occurrence, as a contingency in the trial of countless free agents. But though a probable event, it can never seem approvable. Its becoming actual is an enigma beyond all speculation, which man can only solve by the plea of guilty.

The Economy of Evil is the theologian's question. Unlike the sin of the individual, that of the multitude or of the whole race seems to suggest a solution in some general law, or in God's own plan. A single trespass of his command might be unworthy of his notice; not so the long ages of a world's rebellion. Does He permit, and yet abhor, so immense an evil? Is it all against his will? Here we easily forget that of the poet:

"If not so frequent, would not sin be strange?
That 't is so frequent, this is stranger still."

The sinfulness of every man is in fact as unaccountable as that of any man. The mystery is not solved by simple multiplication. The extended fact may prove coëxtensive influences, circumstances, disabilities; but never a necessity of guilt, either in man's act or God's plan.

The End of Evil is preeminently the Christian's question. "Lord, what shall the end of these things be?" " Oh, let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end." Shall it be temporary, or eternal? Shall it be conserved, and its conservation sanctified by reasons of God's necessity or justice? or may it cease from the universe, as equally worthless and needless in the fair work of creation?

The triple problem we have proposed has been the trial of the skill, the moral integrity, and the faith, of the respective classes we have named. In every aspect it affects also our views of God's character, not to say of His power and His

nature.

§ 4. THE IDEA OF GOD, AND THE CONCEPTION Of god.

That men should believe there is a God, the Maker and Ruler of the world, and that they should be agreed respecting His attributes, are two very different things. The idea of a God

seems a part of our mental constitution, and, as the rudimentary principle of religion, is the same in all minds. A self-subsistent, mightiest, wisest, and best Being is of course God, and claims the homage of all His creatures. But how shall His Power, Wisdom, and Goodness appear?-is a question to which there are as many replies as there are kinds of religion among men. The true answer gives the true conception of God, and the true religion. But between this true conception, and conceptions so false or so dim as to fade away in atheism, there are endless gradations. Men are not agreed respecting God's natural attributes. Some regard Him as a formless Spirit; others, as having essentially a form, a body with its relations to space. With some, He is omnipresent by extension,-part here and part there; and eternal by succession of moments,—older now than He was then. Others discard such notions as gross and unworthy of a divine nature. And the moral attributes of God, even to godly men, appear as different as their views of what is wise, and just, and good. They conceive of God as variously as they do of his justice, wisdom, and goodness, and they worship Him accordingly. They differ as to the highest good; with some it is more intellectual, with others more spiritual, with others more social. And of all these men and their varying conceptions, we may say: "Like worshippers, like God."

In one of the dialogues of Plato this distinction is finely illustrated. It is agreed that the sacred (rò öcon) is that which is dear to the gods. But it happens that the gods themselves differ, so that what is dear to one is hateful to another; and almost every concrete thing is pleasing to some one of them.1 The great question remains,-what is the truly sacred, just, noble, and good, which all profess to regard, and which ought to be really dear to all?

The distinction between the idea and the conception of God is easily abused. We are sometimes told that all except those who have the absolutely true conception of God are idolaters. But we are not so easily hushed into modesty, when we compare

1 The Euthyphron.

ourselves with the worshippers of Moloch. We ask, would their god be worthy of divine honor, if he were real? or would our God be unworthy of divine honor, if he were real? On the other hand we are told that the idolater is a true worshipper, because his conception is that of a God. We answer, all worship "in spirit and in truth" is with reverent inquiry after the truest knowledge of God; false worship seeks to corrupt, or to ignore, a conception of God already too pure and holy. The one yearns after light; the other turns toward darkness. The God of the one is Deity obscured by the dimness of human thought; that of the other is Deity corrupted and un-deified by man's passions.

The idea of God may be compared to the idea of a circle; the child can apprehend it. The true conception of God answers to the doctrine of the properties of the circle, which human learning has not yet exhausted. In a study of geometry, the circle may be so overlaid with illustrative figures, that the careless eye shall not regard it; a subordinate or contrasted figure shall usurp its place. So men have deified some power of temporal good, or some dire evil. Thus the ancients had a whole Olympus of gods to their liking, while the "unknown God," as a barren idea, was neglected. The God of the affections will ever fill the thoughts.

The distinction we have made will be respected by those who employ the a priori argument for the being of God. They tell us there must be a self-existent One, the Archetype and Source of all good, because all men have an idea of such a Being. They certainly do not mean that there is just such a being as each man conceives God to be.

The distinction is vastly important. Freed from the abuse that confounds true and false worship, it still contains a caution to the true worshippers of God. They may dishonor Him by unworthy views and false conceptions. Fancying that they copy from Him, they may regard Him as altogether such an one as themselves, projecting their frail humanities as the models of infinite perfection. Theology may grow infallible and intolerant, mistaking a very false doctrine about God for a genuine doctrine of God. Or, when it is suggested that His character is maligned,

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we are told that IIe is of course infinitely perfect,-all men know that, and he needs no vindication. This easy refuge from the conception to the idea of God, however, will betray itself. Agreed in the true idea of God, and developing it as best we can, by the help of the revelation in His works and His word, we may yet join issue to see if a prevalent conception of His character accords with that idea.

The unworthy opinions of God which denote a wrong solution of the problem of Evil are various, but may be reduced to three classes; which, along with the true solution, we may style the four Theologies.

1. The first regards Evil as existing or subsisting in defiance not only of God's prohibition, but of His power. Either He could not prevent it, or He could not dispense with it. It is necessary, either as a fate, or as means to an end. It may be reduced to vassalage, but it cannot be eliminated or destroyed, without danger of greater evil. This theology, which makes Evil a power coördinate with Good, we shall call Dualism.

2. The second confesses the omnipotence of God, but employs it in the introduction and maintenance of Evil in the world. Evil is a part of God's plan, expressly designed as occasion for display of His attributes. Sin is committed, no less than it is forgiven or punished, of His sovereign purpose. In one form of the theory, the distinctions of right and wrong are themselves a decree of God's pure will, and might be reversed at His pleasure. This is the theology of a divine Absolutism, or Des potism.

3. The third is a natural reäction from the second. It rejects altogether the moral distinctions which had been rested in a pure arbitrament, and resolves all events into a course of Nature. In its higher forms it opposes to the dominion of fate only a divine indiscriminate goodness, or instinct of good nature. This is Naturalism, Pantheism, or Atheism.

4. The fourth seeks to reconcile all Evil that has been or

shall be with the Omnipotence of God, without sacrificing either His Justice or His Love, His moral or His natural goodness. It must answer the question: Why does perfect Power and Wisdom permit that which perfect Holiness abhors? The solution of this problem will be the true Theism.

In a word, Evil is either God's necessity,-or His choice,-or of Nature, and sin does not exist,-or it is simply permitted.

These four theologies will appear in their effects in the hearts of men. The first, creating an eternal conflict in the heavens, difficulties of divine government past all relief, - produces an Agony of Faith.

The second, affirming that might makes right, and that the end will sanctify the means, encourages in these who possess power, the Prostitution of Faith. To the victims of its reasonless omnipotence it leaves only a Prostration of Faith.

The third, blotting out this baleful light from the heavens as worse than darkness, bequeaths to mankind an Eclipse of Faith.

The fourth, recognizing Evil as actual, yet hateful, leaves for man a Trial of Faith; by which, however, he need not be overcome, looking for some "restitution of all things;" in which hope the trial may end in a Triumph.

§ 6.

THE NOTION OF EVIL AS AN ETERNAL NECESSITY
IS DUALISTIC.

The most gross and bald Dualism is that which asserts two personal, self-subsistent Gods, one good and the other evil, warring against each other. But there are various forms of Dualism aside from the notion of an evil God; and we shall define it to be the doctrine of EVIL AS AN ETERNAL PRINCIPLE, whether this principle be taken as a Person, or as a Law of Nature. And with this definition we affirm

1. That the doctrine of evil as an eternal necessity is only a refined form of the doctrine of evil as an eternal principle, and is essentially dualistic.

2. That the doctrine of eternal sin or misery, as the result of an event in time, logically involves the eternal necessity of evil, and is dualistic.