mander of that army, allow the occasion to passington; it is here. on the banks of the James, what the army under my command was expect that the fate of the Union should be decided. ed to do, or which way it was to move, if it moved at all, I sent the following despatch: Headquarters, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 4, 1862-12 m. "Your telegram of last evening is received. I must confess that it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Acquia creek will prove disastrous to our cause. "I fear it will be a fatal blow. "Clear in my conviction of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been and still am actuated solely by love of country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives liave influenced me from the commencement of this war, I do now sad heart obey your orders to ti e utmost of my “Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for 80 important a movement as this; and while they are in progress I beg that careful consideration may be given to my state-grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings, I ments. now secure. shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have "Major General H. W. HALLECK, "This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a debouche on both banks of the James river, so that we are free to act in any direction, and, with the assistance of the gun-boats, I consider our communications as We are twenty-five miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle, until we march fifteen to eighteen miles, which brings the following in reply to mine of 11 P. M. of the Soon after sending this telegram, I received us practically within ten miles of Richmond. Our longest line of land transportation would be from this point twenty-five miles; but with the aid of the gun-boats we can supply the army by water during its advance, certainly to within twelve miles of Richmond. At Acquia creek we would be seventy-five miles from Richmond with land transportation all the way. 3d: "WASHINGTON, August 4, 1862-11.45 p. m. My telegram to you of yesterday will satisfy you in regard to future operations. It was expected that you would have sent off your sick as directed, without waiting to know what were or would be the intentions of the government The President respecting future movements. "From here to Fort Monroe is a march of about seventy miles; for I regard it as imprac-expects that the instructions which were sent to ticable to withdraw this army and its materiel you yesterday, with his approval, will be carried out with all possible despatch and caution. except by land. The quarter-master-general is sending to Fort Monroe all the transportation he can collect. "H. W. HALLECK, Major General. 'Major General G. B. MCCLELLAN." To which the following is my reply: "The result of the movement would thus be a march of one hundred and forty-five miles to reach a point now only twenty-five miles dis tant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aid of the gun-boats and water transportation. Add to this the certain demoralization of this army, which would ensue, the terribly depressing effect upon the people of the north, and the strong probability that it would influence foreign powers to recognize our adversaries, and there appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge, in the strongest terms afforded by our language, that this order may be rescinded, and that, far from recalling this army, it be promptly rein-you expected them to be moved. forced to enable it to resume the offensive. "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 5, 1862-7 a. m. "Your telegram of yesterday received and is being carried out as promptly as possible. With the means at my command no human power could have moved the sick in the time you say * * * * "G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major Ceneral "Major General H. W. HALLeck, My efforts for bringing about a change of policy were unsuccessful, as will be seen from the following telegram and letter received by me in reply to mine of 12 M. of the 4th : It may be said that there are no reinforcements available. I point to Burnside's force, to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry, to those p rtions of the army of the west not required for a strict defensive there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of this rebellion; it is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be "WASHINTON, August 5, 1862-12 m. abandoned, and every available man brought "You cannot regret the order of withdrawal here-a decided victory here, and the military more than I did the necessity of giving it. It strength of the rebellion is crushed-it matters will not be rescinded, and you will be expected not what partial reverses we may meet with to execute it with all possible promptness. It elsewhere. Here is the true defence of Wash-is believed that it can be done now without serious danger. This may not be so if there | sition to a new and by no means distant base, should be any delay. I will write you my views more fully by mail. "H. W. HALLECK, "Major General Comd'g U. S. A. "Major General G. B. MCCLELLAN.” The letter was as follows: "HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, "Washington, August 6, 1862. GENERAL: Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I immediately telegraphed a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail. will demoralize an army in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves assist in that de moralization, which I am satisfied they wil not. Your change of front from your extreme right at Hanover Court House to your present position was over thirty mi es, but I have not heard that it demoralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sustained in effecting it. "A new base on the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg brings you within about sixty miles of Richmond, and secures a reinforcement of forty or fifty thousand fresh and disciplined troops. This change with such advantages, will, I think, if properly represented to your ar"You, General, certainly could not have my, encourage rather than demoralize your been more pained at receiving my order, than troops. Moreover, you yourself suggested that I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was ad- a junction might be effected at Yorktown; but vised by high officers, in whose judgment I had that a flank march across the Isthmus would be great confidence, to make the order immediate- more hazardous than to retire to Fort Monroe. ly on my arrival here, but I determined not to You will remember that Yorktown is two or do so until I could learn your wishes from a three miles further from Richmond than Fredpersonal interview: and even after that inter- ericksburg is. Besides the later is between view I tried every means in my power to avoid Richmond and Washington, and covers Washwithdrawing your army, and delayed my de-ington from an attack by the enemy. cision as long as I dared to delay it. "I assure you, General, it was not a hasty and unconsidered act, but one that caused me more anxious thoughts than any other of my life. But after full and mature consideration of all the pros and cons, I was reluctantly forced to the 'conclusion that the order must be issued. There was, to my mind, no alternative. "Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in the case. You and your officers, at our interview, estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at two hundred thousand men. Since then, you and others report that they have received and are receiving large reinforcements from the South. "The political effect of the withdrawal may at first be unfavorable; but I think the public are beginning to understand its necessity, and that they will have much more confidence in a united army, than in its separated fragments. "But you will reply, why not reinforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To this you said at our interview, that you required thirty thousand additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought you would have "some chance" of success with twenty thousand. But you afterwards telegraphed me that you would require thirty-fivethousand, as the enemy was being largely rein"General Pope's army, now covering Wash- forced. If your estimate of the enemy's strength ington, is only about forty thousand. Your ef was correct, your requisition was perfect'y fective force is only about ninety thousand. reasonable; but it was utterly impossible to fill You are about thirty miles from Richmond, and it until new troops could be enlisted and organGeneral Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemyized, which would require several weeks. directly between you, ready to fall with his su- "To keep your army in its present position perior numbers upon one or the other, as he until it could be so reinforced, would almost may elect. Neither can reinforce the other in destroy it in that climate. The months of Aucase of such an attack. If General Pope's army gust and September are almost fatal to whites be diminished to reinforce you, Washington, Ma- who live on that part of James river, and even ryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncov-after you receive the reinforcements asked for, ered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy, should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They can not be united by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula, is, under present circumstances, a mi itary impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the Peninsula to some point by water, say Fredericksburg, where the two armies can be united. you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries, before you could advance on Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army; but in the mean time General Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you. "In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers, indeed, a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me, are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula, now advise its abandon "Let me allude to some of the objections which you have urged. You say that the withdrawal from the present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army, which is now in excellent discipline and condition." Iment. cannot understand why a simple change of po- "I have not inquired, and do not wish to Only one "Major General H. W. HALLECK, know by whose advice, or for what reasons the army of the Pomac was separated into two parts with the engy between them. I must take things as I fio them. I find the forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been resented for doing this. If you or any one else had presented a better plan, I certainly should have adopted it. But all of your plans require reinforcements, which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to ask for reinforcemeLis; but it is not so easy to give them when you lave no disposable troops at your command. “I have written very plainly, as I understand the case, and I hope you will give me credit for having fully considered the matter, although I may have arrived at very different conclusions from your own. "Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Maj. Gen. MCCLELLAN. "Comd'g. &c., Berkeley Va." On the 7th I received the following telegram: Commanding U. S. Army.” The report of my chief-quarter-master upon the subject is as follows: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "OFFICE OF CHIEF QUARTERMASTER, "Harrison's Landing, August 7, 1862. "GENERAL: I have the honor to return the papers herewith, which you sent me, with the following remarks: "We are embarking five batteries of artillery, with their horses, baggage, etc., which requires the detailing of most of our available boats, except the ferry boats. "The medical department has 10 or 12 of our largest transport vessels, which, if disposable, could carry 12,000 men. Besides, there are some heavy draft steamers at Fort Monroe, that cannot come to this point, but which can carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry. "I have ordered all up here that can ascend to this depot. They will be here to-morrow evening. As it now is, after the details already made, we cannot transport from this place more than 5,000 infantry. "Washington, Aug. 7, 1862—10 a. m. "You will immediately report the number of sick sent off since you received my order; the number still to be shipped, and the amount of transportation at your disposal; that is, the number of persons that can be carried on all the vessels which by my order you were author-cavalry. ized to control. "H. W. HALLECK, Major Generál. "Major General GEO. B. MCCLELLAN." On which I made this reply: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Aug. 7, 1862-10.40 p. m. "In reply to your despatch of 10 A. M. to-day, I report the number of sick sent off since I received your order, as follows: 3,740, including some that are embarked to-night, and will leave to-morrow morning. The number still to be shipped, is as nearly as can be ascertained, 5,700. "There are no transports now available for From and after to-morrow, if the vessels arrive, I could transport 10,000 infantry. In two or three days, a regiment of cavalry can be sent if required. "If you wait and ship from Yorktown or Fort Monroe, after the sick and wounded transports are at my disposal, we can transport 25,000 at a time. The number that can be transported, is contingent on circumstances referred to. "Most of the propellers here are laden with commissary or other supplies, and most of the tugs are necessary to tow off sail craft, also laden with supplies. "I am very respectfully, your most obedient servant, "RUFUS INGALLS, "Chief Quartermaster. Chief of Staff. "General R. B. MARCY, On the 9th, I received this despatch: "The embarkation of five batteries of artillery, with their horses, wagons, etc., required most of our available boats, except the ferry-boats. All the transports that can ascend to this place, have been ordered up, they will be here to-mor“WASHINGTON, Aug. 9, 1862—12.45 p. m. row evening. Colonel Ingalls reports to me "I am of opinion that the enemy is massing that there are no transports now available for his forces in front of Generals Pope and Burncavalry, and will not be for two or three days. As soon as they can be obtained, I shall send off the 1st New York cavalry. “After the transports with sick and wounded have returned, including some heavy draft steamers at Fort Monroe, that cannot come to this point, we can transport 25,000 men at a time. We have some propellers here, but they are laden with commissary supplies and are not available. The transports now employed in transporting sick and wounded will carry 12,000 well infantry soldiers. Those at Fort Monroe, are of too heavy draft to come here, will carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry. Several of the largest steamers have been used for transporting pris7 side, and that he expects to crush them and move forward to the Potomac. You must send reinforcements instantly to Acquia creek. "Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory; you must move with all possible celerity. "H. W. HALLECK, “Major General "Major General G. B. MCCLELLAN.” To which I sent the following reply: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, “ Berkeley, Aug. 10, 1862–8 a. m. Telegram of yesterday received. The bat teries sent to Burnside, took the last available transport yesterday morning. Enough have since arrived to ship one regiment of cavalry to-day. "The sick are being embarked as rapidly as possible. There has been no unnecessary delay, as you assert, not an hour, but everything has been, and is being pushed as rapidly as possible to carry out orders. "G. B. MCCLELLAN, "Major General Commanding. Major General H. W. HALLECK, "Commanding U. S. Army." The following report, made on the same day by the officer then in charge of the transports, exposes the injustice of the remark in the despatch of the general-in-chief, that, "considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory: " “ ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE, "ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Harrison's Landing, Va., Aug. 10, 1862. "Colonel Ingalls being himself ill, has requested me to telegraph you concerning the state and capacity of the transports now here. "On the night of the 8th I despatched eleven steamers, principally small ones, and six schooners, with five batteries of heavy horse artillery, none of which have yet returned. "Requisition is made this morning for transportation of one thousand cavalry to Acquia creek. All the schooners that had been chartered for carrying horses, have been long since discharged or changed into freight vessels. A large proportion of the steamers now here are still loaded with stores, or are in the floating hospital service, engaged in removing the sick. To transport the one thousand cavalry to-day will take all the available steamers now here not engaged in the service of the harbor. These steamers could take a large number of infantry, but are not well adapted to the carrying of horses, and much space is thus lost. "Several steamers are expected here to-day, and we are unloading schooners rapidlv. Most of these are not chartered, but are being taken for the service required at same rates of pay as other chartered schooners. "If you could cause a more speedy return of the steamers sent away from here, it would facilitate matters. "C. G. SAWTELLE, "Capt. and A. Q. M. Comd'g Depot. "General M. C. MEIGS, “Q. M. Gen. U. S. A., Washington.” Our wharf facilities at Harrison's landing were very limited, admitting but few vessels at one time. These were continually in use as long as there were disposable vessels, and the officers of the medical and quartermaster's departments, with all their available forces, were incessantly occupied, day and night, in embarking and sending off the sick men, troops and materiel. Notwithstanding the repeated representations I made to the general-in-chief that such were the facts, on the 10th I received the following: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Berkeley Aug. 10, 1862-11.30 p. m. "Your despatch of to-day is received. I assure you again that there has not been any unnecessary delay in carrying out your orders. You are probably laboring under some great mistake as to the amount of transportation available here. I have pushed matters to the utmost in getting off our sick, and the troops you ordered to Burnside. "Colonel Ingalls has more than once informed the Quartermaster General of the condition of our water transportation. From the fact that you directed me to keep the order secret, I took it for granted that you would take the steps necessary to provide the requisite transportation. A large number of transports for all arms of service, and for wagons, should at once be sent to Yorktown and Fort Monroe. I shall be ready to move the whole army by land, the moment the sick are disposed of. You may be sure that not an hour's delay will occur that can be avoided. I fear you do not realize the difficulty of the operation proposed. The regiment of cavalry for Burnside has been in course of embarkation to-day and to-night. Ten steamers were required for the purpose. Twelve hundred and fifty-eight sick loaded to-day and to-night. Our means exhausted, except one vessel returning to Fort Monroe in the morning, which will take some five hundred cases of slight sickness. "The present moment is probably not the proper one for me to refer to the unnecessarily harsh and unjust tone of your telegrams of late. It will, however, make no difference in my official action. "G. B. MCCLELLAN, "Major General H. W. HALLECK, On the 11th this reports was made: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTMAO, "Berkeley, Aug. 11, 1862-11.30 p. m. "The embakation of (850) eight hundred and fifty cavalry and (1) one brigade of infantry will be completed by (2) two o'clock in the morning, (500) five hundred sick were embarked to-day; another vessel arrived to-night, and (600) six hundred more sick are now being embarked. I still have some four thousand sick to dispose of. You have been grossly misled as to the amount of transportation at my disposal. Ves “G. B. MCCLEllan, “Major Ceneral Comď'g. Major General H. W. HALLECK, sels loaded to their utmost capacity with stores, | mediately sent back to you. All vessels in the and others indispensable for service here, have James river and Chesapeake bay were placed been reported to you as available for carrying at your disposal, and it was supposed that (8) sick and well. I am sending off all that can be eight or (10) ten thousand of your men could be unloaded at Fort Monroe to have them return transported daily. In addition to steamers, here. I repeat that I have lost no time in car- there is a large fleet of sailing vessels which rying out your orders. could be used as transports. The bulk of your materiel on shore, it was thought, could be sent to Fort Monroe covered by that part of the army which could not get water transportation. Such were the views of the government here; perhaps we were misinformed as to the facts; if so, the delay could be explained. Nothing in my telegram was intentionally harsh or unjust; but the delay was so unexpected, that an explanation was required. There has been and is the most urgent necessity for despatch, and not a single moment must be lost in getting additional troops in front of Washington. "H. W. HALleck, "Comdig U. S. Army." On the same day I received the following from the quartermaster in charge of the depot: "ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE, "Major General. I telegraphed the following reply: "HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,. "Harrison's Landing Va. Aug., 11, 1862. "COLONEL: In reply to the communication from Gen. Marcy, which was referred to me by you, I have to state that there are now in this harbor no disposable transports not already de- "Maj. Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN.” tailed either for the use of the hospital departpartment, for the transportation of the N. Y. cavalry, or for the necessary service of the harbor. I think the steamers loading, and to be loaded with cavalry, could take in addition, three thusand infantry; these boats are, however "Berkeley, Aug. 12, 1862-11 p. m. directed to leave as fast as they are loaded; "Your dispatch of noon to-day received. It some have already started. The embarkation The embarkation is positively the fact that no more men could of this cavalry regiment is going on very slow- have embarked hence than have gone, and that ly, and it is not in my power to hurry the matno unnecessary delay has occurred. Before ter, although I have had several agents of the your orders were received, Col. Ingalls directed department, and one commissioned officer at the all available vessels to come from Monroe. Offiwharf, to render all the assistance possible. The cers have been sent to take personal direction. entire army is this morning turning in, to be Have heard nothing here of Burnside's fleet. stored on vessels, knapsacks, officer's baggage, There are some vessels at Monroe, such as Atand other surplus property, and with our limited lantic and Baltic, which draw too much to come wharf facilities, it is impossible, unless the regu- here. Hospital accommodations exhausted this lar issues of forage, &c., are suspended, to avoid side New York. Propose filling Atlantic and great confusion and delay with what is already Baltic with serious cases for New York, and ordered to be done; of course, if any infantry to encamp slight cases for the present at is ordered to embark on these cavalry transports, Monroe. In this way can probably get off the the confusion and difficulties will be increased. "I know of no boats that may be expected here to-day, except the South America' and 'Fanny Cadwallader' (a propeller) which were ordered to be sent back from Fort Monroe. "The transports with the artillery left for Acquia Creek on the night of the 8th and the morning of the 9th. They were ordered to reThey were ordered to return immediately. "I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "C. G. SAWTELLE, "Capt. and A. Q. M. Comd'g Depot. "Lieut. Col. RUFUS INGALLS, (3400) thirty-four hundred sick still on hand by day after to-morrow night. I am sure that you have been misinformed as to the availability of vessels on hand. We cannot use heavy loaded supply vessels for troops or animals, and such constitute the mass of those here, which have been represented to you as capable of transporting this army. I fear you will find very great delay in embarking troops and materiel at Yorktown and Monroe, both from want of vessels and of facilities for embarkation. At least two additional wharves should be built at each place. I ordered two at the latter some two weeks ago, but you countermanded the order. "I learn that wharf accommodations at Acquia are altogether inadequate for landing troops and supplies to any large extent. Not an hour "WASHINGTON, Aug. 12, 1862-12 m. should be lost in remedying this. Great delays "The quarter-master-general informs me that will ensue there from shallow water. You will nearly every available steam vessel in the coun- find vast deficiency in horse transports; we try is now under your control. To send more had nearly two hundred when we came here. from Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York I learn of only twenty provided now; they carry would interfere with the transportation of about fifty horses each. More hospital accom army supplies, and break up the channels of travel by which we are to bring forward the new troops. Burnside moved nearly thirteen thousand (13,000) troops to Acquia creek in less than two (2) days, and his transports were im modations should be provided. We are much impeded here because our wharves are used night and day to land current supplies. At Monroe a similar difficulty will occur. With all the facilities at Alexandria and Washington, |