mony which will disprove the answer, or such material part thereof, which he can produce at the next term of the court or at an earlier day, and that he has had no opportunity to procure such testimony since the coming in of the answer, the court may grant a continuance of such motion until the next term, or until such testimony can be procured.

[R. S. 1845, p. 383, § 13; Farrell v. McKee, 36 Ill. 226; Smith v. l'owell, 50 Ill. 21; Reece v. Darby, 4 Scam, 162.

19. Testimony to be by deposition. § 19. The testimony of witnesses to be used upon such motion, except such as may be contained in the affidavits filed with the bill or answer, shall be depositions in writing, which shall be taken in the same manner as other testimony in cases in chancery. [R. S. 1845, p. 383, 13.

20. Depositions read in final hearing. 20. Depositions taken upon a motion to dissolve an injunction may be read in the final hearing of the cause. [R. S. 1845, P. 383, 13.

21. Effect of appeal in injunction. § 21. No appeal from a decree dissolving an injunction shall have the effect to continue in force the injunction unless the appeal is prayed at the entering of such decree, and the court allowing the same shall so order, or unless the party praying the appeal shall, within ten days after the appeal is allowed, procure from the supreme court, if in session, or a judge thereof if in vacation, an order directing that the appeal shall have the effect to continue such injunction in force; and no such order shall be granted except for good cause appearing in the record, nor when the bill is dismissed by the complainant. The supreme court, or a judge thereof, may for good cause extend the time for procuring such order.

[Shaw v. Hill, 67 Ill. 455; Prout v. Lomer, 79 Ill. 331; Weaver v. Poyer, 70 Ill. 567; Hanford v. Blessing, 80 l. 188; Bressler v. McCune, 56 Ill. 475; Champlin v. Morgan, 18 III. 293; Blount v. Tomlin, 26 Ill. 531.

22. Further bond. § 22. The court or judge granting the order for the continuance in force of any such injunction may require, as a condition of granting the same, such further bond and security, to be filed with the clerk of the supreme court, as may be deemed equitable.

23. Injunctions on Sunday. 23. When an application shall be made on a Sunday for a writ of injunction, and there shall be filed with the bill an affidavit of the complainant, or his, her or their agent or attorney, stating that the benefits of an injunction will be lost or endangered, or irremediable damage occasioned unless such writ be immediately issued, and giving the reasons for such statement, then it shall be lawful for any officer who is authorized by the law of this State to grant writs of injunction, if it appears to him from such affidavit that the bene fits of an injunction will be lost or endangered, or irremediable damage occasioned unless such writ be immediately issued, and if the complainant otherwise be entitled to such writ under the law, to grant a writ of injunction on a Sunday; and it shall be lawful for the clerk to issue, and for the sheriff or coroner to serve such writ of injunction on a Sunday as on any other day, and all affidavits and bonds made and proceedings had in such case shall have the same force and effect as if made or had on any other day.

[Langabier v. R. R. Co., 64 Ill. 243.

AN ACT requiring compensation for causing death by wrongful act, neglect or default. Approved Feb. 12, 1853. In force Feb. 12, 1853. L. 1853, p. 97.]

1. Killing-action survives. SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who or company or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.

v.

[See "Administration of Estates," ch. 3. § 122; Miners," ch. 93, 8 14; City of Chicago v. Ganin, 2 Ch. L. J. 144; City of Mendota v. Fay, 1 Ch. L J. 216; C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Langley, 1 Ch. L. J. 255; Clark v. Gotts, 1 Ch. L. J. 401; C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Harwood, 80 Ill. 88; Hackett v. Smelsley, 77 Ill. 109; Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co. v O'Connor, 77 Ill. 391; C. & A. R. R Co. v. Becker, 76 Ill. 25; T. W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 76 Ill. 278; T. W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Durkin, 76 Ill. 395; Weick v. Lander, 75 Ill. 93; Chicago v. Scholten, 75 Ill. 468; T. W. & W. Ry. Co Brooks, 81 Ill. 245; R. R. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Byam, 80 Ill. 528: Paxton v. Boyer, 67 Ill. 135; Grand Tower M, & T. Co. v. Hawkins, 72 Ill. 386; Latham v. Rovel, 72 Ill. 179; Camp Pt. M'fg. Co. v. Ballou, 71 l. 417: O. & M. Ry. Co. v. Stratton, 78 Ill. 88; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Hall, 72 Ill. 222; Same v. Green, 81 I. 19; C. B. & Q. Ŕ. R. Co. v. Van Patten, 64 Ill. 517; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Goddard, 72 Ill. 567; C. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Clark, 70 Ill. 276: Sterling Bridge Co. v. Pearl, 80 Ill. 251; Fairbank v. Hamtzsche, 73 Ill. 236; Weick v. Lander, 75 Ill. 93; T. P. & W. R. R. Co v. Conroy, 68 Ill. 561 ; !. C. R. R. Co. v. Houck, 72 Ill. 285; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Baches, 55 Ill. 379; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Hoffman, 67 Ill. 287; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Welch, 52 III. 183 C. R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. McKittrick, 78 Ill. 619; C. C. & L. C. R. R. Co. v. Troesch, 68 Ill. 545; C. & N. W. Ry. v. Taylor, 69 Ill. 461; I. B. & W. Ry. Co. v. Flanigan, 77 Ill. 365; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Keen, 72 Ill. 512; Ryan v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., Go Ill. 171: I. C. R. R. Co. v. Jewell, 46 Ill. 99; City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 356; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Hutchinson, 47 Ill. 408; Same v. Weldon, 52 III. 290; Same v. Phillips, 49 Ill. 234; Same v. Phillips, 55 Ill. 194; Pittsburgh, etc., v. Thompson, 56 Ill. 138 C. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 55 l. 496; C. & A. R. R Co. v. Quaintance, 58 Ill. 391; Indianapolis, etc., v. Stables, 62 I. 313; C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Murphy, 53 Ill. 336; Lalor v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 52 Ill. 401; Litchfield Coal Co. v. Taylor, 81 II 592; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Crogin, 71 Ill. 177; Utley v. Burns, 70 Ill. 162: Buckingham v. Fisher, 70 l. 123; City of Chicago v. Wright, 68 Ill. 587; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Chambers, 71 Ill. 520: I. C. R. R Co. v. Godfrey, 71 Ill 500; Same v Hammer, 72 Ill. 347; G. T. M. & T. Co. v. Hawkins, 72 Ill. 386; C. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Coss, 73 Ill. 395; St. L. & S. E. R. R. Co. v. Britz, 72 Ill. 256; R. R. I. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Hillmer, 72 Ill, 235; Kewanee v. Depew, 80 Ill. 119; C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Murray, 71 Ill. 602; T W. & W. Rv. Co. v. Eddy, 72 Ill. 138; T W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Grush, 67 Ill. 262; T. W. & W. Ry Co. v. Fredericks, 71 Ill. 294;

T. W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 77 Ill. 217; T. W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Maine, 67 IIL 279; St. L, Vandalia & T. H. R. R. Co. v. Bell, 81 Ill. 76; C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Sullivan, 63 Ill. 293; T. W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Ingraham, 77 Ill. 310; C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Keete, 47 III. 109; C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Gregory, 58 Ill. 273; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v Morris, 26 Ill. 403; Chicago, etc., v. Triple:t, 38 Ill. 482; St. L., etc., v Manly, 58 Ill. 300; Chicago, etc., v. Payne, 59 Ill. 534; Same v. Dunn, 61 Ill. 385; Same v. Lee, 60 Ill. 501; Same v. Murray, 62 ill. 326; Same v. Sweet, 45 Ill. 201; Same v. Gregory, 58 Ill. 272; C. C. R. Co. v. Young, 62 Ill. 239; I. G. R. R. Co. v. Cox, 21 Ill. 20; Perry v. Ricketts, 55 Ill. 234.

2. Action - by whom brought, etc. — limit of damages. § 2. Every such action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal representatives of such deceased person, and the amount recovered in every such action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin of such deceased person, and shall be distributed to such widow and next of kin, in the proportion provided by law in relation to the distribution of personal property left by persons dying intestate; and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation, with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the wife and next of kin of such deceased person, not exceeding the sum of $5,000: Provided, that every such action shall be commenced within two years after the death of such person. [Quincy Coal Co. v. Hood, 77 III. 68; City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 359; Same v. Scholten, 75 Ill. 469; T. W & W. Ry. Co. v. Brooks, 81 Ill. 245; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 Ill. 339; Same v. Swett, 45 Ill. 201; Same v. Morris, 26 Ill. 400; Same v. Powers, 42 Ill. 170; I. C R. R. Co. v. Welch, 52 Ill. 188; Samne v. Weldon, 52 Il. 295; Drake v. Gilmore, 52 N. Y. 389; Townsend v. Radcliffe, 44 Ill. 446; Pittsburgh, etc., v. Bumstead, 48 II. 221; Conant v. Griffin, 48 Ill. 410; Toledo, etc., R. R Co. v. Webster, 55 Ill. 338; Goltra v. People, 53 Ill. 224.

AN ACT to require owners of threshing and other machines to guard against accidents. [Approved March 31, 1869. In force April 1, 1869. L. 1869, p. 254.] 3. Duty of owner of machine. SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That all persons in this State who are or may hereafter own or run any threshing machine, corn sheller, or any other machine which is connected to a horse power by means of tumbling rods or line of shafting, shall cause each and every length or section of such tumbling rod (except the one next the horse power), together with the knuckles or joints and jacks thereof, to be safely boxed or secured while running.

4. Penalty. 2. Any person owning or running any machine, as mentioned in section I of this act, without complying with the requirements of the aforesaid section, shall be held liable to the person damaged for any damage which may be sustained by such person by reason of such neglect, and no action shall be maintained nor shall any legal liability exist for services rendered by or with any such machine, when it shall be made to appear that the first section of this act has not been complied with.

5. When act in force. § 3. This act shall be in force from and after the first day of April next.

[*583]

SECTION

Chapter 71.

INN-KEEPERS.

SECTION

I. Notice to deposit money, etc., to be 2. When inn-keeper not

posted.

money, etc., lost.

liable for

AN ACT for the protection of inn-keepers. [Approved February 22, 1861. In force April 24, 1861. L. 1861, p. 133.]

1. Notice to deposit money, etc. SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That hereafter every landlord or keeper of a public inn or hotel in this State, who shall constantly have in his inn or hotel an iron safe, in good order, and suitable for the safe custody of money, jewelry, and other valuable articles, belonging to his guests or customers, shall keep posted up conspicuously, on the office, also at the inside of every entrance door of every public, sleeping, bar, reading, sitting and parlor room of his inn or hotel, notices to his guests and customers that they must leave their money, jewelry or other valuables with the landlord, his agent or clerk, for safe keeping, that he may make safe deposit of the same in the place provided for that purpose.

[Johnson v. Richardson, 17 Ill. 303; Kelsey v. Berry, 42 Ill. 469.

2. When inn-keeper not liable. 2. That such landlord, hotel or inn-keepers as shall comply with the requirements of the first section of this act, shall not be liable for any money, jewelry or other valuables, of gold, silver or rare and precious stones, that may be lost, if the same is not delivered to said landlord, hotel or inn-keeper, his agent or clerk, for deposit, unless such loss shall occur by the hand or through the negligence of the landlord, or by a clerk or servant employed by him in such hotel or inn: Provided, that nothing herein contained shall apply to such amount of money and valuables as is usual, common and prudent for any such guest to retain in his room or about his person.

[Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Smith, 73 Ill. 360; Bendetson v. French, 46 N. Y. 266.

AN ACT concerning insolvent debtors. [Approved April 10, 1872. In force July 1, 1872. L. 1871-2, p. 490.]

1. Jurisdiction. SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That the county courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in their respective counties in all applications for discharge from arrest or imprisonment under the provisions of this act, and shall be held to be always open and in session for the hearing of such applications. [R. S. 1845, p. 282, § 2; L. 1861, p. 105, § I.

2. When debtor released. 2. When any person is arrested or imprisoned upon any process issued for the purpose of holding such person to bail upon any indebtedness, or in any civil action when malice is not the gist of the action, or when any debtor is surrendered or committed to custody by his bail in any such action, or is arrested or imprisoned upon execution in any such action, such person may be released from such arrest or imprisonment upon complying with the provisions of this act.

[R. S. 1845, p. 282, § 3; L. 1861, p. 178, 88 1, 2; People v. Greer, 43 Ill. 213.

3. Notice of application. 3. When any such debtor shall desire to make application to be discharged under the provisions of this act, he shall give reasonable notice of his intended application, to the creditor at whose instance he was arrested or imprisoned, or to his agent or his attorney if in the county, if not, to the officer who made the arrest. Reasonable notice shall be not less than one hour before such applica