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Afterwards he telegraphed:

"The enemy has begun an attack on Smith's left with infantry. I know no details."

Afterwards the following:

"The enemy has opened on Smith from a battery of three pieces, to the right of the White House. Our shells are bursting well, and Smith thinks Summer will soon have a cross fire upon them that will silence them."

Afterwards, at 5.50 P. M., the following was sent to General Keyes:

"Please send one brigade of Couch's division to these headquarters without a moment's delay. A staff officer will be here to direct the brigade where to go."

left with smaller forces to hold their positions than they deemed adequate.

To have done more, even though Porter's reverse had been prevented, would have had the still more disastrous result of imperilling the whole movement across the Peninsula.

cal superiority of the enemy, and made it eviThe operations of this day proved the numerident that while he had a large army on the left bank of the Chickahominy, which had already turned our right, and was in position to intercept the communications with our depots at the White House; he was also in large force between our army and Richmond. I therefore effected a junction of our forces.

This might probably have been executed on either side of the Chickahominy, and if the concentration had been effected on the left bank, it is possible we might, with our entire force have defeated the enemy there; but at that time they

Subsequently the following was sent to Gen-held the roads leading to the White House, so erals Sumner and Franklin:

"Is there any sign of the enemy being in force in your front? Can you spare any more force to be sent to General Porter? Answer at once."

that it would have been impossible to have sent forward supply trains in advance of the army in that direction, and the guarding of these trains would have seriously embarrassed our operations in the battle. We would have been compelled to fight if concentrated on that bank of the river. Moreover, we would at once have been

At 5.15 P. M., the following was received from followed by the enemy's forces upon the RichGeneral Franklin:

"I do not think it prudent to take any more troops from here at present."

General Sumner replied as follows:

"If the general desires to trust the defence of my position to my front line alone, I can send French with three regiments, and Meagher with his brigade to the right; every thing is so uncertain, that I think it would be hazardous to do it."

These two brigades were sent to reinforce General Porter, as has been observed.

At 5.25, I sent the following to General Franklin:

"Porter is hard pressed, it is not a question of prudence, but of possibilities. Can you possibly inaintain your position until dark with two Brigades? I have ordered eight regiments of Summer's to support Porter, one brigade of Couch to this place; Heintzelman's reserve to go in rear of Sumner. If possible send a brigade to support Porter': it should follow the regiments ordered from Summer."

mond side of the river operating upon our rear, and if in the chances of war we had been ourselves defeated in the effort, we would have been forced to fall back to the White House, and probably to Fort Monroe; and as both our flanks and rear would then have been entirely exposed, our entire supply train, if not the greater part of the army itself might have been lost.

The movements of the enemy showed that they expected this, and as they themselves acknowledged, they were prepared to cut off our retreat in that direction. I therefore concentrated all our forces on the right bank of the river during the night of the 26th and morning of the 27th, all our wagons, heavy guns, &c., were gathered there.

It may be asked why, after the concentration of our forces on the right bank of the Chickahominy, with a large part of the enemy drawn away from Richmond, upon the opposite side, I did not, instead of striking for James river fifteen miles below that place, at once march directly on Richmond,

It will be remembered that at this juncture the enemy was on our rear, and there was every reason to believe that he would-sever our communications with our supply depot at the White House.

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We had on hand but a limited amount of ra

At 7.35, the following was sent to General tions, and if we had advanced directly on Rich

Sumner:

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mond it would have required considerable time to carry the strong works around that place, du"If it is possible send another brigade to re-ring which our men would have been destitute inforce General Smith. It is said three heavy of food; and even if Richmond had fallen becolumns of infantry are moving on him. fore our arms, the enemy could still have occupied our supply communications between that From the foregoing despatches it will be seen place and the gun-boats, and turned their disasthat all disposable troops were sent from the ter into victory. If, on the other hand, the enright bark of the river to reinforce General emy had concentrated all his forges at Richmond Porter, and that the corps commanders were, during the progress of our attack, and we had

been defeated, we must in all probability have lost our trains before reaching the flotilla.

The battles which continued day after day, in the progress of our flank movement to the James, with the exception of the one at Gaines's mill, were successes to our arms, and the closing engagement at Malvern hill was the most decisive of all.

On the evening of the 27th of June I assembled the corps commanders at my headquarters, and informed them of the plan, its reasons, and my choice of route and method of execution.

General Keyes was directed to move his corps, with its artillery and baggage, across the White Oak swamp bridge, and to seize strong positions on the opposite side of the swamp, to cover the passage of the other troops and trains.

This order was executed on the 28th by noon. Before day-break on the 28th I went to Savage's station, and remained there during the day and night, directing the withdrawal of the trains and supplies of the army.

Orders were given to the different commanders to load their wagons with ammunition and provisions, and the necessary baggage of the of ficers and men, and to destroy all property which could not be transported with the army. Orders were also given to leave with those of the sick and wounded who could not be transported, a proper complement of surgeons and attendants, with a bountiful supply of rations and medical stores.

The large herd of 2,500 beef cattle was, by the chief commissary, Colonel Clark, transferred to the James river without loss.

On the morning of the 28th, while General Franklin was withdrawing his command from Golding's farm, the enemy opened upon General Smith's division from Garnett's hill, from the valley above, and from Gaines's hill on the opposite side of the Chickahominy, and shortly afterwards two Georgia regiments attempted to carry the works about to be evacuated, but this attack was repulsed by the 23d New York, and the 49th Pennsylvania volunteers on picket, and a section of Mott's battery.

this side of the river, the right bank, we repulsed several strong attacks; on the left bank our men, did all that men could do-all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers soon after I had brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men-those battalions who fought most bravely, and suffered most, are still in the best order. My regulars were superb; and I count upon what are left to turn another battle in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I (20,000) twenty thousand, or even (10,000) ten thousand fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat, and save the materiel and personnel of the army.

"If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle, because my force was too small.

"I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general, who feels in his heart, the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes, but to do this, the government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large reinforcements, and send them at once.

"I shall draw back to this side of the Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our materiel. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have.

"In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President, that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous, when I said that my force was too weak. I merely reiterated a truth, which to-day has been too plainly proved. If at this instant I could dispose of (10,000) ten thousand fresh men, I could gain the victory to-morrow.

Porter's corps was moved across White Oak swamp during the day and night, and took up positions covering the roads leading from Richmond towards White Oak swamp and Long bridge. McCall's division was ordered, on the night of the 28th, to move across the swamp and take a proper position to assist in covering the remaining troops and trains. During the same night the corps of Sumner, Heintzelman, and the division of Smith, were ordered to an interior line, the left resting on Keyes's old intrenchments, and curving to the right so as to cover Savage's station. General Slocum's division, of Franklin's corps, was ordered to Savage's station in reserve. They were ordered to hold this position until dark of the 29th, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains, and "To Hon. E. M. STANTON, then to fall back across the swamp and unite with the remainder of the army.

"I know that a few thousand more men would have changed the battle from a defeat to a victory; as it is, the government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result.

"I feel too earnestly to-night, I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades, to feel otherwise than that the government has not sustained this army. sustained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost.

On the 28th I sent the following to the Secretary of War:

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE Potmac, "Savage's Station, June 28, 1862–12.20 a.m. I now know the whole history of the day. On

"If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other persons in Washington.

"You have done your best to sacrifice this

army.

"G. B. MCCLELLAN,
"Major General.

Secretary of War."

The headquarters' camp at Savage's station was broken up early on the morning of the 29th, and moved across White Oak swamp.

As the essential part of this day's operations was the passage of the trains across the swamp, and their protection against attack from the di

rection of New Market and Richmond, as well as the immediate and secure establishment of our communications with the gun-boats, I passed the day in examining the ground, directing the posting of the troops, and securing the uninterrupted movement of the trains.

In the afternoon I instructed General Keyes to move during the night to James river, and occupy a defensive position near Malvern hill, to secure our extreme left flanks.

General F. J. Porter was ordered to follow him, and prolong the line towards the right. The trains were to be pushed on towards James The trains were to be pushed on towards James river in rear of these corps, and placed under the protection of the gun-boats as they arrived. A sharp skirmish with the enemy's cavalry, early this day on the Quaker road, showed that his efforts were about to be directed towards impeding our progress to the river, and render my presence in that quarter necessary.

BATTLE OF ALLEN'S FARM.

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of Savage's station, says:
General Sumner, in his report of the battle
"When the enemy
appeared on the Williamsburg road, I could
not imagine why General Heintzelman did not
attack him, and not till some time afterwards
did I learn, to my utter amazement, that Gene-
ral Heintzelman had left the field and retreated
with his whole corps (about 15,000 men) before
the action commenced. This defection, might
have been attended with the most disastrous
consequences, and although we beat the enemy
signally and drove him from the field, we
should certainly have given him a more crush-
ing blow if General Heintzelman had been
there with his corps."

General Sumner vacated his works at Fair
Oaks on June 29th, at day-light, and marched
his command to Orchard station, halting at Al-erations of his corps says:
len's field, between Orchard and Savage's sta-
tions.

General Heintzelman, in the report of the op

The divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick, were formed on the righ of the railroad, facing to wards Richmond, Richardson holding the right, and Sedgwick joining the right of Heintzelman's

corps.

The first line of Richardson's division was held by General French General Caldwell supporting in the second. A log building in front of Richardson's division, was held by Colonel Brooks with one regiment, (53d Pennsylvania volunteers), with Hazzard's battery on an elevated piece of ground, a little in rear of Col. Brook's command.

At 9 A. M., the enemy commenced a furious attack on the right of General Sedgwick, but were repulsed. The left of General Richardson was next attacked, the enemy attempting in vain to carry the position of Colonel Brooks. Captain Hazzard's battery, and Captain Pettit's battery, which afterwards replaced it, were served with great effect, while the 53d Pennsylvania kept up a steady fire on the advancing enemy, compelling them at last to retire in disorder. The enemy renewed the attack three times, but were as often repulsed.

BATTLE OF SAVAGE'S STATION.

General Slocum arrived at Savage's station at an early hour on the 29th, and was ordered to cross White Oak swamp and relieve General Keyes's corps. As soon as General Keyes was thus relieved, he moved towards James river, which he reached in safety, with all his artillery and baggage, early on the morning of the 30th, and took up a position below Turkey creek bridge.

During the morning General Franklin heard that the enemy, after having repaired the bridges, was crossing the Chickabominy in large force, and advancing toward Savage's station. He communicated this information to General Sumner at Allen's farm, and moved Smith's division to Savage's station.

"On the night of the 28th of June I received orders to withdraw the troops of my corps from the advanced position they had taken on the 25th of June, and to occupy the intrenched lines about a mile in rear. A map was sent me showing the positions General Sumner's and General Franklin's corps would occupy. About sunrise the next day our troops slowly fell back to the new position, cautiously fol lowed by the enemy taking possession of our camps as soon as we left them.

"From some misapprehension General Sumner held a more advanced position than was indicated on the map furnished me, thus leaving a space of about three-fourths of a mile between the right of his corps and General Smith's division of General Franklin's corps. *

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At 11 A. M. on the 29th the enemy commenced an attack on General Sumner's troops, a few shells falling within my lines. Late in the afternoon reports reached me that the rebels were in possession of Dr. Trent's house, only a mile and a half from Savage's station. I sent several cavalry reconnoissances, and finally was satisfied of the fact. General Franklin came to my headquarters, when I learned of the interval between his left and General Sumner's right, in which space Dr. Trent's house is. Also that the rebels had repaired one of the bridges across the Chickahominy, and were advancing.

"I rode forward to see General Sumner, and met his troops falling back on the Williamsburg road, through my line. General Sumner informed me that he intended to make a stand at Savage's station, and for me to join him to determine upon the position. This movement of General Sumner's uncovering my right flank, it became necessary for me at once to withdraw my troops.

"I rode back to find General Sumner; after some delay, from the mass of troops in the field, I found him, and learned that the course of

action had been determined on: so returned to my command, and to give the necessary orders for the destruction of the railroad cars, ammunition, and provisions still remaining on the ground.

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communication with the gun-boats, and covering the pa-sage of the supply trains, which were pushed forward as rapidly as possible upon Haxall's plantation. The remaining corps were pressed onward, and posted so as to guard "The whole open space near Savage's sta- the approaches from Richmond as well as the tion was crowded with troops, more than I sup-crossing of the White Oak swamp, over which posed could be brought into action judiciously, the army had passed. An aide from the commanding general had in the morning reported to me, to point out a road across the White Oak swamp, starting from the left of General Kearney's position and leading by Brackett's ford. The advance of the column reached the Charles City road at 61⁄2 and the rear at 10 P. M., without acci-occasion.

P. M. dent.

The orders given by me to General Sumner, Heintzelman and Franklin, were to hold the

General Franklin was ordered to hold the passage of White Oak swamp bridge, and cover the withdrawal of the trains from that point. His command consisted of his own corps, with General Richardson's division and General Naglee's brigade placed under his orders for the

General Slocum's division was on the right of the Charles City road.

On the morning of the 30th I again gave to positions assigned them until dark. As stated the corps commanders within reach instructions by General Heintzelman, General Sumner did for posting their troops. I found that, notwithnot occupy the designated position, but as he was the senior officer present on that side of the standing all the efforts of my personal staff and White Oak swamp, he may have thought that other officers, the roads were blocked by wathe movements of the enemy justified a devia-gons, and there was great difficulty in keeping tion from the letter of the orders. It appears from his report that he assumed command of all the troops near Savage's station, and determined to resist the enemy there, and that he gave General Heintzelman orders to hold the same position as I had assigned to him.

The aid sent by me to General Heintzelman, to point out the road across the swamp, was to guide him in retiring after dark.

On reaching Savage's station, Sumner's and Franklin's commands were drawn up in line of battle in the large open field to the left of the railroad, the left resting on the edge of the woods, and the right extending down to the railroad.

General Brooks, with his brigade, held the wood to the left of the field, where he did excellent service, receiving a wound, but retaining his command.

General Hancock's brigade was thrown into the woods on the right and front.

At 4 P. M. the enemy commenced his attack in large force by the Williamsburg road. It was gallantly met by General Burns's brigade, supported and reinforced by two lines in reserve, and finally by the New York 69th, Hazzard's and Pettit's batteries again doing good service. Osborne's and Bramhall's batteries also took part effectively in this action, which was continued with great obstancy until between 8 and 9 P. M., when the enemy were driven from the field.

Immediately after the battle the orders were repeated for all the troops to fall back and cross White Oak swamp, which was accomplished during the night in good order.

By midnight all the troops were on the road to White Oak swamp bridge, General French, with his brigade, acting as rear guard, and at 5 A. M. on the 30th all had crossed, and the bridge was destroyed.

On the afternoon and night of the 29th I gave the corps commanders their instructions for the operations of the following day. As stated before, Porter's corps was to move forward to James river, and with the corps of General Keyes, to occupy a position at or near Turkey band, on a line perpendicular to the river, thus covering the Charles City road to Richmond, opening

the trains in motion.

The engineer officers whom I had sent forward on the 28th to reconnoitre the roads had neither returned nor sent me any reports or guides.

Generals Keyes and Porter had been delayed one by losing the road, and the other in repairing an old road, and had not been able to send We then knew of but one me any information. road for the movement of troops and our immense trains.

It was therefore necessary to post the troops in advance of this road, as well as our limited knowledge of the ground permitted, so as to cover the movement of the trains in rear.

I then examined the whole line from the swamp to the left, giving final instructions for the posting of the troops and the obstruction of the roads towards Richmond, and all corps commanders were directed to hold their positions until the trains had passed, after which a more concentrated position was to be taken up near James river.

Our force was too small to occupy and hold the entire line from the White Oak swamp to the river, exposed as it was to be taken in reverse by a movement across the lower part of the swamp, or across the Chickahominy below the swamp. Moreover, the troops were then greatly exhausted, and required rest in a more secure position.

I extended my examinations of the country as far as Haxall's, looking at all the approaches to Malvern, which position I preceived to be the key to our operations in this quarter, and was thus enabled to expedite, very considerably, the passage of the trains, and to rectify the positions of the troops.

Everything being then quiet, I sent aides to the different corps commanders to inform them what I had done on the left, and to bring me information of the condition of affairs on the right. I returned from Malvern to Haxall's, and, having made arrangements for instant communication from Malvern by signals, went on board of Captain Roger's gun-boat, lying near, to confer with him in reference to the condition of our supply vessels, and the state of things on the river.

General McCall, in his report of the battle, says:

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"About half-past two my pickets were driven

It was his opinion that it would be necessary for the army to fall back to a position below City Point, as the channel there was so near the southern shore that it would not be possible to bring up the transports, should the enemy occu-in by a strong advance, after some skirmishing py it. Harrison's Landing was, in his opinion, the nearest suitable point. Upon the termination of this interview, I returned to Malvern hill, and remained there until shortly before daylight.

BATTLE OF NELSON'S FARM.

On the morning of the 30th General Sumner was ordered to march with Sedgwick's division to Glendale ("Nelson's farm ").

without loss on our part. At 3 o'clock the enemy sent forward a regiment on the left centre and another on the right centre, to feel for a weak point. They were under cover of a shower of shells, and boldly advanced, but were both driven back, on the left by the 12th regiment, and on the right by the 7th regiment.

For near two hours the battle raged hotly here.

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At last the enemy was compelled to retire before the well-directed musketry fire of the reserves. the rear, but I rode up and sent them back. It was however of little avail, and they were soon after abandoned by the cannoneers. The batteries in front of the centre were boldly charged upon, but the enemy was speedily forced back.

The German batteries were driven to

General McCall's division (Pennsylvania reserves) was halted during the morning on the New Market road, just in advance of the point where a road turns off to Quaker church. His line was formed perpendicularly to the New Market road, with Meade's brigade on the right, Seymour's on the left, and Reynold's brigade, commanded by Colonel S. G. Simmons, of the 5th Pennsylvania, in reserve. Randall's regular battery on the right, Kern's and Cooper's batteries opposite the center, and Deitrich's and Kauerhem's batteries, of the artillery reserve, on the left-all in front of the infantry line. The country in General McCall's front was open, "Somewhat similar charges had, I have statintersected towards the right by the New Mar-ed, been previously made on Cooper's and Kern's ket road, and a small strip of timber parallel to batteries by single regiments without success, it. The open front was about 800 yards, its depth they having recoiled before the storm of canisabout 1,000 yards. ter hurled against them.

"Soon after this a most determined charge was made on Randall's battery by a full brigade advancing in wedge-shape, without order, but in perfect recklessness.

A like result was anticipated by Randall's On the morning of the 30th General Heintzel-battery, and the 4th regiment was requested not man ordered the bridge at Brackett's ford to be to fire until the battery had done with them. destroyed, and trees to be felled across that Its gallant commander did not doubt his ability road and the Charles City road. to repel the attack, and his guns did indeed mow down the advancing host, but still the gaps were closed, and the enemy came in upon a run to the very muzzle of his guns.

General Slocum's division was to extend to the Charles City road.

General Kearney's right to connect with Gen

eral Slocum's left.

"It was a perfect torrent of men, and they General McCall's position was to the left of were in his battery before the guns could be rethe Long Bridge road, in connection with Gene-moved. Two guns that were indeed successfully ral Kearney's left. General Hooker was on the

left of General McCall.

limbered had their horses killed and wounded, and were overturned on the spot, and the enemy Between 12 and 1 o'clock the enemy opened dashing past drove the greater part of the 4th a fierce cannonade upon the divisions of Smith regiment before them. The left company (B) and Richardson and Naglee's brigade at White nevertheless stood its ground, with its captain, Oak Swamp bridge. This artillery fire was con- Fred. A. Conrad, as did likewise certain men of tinued by the enemy through the day, and be other companies. I had ridden into the regicrossed some infantry below our position. Rich-ment and endeavored to check them, but with ardson's division suffered severely. Captain only partial success. Ayres directed our artillery with great effect.

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Captain Hazzard's battery, after losing many "There was no running; but my division, recannoneers, and Captain Hazzard being mortally duced by the previous battles to less than (6,wounded, was compelled to retire. It was re-000) six thousand, had to contend with the diplaced by Pettit's battery, which partially si-visions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, considered lenced the enemy's guns.

General Franklin held his position until after dark, repeatedly driving back the enemy in their attempts to cross the White Oak swamp.

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At 2 o'clock in the day the enemy were reported advancing in force by the Charles City road, and at half-past 2 o'clock the attack was made down the road on General Slocum's left, but was checked by his artillery. After this the caemy, in large force, comprising the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, attacked General | adds: Metall, whose division, after severe fighting, "General Hoker, being on his left, by movwas compelled to retire.

ing to the right repulsed the rebels in the hand

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