dictated, and then enforced, by the conqueror? Hitherto the bounds of the Empire have often enough, after successful war, been enlarged by cession; and sometimes in this way a foreign population of European blood has become, against its will, subject to Great Britain; but in these cases the defeated sovereign has handed over to the victorious sovereign the allegiance and territory of his former subjects, and the settlement is thus in some sort regularised. Thus Canada was ceded to England, Alsace and Lorraine to Germany. In the case of the Orange Free State there has of course been no question of 'suzerainty,' and even as regards the Transvaal the suzerainty,' or at least the meaning of that term, has since 1884 been highly disputable. The citizens of the two States assuredly owed no allegiance to the Queen, and they cannot therefore be regarded in any legal or constitutional sense as 'rebels;' and we shall gain nothing by any attempt to pretend to ourselves that our rights henceforth over the Republics spring from anything but conquest pure and simple. Thus Lord Roberts, as Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, was able to declare Mr. Steyn no longer President of the Free State. That conquest must be the inevitable end of the war, should have made Presidents Kruger and Steyn accept almost any terms rather than embark on it; and, on the other hand, it was the perception of this necessary result of war that made so many Englishmen, who realised the difficulties which conquest would bring to South Africa and the Empire, ready to offer or accept almost any conciliation or compromise with President Kruger which would have promised an honourable peace. The war is not now in question; nor is the conquest. They are great and terrible facts of which account has to be taken. It is impossible to treat seriously the letters of the two Presidents asking that the independence of the two Republican States should now be recognised. The status quo ante has disappeared for ever, and the task imposed upon British statesmanship is how to make the conquest of the two Dutch Republics a success.

Never was statesmanship put to a severer trial; all the more severe in that the general public seems hardly able yet to grasp the difficulties that have to be surmounted. It is perfe lear that henceforth the two Republics must be part 1 that citizens of these States must enjoy ties, and privileges, not by virtue of inbut under the law and constitution there must and can be no question.

more serious fashion than the vapourings of their daily papers.

During the first weeks of war we heard much of the terms which we should be ready to grant to our vanquished foes; but as the war went on, and as the severity of the struggle was better realised, men felt it was both more prudent and more dignified to achieve the victory before planning the disposal of its fruits. Lord Salisbury at the Guildhall on Lord Mayor's Day had said everything that needed saying in the early stages of the war. We were fighting, not to win for ourselves territory or gold, but to establish equal and just government among the Europeans of South Africa. We had to re-establish peace after victory, and to take security against its future disturbance. How this could best be done it would have been unwise and impolitic to discuss in detail in advance; for it is clear that the measures to be taken must necessarily depend on the circumstances and conditions found to exist when the pacification takes place. A condition precedent to the spread of free and constitutional government throughout South Africa is the destruction of the military power of the two republics.

There never was any sense in the notion that when once the enemy had been driven out of British territory the war would change its character, and would henceforth become a war of sheer aggression on our part. On this misapprehension of the problem which war, if it is to do any good at all, must solve, is founded the policy of offering terms of peace to the two republics, on the basis of their independence, as soon as their troops have been expelled from British territory. Upon which side of the frontier the conflict is waged for the time being is in truth merely a matter of military exigency, and by itself has little bearing on British or Boer rights or upon the terms of pacification which it will be politic eventually to ask. The republics must abandon for the future and once for all the theory that they form separate nations, with the rights and powers necessarily belonging to nationhood, such as the possession and control of military forces, arsenals, and forts. So much is clear. The Orange Free State and the South African Republic must be brought within the Empire. But here the difficulty begins. Most thoughtful Englishmen would be glad to give the Dutch States, for our sakes as well as for theirs, the largest possible amount of local autonomy consistent with the peace and quiet of South Africa; and will rejoice when it becomes possible for the Imperial factor

to have as little to say to the internal government of South Africa, as it now has to that of Canada or Australia. But that time has not come, and it will be the duty of the Imperial Power as soon as peace is established to start the new system under which the Dutch States are to be governed. The problem we have to solve is different in kind from anything we have yet attempted in our colonial empire. The Dutch States are accustomed to popular self-government based upon the most democratic lines. To govern such people on the system of a Crown colony could, of course, only be a temporary expedient till some form of local government based upon the instincts of the people should be established. To form them at once into self-governing colonies of the ordinary type would be to give them the very powers which all are agreed it would be dangerous to the general peace for them to enjoy. An Australian colony not only makes its own laws, but provides itself with what troops and what armaments it desires, and there is no difficulty in the case. But in the two Dutch States we make acquaintance with a new class of citizen-viz. with men of European blood who are British subjects against their will, and this necessarily introduces extreme difficulty into the working of popular government. Yet it is largely out of respect for the fundamental principle of democracy, equality of political privilege between man and man, that the British people has felt justified in the policy of war. Nevertheless it is impossible at once to apply to a conquered State, in its entirety and with success, a system of government which almost of necessity presupposes a free people.

The difficulties that have to be faced in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State are not the only ones that have to be faced in South Africa. It is useless to shut our eyes to facts, and the fact is that the war with the Republics has been largely regarded throughout the whole of South Africa as a civil war. How could it be otherwise, when father was ranged against son, and brother against brother? It is vain to suppose that the sympathies due to common race can be extinguished among the citizens of Cape Colony and Natal, or that with the bitter feelings left behind by the war between men of English and men of Dutch blood, free constitutional government will work altogether smoothly. Dutchmen are in a majority in Cape Colony. Under these circumstances, a peaceful and steady developement of local popular institutions into a great and loyal self-governing

South African Federation, under the British flag, though much to be desired, can hardly come about very rapidly.

The great successes in the field of the past six weeks have brought much nearer to our minds the immediate difficulties which will follow the re-establishment of peace. The great and rapid increase of our army, the brilliant strategy of Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener, and the never-failing valour of our troops have very quickly sufficed completely to turn the tables against the Boer forces. The relief of Kimberley, the capture of Kronje and his little army of 4,000 men, Sir Redvers Buller's entry into Ladysmith, and the capture of the Free State capital have of course convinced the whole world and our enemies themselves of the utter hopelessness of the Boer cause. It is now seriously questioned whether the two Republics have any time had more than fifty thousand men under arms, and these constitute almost the whole manhood of the race; for among the Boer prisoners, and among the killed and wounded, there have been found numbers of old men and boys of fourteen and even less, whom excess or deficiency of years would have disqualified from service in any of the regular armies of Europe. Our enemy, let us frankly acknowledge it, has shown splendid courage, and has made an extraordinary resistance to our arms; but there could not from the beginning be a doubt in the minds of Englishmen as to the ultimate victory in a war between the two Dutch Republics of South Africa and the British Empire. How complete has been our military triumph may be judged from the fact that something like a quarter of the whole fighting strength of the nations opposed to us has been placed hors de combat; while the British troops in South Africa probably now number at least five times what remain of our foes. Under these circumstances, it seems improbable that our troops should have to encounter very much more continuous heavy fighting, though it is possible, if not very likely, that irregular and scattered resistance may be prolonged for a considerable period. Thus there is every reason to hope that peace is not far distant, that the work of our generals and our soldiers is almost done, and that the work of our statesmen will soon be resumed.

With whom then is peace to be made? Are its terms to be agreed upon by the representatives of both belligerents, so as to bind them both, after the usual fashion in which peace is re-established after war between civilised nations? or are the terms simply to be

dictated, and then enforced, by the conqueror? Hitherto the bounds of the Empire have often enough, after successful war, been enlarged by cession; and sometimes in this way a foreign population of European blood has become, against its will, subject to Great Britain; but in these cases. the defeated sovereign has handed over to the victorious sovereign the allegiance and territory of his former subjects, and the settlement is thus in some sort regularised. Thus Canada was ceded to England, Alsace and Lorraine to Germany. In the case of the Orange Free State there has of course been no question of 'suzerainty,' and even as regards the Transvaal the 'suzerainty,' or at least the meaning of that term, has since 1884 been highly disputable. The citizens of the two States assuredly owed no allegiance to the Queen, and they cannot therefore be regarded in any legal or constitutional sense as 'rebels;' and we shall gain nothing by any attempt to pretend to ourselves that our rights henceforth over the Republics spring from anything but conquest pure and simple. Thus Lord Roberts, as Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, was able to declare Mr. Steyn no longer President of the Free State. That conquest must be the inevitable end of the war, should have made Presidents Kruger and Steyn accept almost any terms rather than embark on it; and, on the other hand, it was the perception of this necessary result of war that made so many Englishmen, who realised the difficulties which conquest would bring to South Africa and the Empire, ready to offer or accept almost any conciliation or compromise with President Kruger which would have promised an honourable peace. The war is not now in question; nor is the conquest. They are great and terrible facts of which account has to be taken. It is impossible to treat seriously the letters of the two Presidents asking that the independence of the two Republican States should now be recognised. The status quo ante has disappeared for ever, and the task imposed upon British statesmanship is how to make the conquest of the two Dutch Republics a success.

Never was statesmanship put to a severer trial; all the more severe in that the general public seems hardly able yet to grasp the difficulties that have to be surmounted. It is perfectly clear that henceforth the two Republics must be part of the Empire, and that citizens of these States must enjoy their rights, and liberties, and privileges, not by virtue of international agreement, but under the law and constitution of the Empire. Of this there must and can be no question.