First. Because the site of the station is not at present secure against the heavy ordnance of the period, and the defenses of the city of New London, Conn., could offer little opposition to a fleet of iron-clads. The policy of to-day in selecting a naval station should be to place it beyond the reach of an enemy's fleet, whereas the station at New London is less than six miles from the mouth of the harbor, and an enemy's iron-clads could lie off the town and destroy the yard even were they prevented from ascending higher by obstructions placed in the channel. Besides, a yard in such a position would invite an attack upon the town of New London, where property much exceeding in value any naval station established there would be sacrificed. No objections can be raised to dispensing with or abandoning this place on the ground that the Government has made any considerable outlay here, for up to the present moment the total expenditure has been but $90,000.

Second. It would cost a large amount of money to establish a navyyard at New London, an expenditure that could not be justified when it is considered that our most important naval establishment, that at Brooklyn, N. Y., is only a few hours' sail, and there are two yards to the east of it. Half the amount that would be required to make a navyyard at New London, if laid out in perfecting the yard at New York, would be far more advantageous to the Navy, and would confer upon our principal yard advantages which it sadly needs, and wanting which it caunot be considered a thoroughly efficient establishment. The site at New London is a mile in length with a breadth of only about two hundred yards, and it would require this width to be increased toward the channel about one hundred yards to give water enough for large ships to lie at the dock. To level the land and make the grade suitable for buildings, docks, slips, &c., and erecting a sea-wall would require no more than the ordinary expense, judging by the cost of the amount of work that has so far been performed, although high hills would have to be leveled to make the yard what it should be.

One of the reasons advanced for placing a navy-yard at New London was the advantage of having iron-clads lying in fresh water, where their bottoms would not become foul. This advantage does not exist at the point in question, for the bottoms and propellers of the vessels there are thickly incrusted with a mixture of barnacles and grass which can only be removed at great expense after docking the vessels. Salt water from Long Island Sound flows into the harbor of New Loudon every flood-tide, and the fresh water of the river becomes salt at this point. Third. Although there is sufficient depth from the mouth of the harbor to the navy yard, yet there is not room enough for a vessel lying at anchor off the yard to swing, and difficulty might be experienced even in turning a long vessel on her center.

Fourth. There are no dry-docks or lifting-docks, except such as are suited for very small vessels, and to meet the demands for docking Government ships, very extensive works would have to be established.

Fifth. There is no certainty that the channel at the navy-yard would not fill up in the course of a few years, after the necessary extension of the grounds into the river channel, which is, on an average, about two hundred yards wide.

The river itself is sluggish, but the wharves and abutments would collect all the deposits and would cause continued dredging; the chances are also that for purposes of commerce the harbor would be injured. With regard to the defensibility of this position, some of the members of the board are of opinion that there is no serious objection on that score, as at the entrance of the harbor and along its shores are good

sites for forts, and the channel could be obstructed by torpedoes, &c., in such a manner as to prevent the entrance of an enemy. By the comparatively rapid and cheap method of constructing earthworks manned by heavy guns, it is considered the place could be made defensible. It would be of more benefit, however, to the Government to perfect the navy-yards it already possesses than to make a large outlay on a posi tion of doubtful utility. Taking all things into consideration, the board are constrained to recommend that the naval station at New London be dispensed with and abandoned, and the land, docks, buildings, &c., be turned over to the Light-House Board to be used for their purpose.

The discussion of the naval station at League Island, Pa., was then commenced. During their visit to this place, the board made such examinations as they thought necessary. In the opinion of the board it should be the policy of the Government to maintain one large naval sta tion, combining in itself the advantages and facilities of all the others. League Island was presented to the Government by the authorities of Philadelphia, who incurred considerable expense in purchasing the rights of other parties. The site was given with the understanding that a navy. yard would be established there, and acting upon the idea, the United States have already expended there the sum $865,600. The time allowed. the board for the examination and discussion of the several subjects confided to them was too limited to enable them to make a minute personal examination of League Island, which would involve actual surveys, measuring depths of soil, and devising plans for the future development of a great naval station, but they have availed themselves of the best information, which is fortunately very full and reliable, within their reach. The advantages of League Island have been fully discussed hereto fore by persons well qualified to judge, and the opinion of the majority has favored the location of a navy-yard at this place. This consideration has materially influenced the board in coming to its conclu sions, while at the same time they have not neglected such personal observations as time and circumstances would permit. Before expressing any opinion with regard to League Island, it will be well to briefly state. the circumstances under, which it came into the possession of the Gov ernment.

If the board have on this occasion entered more fully into details in reference to this location than they have in reference to other navy-yards, it is because of its importance, the large expenditures that will be ne cessary in the future in case it is retained, and the fact that most of the other naval stations are long-established institutions and little argu ment is needed to show their necessity.

It has long been the opinion of experienced naval officers that the country needs at some point a large establishment possessing all the requirements for building and preserving an iron-clad navy, such as will be suitable for the future wants of this great nation. With the excep tion of League Island, all our naval stations on the Atlantic coast are deficient in a fresh-water anchorage, one of the first requisites toward preserving iron vessels laid up in ordinary. They are besides deficient in dock yard accommodations, including means for docking ships and constructional resources. Careful examination was made by order of the Navy Department of the fresh-water tributaries on our Atlantic coast, and in 1862 the authorities of Philadelphia were applied to in reference to obtaining a title for League Island. The result was the cession of the island and the waters of the back channel to the United States Government. It was determined to commence a naval establishment there as SOOR as the old Philadelphia yard could be sold. The latter, although

very useful during the late civil war, was an unsuitable site for naval purposes, being too small in area and too near commercial buildings of an inflammable character.

At the close of the war the use of League Island became very apparent. The Government possessed a considerable number of iron-clads which required to be laid up in fresh water and secure from floating ice. These vessels were, therefore, sent to the new station, and remained there, with little, if any, deterioration, until required for service. Besides the back waters at League Island, a supplementary act of the city of Philadelphia gave to the United States Government the means of obtaining "ownership and sovereignty over all the north shore and adjacent land, so far as the Government of the United States may require."

The authorities of Philadelphia have behaved in this matter with great liberality, incurring considerable expense in carrying out the wishes of the General Government; for, although the establishment of a navyyard on a large scale would be, in some respects, very advantageous to Philadelphia, yet it would seem that, in a commercial point of view, the value of League Island to the city is much greater than any naval · establishment could possibly be. The land all along the river front is rapidly increasing in value, and the loss of League Island will in course. of time be seriously felt by the commerce of Philadelphia. The railroads are extending their tracks toward the river, and a great railroad is advancing from the foot of Hanover street to its present tracks north of Dock street, a distance of 15 miles, and from Dock street south to Greenwich Point, 33 miles. This covers a large portion of the riverfront, and excludes, at the will of this giant corporation, the increasing commerce of the city. With five miles of river-frontage held by a great railroad corporation, League Island becomes still more valuable to the city for commercial purposes, and shows that Philadelphia could not have been influenced by mercenary motives in donating League Island to the Government, for its wise men must have foreseen the future importance of this place to commerce.

Discussions have already taken place in the city councils of Philadelphia and in the columns of the press with regard to the retrocession of the island to the city, on the plea of promoting its commercial interests; and it is assumed by disinterested parties that the city councils will be urged to convey the ownership of League Island to the great corporation. in question. In this event, its tracks would be extended from Greenwich Point to the island, a distance of three and a half miles, and it would then control 83 miles of Delaware River.

In this connection it may be pertinent to remark that about May 17, 1876, the Committee on Naval Affairs of the United States House of Representatives reported a bill to abandon League Island yard, and this was the cause of Mr. Randall's introducing the resolution establishing the present commission to examine into the subject. Specious ar guments were adduced by a portion of the press to favor the proposed abandonment, on the ground that it would require a fabulous sum of money to reclaim and make the lands tenable-that the place is unhealthy and unfit for human habitation, and that the Government would save by establishing a station at Gloucester, or some other point on the Jersey shore contiguous to Philadelphia. By this arrangement, while the city was to enjoy all the advantages of a navy-yard, the interests of the Government at League Island were to be sacrificed with no compensation whatever for the money already spent there according to the extensive plans laid out for the future. However, the Government must

always expect to encounter opposition in the establishment of a navy. yard, where it may conflict with the interests of trade, for, notwithstanding the absolute necessity of efficient naval stations for the protection of commerce and commercial cities, the community are generally ready to sacrifice the interests of the Government to their own particu lar benefit. The scheme to turn League Island to commercial account and to annex it to the old navy-yard, Greenwich Point, Washington street terminus, Hanover street acquisition, &c., is a grand and lucra tive idea, well calculated to awaken the cupidity of speculators, who never consider the interests of the country or regard any rights that stand in the way of their investments. Fortunately, the Government has not expended such an amount at League Island as to entail severe loss, in case the site is abandoned; at the same time the expenditure has been sufficiently large to render it the part of wisdom to have the question of retention or abandonment definitely settled before another dollar is spent on the work.

No doubt League Island is a very eligible situation for a navy-yard, pos sessing perhaps even greater advantages than the one in Brooklyn, N. Y. It is contiguous to a large city, where plenty of skilled labor cau be procured at will, where stores of all kinds can be obtained at short notice.

The island is within easy reach of the great coal and iron mines of Pennsylvania, and while the navy-yard was in course of construction access could be had to the great shops along the Delaware for such pieces of steam machinery as the yard could not supply.

Any amount of pure, fresh water could be conveyed in pipes from the river Schuylkill at a moderate outlay; an inestimable advantage to a navy-yard. The defensible portion of League Island is well established, and no further outlay in that direction is required; the fortifications on the Delaware are, or could be made, ample for the protection of the naval station; no enemy could reach Philadelphia if the defenses were properly armed and manned.

Since the introduction of steam-vessels in war the policy in establishing navy-yards has changed, and it is considered wise to place them as far as possible from the sea. These places our own vessels would have no difficulty in reaching under steam, while an enemy would be harassed at every step by guns, obstructions, submarine mines, &c., making his progress hazardous, if not impossible. This is a very strong point in the selection of a site for a navy-yard, and is one in which several of our yards are deficient.

In 1862 it became evident that we required one great naval station that could build the largest iron-clads and the heaviest machinery, since no private establishment can be expected to contain within itself all the necessary appliances for constructing great ships of war.

It was found that by employing private individuals to build iron-clads the expense was much greater than if the Government had built them. Heavy iron beams, shafting, and plates could only be procured from one or two parties, and from them in but limited quantities and with great delay. Were we at any time to become involved in war with a great naval power, we could hardly defend ourselves, much less assume the offensive, for want of means to build and repair ships. The difficulties are much greater than they were in 1865. Then we could only roll out at private establishments 3-inch iron plates. Individuals have no use for the various kinds of iron required by the Navy, and there must be an mmense outlay on their part in making the necessary preparation to

exeente Government work, which, as a matter of course, must be added to the expense of building our iron-clads.

In a war like that through which we lately passed a very considerable portion of an iron ship could be procured at the ordinary private establishments; but in a war where we would have to compete with the navies of the great European powers, we should be obliged to build such large and expensive structures that the work could only be performed by a properly organized Government establishment, unless we wish to be exposed to great imposition and to risk having inferior vessels. So rapidly has the science of building heavy iron war-vessels advanced in Europe, that we have been left far in the rear for want of the means by which other nations have arrived at such perfection in naval architecture and ordnance.

One of the greatest difficulties under which our Navy has labored is the want of a settled policy with regard to navy-yards and the class of vessels to be constructed. We could evidently establish no practical system for building the necessary iron-clads for want of means in even a single yard for doing the work. Considering all these things, the liberal and intelligent plans devised for the improvement of League Island must meet with approval from experienced naval officers, even although some objectionable features undoubtedly exist in the location of this site for a navy-yard.

We propose to mention the disadvantages as well as the advantages of League Island. The great objections are "its alluvial soil and the cost of raising the surface to a proper grade, the depth it will be neces sary to penetrate before reaching a proper foundation, and the expense of piling on which to erect superstructures."

League Island is a reclaimed marsh, and only at a depth of from 25 to 56 feet can gravel be found to sustain piles, and no structures can be built without piling.

This latter objection partly exists at the Boston, Brooklyn, Norfolk, and Pensacola navy-yards, and no difficulty has been encountered in erecting substantial structures there.

There is, however, a difference of opinion with regard to the depth of the alluvial soil of League Island.

The report of an officer of the Coast Survey, who is said to have made careful borings in every part of the island, is favorable. He reports the surface soil only about 34 feet deep, with an average depth below this of from 25 to 26 feet fine sand and clay all over the island. The board have not seen the report alluded to, but rely principally on the report of a board of civil engineers, of which Mr. W. S. P. Sanger was the president, dated April 26, 1873.

This document states as follows:

The borings show that at the western end of the island the depth from the surface of the meadow to hard bottom is 55 feet, and that this depth gradually decreases toward the easten end. The original foundation, which is a hard, firm, and compact gravel, is covered by an alovial deposit varying in depth from 20 to 55 feet, and of a consistency which will not of itself afford good foundations for heavy structures. The firm bottom is too low to admit of excavations for foundations, and it must therefore be reached by piling, and, consequently, in the preparation of all foundations piling must be resorted to. With this assistance, we entertain no doubt that firm and substantial foundations, capable of sustaining any weight that may be imposed upon them, can be obtained.

This board of civil engineers claim to have carefully examined the island and procured all necessary information before proceeding to construct any public buildings. They had the proper facilities, and we therefore assume that their report is correct. The next objection to League Island is the difficulty of building dry-docks, which can only be