1. Whether state regulation of railroad unreasonable not a Federal question. Whether a regulation of a state railroad commission otherwise legal is arbitrary and unreasonable because beyond the scope of the powers delegated to the commission is not a Federal question. Atlantic Coast Line v. North Carolina Corp. Comm., 1.
2. Rejection by state court as evidence of letter from superior to subordinate Federal officer.
The rejection as evidence, by the state court, of a letter written by the
Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of the Land Office, on the ground that it was res inter alios, held, in this case proper and not to present any Federal question. Chapman & Dewey Land Co. v. Bige- low, 41.
3. Questions local and not Federal-Effect of state statutes. Whether the statutes of a State authorize the incorporation of a bridge
company to construct a bridge over a navigable river separating it from another State; whether such statutes confer the right of eminent do-
main on a corporation of another State, and whether such a corporation can exercise therein powers other than those conferred by the State of its creation, are all questions of state law, involving no Federal ques- tions, and the rulings of the highest court of the State are final and conclusive upon this court. Stone v. Southern Illinois Bridge Co., 267. 4. Conformity of state statute with state constitution not a Federal question. Whether the proceedings in the enactment of a state statute conform with the state constitution is to be determined by the state court and its judgment is final. Smith v. Jennings, 276.
5. State court's construction of state statute held not to raise any Federal ques- tion.
A state statute directing the state treasurer to write certain bonds off the books in his office and no longer to carry them as a debt of the State does not impair any existing obligation of the State to pay the bonds nor affect the remedy to recover upon them; and where the state court has so construed the act, in refusing to enjoin the treasurer from mak- ing the entries required thereby, at the suit of one claiming to own the bonds, no Federal right of the plaintiff is denied, obstructed, impaired or affected and the writ of error will be dismissed. Ib.
FIFTH AMENDMENT.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8–13. PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 2.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
See TAXES AND TAXATION, 3; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RAILROADS, 4.
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS.
See EIGHT-HOUR LAW.
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. See CONGRESS, POWERS OF.
GRANTS.
See PUBLIC LANDS.
HAWAII.
See CONTRACTS, 2.
HOMESTEADS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 4.
IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT OBLIGATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 2, 3, 4;
IMPORTS.
See CUSTOMS DUTIES.
1. Title to tribal lands; restraint on alienation.
The title of Indians to lands belonging to the tribe is more than the right of mere occupation, and although the actual title may be in the United States it is held in trust for the Indians and the restraint on alienation should not be exaggerated. United States v. Paine Lumber Co., 467.
2. Right of allottee Indians to cut timber.
Indian allottees under the Stockbridge and Munsie treaty of 1856, 11 Stat. 663, and the Act of February 6, 1871, 16 Stat. 404, were vested with sufficient title in their allotments to authorize the cutting of timber, for sale and not by way of improvements, without the approval of the Department of the Interior. Ib.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
1. Force and effect of findings of.
The findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission are made by the law prima facie true, and this court has ascribed to them the strength due to the judgments of a tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm., 441.
2. Conclusiveness of findings.
Where the inquiry before the Interstate Commerce Commission is essentially one of fact, the existence of competition cannot in this court be made an inference of law dominating against the actual findings of the com- mission and their affirmance by the Circuit Court. Ib.
3. Review of findings; effect of affirmance by Circuit Court and Circuit Court of Appeals.
The reasonableness of a rate is a question of fact, and while the conclusions of the commission are subject to review if that body excludes facts and circumstances that ought to have been considered they will not after having been affirmed by the Circuit Court and Circuit Court of Appeals, be reversed because the commission did not adopt the presumptions of mixed law and fact put forward by appellants as elements for deter- mining the reasonableness of a rate. Ib.
4. Power of Commission in considering the subject and operation of new classification-Soap rate case.
The Interstate Commerce Commission, in making an investigation on the complaint of a shipper has, in the public interest, the power disem- barrassed by any supposed admissions contained in the statement of the complaint to consider the whole subject and the operation of the new classification complained of in the entire territory; also how far its going into effect would be just and reasonable and would create preferences or engender discriminations and whether it is in conformity with the requirements of the act to regulate commerce. And if it finds that the new classification disturbs the rate relations thereupon existing in the official classification territory and creates preferences and en- genders discriminations it may, in order to prevent such result, pro- hibit the further enforcement of the changed classification, and an order to that effect is within the power conferred by Congress on the Commission; and so held as to an order of the Commission directing carriers from further enforcing throughout official classification terri- tory a changed classification in regard to common soap in less than carload lots. Cincinnati &c. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm., 142. See JURISDICTION, B 2, 3.
INTERSTATE LAW. See STATES, 1.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
See COMMERCE, 1.
IRRIGATION.
See JURISDICTION, A 1;
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8-13.
JUDGMENTS AND DECREES.
1. Cogency of judgment rendered upon demurrer.
That a judgment was rendered upon demurrer does not affect its cogency if it is otherwise efficacious to bring into play the presumption of the thing adjudged. Yates v. Utica Bank, 181.
2. Effect of decree enjoining municipality from regulating water rates. A decree must be read in the light of the issues involved in the pleadings and the relief sought, and a decree in a suit brought by a water company against a municipality to enjoin it from regulating rates does not finally dispose of the right of the city to regulate rates under a law passed after the contract went into effect and after the bill was filed. Vicksburg v. Waterworks Co., 496.
3. Res judicata; extent of application.
Rights between litigants once established by the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction must be recognized in every way, and wherever the judgment is entitled to respect, by those who are bound thereby. Kessler v. Eldred, 285.
4. Res judicata; identity of causes of action.
A judgment of dismissal based on the ground that plaintiff in an action against the directors of a national bank had not set up any individual wrong suffered by him but solely an injury sustained in common with all other creditors of the bank, is not res adjudicata of a right of action between the same parties to recover for individual loss suffered as dis- tinct from the right of the bank. Yates v. Utica Bank, 181.
Justiciable nature of controversy.
1. Controversies between States Kansas having brought in this court an original suit to restrain Colorado and certain corporations. organized under its laws from diverting the waters of the Arkansas River for the irrigation of lands in Colorado, thereby, as alleged, preventing the natural and customary flow of the river into Kansas and through its territory, held, that the controversy between the parties plaintiff and defendant is one of a justiciable nature. By the Constitution the entire judicial power of the United States is vested in its courts, specifically included therein, being a grant to the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over controversies between two or more States. Kansas v. Colorado, 46.
2. To review decision of state court dismissing bill to remove cloud on title. Writ of error to review decision of the state court, dismissing bill to remove cloud on title to lands under water, dismissed for want of jurisdiction on the findings of the court below and the authority of the cases cited. Chapman & Dewey Land Co. v. Bigelow, 41.
3. To review judgment of state court where an immunity claimed under § 5239, Rev. Stat.
Where in the trial and appellate courts an immunity was claimed under § 5239, Rev. Stat., as to the rule of liability to be applied to directors of a national bank and such immunity was denied, this court has juris- diction to review the judgment under § 709, Rev. Stat., even if in other respects it might not have jurisdiction. Yates v. Jones National Bank,
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