“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

.. IN FRONT OF YORKTOWN, "April 7, 1862-7 p.m. "Your telegram of yesterday arrived here while I was absent examining the enemy's right, which I did pretty closely.

While the engineer officers were engaged in ascertaining the character and strength of all the defences, and the configuration of the ground in front of Yorktown, in order to deterapproaches, the troops were occupied in openmine the point of attack, and to develop the "The whole line of the Warwick, which really ing roads to the depots established at the nearheads within a mile of Yorktown, is strongly est available points on branches of York River. defended by detached redoubts, and other forti- Troops were brought to the front as rapidly as fications, armed with heavy and light guns. possible, and on the 10th of April the army was posted as follows: Heintzelman's corps, The approaches, except at Yorktown, are covered by the Warwick, over which there is but composed of Porter's, Hooker's and Hamilton's one, or at most, two passages, both of which the order named from the mouth of Wormley's divisions, in front of Yorktown, extending, in are covered by strong batteries. It will be nec- creek to the Warwick road opposite Winn's essary to resort to the use of heavy guns, and some siege operations, before we can assault. mills; Summer's corps, Sedgwick's division only All the prisoners state that Gen. J. E. Johnston having arrived, on the left of Hamilton, extenaarrived in Yorktown yesterday with strong rein-ng down the Warwick and opposite the Winn's forcements. It seems clear that I shall have mills works; Keyes's corps, (Smith's, Couch's, the whole force of the enemy on my hands, proand Casey's divisions), on the left of Sedgwick, bably not less than (100,000) one hundred thou-facing the works at the one gun battery, Lee's mills, etc., on the west bank of the Warwick. sand men, and possibly more. In consequence Sumner, after the 6th of April, commanded the of the loss of Blenker's division, and the 1st left wing, composed of his own and Keyes's corps, my force is possibly less than that of the enemy, while they have all the advantage of position.

י

"I am under great obligations to you for the offer that the whole force and material of the governinent, will be as fully and speedily under my command as heretofore, or as if the new partments had not been created.

:

"Since my dispatch of the 5th inst, five

corps.

Throughout the preparations for, and during the seige of Yorktown, I kept the corps under Gen. Keyes, and afterwards the left wing under Gen. Summer, engaged in ascertaining the charde-acter of the obstacles presented by the Warwick, and the enemy intrenched on the right “Since my arrangements were made for this bank, with the intention, if possible, of overcampaign, at least (50,000) fifty thousand men coming them and breaking that line of defence, have been taken from my command. so as to gain possession of the road to Willamedivis-bug, and cut off Yorktown from its supports and supplies. The forces under Gen. Heitzer man were engaged in similar efforts upon the works between Winn's mills and Yorktown. Gen. Keyes's report of the 16th of April, enclosing reports of brigade commanders engaged in reconnoissances up to that day, said, no part of his (the enemy's line opposite his) line, as far as discovered, can be taken by a sault without in enormous waste of life.', Recon noissances on the right flank demonstrated the fact that the Warwick was not passable in that direction except over a narrow dam, the apteries and intrenchments, which could be filled proaches to which were swept by several batquickly with supports sheltered by the timber immediately in rear.

ions have been in close observation of the ene-
my, and frequently exchanging shots. When
my present command all joins, I shall have about
(85,000) eighty-five thousand men for duty,
from which a large force must be taken for
With this army I could
guards, escorts, etc.
assault the enemy's works, and perhaps carry
them, but were I in possession of their intrench-
ments, and assailed by double my numbers, I
should have no fears as to the result.

"Under the circumstances that have been dveloped since my arrival here, I feel fully impressed with the conviction, that there is to be fought the great battle that is to decide the existing

that

contest. I shall, of course, commence the attack as soon as I can get my siege train, and shall do all in my power to carry the enemy's of the Potomac, whose position entitled his General Barnard, chief engineer of the army works; but to do this with a reasonable degree opinions to the highest considera.ion, ex 7688of certainty, requires, in my judgment, that I expressshould, if possible, have at least, the whole of could not, with any reasonable degree of cered the judgment that those formidable works the 1st corps to land upon the Severn river, tainty, be carried by assult. General Keyes, and attack Gloucester in the rear. My present commanding 4th a: my corps, after the examinstrength will not admit of a detachment suffi-ation of the enemy's defences on the left. before cient for this purpose, without materially impairing the efficiency of this column. Flag-officer Goldsborough, thinks the works too strong for his available vessels, unless I can turn Gloucester. I send, by mail, copies of this letter, and one of the commander of the gun-boats here. "GEо. B. McClellan, Major-General.”

I had provided a small siege train, and moderate supplies of intrenching tools, for such a for such a contingency at the present. Immediate steps were taken to secure the necessary additions.

alluded to, addressed the following letter to the Hon. Ita Harris, U. S. Senate, and gave me a copy. Although not strictly official. it describes the situation at that time in some respects so well that I have taken the liberty of introducing it here.

"HEAD QUARTERS 4TH CORPS, "Warwick Court House, Va., April 7, 1862 "MY DEAR SENATOR: The plan of cam, aign on this line was made with the distinct understanding that four army corps should be employed, and that the navy should co-operate in

|

Ι

gard or dislike to any of my senior in rank. If I were to credit all the opinions which have been poured into my ears, I must believe that, in regard to my present fine command, I owe much to General McDowell and nothing to General McClellan. But I have disregarded all such officiousness, and I have, from last July to the present day, supported General McClellan and obeyed all his orders with as hearty a good will as though he had been my brother or the friend to whom I owed ost. I shall continue to do so to the last, and long as he is my commander, and I am not desirous to displace him, and would not if I could. He left Washington with the understanding that he was to execute a definite plan of c mpaign with certain prescribed means. The plan was good and the means sufficient, and, without modification, the enterprise was certain of success. But, with the reduction of force and means, the plan is entirely changed, and is now a bad plan, with

means insufficient for certain success.

"Do not look upon this communication as the offspring of despondency. I never despond; and when you see me working the hardest, you may be sure that fortune is frowning upon me. I am working now, to my utmost.

"Please show this letter to the President, and I should like also that Mr. Stanton should know its contents. Do me the honor to write to me as soon as you can, and believe me, with perfect respect,

"Your most obedient servant,

"E. D. KEYES, “Brig. Gen. Commanding 4th Army Corps. "HON. IRA HARRIS, U. S. Senate."

On the 7th of April, and before the arrival of the divisions of Generals Hocker, Richardson, and Casey, I received the following dispatches from the President and Secretary of War.

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1862-8 r. m. “Yours of 11 A. M. to-day received. Secretary of War informs me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury's brigade, under your orders, is not and will not be interfered with. You have now over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent

you had

of General Wool's command. I think
better break the enemy's line from Yorktown
to Warwick river at once. This will probably
use time as advantageously as you can.
"A. LINCOLN, President.
"General G. B. MCCLELLAN."

By the 9th of April I had acquired a pretty good knowledge of the position and strength of the enemy's works, and the obstacles to be over come.

On that day I received the following letter from the President.

"WASHINGTON, April 9th, 1862. "MY DEAR SIR: Your despatches, complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

before you left here, and you know the pressure "Blenker's division was withdrawn from you under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it, certainly not without reluctance.

"After you left I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defence of Washington and Manassas Junction; and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. This presented (or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone) a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this Į that drove me to detain McDowell.

"I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up and nothing was substituted for it, of conrse I was constrained to substitute something for it myself. And allow me to ask, Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city, to be entirely open, except what resistance could be ized troops? This is a question which the counpresented by less than twenty thousand organtry will not allow me to evade.

"There is a curious mystery about the numbers of the troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement, taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,You 000 then with you and en route to you. now say you will have but 85.000 when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for?

"As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do, if that command was away.

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1862-2 P.M. "The President directs me to say that your despatch to him has been received. General Sumner's corps is on the road to join you, and "I suppose the whole force which has gone will go forward as fast as possible. Franklin's forward for you is with you by this time, and, if division is now on the advance toward Manassas. so, I think it is the precise time to strike a blow. There is no means of transportation here to send By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon it forward in time to be of service in your pre-you-that is, he will gain faster, by fortificasent operations: Telegraph frequently, and all tions and reinforcements, than you can by reinin the power of the government shall be done forcements alone. to sustain you as occasion may require. 'EDWIN M. STANTON, "Secretary of War.

"General G. B. MCCLELLAN,"

"And once more, let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember, I always insisted that going

down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrencaments at either place. The country will not fail to note-is now noting-that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy, is but the story of Manassas repeated.

carefully constructed with well made sod-revetments.

There were numerous traverses between the guns, and ample magazines; how sufficient in bomb-proof qualities, I am unable to say.

"The two first guns of the work on the heights, bear upon the water as well as the land, and were of heavy calibre.

“I beg to assure you that I have never writ- The lists herewith, gives all the guns in ten you, or spoken to you, in greater kindness position, or for which there were emplacements. of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose | The vacant emplacements were all occupied beto sus am you, so far as in my most anxious fore the evacuation by siege-guns, rifted 41⁄2 judgment I consistently can. But you must act. inch, 24-pounders and 18-pounders. Yours, very truly,

"A. LINCOLN.

"Major General MCCLELLAN.”

"In Fort Magruder (the first exterio work) there were found 1 8-inch columbiad, 1 42pounder, and 1 8-inch siege-howitzer, the two former en barbette.' barbette.' The sketeh will show

the emplacements for guns on field and siegecarriages, making, I think, with the foregoing, 22. Two of these were placed behind traverses with embrasures covered by bridges.

With great deference to the opinions and wishes of his excellency, the President, I most respectfully beg leave to refer to the facts which I have presented, and those contained in the accompanying letter of General Keyes, with the The two external redoubts, with the conreports of General Barnard and other officers, as necting parapets, formed a re-entrant with the furnishing a reply to the above letter. His ex-fronts of attack, and all the guns bore on our cellency could not judge of the formidable character of the works before us as well as if he

approaches.

It will be seen, therefore, that our approaches were swept by the fire of at least 49 guns, nearly all of which were heavy, and many of them the most formidable guns known, besides that, two-thirds of the guns of the waterbatteries, and all the guns of Gloucester, bore on our right batteries, though under disadvan

had been upon the ground, and, whatever might have been is desire for prompt action, (certainly no greater than mine), I feel confident, if he could have made a personal inspection of the enemy's defences, he would have forbidden me from risking the safety of the army, and the possible successes of the campaign on a sanguiu-tageous circumstances. ary assault of an advantageous and formidable position, which, even if successful, could not "The ravine, behind which the left of the have been followed up to any other or better re- Yorktown fronts of attack was placed, was not sult than would have been reached by the regu- very difficult, as the heads formed depressions lar operations of a siege. Still less could I fore-in front of there left imperfectly seen by their fire, and from which access could be had to the go the conclusion of my instructed judgment for the mere sake of avoiding the personal cou-ditches, but we could not be sure of this fack before the evacuation. The enemy held, by sequences intimated in the President's despatch. slight breast-work, and rifle The following extracts from the report of the means of a chief engineer (Brigadier General J. G. Bar- trenches, a position in advance of the heads of nard), embody the result of our reconnoissance, their ravines, as far forward as the Burnt house. "The ravines, which head between the and give, with some degree of detail, the character and strength of the defences of Yorktown Yorktown fortifications and the exterior works, and the Warwick, and some of the obstacles are deep and intricate. They were tolerably which the army contended against and over-westwardly from the Yorktown works, and well seen, however, by the works which run

caine.

"The three bastioned fronts looking towards our approaches appear to have been earliest built, and have about fifteen feet thickness of parapet, and 8 feet to 10 feet depth of ditch; the width varying much, but never leaving less at top of the scrap than 15 feet; I think, generally, much more.

"The works extending around the town, from the western salient of fronts just mentioned, appear to have been finished during the last winter and spring. They have formidable profiles, 18 feet thickness of parapet, and generally, 10 feet depth of ditch.

“The water-batteries had generally, eighteen feet parapet. the gun is barbette.

They wero (as well as all works mentioned)

which were too numerous and complicated to be traced on paper.

"Fort Magruder, the first lunette on our left, appears to have been built at an early period.

"The external connection between this work, was first a rifle trench, probably afterwards enlarged into a parapet, with external ditch, and an emplacement for four guns in or near the emall redan in the centre.

"Behind this they had constructed numerous epaulments with connecting boyaus not fully arranged for infantry fires, and mainly intended, probably, to protect their camps and reserves against the destructive effects of our artillery.

"From the red redoubt,' these trenches and epaulments, ran to the woods and rivulet which forms a head of the Warwick, and continue almost without break to connect with the works at Winn's mill. This stream just mentioned, (whatever be its | be its name, the term 'Warwick,' according to some, applying only to the tidal channel from the James river, up as high as Lee's mill), was inundated by a number of dams, from near where its head is

crossed by the epaulments mentioned, down to Lee's mill.

batteries, and as soon as the enemy's guns, which swept the neck of land between Wormley's creek and the Warwick, were crippled, and their fire kept down, to push the tienenes as far forward as necessary, and to assault Yorktown and the adjacent works.

"Below Lee's mill, the Warwick follows a tortuous course through salt marshes of 200 yards or 300 yards in width, from which the land rises up boldly to a height of 30 or 40 feet. The first group of works is at Winn's mill, where there is a dam and bridge. The next, is The approaches to the batteries, the necesto guard another dam between Winn's and sary bridges, and the roads to the depote, had Lee's wills, this is the point attacked by Gen-been vigorously pushed to completion by the eral Smith, on the 16th ultimo, and where troops under Generals Heintzelman and Summer, Lieutenant Merrill was wounded; the object of and were available for infantry, and in some inthe attack, was merely to prevent the further stances for artillery, on the 17th of April, when construction of works, and feel the strength of the position). A work, of what extent is not now known, was at the sharp angle of the stream, just above Lee's mill, and a formidable group of works was at Lee's mill, where there was also a dam and bridge.

"From Lee's mill a line of works extends across Mulberry island (or is supposed to do 80).

"At Southall's landing is another formidable | group of works, and from here, too, they extend apparently across the James.

"These groups of field works were connected by rifle trenches or parapets, for nearly the whole distance.

They are far more extensive than may be supposed, from the mention of them I make; and every kind of obstruction which the country affords, such as abattis, marsh, inundation, &c., was skillfully used. The line is certainly one of the most extensive known to modern times.

the batteries and their connections were commenced, and labor upon them kept up, night and day, until finished.

Some of the batteries, on easy ground and concealed from the view of the enemy, were early completed and armed, and held ready for any emergency, but not permitted to open, as the return fire of the enemy would interfere too much with the labor on other and more impor tant works. The completion of the more exposed and heaviest batteries was delayed by storms, preventing the landing of guns and ammunition. It having been discovered that the enemy were receiving artillery stores at the wharf in Yorktown, on May 1st, battery No. 1 was opened with effect upon the wharf and town.

On the 22d of April, General Franklin, with his division from General McDowell's corps, had arrived and reported to me. The garrison of Gloucester point had been reinforced and the works strengthened; but as this division was too small to detach to the Severn, and no more troops could be spared, I determined to act on Gloucester by disembarking it on the north bank of the York river, under the protection of the gun-boats. The troops were mainly kept on board ship while the necessary prepara"If we could have broken the enemy's line tions were made for landing them, and supportacross the isthmus, we could have investeding them in case of necessity. For a full aeYorktown, and it must, with its garrison, have soon fallen into our hands.

"The country on both sides the Warwick, from near Yorktown down, is a dense forest, with few clearings. It was swampy, and the roads impassible during the heavy rains we have constantly had, except where our own labors had corduroyed them.

"It was not d emed practicable, considering the strength of that line, and the difficulty of handling our forces (owing to the impracticable character of the country), to do so.

"If we could take Yorktown, or drive the enemy out of that place, the enemy's line was no longer tenable. This we could do by siege operations. It was deemed too hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place by assault."

count of this labor, I refer to the report of Lieut. Col. B. S. Alexander, of the engineer corps detailed for this expedition.

While the siege works were being rapidly completed, the roads on the left wing necessary for communication and advance were opened and corduroyed over the marshes, batteries were erected to silence the enemy's guns and drive him from his works at Winn's and Lee's mills, preparatory to the general attack, active reconnoissances were continually going The plan of the approaches and their de-on, and attempts in force made to drive the enfences, as determined upon and finally executed, emy from the banks. is exhibited in the accompanying map. It was, The result of various reconnoissances made in words, to open the first parallel as near as under the immediate direction of General W. possible to the works of the en my, and under|F. Smith, commanding 2d division, 4th corps, its protection to establish, almost simultaneous-led to the belief that the weakest point of that ly, batteries along the whole front, extending part of the enemy's lines was opposite a field, from York river, on the right, to the Warwick, where it was ascertained that there was a dam on the left (a chord of about one mile in length), the principal approaches were directed against the east end of the main work (which was most heavily armed, and bore both on the water and land), and lay between Wormley's creek and York river. There, also, were placed the most of the batteries designed to act against the land front, to enfilade the water-batteries, and to act upon Gloucester. I designed at the earliest moment to open simultaneously with several

covered by a battery known to contain at least one gun. It was determined to push a strong reconnoissance on this point, to silence the ene my's fire, and ascertain the actual strength of the position, being prepared to sustain the reconnoitering party by a real attack if found expedient.

General W. F. Smith was directed to undertake the operation on the 16th of April. He silenced the enemy's guns, discovered the ex