" rd to the wants of his men and the conditioned the river below Harper's Ferry, the enemy his supplies than the general-in-chief in his would promptly check the movement by reace at Washington city. crossing into Maryland, at the same time coverThe movement from Washington into Mary-ing his rear by occupying in strong force the hand, which culminated in the battles of South passes leading through the Blue ridge from the Mountain and Antietam, was not a part of an of- south east into the Shenandoah valley. fensive campaign, with the object of the inva- I anticipated, as the result of the first course, mon of the enemy's territory, and an attack upon that Lee would fight me near Winchester, if he Die capital, but was defensive in its purposes, al- could do so under favorable circumstances; or though offensive in its character, and would be else that he would abandon the lower Shenantechnically called a defensive offensive cam-doah, and leave the army of the Potomac free paign. to act upon some other line of operations. If It was undertaken at a time when our army he abandoned the Shenandoah, he would natuhad experienced severe defeats, and its object rally fall back upon his railway communications s to preserve the national capital and Balti-I have since been confirmed in the belief that more, to protect Pennsylvania from invasion, if I had crossed the Potomac below Harper's and to drive the enemy out of Maryland. These Ferry in the early part of October, General Lee purposes were fully and finally accomplished would have recrossed into Maryland. by the battle of Antietam, which brought the army of the Potomac into what might be termed an accidental position on the upper Potomac. As above explained, the army was not in condition to move until late in October, and in the meantime circumstances had changed The period had arrived when a sudden and Having gained the immediate object of the great rise of the Potomac might be looked for at sampaign, the first thing to be done was to in- any moment; the season of bad roads and diffimare Maryland from a return of the enemy; the cult movements was approaching, which would accond, to prepare our own army, exhausted by a naturally deter the enemy from exposing himself sofies of severe battles, destitute to a great ex- very far from his base, and his movements all tent of supplies, and very deficient in artillery appeared to indicate a falling back from the rivand cavalry horses, for a definite offensive move-er towards his supplies. Under these circumment, and to determine upon the line of opera-stances, I felt at liberty to disregard the possitions for a further advance. bility of the enemy recrossing the Potomac, and At the time of the battle of Antietam the Po- determined to select the line east of the Blue tomac was very low, and presented a compara-ridge, feeling convinced that it would secure me vely weak line of defence, unless watched by the largest accession of force, and the most corrge masses of troops. The re-occupation of dial support of the President, whose views from Harper's Ferry, and the disposition of troops the beginning, were in favor of that line. above that point, rendered the line of the P'oto- The subject of the defence of the line of the mad secure against everything except cavalry upper Potomac, after the advance of the main raids. No time was lost in placing the army in army, had long occupied my attention; I desired proper condition for an advance, and the circum-to place Harper's Ferry and its dependencies in stances which caused the delay after the battle a strong state of defence, and frequently address☛Antietam have been fully enumerated else-ed the general-in-chief upon the subject of the where. I never regarded Harper's Ferry or its vicinity a proper base of operations for a movement upon Richmond. I still considered the line of he Peninsula as the true approach, but, for obvieûs reasons, did not make any proposal to reBe to it. erection of field-works and permanent bridges there, asking for the funds necessary to accomplish the purpose. purpose. Although I did my best explain as clearly as I was able that I did not wish to erect permanent works of masonry, and that neither the works nor the permanent bridges had any reference to the advance of the In the 6th of October, as stated above, I was army, but solely to the permanent occupation of ered by the President, through the general-Harper's Ferry, I could never make the generalhief, to cross the Potomac and give battle to in-chief understand my wishes, but was refused enemy, or drive him south. Two lines were the funds necessary to erect the field-works, on presented for my choice: 1st, up the valley of the ground that there was no appropriation for Shenandoah, in which case I was to have the erection of permanent fortifications; and was not allowed to build the permanent bridge 12,000 to 15,000 additional troops; 2d, to cross between the enemy and Washington, that is, on the ground that the main army could not be east of the Blue ridge, in which event I was to delayed in its movements until its completion. be reinforced with 30,000 men. Of course I never thought of delaying the advance of the army for that purpose, and so stated repeatedly. At first I determined to adopt the line of the Shenandoah, for these reasons: The Harper's Ferry and Winchester railroad, and the various tarppikes converging upon Winchester, afforded perior facilities for supplies. Our cavalry being weak, this line of communition could be more easily protected. There was no advantage in interposing, at that time, the Blue ridge and the Shenandoah between the nemy and myself. At the period in question the Potomac was till very low, and I apprehended that if I cross On the 25th of October I sent the general-inchief the following telegram : HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "October 25, 1862-10.45 p. m. "As the moment is at hand for the advance of the army, a question arises for the decision of the general-in-chief; which, although perhaps implicitly decided by the President in his letter of the 13th, should be clearly presented by me, as I do not regard it as in my province to determine it. This question is the extent to which the line of the Potomac should be guarded, after the army leaves, in order to cover Maryland and Pennsylvania from invasion by large or small parties of the enemy. It will always be somewhat difficult to guard the immediate line of the river, owing to its great extent and the numer ♦us passages which exist. It has long appeared to me that the best way of covering this line would be by occupying Front Royal, Strasburg, Wardensville and Moorfields, at the debouches of the several valleys in which they are situated. These points, or suitable places in their vicinity, "I commence crossing the river at Berlin should be strongly intrenched and permanently the morning, and must ask a prompt decisio held; one great advantage of this arrangement the questions proposed herein. would be the covering the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and an essential part of the system would be the construction of the link of railway from Winchester to Strasburg, and the rebuilding of the Manassas gap railway bridge over the Shenandoah. rendered fully secure, it is possible that the o tive army, if it supplies the garrisons. may de reduced so much as to be inadequate to the parposes contemplated; if it is preserved inte Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore u Ohio railroad may be unduly exposed. "I leave the decision of these grave questi ma to the general-in-chief. I know nothing of he number of troops in Baltimore, &c. "An important element in the solution of s problem is the fact that a great portion of Bragg's army is probably now at liberty to ute itself with Lee's command. "The intrenchment of Manassas junction would complete the system for the defence of the approaches to Washington and the upper Potomac. Many months ago I recommended this arrangement, in fact gave orders for it to be carried into effect. I still regard it as essential under all circumstances. "The views of the chief engineer of this army in regard to the defences and garrison of Harper's Ferry and its dependencies are in your pos session. The only troops under my command outside of the organization of the army of the Potomac are the Maryland brigade under General Kenly, the 54th Pennsylvania, Colonel Voss; 12th IlliBois cavalry and Colonel Davis's 8th New York cavalry; total, 2,894 infantry, one battery, and about 900 cavalry men. There are also two of my regiments of cavalry (about 750 men) guarding the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, between Hancock and Cumberland. "As I have no department, and command simply an active army in the field, my responsibility for the safety of the line of the Potomac and the states north of it must terminate the moment I advance so far beyond that line as to adopt another for my base of operations. The question for the general-in-chief to decide, and which I regard as beyond my province, is this: "1st. Shall the safety of Harper's Ferry, and the line of the Potomac, be regarded as assured by the advance of the army south of the Blue ridge, and the line left to take care of itself? 2d. If it is deemed necessary to hold the line or that hereinbefore indicated in advance of it, how many troops shall be placed there, at what points, (and in what numbers, and of what composition at each), and whence shall they be supplied, i. e., from this army, or from other Sources? “G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major Gene "Major General H. W. HALLECK, "General-in-Chief, Washington." To which I received the following reply: The gov “WASHINGTON, Oct. 26, 1862-1.35 Į "Maj. Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN." "Omitting the detatched troops mentioned above, and the small garrisons of Boonsboro and “HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE Potomaų, Frederick, the last returns show the strength of "Oct. 29, 1862-1.15 p. m. this army for duty to be about one hundred and "On the 25th instant, I sent you a dispatch sixteen thousand officers and men. This in requesting you to decide what steps should be cludes the divisions of Stoneman and Whipple, taken to guard the line of the Potomac, when sut dots vot include Heintzelman, Sigel and the army leaves here. To this I received your Bayard. reply, that I had been intrusted by the Presi "If Harper's Ferry and the river above are dent, with defeating and driving away the rebel army, that you had given me no orders heretofore, did not give me any then, etc. Under these circumstances, I have only to make such arrangements for guarding this extended line, as the means at my disposal will permit, at the same time keeping in view the supreme necessity of maintaining the moving army in adequate force to meet the rebel army before us. "The dispositions I have ordered are as follows viz: Ten thousand men to be left at Harper's Ferry, one brigade of infantry in front of harpsburg; Kenly's brigade of infantry at Williamsport; Kelly's brigade, including Colomel. Campbell's 54th Pennsylvania infantry, at Cumberland; and between that point and Hancock I have also left four small cavalry regiments, to patrol and watch the river and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad from Cumberland down to Harper's Ferry. "I do not regard this force as sufficient to oover securely this great extent of line, but I do not feel justified in detaching any more troops from my moving columns. I would therefore recommend that some new regiments infantry and cavalry be sent to strengthen the forces left by me. "There should be a brigade of infantry and section of artillery in the vicinity of Cherry run; another brigade at Hancock, an additional brigade at Williamsport, one regiment at Ha gerstown, and one at Chambersburg with a secon of artillery at each place if possible. This is on the supposition that the enemy retain a considerable cavalry force west of the blue ridge. If they go east of it, the occupation of the points named in my despatch of the 25th inst., will obviate the necessity of keeping many of, these troops on the river. } "There are now several hundred of our wounded, including General Richardson, in the vicinity of Sharpsburg, that can not possibly be moved at present. "I repeat that I do not look upon the forces I have been able to leave from this army as sufficient to prevent cavalry raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania, as cavalry is the only description, of troops adequate to this service, and I am, as you are aware deficient in this arm. "G, B. MCCLELLAN, "Major Ceneral Comd'g. "Major General H. W. HALLECK, ›› "General-in-Chief, Washington.” Ferry, detaching one brigade to the vicinity of Sharpsburg. Generall Morell was placed in command of the line from the mouth of the Antietam to Cumberland, General Slocum in command of Harper's Ferry and the line east of the mouth of the Antietam. The orders given to these officers were as follows: i HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Oct. 29, 1862—1 p. m. 'The general commanding directs that you send one brigade of your corps, to march at once to the position now occupied by General F. J. Porter's corps in front of Sharpsburg, te watch and guard the line of the river from the ford near the mouth of the Antietam creek to the mouth of the Opequan creek. The officer in command will also take steps to afford proper protection to the sick and wounded in the bospitals in the vicinity of Sharpsburg and Boorsboro. The regiment now at Boonsboro will be placed under his orders. General Kenly, at Williamsport, will guard the river from the mouth of the Opequan above, including the ford at the mouth of the Opequan. "The commanding general also directs that you take immediate steps to establish the remainder of your corps as follows, viz.: one brigade on Maryland heights, one brigade on Loudon heights, with the remainder on Bolivar heights and at Harper's Ferry. These dispositions should be made at once, so that General Couch can move with his corps. Please acknowledge receipt of this. "R. B. MARCY, "Chief of Staff. Comdg Army Corps, Harper's Ferry." "General H. W. SLOCUM, "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Oct. 31, 1862. "GENERAL: I am instructed by the commanding general to say to you that he has selected you to perform the highly important and responsible duty of taking charge of, and commanding the troops left for the defence of the line of the Potomac river, from the mouth of the Antietam to Cumberland, as well as any other troops that may hereafter be sert for the protection of the Maryland and Pennsylvania frontier within the limits of the line herein specified. The force which has been left to guard the line, is not deemed adequate to prevent cavalry raids, but To which I received, on the 30th, this it is all that the commanding general feels aureply: thorized to detach from the army of the Potomac at the present time, and it devolves upon you to make the best use of this force in your power. You will have four cavalry regiments tributed along the river as to watch all the under your command, which should be so disavailable fords, and give timely notice to the infantry of the approach of any force of rebels. "You will afford all the protection in your power to the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. "You will endeavor to prevent any cavalry raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania. "You will take steps to have all the sick and wounded of our army, as well as of the rebel army, within your lines, properly taken care of, until they can be sent to general hospitals, or I accordingly left the 12th corps at Harper's discharged, or paroled. "You will make your headquarters at Hagerstown, and occasionally visit the different parts of your line. The concentration of the 6th corps, delayed somewhat by intelligence as to the movements. of the enemy near Hedgesville, &c., was commenced on this day; and the 1st corps was already in motion for Berlin. "You will please report promptly to these headquarters everything of importance that ocours within the limits of your command. The three brigades now at Cumberland, Williams-headquarters reached Berlin. port and Sharpsburg, including the 54th Pennsylvania volunteers, near Cumberland, will be under your command. They are commanded by Generals Kelly, Kenly and Gordon. "Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "S. WILLIAMS, On the 28th the 1st corps and the general "Assistant Adjutant General. “General G. W. MORELL, "Commanding Upper Potomac.” On the 25th of October the pontoon bridge at Berlin was constructed, there being already one across the Potomac, and another across the Shenandoah at Harper's Ferry. ! On the 26th two divisions of the 9th corps and Pleasanton's brigade of cavalry, crossed at Berlin and occupied Lovettsville. The 1st, 6th, and 9th corps, the cavalry and reserve artillery, crossed at Berlin between the 26th of October and the 2d of November. The 2d and 5th corps crossed at Harper's Ferry between the 29th of October and 1st of Novem ber. On the 29th the reserve artillery crossed and encamped near Lovettsville; Stoneman's divis ion, temporarily attached to the 9th corps, oGs cupied Leesburg; Averill's cavalry brigade moved towards Berlin from Hagerstown. Two divisions of the 9th corps moved to Wheatland, and one to Waterford. The 2d corps commenced the passage of the Shenandoah at Harper's Ferry, and moved into the valley east of Loudon heights. On the 30th the 1st corps crossed at Berlin and encamped near Lovettsville; the 2d corps completed the passage of the Shenandoah; the 5th corps commenced its march from Sharps burg to Harper's Ferry. On the 31st the 2d corps moved to the vicinity of Hillsborough; the 6th corps reached Boonsboro; the 5th corps reached Harper' Ferry, one division crossing the Shenandoah. On the 1st of November the 1st corps moved to Purcellville and Hamilton; the 2d corps to Woodgrove; the 5th corps to Hillsborough; the 6th corps reached Berlin, one division crossHeavy rains delayed the movement consider-ing. Pleasanton's cavalry occupied Philemont, ably in the beginning, and the 1st, 5th and 6th having a sharp skirmish there, and at Bloomcorps were obliged to halt at least one day at field the crossing, to complete, as far as possible, the necessary supplies that could not be procured at an earlier period. The plan of campaign I adopted during the advance, was to move the army well in hand parallel to the Blue ridge, taking Warrenton as the point of direction for the main body, seizing each pass of the Blue ridge by detachments, as we approached it, and guarding them after we had passed, as long as they would enable the enemy On November 2d the 2d corps occupied Snicker's gap; the 5th corps Snickersville; the 6th corps crossed the Potomac, and encamped near Wheatland; the 9th corps advanced to Bloomfield, Union, and Philemont; Pleasonton drove the enemy out of Union; Averill wag ordered to join Pleasanton. The enemy offered no serious resistence to the occupation of Snicker's gap, but advanced to regain possession of it who were driven back by a few rounds from our with a column of some 5000 to 6000 infantry, rifled guns. to trouble our communications with the Potomac. It was expected that we would unite with the 11th corps and Sickles's division near Thor- On the 3d the 1st corps moved to Philemont, oughfare gap. We depended upon Harper's Union, Bloomfield, &c., the 2d corps to the Ferry and Berlin for supplies, until the Manas vicinity of Upperville; the 5th corps remained sas gap railway was reached; when that occur at Snicker's gap; the 6th corps moved to Purred, the passes in our rear were to be abandoned, cellville; the 9th corps moved towards Upperand the army massed ready for action or move-ville. Pleasanton drove the enemy out of Upment in any direction. perville after a severe fight. On the 4th the 2d corps took possession of Ashley's gap; the 6th corps reached Union; the 9th corps Upperville; the cavalry occupied Piedmont. It was my intention, if upon reaching Ashby's or any other pass, I found that the enemy were in force between it and the Potomac, in the valley of the Shenandoah, to move into the valley and endeavor to gain their rear. I hardly hoped On the 5th the 1st corps moved to Rector to accomplish this, but did expect that by strik-town and White Plains; one division of the ing in between Culpepper Court House and 2d corps to the intersection of the Paris and Little Washington, I could either separate their Piedmont with the Upperville and Barber's army and beat them in detail, or else force them to concentrate as far back as Gordonsville, and thus place the army of the Potomac in position either to adopt the Fredericksburg line of advance upon Richmond, or to be removed to the Peninsula, if, as I apprehended, it were found impossible to supply it by the Orange and Alexandria railroad beyond Culpepper. road; the 6th corps to the Aldie turnpike, east of Upperville; the 9th corps beyond the Manassas railroad, between Piedmont and Salem, with a brigade at Manassas gap; the cavalry under Averill had a skirmish at Manassas gap, and the brigade of Pleasanton gained a handsome victory over superior numbers at Barber's cross-roads; Bayard's cavalry had some sharp skirmishing in front of Salem. On the 27th of October the remaining divisions of the 9th corps crossed at Berlin, and On the 6th the 1st corps advanced to WarPleasanton's cavalry advanced to Purcellville. I renton; the 2d to Rectortown; the 5th corps sommmenced its movement from Snicker's gap to White Plains; the 9th corps to Waterloo and vicinity, on the Rappahannock; the 11th corps was at New Baltimore, Thoroughfare, and Hopewell's gaps; Sickles's division guarding the Orange and Alexandria railroad from Manassas junction, towards Warrenton junction; the avalry near Flint hill; Bayard to cut off what there might be in Warrenton, and to proceed to the Rappahannock station. parties, and also from deserters, prisoners, contrabands, as well as citizens, established the fact of Longstreet, with his command, being at Culpepper, while Jackson with D. H. Hill, with their respective commands, were in the Shenandoah valley, on the western side of the Blue ridge, covering Chester and Thornton's gape, and expecting us to attempt to pass through and attack them. As late as the 17th of November a contraband just from Strasburg came into my November 7th, General Pleasanton was order-camp and reported that D. H. Hill's corps ed to move toward Little Washington and Sperryville, and thence towards Culpepper Court Houme. November 8th, the 2d corps moved half way Warrenton; the 5th corps to New Baltimore. November, 9th, the 2d and 5th corps reached arrenton; the 6th corps New Baltimore. Late on the night of the 7th I received an order relieving ue from the command of the army of the Potomac, and directing me to turn ★over to General Burnside, which I at once did. I had already given the orders for the move ent of the 8th and 9th; these orders were carried into effect without change. two miles beyond that place, on the railroad to Had I remained in command I should hato made the attempt to divide the enemy, as before suggested, and could he have been brought to a battle within reach of my supplies, I cannot doubt that the result would have been a Bril liant victory for our army. On the 10th of November General Pleasantom was attacked by Longstreet, with one divisÌON of infantry and Stuart's cavalry, but repulsed tho attack. The position in which I left the army, as the result of the orders I had given, was as follows: The 1st, 2d and 5th corps, reserve artillery, and general headquarters at Warrenton; the and general headquarters at Warrenton; the 9th corps on the line of the Rappahannock, in the vicinity of Waterloo; the 6th corps at New Baltimore; the 11th corps at New Baltimore, This indicates the relative position of our army Gainsville and Thoroughfare gap; Sickles's di-and that of the enemy at the time I was relieved vision of the 3d corps on the Orange and Alex- from the command. andria railroad, from Manassas junction to Warrenton junction; Pleasanton across the Rappahannock, at Amissville, Jefferson, &c., with his pickets on Hazel river, facing Longstreet's, six miles from Culpepper Court House; Bayard near Rappahannock station. The army was thus massed near Warrenton, ready to act in any required direction, perfectly in hand, and in admirable condition and spirits. I doubt whether during the whole period that I had the honor to command the army of the Potomac it was in such excellent condition to fight a great battle. When I gave up the command to General Burnside, the best information in our possession indicated that Longstreet was immediately in our front near Culpepper; Jackson with one, perhaps both, of the Hills near Chester and Thornton's gaps, with the mass of their forces west of the Blue ridge. The reports from General Pleasanton, in the advance, indicated the possibility of separating the two wings of the enemy's forces, and either beating Longstreet separately, or forcing him to fall back, at least upon Gordonsville, to effect his junction with the rest of the army. The following is from the report of General Pleasanton: "At this time, and from the 7th instant, my advance pickets were on Hazel river, within six miles of Culpepper, besides having my flank pickets towards Chester and Thornton's gaps, extended to Gaines's cross roads and Newby's cross roads, with numerous patrols in the directions of Woodville, Little Washington and Sperryville. The information gained from these It would be impossible to participate in operations such as those described in the foregoing pages without forming fixed opinions upon subjects connected with the organization of our ar mies and the general conduct of military operations. This report would be incomplete without a brief allusion to some general considerations which have been firmly impressed upon me by the events which have occurred. To my mind the most glaring defect in our ar mies is the absence of system in the appointment and promotion of general and other offcers, and the want of means for the theoretical instruction of the mass of officers. The expansion of the army was so great and so rapid at the commencement of the existing war that it was perhaps impossible, in the great scarcity of instructed officers, to have adopted any other course than that which was pursued; bat the time has arrived when measures may be initiated to remedy existing defects, and provide against their recurrence. I think that the army should be regarded sa a permanent one, that is to say, its affairs should be administered precisely as if all who belonged to it had made it their profession for life; and those rules for promotions, &c., which have been found necessary in the best foreign armies to excite honorable emulation, produce an esprit du corps, and secure efficiency, should be followed by us. All officers and soldiers should be made to feel that merit, that is to say, courage, good conduct, the knowledge and performance of the duties of their grade, and fitness to exercing those of a superior grade, will ensure to them ad |