the letter of the text." Lieber, 56. The application of this rule is clear. Consideration of the provisions relative to the rank and pay of officers of the Army and Navy make it evident that Congress used the words "assistant surgeon" as descriptive of the whole class of assistant surgeons, passed as well as those not passed. Jugdment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE MOODY took no part in the decision of this case. GEORGIA v. TENNESSEE COPPER COMPANY. BILL IN EQUITY. No. 5, Original. Argued February 25, 26, 1907.- Decided May 13, 1907. When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be done. They retained the right to make reasonable demands on the grounds of their still remaining quasi-sovereign interests, and the alternative to force a suit in this court. This court has jurisdiction to, and at the suit of a State will, enjoin a corporation, citizen of another State, from discharging over its territory noxious fumes from works in another State where it appears that those fumes cause and threaten damage on a considerable scale to the forests and vegetable life, if not to health, within the plaintiff's State. suit brought by a State to enjoin a corporation having its works in another State from discharging noxious gases over its territory is not the same as one between private parties, and although the elements which would form the basis of relief between private parties are wanting, the State can maintain the suit for injury in a capacity as quasi-sovereign, in which capacity it has an interest independent of and behind its citizens in all the earth and air within its domain; and whether insisting upon bringing such a suit results in more harm than good to its citizens, many of whom may profit through the maintenance of the works causing the nuisance, is for the State itself to determine. THE facts are stated in the opinion. 206 U.S. Argument for the State of Georgia. Mr. John C. Hart, Attorney General of the State of Georgia, and Mr. Ligon Johnson for the State of Georgia: A public nuisance, merely as such, is not abatable or actionable at the direct instance of an individual. Where the public nuisance is at the same time working some special injury to the citizens, by reason of this special injury the individual may seek to abate same, but the right of action is with relation to the particular and private injury and not the public nuisance. The mere fact that the subject matter of the controversy is a public nuisance affords no right of action in the premises to any private person. Not only is this a general rule of law but it is also incorporated in the statute law of the State of Georgia. Citizens of Georgia, by reason of the statutes denying them right of action in the premises, would have been powerless, the right of redress in such matters being reserved solely to the State. Sections 3858 and 4761 of the Code of Georgia of 1895 are practically nothing more than the codification of the law as it existed. The general rule is stated in In re Debs, 158 U. S. 587. And see Attorney General v. Tudor Ice Co., 104 Massachusetts, 239; Attorney General v. Jamaica Pond Corporation, 133 Massachusetts, 361; State v. Goodnight, 70 Texas, 682. That the State is a proper party and that the controversy is justiciable in this court was decided in Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 241. For other authorities in point see Eden on Injunction, 267; Story, Eq. Juris., § 921; Daniels, Chan. Pl. and Pr., 4th ed., 1636; Penn v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How. 518; Irwin v. Dixon, 9 How. 27; Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 168; Smith v. Richter, 159 U. S. 398; Attorney General v. Forbes, 2 Myl. & Cr. 123. Georgia appeals to the court to protect her and her sovereignty and her enforcement of her laws within and with relation to the section and community injured." The maintenance of a public nuisance is a crime by common law and by the statute law of both Tennessee and Georgia. The offender is Argument for the State of Georgia. 206 U. S. in the State of Tennessee. The criminal act, so far as Georgia is concerned, is within the State of Georgia. The offender is without the jurisdiction and beyond the reach of the laws of Georgia, while the acts have been, and are being, committed and threatened in Georgia. In consequence, Georgia, without the aid of this court, is not only unable to punish constantly recurring criminal and injurious acts within her territory and upon her soil and citizens, but is also unable to enforce her laws, civil or criminal, and to maintain her sovereignty within her dominion. Every State possesses sole and exclusive jurisdiction over her own territory, not only with reference to her soil, but of acts committed thereon, as well as of the citizens and inhabitants thereof. Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 630; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 44; Simpson v. State, 92 Georgia, 42; 1 Bishop, Crim. Proceed. 53; Bishop, Crim. Law, § 110; Commonwealth v. Macloon et al., 101 Massachusetts, 1; Rorer on International Law, 2d ed., 323; Minor, Conflict of Laws, 499. As to the preservation of the sovereignty of a State see United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621; Fowler v. Lindsay, 3 Dall. 411. The offender in this case is a corporation. Its corpus is in Tennessee, but this, without the consent of Congress, could not be surrendered to Georgia, even if Tennessee desired. Its chief officers are non-residents of Tennessee. The offense being merely a misdemeanor is not such that Tennessee would recognize by extradition. The State in its suit, as will be seen, is not seeking a mere injunction in equity against the commission of a crime. It appeals to this court to protect it in its sovereign attributes. Unless this cause may be maintained in this court the means of the Federal Government cannot be said to be adequate to its ends, and a State can maintain its sovereignty only through the mere tolerance of her sister States. The police power, the right and power of the State to protect the public safety, health and welfare, as well as the welfare, 206 U. S. Argument for the State of Georgia. health, safety and comfort of each citizen, resides in the States and was never surrendered to the general government, and such right now rests in the State of Georgia, and was and is called into action by the resolution of its legislature as in the bill set forth. The highest and most binding duties of the sovereign are often enforcible only through the police power. Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 33; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 392; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 103. The Constitution of the United States guarantees protection to the State of Georgia against any invasion whatever, whether such invasion be by force of arms or other means, by another State or its citizens, or by a foreign government. It is sufficient that the means be hostile or harmful and be such that Georgia cannot prevent or protect herself against without the use of force upon foreign territory. In the case at bar Georgia has exhausted all amicable or other powers left in her by the Constitution. She has applied to Tennessee to prevent and abate the further commission of the acts complained of, acts which, in their effect, are not only criminal in the State of Georgia, but which result in laying the territory of the State in waste more surely and completely than could be accomplished by any invading army bent upon its destruction. Tennessee has refused to restrain her citizens in the commission of such acts, declines to take any steps in the premises, and shields the defendants in the continuation of a most effective and harmful invasion. Georgia has used every friendly office, has sought through every means open to her to protect her territory and her citizens. She is denied by the Constitution the right of invasion or other aggressive action, and under such denial is powerless in the premises without the aid of this honorable court and the enforcement of the constitutional guarantee of protection through this court, substituted in the place of the right of a State to take direct or hostile action in an endeavor to main Argument for Defendant, the Tennessee Copper Co. 206 U. S. tain her sovereignty and her rights and to preserve the life, health and comfort of her citizens. Constitution of the U. S., Art. IV, Sec. 4; Federalist, LXXX; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208; Debs, Petitioner, 158 U. S. 564; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125. Mr. Howard Cornick, with whom Mr. John H. Frantz, Mr. James B. Wright and Mr. Martin H. Vogel were on the brief, for the defendant the Tennessee Copper Company: The bill and the proof wholly fail to establish such a condition as would give this court jurisdiction of the subject matter of this litigation. The State of Georgia has not made out in her bill nor in her proof, such a state of facts showing such direct interest in this controversy as entitles her under the Constitution of the United States to maintain this action to redress supposed wrongs done to her domain. The State of Georgia, in her bill and in her proof, shows no such state of facts as to entitle her to maintain this suit in her sovereign capacity as parens patriæ, trustee, guardian or representative of her citizens. The threatened reduction of taxable values does not create a direct interest in the controversy, but at most a remote interest. The proof does not support the allegations of the bill. The power of taxation is an incident of sovereignty and not a property right. Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed., 7; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428; Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Case of Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 278. It appears from the proof that there has been absolutely no injury whatever to the streams of the territory under discussion; that with the exception of one small one all the streams of this territory drain into and through the State of Tennessee, and that none of these streams are navigable. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, distinguished. Of these species of property according to the law of nature and of nations |