ting there by mistake. There is nothing of ours on the right of Centreville but Sumner's corps. There was much artillery firing during the day. A rebel major told the sergeant that the rebels had driven in our entire left to-day. He says the road is filled with wagons and stragglers coming towards Alexandria. It is clear, from the sergeant's account, that we were badly beaten yesterday, and that Pope's right is entirely exposed. "WASHINGTON, Sept. 1, 1862-1.30 p. m. "Burnside was ordered up very early yesterday morning. Retain remainder of Couch's forces, and make arrangements to stop all retreating troops in line of works, or where you can best establish an outer line of defence. My news from Pope was up to 4 P. M., he was then all right. I must wait for more definite information before I can order a retreat, as the falling back on the line of works must necessarily be directed, in case of a serious disaster. "Give me all additional news that is reliable. I shall be up all night, and ready to act as circumstances may require. I am fully aware of the gravity of the crisis, and have been for weeks. "H. W. HALLECK, “General-in-Chief. "Major General MCCLELLAN, "Washington." "I recommend that no more of Couch's division be sent to the front, that Burnside be brought here as soon as practicable, and that everything available this side of Fairfax be drawn in at once, including the mass of the troops on the railroad. I apprehend that the enemy will, or have by this time, occupied Fairfax Court House, and cut off Pope entirely, unless he falls back to-night via Sangster's and Fairfax station. I think these orders should be sent at once. I have no confidence in the dispositions made, as I gather them. To speak It will be seen from what has preceded that I frankly, and the occasion requires it, there ap-lost no time that could be avoided in moving pears to be a total absence of brains, and I fear the army of the Potomac from the Peninsula to the total destruction of the army. I have some the support of the army of Virginia; that I cavalry here that can carry out any orders you spared no effort to hasten the embarkation of may have to send. The occasion is grave, and the troops at Fort Monroe, Newport News and demands grave measures. The question is the Yorktown, remaining at Fort Monroe myself salvation of the country. I learn that our loss until the mass of the army had sailed; and that yesterday amounted to fifteen thousand. We after my arrival at Alexandria I left nothing connot afford such losses without an object. It in my power to forward supplies and reinforceis my deliberate opinion that the interests of ments to General Pope. I sent with the troops the nation demand that Pope should fall back that moved all the cavalry that I could get hold to-night if possible, and not one moment is of, even my personal escort was sent out upon to be lost. I will use all the cavalry I have the line of the railway as a guard, with the to watch our right. Please answer at once. I provost and camp guard at headquarters, refeel confident you can rely upon the informa-taining less than one hundred men, many of tion I give you. I shall be up all night, and ready to obey any orders you give me. "G. B. MCCLELLAN, "" Major General. “General HALLECK, "Washington." To which this reply was received: whom were orderlies, invalids, members of bands, etc.; all the headquarter teams that arrived were sent out with supplies and ammunition, none being retained even to move the headquarters camp. The squadron that habitually served as my personal escort was left at Falmouth with General Burnside, as he was deficient in cavalry. FOURTH PERIOD. "Major General PORTER." To which he sent the following reply: On the 1st of September, I went into Wash-ton, and am doing all I can to render your reington, where I had an interview with the gen- treat safe, should that become necessary. eral-in-chief, who instructed me verbally, to "GEO. B. MCCLELLAN take command of its defences, expressly limiting my jurisdiction to the works and their garrisons, and prohibiting me from exercising any control over the troops actively engaged in front under General Pope. During this interview, I suggested to the general-in-chief the necessity of his going in person, or sending one of his personal staff, to the army under General Pope, for the purpose of ascertaining the exact condition of affairs. He sent Colonel Kelton, his assistant adjutant general. "FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE, Sept. 2, 1862-10 a. m. "You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, will ever give, as they have given, to General Pope their cordial co-operation and constant support, in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed, wounded and enfeebled troops, attest our devoted duty. "F. J. PORTER, "Major General Commanding. Neither at the time I wrote the telegram, nor During the afternoon of the same day, I received a message from the general-in-chief, to the effect that he desired me to go at once to his house to see the President. The President informed me that he had reason to believe that" General GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Washington.” the army of the Potomac was not cheerfully cooperating with, and supporting General Pope, that he had "always been a friend of mine," at any other time, did I think for one moment, and now asked me, as a special favor, to use my that General Porter had been, or would be in influence in correcting this state of things. I any manner derelict in the peformance of his replied, substantially, that I was confident that duty to the nation and its cause. Such an imhe was misinformed, that I was sure, whatever pression never entered my mind. The despatch sentiment the army of the Potomac might enter-in question was written purely at the request of tain towards General Pope, that they would the President. obey his orders, support him to the fullest ex- On the morning of the 2d, the President and tent, and do their whole duty. The President, General Halleck came to my house, when the who was much moved, again asked me to tele- President informed me that Colonel Kelton had graph to "Fitz John Porter, or some other of returned from the front; that our affairs were my friends," and try and do away with any feel- in bad condition; that the army was in full reing that might exist, adding that I could rectify treat upon the defences of Washington; the the evil, and that no one else could. I there- roads filled with stragglers, &c. He instructed upon told him that I would cheerfully telegraph me to take steps at once to stop and collect the to General Porter, or do anything else in my stragglers, to place the works in a proper state power, to gratify his wishes and relieve his of defence, and to go out to meet, and take comanxiety, upon which he thanked me very warm-mand of the army when it approached the vily, assured me that he could never forget my cinity of the works; then to put the troops in action in the matter, etc., and left. the best position for defence; committing every I then wrote the following telegram to Gen-thing to my hands. eral Porter, which was sent to him by the general-in-chief: “WASHINGTON, Sept. 1, 1862. "I ask you for my sake, and that of the country, and the old army of the Potomac, that you and all my friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope, in all the operations now going on. The destinies of our country, the honor of our army are at stake, and all depends upon the cheerful co-operation of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to my friends in the army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is, that for their country's sake they will extend to General Pope the same support they ever have to me. "I am in charge of the defences of Washing 111 "WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJ'T GENERAL'S OFFICE, "Washington, Sept. 2, 1862. Major General McClellan will have command of the fortifications of Washington, and of all troops for the defence of the capital. 'By order of Major General HALLECK. 'E. D. TOWNSend, "Assistant Adjutant General." I immediately took steps to carry out these orders, and I sent an aide to General Pope with the following letter: unnecessary delay. He feared that his messenger might miss you, and desired to take this double precaution. On the 7th the 6th corps was advanced to Rockville, to which place my headquarters were moved on the same day. "In order to bring troops upon ground with All the necessary arrangements for the dewhich they are already familiar, it would be best fence of the city, under the new condition of to move Porter's corps upon Upton's hill, that it things, bad been made, and General Banks was may occupy Hall's hill, etc.; McDowell's to Up-left in command, having received his instructon's hill; Franklin's to the works in front of tions from me. Alexandria; Heintzelman's to the same vicinity; Couch to Fort Corcoran, or, if practicable, t the Chain bridge; Sumner either to Fort Albany or to Alexandria, as may be most conve-Potomac in the direction of Leesburg, and that nient. "In haste, General, Very truly yours, “Major General U. S. A. "Major General JOHN POPE, Commanding Army of Virginia.” I left Washington on the 7th of September. At this time it was known that the mass of the rebel army had passed up the south side of the a portion of that army had crossed into Maryland; but whether it was their intention to cross their whole force, with a view to turn Washington by a flank movement down the north bana of The Fotom, to move on Baltimore, or to invade Pennsylvania, were ques tions which at that time we had no means of determining. This uncertainty as to the intenIn the afternoon I crossed the Potomac and tions of the enemy obliged me, up to the 13th rode to the front, and at l'pton's hill met the of September, to march cautiously, and to adadvance of McDowell's corps, and with it Gen-vance the army in such order as continually to erals l'ope and McDowell. After getting what information I could from them, I sent the few aides at my disposal to the left, to give instructions to the troops approaching in the direction of Alexandria; and hearing artillery firing the direction of the Vienna and Langley road, by which the corps of Sumner, l'orter and Sigel were returning, and learning from General Pope that Sumner was probably engaged, I went with a single aide and three orderlies by the shortest line to meet that column. I reached the column after dark, and proceeded as far as Lewinsville, where I became satisfied that the rear corps (Sumner's) would be able to reach its intended position without any serious molestation. therefore indicated to Generals Porter and Sigel the positions they were to occupy, sent instructions to General Sumner, and at a late hour of the night returned to Washington. I keep Washington and Baltimore covered, and at the same time to hold the troops well in hand, so as to be able to concentrate and follow rapidnia, or to return to the defence of Washington, ly if the enemy took the direction of Pennsylvaif, as was greatly feared by the authorities, the enemy should be merely making a feint with a small force to draw off our army, while with their main forces they stood ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to attack the capi tal. In the meantime the process of reorganization rendered necessary after the demoralizing effects of the disastrous campaign upon the other side of the Potomac, was rapidly progressing, the troops were regaining confidence, and their for mer soldierly appearance and discipline were fast returning. My cavalry was pushed out continually in all directions, and all possible steps taken to learn the positions and movements of the enemy. The following table shows the movements of the army from day to day, up to Next day I rode to the front of Alexandria, and was engaged in rectifying the positions of the troops, and giving orders necessary to secure the issuing of the necessary supplies, etc. tember. I felt sure on this day that we could repulse any attack made by the enemy on the south side of the Potomac. On the third the enemy had disappeared from the front of Washington, and the information which I received induced me to believe that he intended to cross the upper Potomac into Maryland. This materially changed the aspect of affairs and enlarged the sphere of operations, for, in case of a crossing in force, an active campaign would be necessary to cover Baltimore, prevent the invasion of Pennsylvania, and clear Maryland. I therefore on the 3d ordered the 2d and 12th corps to Tenallytown, and the 9th corps to a point on the 7th street road near Washington, and sent such cavalry as was available to the fords near Poolsville, to watch and impede the enemy in any attempt to cross in that vicinity. On the 5th the 2d and 12th corps were moved to Rockville, and Couch's division (the only one of the 4th corps that had been brought from the Peninsula) to Offut's cross roads. On the 6th the 1st and 9th corps were ordered to Leesboro, the 6th corps and Sykes's division of the 5th corps to Tenallytown. FRANKLIN. division. Sykes's Tenallytown. Tenallytown............. Tenallytown................. the 14th of Sep consisting of the 1st and 9th corps, under the command of Major General Burnside, moved on Frederick, the 1st corps via Brookville, Cooksville and Ridgeville, and the 9th corps via Damascus and New Market. Franklin, moved to Buckeystown via Darnestown, Dawsonville, and Barnville, covering the road from the mouth of the Mouocacy to Rockville, and being in a position to connect with and support the centre should it have been necessary (as was supposed) to force the line of the Monocacy. Couch's division moved by the "River road," covering that approach, watching the fords of the Potomac, and ultimately following and supporting the 6th corps. The following extracts from telegrams received by me after my departure from Washington will show how little was known there about the enemy's movements, and the fears which were entertained for the safety of the capital. On the 9th of September, General Halleck telegraphed me as follows: "Until we can get better advices about the numbers of the enemy at Drainesville, I think we must be very cautious about stripping too much the forts on the Virginia side. It may bo the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces, and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side of the Potomac. Think of this." Again on the 11th of September, General Halleck telegraphed me as follows: Why not order forward Keyes or Sigel? I think the main force of the enemy is in your front; more troops can be spared from here." This despatch, as published by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and furnished by the general-in-chief reads as follows: "Why not order forward Porter's corps, or Sigel's? If the main force of the enemy is in your front, more troops can be spared from here." I remark that the original despatch as received by me from the telegraph operator, is in the words quoted above: "I think the main force of the enemy, &c." In accordance with this suggestion, I asked on the same day, that all the troops that could be spared should at once be sent to reinforce me; but none came. On the 12th I received the following telegram from his excellency the President: "Governor Curtin telegraphs me: 'I have advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland."" The President adds: "Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information from Wheeling, that the line is cut, corroborates the idea, that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac. Please do not let him get off without being hurt." On the 13th General Halleck telegraphed as follows: "Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in thus uncovering the capital. I am of the opin ion that the enemy will send a small column to The 2d and 12th corps, forming the centre The 2d and 12th corps, forming the centre, wards Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that under the command of General Sumner, moved direction, then suddenly move on Washington on Frederick; the former via Clarksburg and with the forces south of the Potomac, and those Urbana, and the 12th corps on a lateral road be- he may cross over.” tween Urbana and New Market, thus maintain- Again on the 14th, General Halleck teleing the communication with the right wing,graphed me that "scouts report a large force and covering the direct road from Frederick to still on the Virginia side of the Potomac. If Washington. so, I fear you are exposing your left and rear." Again, as late as the 18th, after we had the The 6th corps under the command of General 8 most positive evidence that Lee's entire army was in front of us, I received the following: with its trains, would have extended about fifty miles, and the enemy might have defeated the advance before the rear could have reached the scene of action. Moreover such a movement would have uncovered the communications with Baltimore and Washington on our right, and exposed our left and rear. I presume it will be admitted by every military "WAR DEPARTMENT, "Sept. 16, 1862-12.30 p.m. "Yours of 7 A. M. is this moment received. As you give me no information in regard to the position of your forces, except those at Sharpsburg, of course I cannot advise. I think, how-man that it was necessary to move the army in ever you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the river. I fear now, more than ever, that they will recross at Harper's Ferry or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington. This has appeared to be a part of their plan, and hence my anxiety on the subject. A heavy rain. might prevent it. “H. W. HALLECK, "General-in-Chief. Major General MCCLELLAN." The importance of moving with all due caution, so as not to uncover the national capital, until the enemy's position and plans were developed, was, I believe, fully appreciated by me; and as my troops extended from the Baltimore and Ohio railroad to the Potomac, with the extreme left flank moving along that stream, and with strong pickets left in rear to watch and guard all the available fords, I did not regard my left or rear as in any degree exposed. But it appears from the foregoing telegrams that the general-in-chief was of a different opinion, and that my movements were, in his judgment, too precipitate, not only for the safety of Washington, but also for the security of my left and rear. The precise nature of these daily injunctions against a precipitate advance may now be perceived. The general-in-chief, in his testimony before the "Committee on the Conduct of the War," says: "In respect to General McClellan's going too fast, or too far from Washington, there can be found no such telegram from me to him, he has mistaken the meaning of the telegrams I sent him. I telegraphed him that he was going too far, not from Washington, but from the Potomac, leaving General Lee the opportunity to come down the Potomac and get between him and Washington. I thought General McClellan should keep more on the Potomac, and press forward his left rather than his right, so as the more readily to relieve Harper's Ferry." As I can find no telegram from the generalin-chief recommending me to keep my left flank nearer the Potomac, I am compelled to believe that when he gave this testimony he had forgotten the purport of the telegrams above quoted; and had also ceased to remember the fact, well known to him at the time, that my left, from the time I left Washington, always rested on the Potomac, and that my center was continually in position to reinforce the left or right as occasion might require. Had I advanced my left flank along the Potomac more rapidly than the other columns marched upon the roads to the right, I should have thrown that flank out of supporting distance of the other troops, and greatly exposed it. And if I had marched the entire army in one column along the backs of the river, instead of apon five different parallel roads, the column, such order that it could at any time be concentrated for battle, and I am of opinion that this object could not have been accomplished in any other way than the one employed. Any other disposition of our forces would have subjected them to defeat in detached fragments. On the 10th of September, I received from my scouts information which rendered it quite probable that General Lee's army was in the vicinity of Frederick, but whether his intention was to move towards Baltimore or Pennsylvania was not then known. On the 11th I ordered General Burnside to push a strong reconnoissance across the National road and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad towards New Market, and if he learned that the enemy had moved towards Hagerstown, to press on rapidly to Frederick, keeping his troops constantly ready to meet the enemy in force. A corresponding movement of all the troops in the center and on the left was ordered in the direction of Urbana and Poolesville. On the 12th a portion of the right wing entered Frederick, after a brisk skirmish at the outskirts of the city and in the streets. On the 13th the main bodies of the right wing and center passed through Frederick. It was soon ascertained that the main body of the enemy's forces had marched out of the city on the two previous days, taking the roads to Boonsboro' and Harper's Ferry, thereby rendeving it necessary to force the passes through the Catoctin and South Mountain ridges, and gain possession of Boonsboro' and Rohrersville before any relief conld be extended to Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry. On the 13th, an order fell into my hands issued by General Lee, which fully discloses his plans, and I immediately gave orders for a rapid and vigorous forward movement. to: The following is a copy of the order referred "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, Sept. 9, 1862. (6 SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 191. "The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, will take the route towards Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday night take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry. "General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsboro', where it will halt with the reserve, supply and baggage trains of the army. |