CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1906. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY v. NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION COMMISSION. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA. No. 15. Argued February 28 and March 1, 1907.-Decided April 29, 1907. Railroad companies from the public nature of the business by them carried on, and the interest which the public have in their operation are subject as to their state business to state regulation, which may be exerted either directly by the legislative authority or by administrative bodies endowed with power to that end. The public power to regulate railroads and the private right of ownership of such property coexist and do not the one destroy the other; and where the power to regulate is so arbitrarily exercised as to infringe the rights of ownership the exertion is void because repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. An order of a state railroad commission requiring a railroad company to so arrange its schedule as to furnish transportation between two points so as to make connections with through trains, held, under the circumstances of this case, not to be so arbitrary or unreasonable as to transcend the limits of regulation and to be in effect either a denial of due process of law or a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws, or a taking of property without compensation. Whether a regulation of a state railroad commission otherwise legal is arbitrary and unreasonable because beyond the scope of the powers delegated to the commission is not a Federal question. It is within the power of a state railroad commission to compel a railroad company to make reasonable connections with other roads so as to pro VOL. CCVI-1 (1) Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 206 U.S. mote the convenience of the traveling public, and an order requiring the running of an additional train for that purpose, if otherwise just and reasonable, is not inherently unjust and unreasonable because the running of such train will impose some pecuniary loss on the company. While the enforcement by a State of a general scheme of maximum rates so unreasonably low as to be unjust and unreasonable may be confiscation and amount to taking property without due process of law, the State has power to compel a railroad company to perform a particular and specified duty necessary for the convenience of the public even though it may entail some pecuniary loss. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 526, distinguished. THE facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. John G. Johnson, with whom Mr. Warren G. Elliott and Mr. Frank P. Prichard were on the brief, for plaintiff in error: A State cannot require a railroad company to run a special daily train at a loss for the convenience of a limited number of passengers who wish to make close connection with a particular train on a crossing road, it appearing that it is already running sufficient trains to accommodate the general travel on its lines and has arranged its schedules to best accommodate general travel and connect with all connecting roads, and that its failure to connect with such particular train was due to a change of schedule on the crossing road to which it was impracticable to conform by any change in the schedule of the train which had made the connection under the original schedule. As to the power of the State to regulate railroads and the constitutional limitations upon the exercise of such power and as to what are unreasonable regulations, see Wisconsin, &c. R. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466-526; St. Louis & S. F. Ry. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167. A statute which in effect applied to one corporation only and not to others in like business was unreasonable. Every partial or private law which directly proposes to destroy or affect individual rights or does the same thing by affording remedies leading to similar consequences, is unconstitutional and void. 206 U.S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 79; Lake Shore & Mich. Southern v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684. In the case at bar the order complained of was not an exercise of the police power of the State. It was not made to protect the health, the morals, or the safety, of the citizens. It was the exercise of a governmental power to regulate, for public convenience, the facilities afforded to the public by a corporation. See Minneapolis & St. L. R. R. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257. An order which is reasonable, when necessary for the protection of the lives or health of the public, may be very unreasonable if made simply for public convenience. The order in the present case was a very unusual one. None of the authorities cited by the court, or counsel in the court below, show any attempt by a state legislature, or a commission, to increase the number of trains on a railroad. People v. St. L., A. & T. H. R. R. Co., 176 Illinois, 512, distinguished, and see Ohio & Miss. Ry. v. People, 120 Illinois, 200. No case has held that, in the absence of statutory requirements, a railway company may be compelled by mandamus. to increase the number of trains on its road or to run daily a particular number of trains, over its road, and there is no common law authority for making such an order. As to general regulations prescribing a minimum number of daily trains, see Lake Shore & Mich. South. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285. The cases show no attempted exercise by any State, or commission, of a power to order a particular railroad to put on an additional train between certain points for the sake of affording additional convenience of transportation. Such a power would partake more of the nature of an operation of such particular road than of a general regulation of all roads for the public convenience. In this case the order compelled the railroad to run an additional train at a pecuniary loss. This is the appropriation of property without compensation. Argument for Defendant in Error. 206 U. S. There can be no just distinction between taking possession of and using a company's property at its expense and forcing the company to use the property for the benefit of the public at a loss to itself. Chicago, Mil. &c. Ry. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167-173. Conceding that it is within the power of the legislature to compel this particular railroad to run this particular additional train over its road, to meet some special public need, it is certainly not within the power of the legislature to compel the railroad to do it for nothing, much less to do it at a loss. Even if the legislature had the power to direct the running of a special additional train at a loss in order that a comparatively few passengers from a branch line might make convenient connection with a particular train over another road, the order itself was under the circumstances so unreasonable that it must be considered an unwarrantable interference with the property rights of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, which was running a sufficient number of trains for all necessary purposes. There could not have been a more unreasonable and unjustifiable interference with its affairs. It is no answer to this to say that the jury found it was "reasonable, and proper that for the convenience of the traveling public" the connection should be made. The other facts found by the jury, coupled with the omission of either finding or testimony justifying the order, make the question one for the court. The finding resulted from a failure properly to instruct the jury as to the duty and rights of the appellant. It is for the court to say what is the nature of the convenience which justifies such an order and how far, for such convenience, the legislature or commission can interfere with the reasonable exercise by the railroad of its right to operate its own road. Mr. Robert D. Gilmer, Attorney General of the State of North Carolina, and Mr. F. A. Woodard, for defendant in error: The North Carolina Corporation Commission found as a fact that its order could be carried into effect by the extension of |