strangely diverse schools unexpectedly meet, for Socialism that is now so alarming to the rulers of the world, springs in its root from the same intolerable sense of the world's wrong, and insists on the same breach with culture and with history. In some at least of its types and its ideals, Socialism comes nearer to what is called Byzantinism than either professors or opponents well know. Yet history-standing forces, institutions founded on social needs transient or abiding, forms and conventions-all hold their ground with a tremendous grip. However violent the supposed breach, the old Manichean tale will still go on.

'When you see,' cried Bossuet, the old and the new Assyrians, the Medes, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, present themselves successively before you and fall, so to say, one upon the ruin of the other; all this frightful turmoil makes you feel that there is nothing solid among mankind, and that inconstancy and agitation is the peculiar lot of human things.' But then he detects or he manufactures a chain. The parts of so great a whole are linked together, he says. With the reserve of certain extraordinary strokes in which God intended that His hand alone should be manifest,' no great change has ever taken place that had not its causes in ages that went before. These 'extraordinary strokes,' if they exist, and if he had pondered their significance, it must have puzzled Bossuet to reconcile with his theory of the chain-with what in modern language we should call the reign of law in history-which it was his express object to set forth. William of Tyre, the twelfth-century historian of the Crusades, hit this when he wrote: To no one should the things done by our Lord be displeasing, for all His works are right and good. But, according to the judgment of men, it was marvellous how our Lord permitted the Franks (the people in the world who honour Him most) to be thus destroyed by the enemies of the faith.' Mr. Harrison's book, with no deliberate intention of his, for he is here a writer of neutral history, will give people of a reflective turn of mind, whether Jew, Mahometan, Christian, or Agnostic, if they be in the humour, many deep things to ruminate upon.

JOHN MORLEY.

1904

OUR NAVAL STRENGTH AND THE

NAVY ESTIMATES

I

DURING the past session the Army has been a leading subject of debate. We have less anxiety in regard to the Navy. We have had a sound system and able Ministers at the Admiralty, well advised by the boards of naval officers over which they have presided. Our naval administration is a source of strength to the country. In every department of the State, and not least at the Admiralty, organisation and policy must always need revision. There are changes in the policy of foreign Powers which we must be prepared to meet, neither falling behind nor going beyond the standard of strength which the wisdom of Parliament has laid down. Nor can financial considerations be disregarded. We have to make both ends meet, and the national income is not a fixed quantity. In the late debate in the House of Lords, Lord Selborne said truly: The Navy and the national credit are the two pillars on which in every material sense the safety of the Empire depends.' The principles laid down by Mr. Micawber are as sound in public as in private finance. 'My other piece of advice, Copperfield, you know. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen, nineteen six; result, happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure, twenty pounds ought and six; result, misery.'

Our war expenditure has reached an amount unprecedented in time of peace. The continual increase in estimates fills statesmen with concern. In 1899 Sir Michael Hicks-Beach was growing anxious as to the cost of the Army and Navy. In a weighty speech he pointed to the 63,000,000l. which were being spent by Great Britain, as against a corresponding expenditure of 36,400,000l. by France, and 35,250,0001. by Germany. In 1903, as it was shown in a Parliamentary return of last Session, the cost of Imperial defence had increased to 87,487,000l., including Army estimates, 34,425,000l.; military expenditure of India, 17,782,000l.; contributions of Crown Colonies in aid of Army votes, 355,000l. For 1904-5 the expenditure for the Navy will be 36,889,000l. under estimates, 5,111,000l. under Works Acts--in round figures,

42,000,000l. Our surpluses have disappeared. The public credit is impaired. In the grave words addressed by Mr. Chamberlain to the representatives of the Colonies at the Coronation Conference, The weary Titan groans beneath the orb of his too vast fate."

II

Are reductions possible for the Navy under any head of charge? Let us consider first the votes for manning. They have increased in ten years from 5,400,000l. to 9,100,000l., as against, in round figures, 3,000,000l. for the French Navy and half that amount for Germany and Russia. A voluntary service must be costly; and we have raised our numbers from 85,103 to 131,100, the cost per man being certainly not less than 100l. a year. In addition we have to give the training at sea, which is indispensable to make seamen. This means more ships in commission.

In the strength of our permanent force we are far above the twoPower standard. The table below is taken from a report by the Committee of the House of Representatives on the United States Navy Appropriation Bill for 1904-5:

NUMBER OF OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL Powers.

The permanent force of the British Navy is too large; the Reserves are too few. As given in detail in the estimates, they number in all 60,000 men. France has a Reserve of more than 100,000 on the rolls, giving at least 50,000 fit for service. Germany has 74,000 men on the rolls, and all receive a training in the Navy.

The permanent force of the Navy should be strong in officers, strong in all ratings requiring special training. Long-service training is not necessary for all the duties of the deck and the stokehold. In a battleship some 200 men are detailed for the ammunition supply, and many are for unskilled work. British naval officers insist, and rightly so, on a high standard of efficiency. Their desire is natural to command men reared, as they themselves have been, from their boyhood in the service. They share the reluctance with which

Reserves were accepted by their brother officers of the Army. Neither the Volunteers nor the Yeomanry received much encouragement from the military authorities of the elder day. Lessons may sometimes be learned from foreign navies. The ship's company of the flagship of the squadron which represented the United States on the occasion of the King's coronation were a splendid body of men. The flag-captain informed me that nearly one-third of the crew had been entered as landsmen. In addition he had ninety apprentices. These novices made up for want of experience afloat by their keenness to learn. They were efficient for their duties. The Navy of the United States has never failed in war. Long service for all ratings is not insisted upon.

It is the part of the statesman to take broad views of things, and it is due to Lord Selborne and his predecessors in the office of First Lord to say that they have appreciated the need for Reserves, and the impossibility of maintaining in peace a permanent force sufficient to meet the stress and strain of a great naval war.

After a long delay the Reserves have been taken in hand. We have an increase in the estimates for 1904-5 of 13,000 men. The new forces include the Colonial Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteers. Our Colonies offer a wide field for recruiting. We have the hardy fishermen of Newfoundland and the maritime provinces of the Canadian Dominion. In Australia we have 20,000 seafaring men. At home the call for volunteers has been warmly received. The Admiralty have been fortunate in securing as the first commanders the Hon. Rupert Guinness for the Thames, the Marquis of Graham for the Clyde, Retired Admiral the Hon. T. S. Brand for Sussex, and Retired Commander Stephen Thompson for Bristol. For instructors we may look with confidence to the Navy. The old force of Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers was full of zeal for the service. The men were smart and intelligent in gunnery. They could pull a strong oar. They had one fault, and it was pardonable. They were too keen to be rated as bluejackets. The force was too hastily disbanded. Under an improved organisation, and with conditions, now clearly laid down, of liability to serve wherever and in whatever capacity they may be required, volunteers will certainly take their place in a general mobilisation of the fleet. To make Reservists efficient more money must be spent. The Reserve vote for the current year has been increased by 107,000l. ; yet the total remains at 404,000l. for the Reserves, while some 10,000,000l. are voted for the permanent service. It seems still true to say that the Reserves are starved. Any standard of strength is more or less arbitrary. Looking to the numbers in foreign navies, it does not appear necessary that our permanent force should exceed 100,000. With an equal number of well-trained men in reserve, our total strength would be greater than at present, while the cost would be considerably less. To raise the

numbers and improve the training of the Reserves is the first step to a reduction in the votes for manning. The cost of Reservists does not exceed one-tenth of the cost of permanent men.

III

In this connection suggestions from time to time offered in the Naval Annual may perhaps appropriately be renewed.

(a) Our resources for manning the Navy may be materially increased by organising a portion of the Army as an amphibious force. Regiments may be permanently quartered at the naval ports, exercised in boats, and drilled with the Marines as gunners. As disciplined soldiers they would be ready for service afloat or ashore.

(b) It is more difficult to raise men for the stokehold than for deck duties. Stokers of the tropical races should be enrolled in the Reserves.

(c) The names of officers of the Royal Naval Reserve in the several ranks fill pages of the Navy List. They should be something more than a force on paper. For the cadets of the Royal Naval Reserve— officers of the Royal Navy in time of emergency-something more is wanted than the haphazard training and scanty opportunities for general instruction of the apprentice in the mercantile marine. The Admiralty should offer premiums to shipowners for the education of cadets, under conditions which would ensure that the work should be well done.

There is a further and a cogent argument for the reinforcement of the Reserves. It is the only means by which the decline in the British element in the mercantile marine can be arrested. The reasons for the reduction in the number of British persons employed are not far to seek. The vast trade with the East, through the Suez Canal, is entirely in steam. The voyages are made through the hottest seas in the world. In the tropics, men of tropical races are most suitable. Climatic conditions cannot be changed. In the trade with the Far East by the Suez route, working hands will not be recruited from a northern population. In all other trades British ships should be manned by British seamen. Their falling numbers are due to the scanty wages of the sailor. Shipowners receive no special favours from the State. Nor are they more disinterested than other classes of employers engaged in keen competition, the most severe which the British shipowner has to face being that under his own flag. Expenses must be cut down. In mastless ships the foreigner does the work required, and is content with wages too low to keep a decent home in England. The State may combine with the shipowner. It may supplement wages with the retainers paid to Reservists, and a hundred thousand, as it has been said, are required.

The Reserve question is urgent. In framing a comprehensive