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larger expenditure of time and money than mine?
Second. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?
Third. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?
Fourth. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would ?
Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?
ABRAHAM LINCOLA MAIOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN.
June 28, 1862 This letter was written to W. H. Seward, the Secretary of State, shortly after the Union victories in Kentucky and Tennessee and upon the Mississippi River, in the spring of 1862.]
Executive Mansion, June 28, 1862. Hos. W. H. SEWARD:
MY DEAR SIR : My view of the present condition of the war is about as follows:
The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the flood in the Chickahominy have enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in Rich. mond for McClellan to successfully attack. In fact there soon will be no substantial rebel force anywhere else. But if we send all the force from here to McClellan, the enemy will, before we can know of it, send a force from Richmond and take Washington. Or if a large part of the western army be brought here to McClellan, they will let us have Richmond, and retake Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, etc. What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more. A reasonable force should in every event be kept about Washington for its protection Then let the country give us a hundred thousand new troops in the shortest possible time, which, added to McClellan directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place which we now hold, and will substantially end the war. I expect to maintaini this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me ; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard it is to have a thing un. derstood as it really is. I think the new force should be all, or nearly all. infantry, principally because such can be raised most cheaply and quickly. Yours very truly,
To Mrs. Lincoln
(Always touching was the President's affection, anxiety and playfulness in matters concerning his wife and his “dear Tad". even in the most crowded days of politics and warfare.) December 21, 1862
Washington. MRS. A. LINCOLN, Continental Hotel:
Do not come on the night train. It is too cold. Come in the morning.
June 9, 1863
Washington. MKS. LINCOLN, Philadelphia:
Think you had better put “Tad's" pistol away. I had an ugly dream about him.
September 31, 1863
Washington. Mrs. A. LINCOLN,
Fifth Avenue Hotel, New York: The air is so clear and cool and apparently bealthy that I would be glad for you to come. Nothing very particular but I would be glad to see you and Tad.