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"This attack commenced about 4 P.M., and was pushed by heavy masses with the utmost determination and vigor. Captain Thompson's battery, directed with great precision, firing double charges, swept them back. The whole open space, 200 paces wide, was filled with the enemy; each repulse brought fresh troops. The third attack was only repulsed by the rapid volleys and determined charge of the 63d Pennsylvania, Colonel Hays, and half of the 37th New York volunteers."

General McCall's troops soon began to emerge from the woods into the open field. Several batteries were in position and began to fire into the woods over the heads of our men in front. Captain De Russy's battery was placed on the right of General Sumner's artillery, with orders to shell the woods. General Burns's brigade was then advanced to meet the enemy, and soon drove him back. Other troops began to return from the White Oak swamp.

was very late at night before my aides returned to give me the result of the day's fighting along the whole line, and the true position of affairs. While waiting to hear from General Franklin before sending orders to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman, I received a message from the latter that General Franklin was falling back; whereupor. I sent, Colonel Colburn of my staff with orders to verify this, and, if it were true, to order in Genral Sumner and Heintzelman at once. He had not gone far when he met two officers sent from General

Franklin's headquarters with the information that he was falling back. Orders were then sent to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman to fall back also, and definite instructions were given as to the movement, which was to commence on the right. The orders met these troops already en route to Malvern. Instructions were also sent to General Franklin as to the route he was to follow.

General Barnard then received full instruc

tions for posting the troops as they arrived. I
then returned to Haxall's and again left for Mal-
vern soon after daybreak, accompanied by sev-
entire circuit of the position, and then returned
I once more made the
eral general officers.
to Haxall's, whence I went with Captain Rod-
gers to select the final location for the army and
its depots. I returned to Malvern before the
serious fighting commenced, and after riding
along the lines and seeing most cause to feel
anxious about the right, remained in that
vicinity.

BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL.

Later in the day, at the cail of General Kearney, General Taylor's 1st New Jersey brigade, Slocum's division, was sent to occupy a portion of General McCall's deserted position, a battery accompanying the brigade. They soon drove back the enemy, who shortly after gave up the attack, contenting themselves with keeping up The position selected for resisting the fura desultory firing till late at night. Between ther advance of the enemy on the 1st of July, 12 and 1 o'clock at night General Heintzelman was with the left and centre of our lines restcommenced to withdraw his corps, and soon after ing on Malvern Hill," while the right curved daylight both of his divisions, with General Slo- | backwards through a wooded country toward a cum's division, and a portion of General Sum-point below Haxall's on James river. ner's command, reached Malvern hill.

Malvern

hill is an elevated plateau about a mile and a On the morning of the 30th General Sumner, half by three-fourths of a mile area, well cleared in obedience to orders, had moved promptly to of timber, and with several converging roads Glendale, and, upon a call from General Frank-running over it. In front are numerous defenlin for reinforcements, sent him two brigades, which returned in time to participate and render good service in the battle near Glendale. General Sumner says of this battle:

"The battle of Glendale was the most severe action since the battle of Fair Oaks. About 3 o'clock P.M. the action commenced, and, after a furious contest, lasting till after dark, the ene my was routed at all points and driven from the field."

sible ravines, and the ground slopes gradually toward the north and east to the wood-land, giving clear ranges for artillery in those directions. Toward the northwest the plateau falls off more abrubptly into a ravine which extends to James river. From the position of the enemy, his most obvious lines of attack would come from the directions of Richmond and White Oak swamp, and would almost of necessity strike us upon our left wing. Here, therefore, The rear of the supply trains and the reserve the lines were strengthened by massing the artillery of the army reached Malvern hill about troops, and collecting the principal part of the At about this time the enemy began to artillery. Porter's corps held the left of the appear in General Porter's front, and at 5 o'-line (Sykes's division on the left, Morrell's on clock, advanced in large force against his left the right) with the artillery of his two divisions flank, posting artillery under cover of a skirt of advantageously posted; and the artillery of the timber, with a view to engage our force on Mal-reserve so disposed on the high ground, that a vern hill, while with his infantry and some artil- concentrated fire of some sixty guns could be lery he attacked Colonel Warren's brigade. A brought to bear on any point in his front or left. concentrated fire of about thirty guns was Colonel Tyler also had, with great exertion, brought to bear on the enemy, which, with the succeded in getting ten of his siege guns in poinfantry fire of Colonel Warren's command, com-sition on the highest point of the hill. pelled him to retreat, leaving two guns in the hands of Colonel Warren.

4 P.M.

The gun-boats rendered most efficient aid at this time, and helped to drive back the enemy. It

Couch's division was placed on the right or Porter, next came Kearney and Hooker, next Sedgwick and Richardson, next Smith and Slocum, then the remainder of Keyes's corps, ex

ed within a few yards of our lines. They then poured in a single volley and dashed forward with the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, and driving the routed columns in confusion from the field.

tending by a backward curve nearly to the river. | canister and shell from our artillery, had reachThe Pennsylvania Reserve corps was held in reserve, and stationed behind Porter's and Couch's position. One brigade of Porter's was thrown to the left on the low ground, to protect the flank from any movement direct from the Richmond road. The line was very strong along the whole front of the open plateau; but from thence to the extreme right, the troops were more deployed. This formation was imperative as an attack would probably be made upon our left.

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About two o'clock a column of the enemy was observed moving towards our right, within

the skirt of woods in front of Heintzelman's

About seven o'clock, as fresh troops were accumulating in front of Porter and Couch, Meagher and Sickles were sent with their brigades as soon as it was considered prudent to withdraw any portion of Sumner's and Heintzelman's troops to reinforce that part of the line and hold the position. These brigades relieved such regiments of Porter's corps and Couch's division as had expended their ammunition, and batteries from the reserve were pushed forward to replace those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the enemy persisted in his efforts to take the position so tenaciously defended; but despite his vastly superior numbers, his repeatfearful loss, and darkness ended the battle of ed and desperate attacks were repulsed with Malvern hill, though it was not until after nine o'clock that the artillery ceased its fire.

During the whole battle Commodore Rodgers added greatly to the discomfiture of the enemy by throwing shells among his reserves and advancing columns.

corps, but beyond the range of our artillery. Arrangements were at once made to meet the anticipated attack in that quarter; but though the column was long, occupying more than two As the army, in its movement from the Chickhours in passing, it disappeared, and was not ahominy to Harrison's landing, was continually again heard of. The presumption is, that it re-occupied in marching by night and fighting by tired by the rear, and participated in the attack afterwards made on our left.

About 3 P.M. a heavy fire of artillery opened on Kearney's left, and Couch's division, speedily followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on Couch's front. The artillery was replied to with good effect by our own, and the infantry of Couch's division remained lying on the ground until the advancing column was within short musketry range, when they sprang to their feet, and poured in a deadly volley, which entirely broke the attacking force, and drove them in disorder back over their own ground. This advantage was followed up until we had advanced the right of our line some seven or eight hundred yards, and rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving us a stronger position, and a better fire. Shortly after four o'clock the firing ceased along the whole front, but no disposition was evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw from the field.

Caldwell's brigade, having been detached from Richardson's division, was stationed upon Couch's right, by General Porter, to whom he had been ordered to report. The whole line was surveyed by the generals, and everything held in readiness to meet the coming attack. At six o'clock the enemy suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter with the whole strength of his artillery, and at once began pushing forward his columns of attack to carry the hill. Brigade after brigade formed under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open space and charge our batteries; but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, in every case, sent them reeling back to shelter, and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. In several i stances our infantry withheld their fire until the attacking columns, which rushed through the storm of

day, its commanders found no time or opportunity for collecting data, which would enable them to give exact returns of casualties in each engagement. The aggregate of our entire losses, from the 26th of June to the 1st of July, inclusive, was ascertained, after arriving at Harrison's landing, to be as follows:

List of the killed, wounded and missing, in the
army of the Potomac, from the 26th of June,
to the 1st of July, 1862, inclusive.

Corps.
1st.-McCall's Pa. Res'vs 253

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2d.-Sumner's
3d.-Heintzelman's
4th.-Keyes's
5th.-Porter's -
6th-Franklin's
Engineers
Cavalry

Kil'd. Woun'd. Mis'g. Ag'te. 1,242 1,581 8,74 848 2,111 833 2,078

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187

1,076

189

1,151

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1.198

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1,79

2

21

23

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Although the result of the battle of Malverr was a complete victory, it was nevertheless necessary to fall back still further in order to reach a point where our supplies could be brought to us with certainty. As before stated, in the opinion of Captain Rodgers, commanding the gun-boat flotilla, this could only be done below City point; concurring in his opinion, I selected Harrison's bar as the new position of the army. The exhaustion of our supplies of food, forage and ammunition made it imperative to reach the transports immediately.

The greater portion of the transportation of the army having been started for Harrison's landing, during the night of the 30th of June, and 1st of July, the order for the movement of the troops was at once issued upon the final repulse of the enemy at Malvern hill.

The order prescribed a movement by the left

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an attack from any quarter. His dispositions were so successful that, to use his own words: "I do not think more vehicles or more public property were abandoned on the march from Turkey bridge than would have been left, in the same state of the roads, if the army had been moving toward the enemy, instead of away from him; and when it is understood that the carriages and teams belonging to this army, stretched out in one line, would extend not far from forty miles, the energy and caution necessary for their safe withdrawal from the presence of an nemy vastly superior in numbers, will be appreciated.”

and rear. General Keyes's corps to cover the manœuvre. It was not carried out in detail as regards the divisions on the left, the roads being somewhat blocked by the rear of our trains. Porter and Couch were not able to move out as early as had been anticipated, and Porter found | it necessary to place a rear-guard between his command and the enemy. Golonel Averill, of the 3d Pennsylvania cavalry, was entrusted with this delicate duty. He had under his command his own regiment and Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan's brigade of regular infantry, and one battery. By a judicious use of the resources at his command, he deceived the enemy so as to cover the withdrawal of the left wing without being attacked, remaining himself on the previous day's battle-field until about 7 o'clock of the 2d July. Meantime, General Keyes having received his orders, commenced vigorous preparations for covering the movement of the entire army, and protecting the trains. It being evident that the immense number of wagons and artillery carriages pertaining to the army could not move with celerity along a single road, Ge- Great credit must be awarded to General neral Keyes took advantage of every accident Keyes, for the skill and energy which characterof the ground to open new avenues, and to fa-ized his performance of the important and delicilitate the movement. He made preparations cate duties entrusted to his charge. for obstructing the roads after the army had passed, so as to prevent any rapid pursuit, destroying effectually Turkey bridge, on the main road, and rendering other roads and approaches temporarily impassible by felling trees across them. He kept the trains well closed up, and directed the march so that the troops could move on each side of the roads, not obstructing the passage, but being in good position to repel

The last of the wagons did not reach the site selected at Harrison's bar, until after dark on the 3d of July, and the rear guard did not move into their camp until every thing was secure The enemy followed up with a small force, and on the 3d threw a few shells at the rear guard, but were quickly dispersed by our batteries, and the fire of the gun-boats.

High praise is also due to the officers and men of the 1st Connecticut artillery, Col. Tyler, for the manner in which they withdrew all the heavy guns during the seven days, and from Malvern hill. Owing to the crowded state of the roads, the teams could not be brought within a couple of miles of the position, but these energetic soldiers removed the guns by hand for that distance, leaving nothing behind.

THIRD PERIOD.

CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

On the 1st of July, I received the following | have been disastrous in the extreme. This from the President:

closed the hard fighting which had continued from the afternoon of the 26th ult., in a daily series of engagements, wholly unparalleled on this continent for determination and slaughter on both sides.

'The mutual loss, in killed and wounded, is enormous. That of the enemy certainly greatest. On Tuesday evening, the 1st, our army commenced its movement from Haxall's to this point. Our line of defence there, being too extended to be maintained by our weakened forces. Our train was immense, and about 4 A. M., on the 2d, a heavy storm of rain began, which continued during the entire day, and until the forenoon of yesterday.

"WASHINGTON, July 1, 1862—3.30 p. m. "It is impossible to reinforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men, we could not get them to give you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security and wait, rest and repair. "Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it out. "Maj. Gen. GEO. B. MCCLELJAN.” "The road became horrible. Troops, artillery In a despatch from the President to me on the and wagons, moved on steadily, and our whole 2d of July, he says:

"A. LINCOLN.

"If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to. Try just now to save the army materiel and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can.

"The governors of eighteen (18) states offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which I accept."

army, men and materiel, was finally brought safe into this camp. The last of the wagons reached here at noon yesterday. The exhaustion was very great, but the army preserved its morale, and would have repelled any attack which the enemy was in condition to make.

"We now occupy a line of heights about two miles from the James, a plain extending from

there to the river. Our front is about three miles long. These heights command our whole position, and must be maintained. The gun

On the 3d of July, the following kind despatch boats can render valuable support upon both

was received from the President:

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flanks. If the enemy attack us in front, we must hold our ground as best we may and at whatever cost.

On the 4th, I sent the following to the Presi-be decisive. dent:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Harrison's Bar, James River, July 4, 1862. "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 2d instant.

"I shall make a stand at this place, and endeavor to give my men the repose they so much require.

"After sending my communication on Tuesday, the enemy attacked the left of our lines, and a fierce battle ensued, lasting until night; they were repulsed with great slaughter. their attack succeeded, the consequences would

Had

“Our positions can be carried only by overwhelming numbers. The spirit of the army is excellent. Stragglers are finding their regiments, and the soldiery exhibit the best results of discipline. Our position is by no means impregnable, especially as a morass extends on this side of the high ground, from our centre to the James on our right. The enemy may attack in vast numbers, and if so our front will be the scene of a desperate battle, which, if lost, will Our army is fearfully weakened by killed, wounded and prisoners. I cannot now approximate to any statement of our losses, but we were not beaten in any conflict. The The enemy were unable by their utmost efforts to drive us from any field. Never did such a change of base, involving a retrogade movement, and under incessant attacks from a most determined and vastly more numerous foe, partake of so little disorder. We have lost no guns, except 25 on the field of battle, 21 of which were lost by the giving way of McCall's division under the onset of superior numbers.

“Our communications by the James river are not secure. There are points where the enemy can establish themselves with cannon or mus

88

so.

"P. S.-If at any time you feel able to take

A. L."

The following telegram was sent on the 7th: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

ketry and command the river, and where it is not certain that our gun-boats can drive them the offensive, you are not restrained from doing out. In case of this, or in case our front is broken, I will still make every effort to preserve at least the personnel of the army, and the events of the last few days leave no question that the troops will do all that their country can ask. Send such reinforcements as you can. I will do what I can. We are shipping our wounded and sick, and landing supplies. The navy department should co-operate with us to the extent of its resources. Captain Rodgers is doing all in his power, in the kindest and most efficient man-not

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If

"Berkeley, July 7, 1862–8.30 a. m. "As boat is starting, I have only time to acknowledge receipt of despatch by General Marcy. Enemy have not attacked. My position is very strong, and daily becoming more so. attacked to-day, I shall laugh at them. I have been anxious about my communications. Had long consultation about it with Flag-officer Goldsborough last night; he is confident he can keep river open. He should have all gun-boats possible. Will see him again this morning. men are in splendid spirits, and anxious to try it again.

My

"Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, and don't lose confidence in this army. G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major General.

"A. LINCOLN, President."

While general-in-chief, and directing the operations of all our armies in the field, I had become deeply impressed with the importance of adopting and carrying out certain views regarding the conduct of the war, which, in my judgment, were essential to its objects and its success. During an active campaign of three months in the enemy's country, these were so fully confirmed that I conceived it a duty, in the critical position we then occupied not to withhold a candid expression of the more important of these views from the commander-inchief whom the constitution places at the head of the armies and navies, as well as of the gov. ernment of the nation. The following is a copy of my letter to Mr. Lincoln:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

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"WAR DEPARTMENT, "Washington City, D. C., July 4th, 1862. "I understand your position, as stated in your letter, and by General Marcy. To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., In addition to that arrived and now arriving July 7, 1862. from the Potomac (about ten thousand, I sup "MR. PRESIDENT: You have been fully inpose), and about ten thousand I hope you will formed that the rebel army is in our front, with have from Burnside very soon, and about five the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking thousand from Hunter a little later, I do not our positions, or reducing us by blocking our see how I can send you another man within a river communications. I cannot but regard our month. Under these circumstances, the defen- condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in sive, for the present, must be your only care. view of possible contingencies, to lay before Save the army first, where you are, if you can, your excellency, for your private consderation, and, secondly, by removal, if you must. You, my general views concerning the existing state on the ground, must be the judge as to which of the rebellion, although they do not strictly you will attempt, and of the means for effecting relate to the situation of this army, or strictly it. I but give it as my opinion, that with come within the scope of my official duties. the aid of the gunboats and reinforcements These views amount to convictions, and are deepmentioned above, you can hold your present po-ly impressed upon my mind and heart. Our sition; provided, and so long as you can keep James river open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James river open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any apprehension as to the danger of having your communication cut on the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have escaped your at tention.

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cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war, shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.

"The time has come when the government must determine upon a civil and military policy

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