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Tabular Report of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac in the Battle of Antietam on the 16th
and 17th of September, 1862.

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“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Sharpsburg, Sept. 19, 1862.

I have the honor to report that Maryland is entirely freed from the presence of the enemy, who has been driven across the Potomac. No fears need now be entertained for the safety of Pennsylvania. I shall at once occupy Harper's Ferry.

“G. B. MCCLELLAN, "Major General Commanding. Major General H. W. HALLECK,

"Coma'g U. S. Army."

On the following day I received this telegram:

"WASHINGTON, Sept. 10, 1862-2 p. m.
"We are still left entirely in the dark in re-
gard to your own movements and those of the
enemy. This should not be so. You should
keep me advised of both, so far as you know
them.

"H. W. HALLECK,
"General-in-Chief.

Major General G. B. MCCLELLAN.”
To which I answered as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"NEAR SHARPSBURG, Sept. 20, 1862-8 p. m.
"Your telegram of to-day is received. I tel-
egraphed you yesterday all I knew, and had
nothing more to inform you of until this eve
ning. Williams's corps (Banks's) occupied
Maryland heights at 1 P. M. to-day. The rest
of the army is near here, except Couch's divis-
ion, which is at this moment engaged with the
enemy in front of Williamsport. The enemy is
retiring via Charlestown and Martinsburg on
Winchester. He last night reoccupied Wil-
liamsport by a small force, but will be out of it
in the morning. I think he has a force of in-
fantry near Shepherdstown.

.

riously embarrass their operations, and will aid
this army materially.
“G. B.-MCCLELLAN,
“Major General Comá'g.
"Major General H. W. HALLECK,
Comd'g U. S. Army.”

Maryland heights were occupied by General
Williams's corps on this day, and on the 22d
General Sumner took possession of Harper's
Ferry.

It will be remembered that at the time I was assigned to the command of the forces for the defence of the national capital, on the 2d day of September, 1862, the greater part of all the available troops were suffering under the disheartening influences of the serious defeat they had encountered during the brief and unfortu nate campaign of General Pope. Their num bers were greatly reduced by casualties-their confidence was much shaken, and they had lost something of that esprit du corps which is indispensable to the efficiency of an army. Moreover they had left behind, lost or worn out the greater part of their clothing and camp equi page, which required renewal before they could be in proper condition to take the field again.

The intelligence that the enemy was crossing the Potomac into Maryland, was received in Washington on the 4th of September, and the army of the Potomac was again put in motion, under my direction, on the following day—so that but a brief interval of time was allowed to reorganize or procure supplies.

The sanguinary battles of South Mountain and Antietam, fought by this army a few days afterwards, with the reconnoissances immediately following, resulted in a loss to us of ten general officers, many regimental and company officers, and a large number of enlisted men; amounting in the aggregate to fifteen thousand two hundred and twenty. Two army corps had been badly cut up, scattered and somewhat demoralI regret that you find it necessary to couch ized in the action of the 17th. every despatch I have the honor to receive from you, in a spirit of fault-finding, and that you have not yet found leisure to say one word in commendation of the recent achievements of this army, or even to allude to them.

"I have abstained from giving the number of guns, colors, small arms, prisoners, etc., cap tured, until I could do so with some accuracy. I hope by to-morrow evening to be able to give at least an approximate statement.

T

“G. B. MCCLELLAN,
“Major General Comď'g.

"Major General HALLECK,

"General-in-Chief.

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Washington."

On the same day I telegraphed as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, “Sept. 20, 1862. "As the rebel army, now on the Virginia side of the Potomac, must in a great measure be dependent for supplies of ammunition and provisions upon Richmond, I would respectfully suggest that General Banks be directed to send out a cavalry force to cut their supply communications opposite Washington. This would se

In General Summer's corps alone, forty-one commissioned officers and eight hundred and nineteen enlisted men had been killed; four general officers, eighty-nine other commissioned officers, and three thousand seven hundred and eight enlisted men had been wounded; besides five hundred and forty-eight missing; making the aggregate loss of this splendid veteran corps, in this

and one battle, five thousand two hundred

In General Hooker's corps the casualties of the same engagement amounted to two thousand six hundred and nineteen.

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The entire army had been greatly exhausted by unavoidable overwork, fatiguing marches, hunger, and want of sleep and rest, previous to the last battle.

When the enemy recrossed the Potomac into Virginia, the means of transportation at my disposal were inadequate to furnish a single day's supply of subsistence in advance.

Many of the troops were new levies, some of whom had fought like veterans, but the morale of others had been a good deal impaired in those severely contested actions, and they required time to recover, as well as to acquire the necessary drill and discipline.

binder these circumstances, I did not feel atthorized to cross the river with the main army, over a very deep and difficult ford in pursuit of the retreating enemy, known to be in strong force on the south bank, and thereby place that stream, which was liable at any time to rise above a fording stage, between my army and its hase of supply.

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On the 27th I made the following report:

“Headquarters Army of the Potomaq,

"Sept. 27, 1862—10 a. m.

"All the information in my possession, goes to prove that the main body of the enemy is concentrated not far from Martinsburg, with some troops at Charleston, not many in Winextension towards our right, and beyond it They are receiving reinforcements in Winchester, mainly, I think, of conscripts, perhaps e☛☛ tirely so.

I telegraphed on the 22d to the general-in-chester. Their movements of late have been an chief as follows:

"As soon as the exigencies of the service will admit of it, this army, should be reorganized. It is absolutely necessary to secure its efficiency, that the old skeleton regiments should be filled up at once, and officers appointed to supply the Bumerous existing vacancies. There are in sances where captains are commanding regimente, and companies are without a single com missioned officer."

On the 23d the following was telegraphed to the general-in-chief:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POromag,
"Near Shepherdstown,

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"The army is not now in condition to undertake another campaign, nor to bring on another battle, unless great advantages are offered by some mistake of the enemy, or pressing military exigences render it necessary. We are greatly deficient in officers. Many of the old regiments are reduced to mere skeletons; the new regi ments need instruction. Not a day should be lost in filling the old regiments-our main dependence; and in supplying vacancies among the officers by promotion.

"My present purpose is to hold the army about as it is now, rendering Harper's Ferry socure, and watching the river closely, intending to attack the enemy should he attempt to crosa to this side.

"( Sept. 23d, 1862-9.30 a. m. "From several different sources, I learn that General R. E. Lee is still opposite to my posi tion Hop at Leestown, between Shepherdstown and Martinsburg, and that General Jackson is on the Opequan creek, about three miles from its mouth, both with large force. There are also Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us indications of heavy reinforcements moving to the great advantage of a secure debouche, but wards them from Winchester and Charlestown. we cannot avail ourselves of it until the railroad fhare therefore ordered General Franklin to bridge is finished, because we cannot otherwise lake position with his corps at the cross roads, supply a greater number of troops than we now about one mile northwest of Bakersville, on have on the Virginia side at that point. When the Bakersville and Williamsport road, and Gen-the river rises so that the enemy cannot cross in eral Couch to establish his division near Downs ville, leaving sufficient force at Williamsport to watch and guard the ford at that place. The fact of the enemy remaining so long in our front, and the indications of an advance of reinforce ments, seem to indicate that he will give us another battle with all his available force.

force, I purpose concentrating the army somewhere near Harper's Ferry, and there acting according to circumstances, viz: moving on Winchester, if, from the position an altitude of the enemy, we are likely to gain a great advántage by doing so, or else devoting a reasonable time to the organization of the army and in"As I mentioned to you before, our army has struction of the new troops, preparatory to an been very much reduced by casualties in the advance on whatever line may be determined. recent battles, and, in my judgment, all the re- In any event, I regard it as absolutely necessary inforcements of old troops that can possibly be to send new regiments at once to the old corps dispensed with around Washington and other for purposes of instruction, and that the old places, should be instantly pushed forward by rail regiments be filled at once. I have no fears as to this army. A defeat at this juncture would be to an attack on Washington by the line of Marainous to our cause. I cannot think it possible nassas. Holding Harper's Ferry as I do, they that the enemy will bring any forces to bear will not run the risk of an attack upon their upon Washington till after the question is de-flank and rear, while they have the garrison of cided here, but if they should, troops can soon Washington in their front. be sent back from this army by rail to reinforce the garrison there.

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"The evidence that I have that reinforcements are coming to the rebel army, consists in the facts that long columns of dust extending from Winchester to Charleston, and from Charlestown in this direction, and also troops moving this way were seen last evening. This is corroborated by citizens. General Sumner, with his corps and Williams's (Banks's), occu pies Harper's Ferry and the surrounding heights think he will be able to hold his position until

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reinforcements arrive.

“G. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major General

"Major General H. W. HALLECE,
"General-in-Chief, Washington.”

"I rather apprehend a renewal of the attempt on Maryland, should the river remain low tor a great length of time, and should they receive considerable addition to their force.

"I would be glad to have Peck's division a I am surprised that Sigel's soon as possib e. without my knowledge. The last I heard from men should have been sent to Western Virginia you on the subject, was, that they were at my disposition. In the last battles the enemy was undoubtedly greatly superior to us in number, and it was only by very hard fighting that we gained the advantages we did. As it was, the result was at one period very doubtful, and we had all we could do to win the day. If the enemy receives considerable reinforcements, and we none, it is possible that I may have too much on my hands in the next battle.

My own view of the proper policy to be pursued is, to retain in Washington merely the force necessary to garrison it, and to send everything else avai able to reinforce this army. The railways give us the means of promptly reinforcing Washington, should it become necessary. If I am reinforced as I ask, and am allowed to take my own corse, I will hold myself responsible for the safety of Washington. Several persons, recently from Richmond, say that there are no troops there except conscripts, and they few in number.

"I hope to be able to give you details as to late battles by this evening. I am about starting again for Harper's Ferry.

"G. B. MCCLELLAN,

← Major General Come'g.

"Major General HALLECK,

"General-in-Chief, Washington."

The work of reorganizing, drilling, and supplying the army I began at the earliest moment. The different corps were stationed along the river in the best positions to cover and guard the fords. The great extent of the liver front, from near Washington to Cumberland (some one hundred and fifty miles), together with the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, was to be carefully watched and guarded, to prevent, if possible, the enemy's raids. Reconnoissances upon the Virginia side of the river, for the purpose of learning the enemy's positions and movements, were made frequently, so that our cavalry, which, from the time we left Washing ton, had performed the most laborious service, and ad from the commencement been deficient in numbers, was found totally inadequate to the requirements of the army.

Cox (about 5,000 men) was ordered from my command to Western Virginia.

On the 7th of October I received the folławing telegram:

"WASHINGTON, D. C., Oct. 6, 1862. "I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Poto mac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army must move now, while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operations, you can be reinforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the va ley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the ene my, but does not order it. He is very désirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what fine you adopt, and when you intend to cross the river. Also, to what point the reinforcements are to be Bent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before or ders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief fully concur with the President in these instructions. "H. W. HALLECI, “General-in-Chief.

“Major General MCCLELLAN.”

At this time General Averill, with the greater part of our efficient cavalry, was in the vidinity of Cumberland, and General Kelly, the commanding officer, had that day reported that a la ge force of the enemy was advancing on Colonel Campbell at St. John's run. This overwork had broken down the greater obliged me to order General Averil to proceed part of the horses, disease had appeared among with his force to the support of Colonel Campthem, and but a very small portion of our orig-bell, which delayed his return to the army för inal cavalry force was fit for service. several days.

To such an extent had this arm become reduced, that when General Stuart made his raid into Pennsylvania on the 11th of October with 2,000 men, I could only mount 800 men to follow him.

Harper's Ferry was occupied on the 22d, and in order to prevent a catastrophe similar to the one which happened to Colonel Miles, I immediately ordered Maryland, Bolivar and Loudon heights to be strongly fortified. This was done as far as the time and means at our disposal permitted,

The main army of the enemy during this time remained in the vicinity of Martinsburg and Bunker Hill, and occupied itself in drafting and coercing every able-bodied citizen into the ranks, forcibly taking their property where it was not voluntarily offered, burning bridges, and destroying railroads.

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On the 10th of October Stuart crossed the river at McCoy's ferry, with 2,000 cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, on his raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, making it necessary to use all our cavalry against him. This exhausting service completely broke down nearly all of our cavalry horses, and rendered a remount absolutely indispensable, before we could advance on the enemy.

The following were the dispositions of troops made by me to defeat the purposes of this raid.

General Averill, then at Green Spring, on the upper Potomac, was ordered to move rapidly down upon the north side of the river, with all his disposable cavalry, using every exertion to get upon the trail of the enemy and follow it up vigorously.

General Pleasanton, with the remaining cavalry force, was ordered to take the road by On the first day of October his excellency Cavetown, Harmon's gap, and Mechanicsville, the President honored the army of the Potomac and cut off the retreat of the enemy, should he with a visit, and remained several days, during make for any of the fords below the position of which he went through the different encamp- the main army. His orders were to pursue ments, reviewed the troops, and went over the them with the utmost rapidity, not to spare battle-fields of South mountain and Antietam. his men or horses, and to destroy or capture I had the opportunity during this visit to de-them if possible. scribe to him the operations of the army since the time it left Washington, and gave him my reasons for not following the enemy after he crossed the Potomac.

On the 5th of October the division of General

General Crook, at that time commanding Cox's division at Hancock, en route for Western Virginia, was ordered to halt, place his men in cars, and remain in readiness to move to any point above, should the enemy return in that

direction, keeping his scouts well out on all the ported to General Pleasanton with his comroads leading from the direction of Chambers-mand while the enemy was crossing the river, burg to the upper Potomac. and was informed by him (General Pleasanton) The other commanders between Hancock and that he was too late, and that nothing could be Harper's Ferry were instructed to keep a vigi-done then. lant watch upon all the roads and fords, so as to prevent the escape of the rebels within these limits.

General Burnside was ordered to send two brigades to the Monocacy crossing, there to remain in cars, with steam up, ready to move to any point on the railroad to which Stuart might be aiming. While Colonel Rush, at Frederick, was directed to keep his lancers scouting on the approaches from Chambersburg, so as to give timely notice to the commander of the two brigades at the Monocacy crossing.

General Pleasanton in his report of this affair says:

"It was at this time that Colonel Ward reported to me from General Stoneman's division, with a brigade of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a section of artillery. I told him that his command could be of no use, as the enemy had then crossed the river. These are the only troops that I knew of, that were in that vicinity, and this was the first intimation that I received that any troops were endeavoring to assist me in capturing the rebels. I succeeded in preventGeneral Stoneman, whose head-quarters were ing the enemy from crossing at the mouth of then at Poolsville, occupying with his division the Monocacy, and drove him to White's ford, the different fords on the river below the mouth three miles below. Had White's ford been oc of the Monocacy, was directed to keep his cav-cupied by any force of ours previous to the aly well out on the approaches from the direc-time of the occupation by the enemy, the caption of Frederick, so as to give him time to mass his troops at any point where the enemy might attempt to cross the Potomac in his vicinity. He was informed of General Pleasan

tan's movements.

After the orders were given for covering all the fords upon the river, I did not think it possible for Stuart to recross, and I believe that the capture or destruction of his entire force was perfectly certain, but owing to the fact that my orders were not in all cases carried out as I expected, he effected his escape into Virginia without much loss.

The troops sent by General Burnside to the Monocacy, owing to some neglect in not giving the necessary orders to the commander, instead of remaining at the railroad crossing as I directed, marched four miles into Frederick, and there remained until after Stuart had passed the railroad only six miles below, near which point it was said he halted for breakfast.

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General Pleasanton ascertained after his arrival at Mechanicstown that the enemy were only about an hour ahead of him, beating a hasty retreat towards the mouth of the Monocacy. He pushed on vigorously, and near to its mouth overtook them with a part of his force, having marched seventy-eight miles in twentyfour hours, and having left many of his horses broken down upon the road. He at once attacked with his artillery, and the firing continued for several hours, during which time, he states that he received the support of a small portion of General Stoneman's command, not sufficient to inflict any material damage upon the enemy.

ture of Stuart's whole force would have been certain and inevitable; but with my small force, which did not exceed one-fourth of the enemy's, it was not practicable for me to occupy that ford, while the enemy was in front."

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It would seem from the report of General Stoneman that the disposition he made of his troops previous to the arrival of Stuart, was a good one. He stationed two regiments at the mouth of the Monocacy, and two regiments at White's ford, the latter in the very place where the crossing was made, and the former only three miles off, with a reserve of three regiments at Poolesville, some six miles distant. General Pleasanton's report shows that from the time the firing commenced, until the enemy were across the river was about four and a-halr hours. General Stoneman states that he started the reserve from Poolesville at about nine o'clock; but it appears from the report of General Pleasanton, that it did not reach him till half-past one.

At the time I received the order of October 6th, to cross the river and attack the enemy the army was wholly deficient in cavalry, and a large part of our troops were in want of shoes, blankets, and other indispensable articles of clothing, notwithstanding all the efforts that had been made since the battle of Antietam, and even prior to that date, to refit the army with clothing as well as horses. I at once consulted with Colonel Ingalls, the chief quartermaster, who believed that the necessary articles could be furnished in about three days. Orders were immediately issued to the different commanders who had not already sent in their requisitions to do so at once, and all the necessary General Stoneman reports, that in accord- steps were forthwith taken by me to ensure a ance with his instructions, he gave all necessary prompt delivery of the supplies. The requisiorders for intercepting the return of the rebels, tions were forwarded to the proper department and Colonel Staples commanding one of his at Washington, and I expected that the articles brigades, states that he sent two regiments of would reach our depots during the three days infantry to the mouth of the Monocacy, and specified; but day after day elapsed, and only a one regiment to White's ford. That on the small portion of the clothing arrived. Corps morning of the 12th, about 10 o'clock, he, by commanders, upon receiving notice from the General Stoneman's order, marched the remain-quartermasters that they might expect to receive ing three regiments of his command from their supplies at certain dates, sent their trains Poolesville towards the mouth of the Monoca- for them, which after waiting were compelled cy; that before getting into action, he was re- to return empty. Several instances occurred lieved by General Ward, who states that he re- where these trains went back and forth, from

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