such corporation carried on as the result of permission to come in. The sole contention, then, upon which the acts can be sustained is that although they exerted a power which could not be called into play consist been said to be exclusive, at least, "whenever the subjects of it are national in their character, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation," regardless of whether Congress sees fit to exercise it. 423; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56, 54 L. Ed. 378, and Western U. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 54 L. Ed. 355, the court held that such cases were not overruled by Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U. S. 111, 61 L. Ed. 176; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Botkin, 240 U. S. 227, 60 L. Ed. 617; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 59 L. Ed. 265, and Baltic Min. Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68, 58 L. Ed. 127. * * "The power of a state to regulate the transaction of a local business within its borders by a foreign corporation is not unrestricted or absolute, but must be exerted in subordination to the limitations which the Constitution places on state action."' International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135, 141, 62 L. Ed. 624, Ann. Cas. 1918 C 617, recapitulating the holdings in Ludwig v. Western U. Tel. Co., 216 U. S. 146, 54 L. Ed. 423; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56, 54 L. Ed. 378, and Western U. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 54 L. Ed. 355. 7The Constitution of the United States having given to Congress the power to regulate commerce, not only with foreign nations, but among the several states, that power is necessarily exclusive whenever the subjects of it are national in their character, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation." Robbins v. Shelby Co. Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. Ed. 694. See also Atlantic & P. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160, 47 L. Ed. 995, 999, quoting the above and citing numerous cases decided subsequently to the many cited in Robbins v. Shelby Co. Taxing Dist., supra, and, further, Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 29 L. Ed. 257, quoted in note 8, infra. 8The power to regulate commerce among the several states is granted to Congress in terms as absolute as is the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. If not in all respects an exclusive power; if, in the absence of congressional action, the states may continue to regulate matters of local interest only incidentally affecting foreign and interstate commerce, such as pilots, wharves, harbors, roads, bridges, tolls, freights, etc., still, according to the rule laid down in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 319 [13 L. Ed. 1005], the power of Congress is exclusive wherever the matter is national in its character or admits of one uniform system or plan of regulation; and is certainly so far exclusive that no state has power to make any law or regulation which will affect the free and unrestrained intercourse and trade between the states, as Congress has left it, or which will impose any discrimi nating burden or tax upon the citi 6"Under the commerce clause exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce rests in Congress, and a state statute which either directly or by its necessary operation burdens such commerce is invalid, regardless of the purpose with which it was enacted." International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135, 141, 62 L. Ed. 624, Ann. Cas. 1918 C 617, recapitulating the holdings in Ludwig v. Western U. Tel. Co., 216 U. S. 146, 54 L. Ed. 423; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56, 54 L. Ed. 378, and Western U. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. 8. 1, 54 L. Ed. 355. T Taxation is never a privilege but is always a burden and a state tax on interstate or foreign commerce 10 is a burden thereupon 11 and hence a regulation thereof.12 It follows, therefore, as of course, zens or products of other states, coming or brought within its jurisdiction. All laws and regulations are restrictive of natural freedom to some extent, and where no regulation is imposed by the government which has the exclusive power to regulate, it is an indication of its will that the matter shall be left free. So long as Congress does not pass any law to regulate commerce among the several states, it hereby indicates its will that that commerce shall be free and untrammeled; and any regulation of the subject by the states is repugnant to such freedom. This has frequently been laid down as law in the judgments of this court. In Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. [275] 282 [23 L. Ed. 347], Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court, said: "The fact that Congress has not seen fit to prescribe any specific rules to govern interstate commerce does not affect the question. Its inaction on this subject, when considered with reference to its legislation with respect to foreign commerce, is equivalent to a declaration that interstate commerce shall be free and untrammeled.'"' Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 29 L. Ed. 257. See also Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 29 L. Ed. 158. 9 See § 4574, supra. 10 Insurance is not commerce (New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495, 58 L. Ed. 332, reviewing the several Federal Supreme Court cases thus holding), and hence a state which imposes an annual tax on all premiums charged or received on contracts for property insurance made within its boundaries by foreign insurance companies does not thereby impose a tax on foreign commerce. Liverpool & L. Life & Fire Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 566, 19 L. Ed. 1029. For the same reason a tax upon the excess of premiums, over losses and ordinary expenses, received in the state by a foreign insurance company, transacting business in the state, but making, modifying and discharging all of its insurance contracts at its home office in a foreign state is not invalid as a tax on interstate commerce. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495, 58 L. Ed. 332, aff'g 43 Mont. 243, 115 Pac. 911. The Kentucky statute requiring commercial agencies to procure a license and pay a tax is not invalid as to a foreign corporation, issuing lists of guaranteed attorneys and represented in Kentucky by certain Kentucky lawyers on such lists, on the ground that the business of such corporation is interstate commerce. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Kentucky, 231 U. S. 394, 58 L. Ed. 283, aff'g 139 Ky. 27, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 648, Ann. Cas. 1912 B 333, 129 S. W. 314. 11 Pacific Exp. Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339, 35 L. Ed. 1035; Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161, 34 L. Ed. 150; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 32 L. Ed. 311; Philadelphia & S. Mail Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 30 L. Ed. 1200. "It is thoroughly well settled in this court that state laws may not burden interstate commerce. As one form of burden may exist in taxing the conduct of interstate commerce, such taxation has been uniformly condemned." United States Exp. Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335, 56 L. Ed. 459. 12 Pacific Exp. Co. v. Seibert, 142 |