Especially harmful does the closed shop become, in the opinion of its opponents, when a union requires foremen to obey its rules and to serve the union rather than the employers. All closed-shop unions, it is represented, "define the workman's rights but say nothing of his duties. They destroy shop discipline and put nothing in its place."

To these indictments the advocates of the closed shop have made vigorous rejoinder. They assert that while the unions do not allow employers to "victimize" their members, they do not interfere otherwise with the "right to hire and discharge" as long as all persons who are hired become union members. It is also flatly denied that the minimum wage is usually the maximum, and that production is restricted in closed shops.

The reconciliation of these conflicting statements of facts is possible. The opponents of the closed shop in discussing its economic effects always assume that the closed shop is everywhere the same, and take as typical those unions in which the restrictions on employment are most severe. The advocates of the closed shop assume as typical those unions in which the restrictions are mildest. It will be noted that in this respect the unions vary widely. In the majority of closed-shop unions, however, the employer is allowed to hire nonunionists when competent unionists are not available, or even in many unions when they are available. It is also customary to allow such non-unionists to work a certain period in a shop before being required to join the union. There is little basis for the claim, therefore, that employers are restricted to hiring union men only. It is true that "scabs" and members of rival unions are rarely allowed to work. "Scabs," however, form but a small part of the men in any trade, and agreements between rival unions have now to some extent solved the problem of jurisdictional disputes.

If the union itself is closed, union employers have no means of obtaining additional help when their business increases. The closed union, however, although it is usually found with the closed shop, is not identical with it. To say that no more members shall be admitted to a union is an entirely different thing from saying that union men shall not work with non-unionists.

All unions that have advanced beyond the most rudimentary stage enforce a minimum wage. The tendency to uniformity and a "dead level" growing out of the existence of the minimum wage can only be connected with the closed shop through some restriction on the right to hire and discharge. If the union has a compulsory waiting list, it is easy to see how the minimum wage may become the maximum wage. However, compulsory waiting lists are established

in very few unions. Similarly, restriction of output is connected with the closed shop only through the waiting list. A great part of closed-shop unions do not have waiting lists.

It is also charged that the joint and extended closed shops lead to demands upon employers. When satisfactory conditions have been obtained in one trade, the men may be called out on strike because "unfair" material is used, or because the open shop exists in an allied trade. Grievances "manufactured outside the shop" are thus said to be constantly arising. Complaint is also made that the closed shop is responsible for many unnecessary shop rules which virtually deprive the employer of control over his business. One writer has gone so far as to say that "the amount of restriction which it may be expected to find in 'closed shops' will certainly amount to one-third of what the output should amount to." Statements have frequently been made that the open shop has brought business prosperity to different communities.

Taking up the last of these contentions first, the unions allege that closed-shop agreements are of distinct advantage to employers. In open shops of most trades the employer is said to be constantly harassed with complaints from individuals. In closed shops all grievances must first be referred to the union, which acts upon many of them unfavorably. It is equally undeniable that most unions which have opportunity to enforce the extended or the joint closed shop have not hesitated at times to strike even when all their demands in the particular shop have been satisfied.

The unions have also denied in a general way that their shop rules have been unduly restrictive. As a matter of fact, the great open-shop movement which began in 1901 was caused primarily by the rapid increase in rules regulating the number of apprentices, the kind of machinery that should be used, the methods of shop management, and the like. The connection between the closed shop and arbitrary shop rules is close, but the two are not identical. Arbitrary rules can rarely be enforced except in closed shops. If the union is strong enough to secure the one, it can, if it sees fit, enforce the other. Obviously, however, a closed-shop union need not, and many of them do not, have hurtful shop rules.

The defenders of the closed shop have tried to show that the closed shop is an advantage to an employer. In the first place, they claim that the closed shop protects fair-minded employers from "cut-throat competition." If an industry is thoroughly unionized, every manufacturer or contractor can tell precisely what his competitors are paying in wages. As wages form the largest item in the

average employer's expense account, it therefore becomes possible for him to "figure intelligently on his work," something which he "could never feel certain of were the open shop to pervail." The same shop rules also apply in all union establishments. Under the open shop not nearly the same uniformity in competitive conditions can be secured. The closed shop is a device absolutely essential to the rigid and wide enforcement of union rules.

Secondly, those who uphold the closed shop affirm that it tends to create a greater esprit de corps among the men than the open shop does. Union and non-union men represent two diametrically opposed ideas. The first stand for collective, the second for individual action. Consequently, there is constant conflict between the two in the endeavor to obtain control over a shop. Because his men do not co-operate, the employer is likely to lose money. Therefore as a business necessity open shops must become either un on or nonunion. That there should be ill-feeling between union and nonunion men is easily understood when we consider why unions desire the closed shop. Non-union men are the economic enemies of unionists as long as employers resort to individual bargaining or express a dislike for full union control. In particular, efforts are put forth to make the employment of "scabs" unprofitable.

Finally, unionists say that the closed shop is advantageous to employers because in many unions it carries with it the privilege of using a label that has a distinct market value. No union solicits work for an open shop. A label, however, is an advantage to an employer only under certain conditions. It can be used to best advantage on articles largely purchased by the laboring classes. That a label increases sales on such goods is evidenced by the fact that manufacturers, solely for the purpose of obtaining the use of the label, have often asked that their establishments be unionized. The labor journals not infrequently contain statements from employers that the closed shop is a "good business proposition." But the label rarely effects an increase in the demand for expensive goods or for articles sold to women. It is evident, therefore, that the number of employers who can find an advantage in the use of the labels is small relative to the total number of employers.

To sum up the arguments against the closed shop on the ground that it affects unfavorably the economic conduct of industry, it may be said that the crux of the question is whether or not the "right to hire and discharge" is unduly restricted under the closed shop. The employer may enjoy the use of a valuable label and may be placed on a "fair competitive basis" with other employers. Individually the employer may reap a gain. But in the long run industry will be

· carried on less efficiently if by waiting lists or other restrictive devices the union interferes with the employer's hiring and dischargX ing his working force in accordance with his best judgment.

296. The Ethics of the Closed Shop11

BY JAMES H. TUFTS

In certain industries in which the workmen are well organized they have made contracts with employers which provide that only union men shall be employed. The psychological motive for the demand for the closed shop is natural enough; the union has succeeded in gaining certain advantages in hours or wages or both; this has required some expense and perhaps some risk. It is natural to feel that those who get the advantage should share the expense and effort, and failing this, should not be admitted to the shop. If the argument stopped here it would be insufficient for a moral justification for two reasons. First, joining a union involves much more than payment of dues. It means control by the union in ways which may interfere with obligations to family, or even to the social order. Hence, to exclude a fellow workman from the opportunity to work because he perhaps for conscientious reasons-would not belong to the union, could not be justified unless the union could make it appear that it was maintaining a social and not merely a group interest. Second, in some cases unions have sought to limit output. In so far as this is done, not for reasons of health, but to raise prices, the union is opposing the interest of consumers. Here again the union must exhibit a social justification if it is to gain social approval.

On the other hand, it may be noted that the individualist who believes in the competitive struggle as a moral process has no ground on which to declare for "open shop." Exactly the same principle which would permit combination in capital and place no limit on competitive pressure, provided it is all done through free contracts, can raise no objection against combinations of laborers making the best contracts possible. When a syndicate of capitalists has made a highly favorable contract or successfully underwritten a large issue of stock, it is not customary under the principle of "open shop" to give a share in the contract to all who ask for it, or to let the whole public in "on the ground floor." Nor are capitalists accustomed to leave a part of the market to be supplied by some competitor for fear such competitor may suffer if he does not have

"Adapted from Ethics, by John Dewey and James H. Tufts, pp. 559-561. Copyright by Henry Holt & Co. (1909).

business. When the capitalist argues for the open shop upon the ground of freedom and democracy, it seems like the case of the mote and the beam.

An analogy with a political problem may aid: Has a nation the right to exclude (or tax heavily) goods or persons from other countries? May it maintain a "closed shop"? The policy of the American colonists and of the United States has varied. The Puritans maintained a "closed shop" on religious lines. They came to this country to maintain a certain religion and polity. They expelled several men who did not agree with them. The United States excludes Chinese laborers, and imposes a tariff which in many cases is intended to be prohibitive against the products of other countries. This is done avowedly to protect the laborer, and in so far as it is effective it closes the shop. The maxim, "This is a white man's country," is a similar "closed shop" utterance. On moral grounds the non-union man is in the same category as the man of alien race or country. What, if anything, can justify a nation or group from excluding others from its benefits? Clearly the only conditions are (1) that the group or nation is existing for some morally justifiable end, which (2) would be endangered by the admission of the outsiders. A colony established to work out religious or political liberty would be justified in excluding a multitude who sought to enter it and then subvert these principles. If a union is working for a morally valuable end, e. g., a certain standard of living which is morally desirable, and if this were threatened by the admission of non-union men, the closed shop would seem to be justified. If the purpose were merely to secure certain advantages to a small group, and if the open shop would not lower the standard but merely extend its range of benefits, it is hard to see why the closed shop is not a selfish principle-though no more selfish than the grounds on which the tariff is usually advocated.

E. THE WEAPONS OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 297. The Function of the Strike in Collective Bargaining15

BY JOHN MITCHELL

The normal condition of industry is peace. The average workingman, engaged in industries in which strikes occur, loses less than a day a year in this manner. A strike lasts upon the average about twenty-three days, but the average employer carries on his business

15 Adapted from Organized Labor, 299-306, Copyright by the American Book and Bible House (1903).