1. Construction of contract of shipbuilding company with United States-
Effect of release to relieve United States from liability.
In a contract made between a building company and the United States for
the construction of a battleship at a cost of over three millions of dollars
it was provided that a special reserve of sixty thousand dollars should
be held until the vessel had been finally tried and then paid to the com-
pany "on the execution of a final release to the United States in such
form as shall be approved by the Secretary of the Navy, of all claims
of any kind or description under or by virtue of said contract." The
vessel having been built and the final trial had, all moneys were paid
on the execution by the company of a stipulation to "remise, release
and forever discharge the United States of and from all and all manner
of debts, dues, sum and sums of money, accounts, reckonings, claims
and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, for or by reason of or on
account of the construction of said vessel under the contract aforesaid."
Held, that in the absence of anything to the contrary, it will be as-
sumed that the release which was executed was the one stipulated for
in the original contract and was intended to include all matters which
according to its terms were to be released by the company as a con-
dition of final payment. The words in the release “by reason of" are
equivalent to those in the original contract "by virtue of" and include
all claims which grew out of the performance of the contract, although
not arising from the actual construction of the vessel. United States
v. Wm. Cramp & Sons Co., 118.
2. Construction of contract between mission board and the Hawaiian govern-
ment in regard to religious institution.
A foreign mission board maintaining a school in Hawaii in 1849 turned the
school over to the government under an agreement, expressed in cor-
respondence, that the government should maintain it as an institution
for the cultivation of sound literature and solid science, that no religious
tenet or doctrine contrary to those inculcated by the mission, a sum-
mary of which was transmitted in the correspondence, should be taught,
and that in case the government did not so maintain it, it should pay
to the mission $15,000. After maintaining the school for many years
as it had been maintained under the mission, the government converted
it into an agricultural college and religion ceased to be a part of the
curriculum, meanwhile the constitution of Hawaii of 1894 prohibited
the appropriation of any money for sectarian institutions. Held, in
an action brought by the mission to recover the $15,000, that extrinsic
evidence, as to what the parties did and the nature of the course of
instruction when the agreement was made, and thereafter as continued
by the government, was admissible to prove the intent of the parties as
to what was meant by sound literature and solid science, and that under
all the circumstances the agreement was that religious instruction was
to be continued and on the failure of the government to continue such
instruction the mission was entitled to recover the $15,000. The gov-
ernment of Hawaii was not relieved from its contract obligation by
reason of the adoption of the constitutional prohibition against ap-
propriation for sectarian institutions. Lowrey v. Hawaii, 206.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 2, 3, 4;
FEDERAL QUESTION, 5;
CONVEYANCES.
See INDIANS, 1.
1. Stockholders; enforcement of liability—Minnesota law.
This court in this case followed the judgment of the highest court of the
State in determining that a corporation was not within the exception,
constitutional and statutory, as to stockholders' liability in favor of
certain classes of corporations. Where, as in Minnesota, stockholders'
liability is fixed and measured by the Constitution, a stockholder upon
acquiring his stock incurs an obligation arising from the constitutional
provisions, and as such capable of being enforced in the courts not only
of that State but of another State and of the United States. Bern-
heimer v. Converse, 516.
2. Stockholders' liability-State regulation to make effectual.
One who becomes a member of a corporation assumes the liability attach-
ing to such membership and becomes subject to such regulations as the
State may lawfully make to render the liability effectual. Ib.
3. Stockholders' liability-Right of receiver to sue to collect.
While a chancery receiver, having no authority other than that arising from
his appointment, may not maintain an action in another jurisdiction, a
receiver may sue in a foreign jurisdiction to collect statutory liability
of stockholders where the statute confers the right upon the receiver
as quasi-assignee. Ib.
4. Stockholders' liability; application of local law limiting time of action to
collect.
Section 55 of ch. 588, N. Y. Laws of 1892, limiting the time within which to
bring an action against a stockholder for a debt of the corporation does
not apply to an action brought by a receiver to enforce statutory lia-
bility of stockholder of a foreign corporation. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 2, 5, 6;
JURISDICTION, A 4;
See PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1.
Source of authority of District Court of the United States for Porto Rico.
The District Court of the United States is not a constitutional court of the
United States; its authority emanates wholly from Congress under the
sanction of its power to govern territory occupying the relation that
Porto Rico does to the United States. Romeu v. Todd, 358.
See ARMY AND NAVY, 1;
CORPORATIONS, 1;
FEDERAL QUESTION;
JURISDICTION;
MANDAMUS;
PORTO RICO, 2;
1. Conclusiveness of judgment of.
The judgment of a court-martial having jurisdiction to try an officer or a
soldier for a crime is entitled to the same finality and conclusiveness
as to the issues involved as the judgment of a civil court in cases within
its jurisdiction is entitled to. Grafton v. United States, 333.
2. Criminal jurisdiction-Effect of judgment on civil courts.
General courts-martial may take cognizance, under the 62d article of war,
of all crimes, not capital, committed against public law by an officer or
soldier of the Army within the limits of the territory within which he is
serving; and, while this jurisdiction is not exclusive, but only concur-
rent with that of the civil courts, if a court-martial first acquires juris-
diction its judgment cannot be disregarded by the civil courts for mere
error, or for any reason not affecting the jurisdiction of the court
rendering it. Ib.
See ARMY AND NAVY, 2;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10, 13.
Intentional violation of law; what constitutes.
One who intentionally adopts certain conduct in certain circumstances
known to him, which conduct is unlawful, intentionally breaks the law.
Ellis v. United States, 246.
See COMMERCE, 1, 2;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13;
COURTS-MARTIAL, 2.
1. Classification of imports; designation of articles.
The commercial designation of an article, which designation was known at
the time of the passage of a tariff act, is the name by which the article
should be classified for the payment of duty without regard to the
scientific designation and material of which it may be made or the use
to which it may be put. Goat & Sheepskin Co. v. United States, 194.
2. Classification of imports-What constitutes "wool."
The word "wool" in paragraph 360 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897, 30 Stat.
151, 183, does not include a substance which, while the growth upon a
sheepskin is, nevertheless, commercially known, designated, and dealt
VOL. CCVI-37
in, as Mocha hair, having none of the characteristics of wool, and which
would not be accepted by dealers therein as a good delivery of wool. Ib.
3. Classification of imports-Duty on metal beads strung on cotton cords.
In construing a tariff act the court cannot disregard the condition upon which
the law makes the duty depend. Under paragraph 408 of the tariff act
of 1897, 30 Stat. 151, 189, metal beads strung on cotton cords or strings,
although only temporarily strung to facilitate transportation, are sub-
ject to the higher duty of forty-five per cent and not to the lower duty
of thirty-five per cent as beads "not threaded or strung." Franken-
berg v. United States, 224.
1. Constitutionality of act of August 1, 1892-Power of Congress over con-
struction of public works.
The provisions in the act of August 1, 1892, 27 Stat. 340, limiting the hours
of laborers and mechanics employed by the United States or any con-
tractor or subcontractor upon any of the public works of the United
States to eight hours per day except in cases of extraordinary emergency,
and imposing penalties for the violation thereof, are constitutional and
within the powers of Congress. In this respect Congress has the same
power as a State has over the construction of its public works. (Atkin
v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207.) Ellis v. United States, 246.
2. Extraordinary emergency within meaning of.
The disappointment of a contractor with regard to obtaining some of his
materials did not, under the circumstances of this case, amount to an
extraordinary emergency within the meaning of the statute and justify
him in having laborers work more than eight hours. Ib.
3. Laborers and mechanics within meaning of act.
Persons employed on dredges and scows, in dredging a channel in a harbor
are not within the meaning of the act of August 1, 1892, laborers or
mechanics employed on any of the public works of the United States.
Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.
EJECTMENT.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 2.
ELEVATED RAILWAYS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4, 5.
ELEVATED RAILROAD CASES.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
See FEDERAL QUESTION, 3.
ENUMERATED POWERS.
See CONGRESS, POWERS OF.
EQUALIZATION.
See STATUTES, A 2.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6;
RAILROADS, 3, 4.
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