tegrity of the Union, to uphold the power of our national government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order. "With respect to military operations it is probable, from the best information in my possession, that the interests of the government will be best served by fortifying and holding in considerable strength Rolla, Sedalia, and other interior points, keeping strong patrols constantly moving from the terminal stations, and concentrating the mass of the troops on or near the Mississippi, prepared for such ulterior operations as the public interests may demand. authority of the government by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. I know that I express the feelings and opinion of the President when I say that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and the constitutional authority of the general government. "The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon it that their domestic institutions will in no manner be interfered with, and that they will receive at our hands every constitutional protection. I have only to repeat that you will in all respects carefully regard the local institutions of the region in which you command, allowing nothing but the dictates of military necessity to cause you to depart from the spirit of these instructions. "I would be glad to have you make as soon as possible a personal inspection of all the important points in your department, and report the result to me. I cannot too strongly impress "So much in regard to political consideraupon you the absolute necessity of keeping me tions. The military problem would be a simple constantly advised of the strength, condition, one could it be entirely separated from political and location of your troops, together with all influences; such is not the case. Were the.pofacts that will enable me to maintain that gene- pulation among which you are to operate wholly ral direction of the armies of the United States or generally hostile, it is probable that Nashvillle which it is my purpose to exercise. I trust to should be your first and principal objective point. you to maintain thorough organization, discip- It so happens that a large majority of the inhabfine and economy throughout your department.itants of eastern Tennessee are in favor of the Please inform me as soon as possible of everything relating to the gunboats now in process of construction, as well as those completed. "The militia force authorized to be raised by the State of Missouri for its defence will be under your orders. "I am general, &c., &c., "GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, "Major General Commanding U. S. A. "Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, U. Š. A., "Com'g Dep't of Missouri.” Union; it therefore seems proper that you should remain on the defensive on the line from Louisville to Nashville, while you throw the mass of your forces, by rapid marches, by Cumberland Gap or Walker's Gap, on Knoxville, in order to occupy the railroad at that point, and thus enable the loyal citizens of eastern Tennessee to rise, while you at the same time cut off the railway communication between eastern Virginia and the Mississippi. It will be prudent to fortify the pass before leaving it in your rear. "Brigadier General D. C. BUELL.” "HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, November 7, 1862. GENERAL: In giving you instructions for your guidance in command of the department of the Ohio, I do not design to fetter you. I merely wish to express plainly the general ideas which occur to me in relation to the conduct of operations there. That portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland river is by its position so closely related to the States of Illinois and Missouri, that it has seemed best to attach it to the department of Missouri. Your operations there, in Kentucky, will be confined to that portion of the State east of the Cumberland river. I trust I need not repeat to you that I regard the importance of the territory committed to your care as second only to that occupied by the army under my immediate command. It is absolutely necessary that we shall hold all the State of Kentucky; not only that, but that "HEADQUATERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, November 12, 1863. "GENERAL: Upon assuming command of the department, I will be glad to have you make as soon as possible a careful report of the condition and situation of your troops, and of the military and political condition of your command. The main point to which I desire to call your attention is the necessity of entering eastern Tennessee as soon as it can be done with reasonable chances of success, and I hope that you will, with the least possible delay, organize a column for that purpose, sufficiently guarding at the same time the main avenues by which the rebels may invade Kentucky. Our conversations on the subject of military operations have been so in favor of its inhabitants shall be warmly full, and my confidence in your judgment is so of our cause, it being that which best subserves their interests. It is possible that the conduct of our political affairs in Kentucky is more important than that of our military operations. I certainly cannot overestimate the importance of the former. You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the general government over all portions of our territory. We shall most eadily suppress this rebellion and restore the great, that I will not dwell further upon the subject, except to urge upon you the necessity of keeping me fully informed as to the state of affairs, both military and political, and your movements. In regard to political matters, bear in mind that we are tighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and to uphold the power of the general government; as far as military necessity will permit, religiously respect the constitutional rights of all. Preserve the strictest discipline among the troops, and while employing the utmost energy in military movements, be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us and the rebels. "I mean by this that it is the desire of the government to avoid unnecessary irritation by causeless arrests and persecution of individuals. Where there is good reason to believe that persons are actually giving aid, comfort, or information to the enemy, it is of course necessary to arrest them; but I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrests on mere suspicion. You will find it well to direct that no arrest shall be made except by your order or that of your generals, unless in extraordinary cases, always holding the party making the arrest responsible for the propriety of his course. It should be our constant aim to make it apparent to all that their property, their comfort, and their personal safety will be best preserved by adhering to the cause of the Union. "If the military suggestions I have made in this letter prove to have been founded on erroneous data, you are of course perfectly free to change the plans of operations. "Brigadier General D. C. BUELL, "HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, "Washington, February 14, 1862. "GENERAL: Your despatches in regard to the occupation of Dafuskie island, &c., were received to-day. I saw also to-day, for the first time, your requisition for a siege train for Savannah. "After giving the subject all the consideration in my power, I am forced to the conclusion that, under present circumstances, the siege and capture of Savannah do not promise results commensurate with the sacrifices necessary. When I learned that it was possible for the gunboats to reach the Savannah river, above Fort Pulaski, two operations suggested themselves to my mind as its immediate results. "First.. The capture of Savannah by a 'coup de main,'-the result of an instantaneous advance and attack by the army and navy. ton and its defences. There the rebellion had its birth; there the unnatural hatred of our government is most intense; there is the centre of the boasted power and courage of the rebels. "To gain Fort Sumpter and hold Charleston is a task well worthy of our greatest efforts, and considerable sacrifices. That is the problem I would be glad to have you study. Some time must elapse before we can be in all respects ready to accomplish that purpose. Fleets are en route and armies in motion which have certain preliminary objects to accomplish, before we are ready to take Charleston in hand. But the time will before long arrive when I shall be prepared to make that movement. In the mean time, it is my advice and wish that no attempt be made upon Savannah, unless it can be carried with certainty by a coup de main.' "Please concentrate your attention and forces upon Pulaski and Fernandina. St. Augustine might as well be taken by way of an interlude, while awaiting the preparations for Charleston. Success attends us everywhere at present. "Very truly, yours, "GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, "Maj. Gen., Com'd'g United States Army. "Brig. Gen. T. W. SHERMAN, Commanding at Port Royal, &c." • HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, "Washington, February 23, 1862. "GENERAL: You are assigned to the command of the land forces destined to co-operate with the navy in the attacks upon New Orleans. You will use every means to keep your destination a profound secret, even from your staff officers, with the exception of your chief of staff, and Lieutenant Weitzell, of the engineers. The force at your disposal will consist of the first thirteen regiments named in your memorandum handed to me in person, the 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan, (old and good regiments from Baltimore). "The 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan, will await your orders at Fort Mon roe. "Two companies of the 21st Indiana are well drilled as "heavy artillery. The cavalry force already en route for Ship Island will be suffi "The time for this has passed, and your letter indicates that you are not accountable for the failure to seize the propitious moment, but that, on the contrary, you perceived its advan-cient for your purposes. tages. "Second. To isolate Fort Pulaski, cut off its supplies, and at least facilitate its reduction by bombardment.. "Although we have a long delay to deplore, the second course still remains open to us; and I strongly advise the close blockade of Pulaski, and its bombardment as soon as the 13-inch mortars and heavy guns reach you. I am confident you can thus reduce it. With Pulaski, you gain all that is really essential; you obtain complete control of the harbor; you relieve the blockading fleet, and render the main body of your force disposable for other operations. "I do not consider the possession of Savannah worth a siege after Pulaski is in our hands. But the possession of Pulaski is of the first importance. The expedition to Fernandina is well, and I shall be glad to learn that it is ours. "But, after all, the greatest moral effect would be produced by the reduction of Charles "After full consultation with officers well acquainted with the country in which it is proposed to operate, I have arrived at the conclusion that two (2) light batteries fully equipped, and one (1) without horses, will be all that are necessary. "This will make your force about 14,400 infantry, 275 cavalry, 580 artillery; total, 15,255 men. The commanding general of the department of Key West is authorized to loan you, temporarily, two regiments; Fort Pickens can, probably, give you another, which will bring your force to nearly 18,000. "The object of your expedition is one of vital importance-the capture of New Orleans. The route selected is up the Mississippi river, and the first obstacle to be encountered (perhaps the only one) is in the resistance offered by Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is expected that the navy can reduce these works; in that case you will, after their capture, leave a sufficient garrison in them to render them perfectly secure; and it is recommended that, on the upward passage, a few heavy guns and some troops be left at the pilot station (at the forks of the river) to cover a retreat in the event of a disaster. These troops and guns will, of course, be removed as soon as the forts are captured. "Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will land your forces and siege train, and endeavor to breach the works, silence the fire, and carry them by assault. "The next resistance will be near the English Bend, where there are some earthen batteries. Here it may be necessary for you to land your troops and co-operate with the naval attack, although it is more than probable that the navy, unassisted, can accomplish the result. If these works are taken, the city of New Orleans necessarily falls. In that event, it will probably be best to occupy Algiers with the mass of your troops, also the eastern bank of the river above the city. It may be necessary to place some troops in the city to preserve order; but if there appears to be sufficient Union sentiment to control the city, it may be best for purposes of discipline to keep your men out of the city. "After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be necessary to reduce all the works guarding its approaches from the east, and particularly to gain the Manchac pass. "Baton Rouge, Berwick bay, and Fort Livingston, will next claim your attention. "A feint on Galveston may facilitate the objects we have in view. I need not call your attention to the necessity of gaining possession of all the rolling stock you can on the different railways, and of obtaining control of the roads themselves. The occupation of Baton Rouge by a combined naval and land force should be accomplished as soon as possible after you have gained New Orleans. Then endeavor to open your communication with the northern column by the Mississippi, always bearing in mind the necessity of occupying Jackson, Mississippi, as soon as you can safely do so, either after or before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing to divert you from obtaining full possession of all the approaches to New Orleans. When that object is accomplished to its fullest extent, it will be necessary to make a combined attack on Mobile, in order to gain possession of the harbor and works, as well as to control the railway terminus at the city. In regard to this, I will send more detailed instructions as the operations of the northern column develop themselves. "I may briefly state that the general objects of the expedition are, first, the reduction of New Orleans and all its approaches; then Mobile and its defences; then Pensacola, Galveston, &c. It is probable that by the time New Orleans is reduced, it will be in the power of the government to re-enforce the land forces sufficiently to accomplish all these objects. In the mean time you will please give all the assistance in your power to the army and navy commanders in your vicinity, never losing sight of the fact that the great object to be The plan indicated in the above letters comprehended in its scope the operations of all the armies of the Union, the army of the Potomac as well. It was my intention, for reasons easy ried out simultaneously, or nearly so, and in to be seen, that its various parts should be carco-operation along the whole line. If this plan was wise, and events have failed to prove that it was not, then it is unnecessary to defend any delay which would have enabled the army of the Potomac to perform its share in the execution of the whole work. But about the middle of January, 1862, upon recovering from a severe illness, I found that excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the army of the Potomac had taken possession of the minds of the administration. A change had just been made in the War Department, and I was soon urged by the new secretary, Mr. Stanton, to take immediate steps to secure the reopening of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and to free the banks of the lower Potomac from the rebel batteries which annoyed passing vessels. Very soon after his entrance upon office I laid before him verbally my design as to the part of the plan of campaign to be executed by the army of the Potomac, which was to attack Richmond by the lower Chesapeake. He instructed me to develop it to the President, which I did. The result was, that the President disapproved it, and by an order of January 31, 1862, substituted one of his own. the 27th of January, 1862, the following order was issued without consultation with me: [President's General War Order No. 1.] On "EXECUTIVE MANSION, "Washington, January 27, 1862. Ordered, That the 22d day of February, land and naval forces of the United States 1862, be the day for a general movement of the against the insurgent forces. That especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the army of the Potomac, the army of Western Virginia, the army near Munfordsville, Kentucky, the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day. "That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given. "That the heads of departments and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the general-inchief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order. "ABRAHAM LINCOLN." The order of January 31, 1862, was as fol lows [President's Special War Order No. 1. " EXECUTIVE MANSION, "Washington, January 31, 1862. "Ordered, That all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next. ( Abraham LINCOLN." I asked his excellency whether this order was to be regarded as final, or whether I could be permitted to submit in writing my objections to his plan, and my reasons for preferring my own. Permission was accorded, and I therefore prepared the letter to the Secretary of War, which is given below. Before this had been submitted to the President, he addressed me the following note: "EXECUTIVE MANSION, "Washington, February 3, 1862. MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the army of the Potomac: yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York river; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. "If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours: 1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine? "2d. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine? "3d. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine? "4th. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this: that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would? "5th. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine? "Yours truly, "ABRAHAM LINCOLN. "Major General MCCLELLAN." These questions were substantially answered by the following letter of the same date to the Secretary of War: "HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, "Washington, February 3, 1862. "SIR: I ask your indulgence for the following papers rendered necessary by circum stances: "I assumed command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington on Saturday, July 27, 1861, six days after the battle of Bull run. "I found no army to command; a mere collection of regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat. by means of defensive works; nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac. "The troops were not only undisciplined, undrilled and dispirited; they were not even placed in military positions. The city was almost in a condition to have been taken by a dash of a regiment of cavalry. "Without one day's delay I undertook the difficult task assigned to me; that task the honorable Secretary knows was given to me without solicitation or foreknowledge. How far I have accomplished it will best be shown by the past and the present. "The capital is secure against attack, the extensive fortifications erected by the labor of our troops enable a small garrison to hold it held in check, the State of Maryland is securely against a numerous army, the enemy have been in our possession, the detached counties of Virginia are again within the pale of our laws, and all apprehension of trouble in Delaware is at they occupied before the disaster of the 21st an end; the enemy are confined to the positions July. More than all this, I have now under my command a well-drilled and reliable army, to which the destinies of the country may be confidently committed. This army is young and untried in battle; but it is animated by the highest spirit, and is capable of great deeds. such an army created in so short a time from "That so much has been accomplished and nothing, will hereafter be regarded as one of the highest glories of the administration and the nation. "Many weeks, I may say months ago, this army of the Potomac was fully in condition to repel any attack; but there is a vast difference able troops to attack successfully an army elated between that and the efficiency required to enby victory and intrenched in a position long since selected, studied, and fortified. "In the earliest papers I submitted to the force far exceeding the aggregate of that now President, I asked for an effective and moveable on the banks of the Potomac. force I asked for. I have not the "Even when in a subordinate position, I always looked beyond the operations of the army of the Potomac; I was never satisfied in my own mind with a barren victory, but looked to combined and decisive operations. "When I was placed in command of the armies of the United States, I immediately turned my attention to the whole field of operations, regarding the army of the Potomac as only one, while the most important, of the masses under my command. "I confess that I did not then appreciate the total absence of a general plan which had before existed, nor did I know that utter diorganization and want of preparation pervaded the western armies. "I took it for granted that they were nearly, if not quite, in condition to move towards the fulfilment of my plans. I acknowledge that I made a great mistake. "I sent at once-with the approval of the Executive-officers I considered competent to command in Kentucky and Missouri. Their instructions looked to prompt movements. I "Nothing of any consequence had been done soon found that the labor of creation and organto secure the southern approaches to the capitalization had to be performed there; transporta tion-arms-clothing-artillery-discipline, all were wanting. These things required time to procure them. "The generals in command have done their work creditably, but we are still delayed. I had hoped that a general advance could be made during the good weather in December; I was mistaken. "My wish was to gain possession of the eastern Tennessee railroad, as a preliminary movement, then to follow it up immediately by an attack on Nashville and Richmond, as nearly at the same time as possible. "I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of fully preparing ourselves, and then seeking for the most decisive results. I do not wish to waste life in useless battles, but prefer to strike at the heart. "Two bases of operations seem to present themselves for the advance of the army of the Potomac: "1st. That of Washington-its present position-involving a direct attack upon the intrenched positions of the enemy at Centreville, Manassas, &c., or else a movement to turn one or both flanks of those positions, or a combination of the two plans. "The relative force of the two armies will not justify an attack on both flanks; an attack on his left flank alone involves a long line of wagon communication, and cannot prevent him from collecting for the decisive battle all the detachments now on his extreme right and left. "Should we attack his right flank by the line of the Occoquan, and a crossing of the Potomac below that river, and near his batteries, we could perhaps prevent the junction of the enemy's right with his centre, (we might destroy the former); we would remove the obstructions to the navigation of the Potomac, reduce the length of wagon transportation by establishing new depots at the nearest points of the Potomac, and strike more directly his main railway communication. village of Occoquan; this occupation must be continued so long as we continue to draw supplies by the roads from this city, or until a battle is won. "The crossing of the Occoquan should be made at all the fords from Wolf's run to the mouth; the points of crossing not being necessarily confined to the fords themselves. Should the enemy occupy this line in force, we must, with what assistance the flotilla can afford, endeavor to force the passage near the mouth, thus forcing the enemy to abandon the whole line, or be taken in flank himself. Having gained the line of the Occoquan, it would be necessary to throw a column by the shortest route to Dumfries; partly to force the enemy to abandon his batteries on the Potomac; partly to cover our left flank against an attack from the direction of Aquia; and lastly, to establish our communications with the river by the best roads, and thus give us new depots. The enemy would by this time have occupied the line of the Occoquan above Bull run, holding Brentsville in force, and perhaps extending his lines somewhat further to the southwest. "Our next step would then be to prevent the Bull run and Broad run, to fall upon our right enemy from crossing the Occoquan between flank while moving on Brentsville. This might be effected by occupying Bacon Race church and the cross-roads near the mouth of Bull run, or still more effectually by moving to the fords themselves, and preventing him from debouching on our side. These operations would possibly be resisted, and it would require some time to effect them, as, nearly at the same time as possible, we should gain the fords necessary to our purposes above Broad run. Having secured our right flank, it would become necessary to carry Brentsville at any cost, for we could not leave it between the right flank and the main body. The final movement on the railroad must be determined by circumstances existing at the time. "This brief sketch brings out in bold relief the great advantage possessed by the enemy in the strong central position he occupies, with roads diverging in every direction, and a strong line of defence enabling him to remain on the defensive, with a small force on one flank, while he concentrates everything on the other for a decisive action. "The fords of the Occoquan below the mouth of the Bull run are watched by the rebels; batteries are said to be placed on the heights in the rear, (concealed by the woods), and the arrangement of his troops is such that he can oppose some considerable resistance to a passage of that stream. Information has just been received, to the effect that the enemy are intrenching a line of heights extending from the vicinity of Sangster's (Union mills) towards Evansport. "Should we place a portion of our force in Early in January, Spriggs's ford was occupied front of Centreville, while the rest crosses the by General Rhodes, with 3,600 men and eight Occoquan, we commit the error of dividing our (8) guns; there are strong reasons for believing army by a very difficult obstacle, and by a disthat Davis's ford is occupied. These circum-tance too great to enable the two parts to supstances indicate or prove that the enemy antici- port each other, should either be attacked by pates the movement in question, and is prepared the masses of the enemy, while the other is to resist it. Assuming for the present that this held in check. operation is determined upon, it may be well to examine briefly its probable progress. In the present state of affairs, our column (for the movement of so large a force must be made in several columns, at least five or six) can reach the Accatinck without danger; during the march thence to the Occoquan, our right flank becomes exposed to an attack from Fairfax station, Sangster's, and Union mills. This danger must be met by occupying in some force either the two first named places, or better, the point of junction of the roads leading thence to the "I should perhaps have dwelt more decided ly on the fact that the force left near Sangster's must be allowed to remain somewhere on that side of the Occoquan until the decisive battle is over, so as to cover our retreat in the event of disaster, unless it should be decided to select and intrench a new base somewhere near Dumfries, a proceeding involving much time. "After the passage of the Occoquan by the main army, this covering force could be drawn into a more central and less exposed positionsay Brimstone hill or nearer the Occoquan. In |