In his report of 1875, Mr. Stanton pointed out the necessity of a careful revision of all the municipal ordinauces. That necessity still exists. Faithful efforts for more than two years to enforce the laws for licensing trades have not been successful, except to a limited extent. I am convinced that the licensing system, except for those branches of business requiring police supervision, should be abolished. It is unequal in its bearings upon different occupations, oppressing some and not taxing others. It is particularly oppressive to produce dealers. It is unequally enforced, giving opportunities for favoritism and annoyance. At the best, it is vexatious to business men. Congress abolished it in July last in regard only to wagons and carts and dealers in merchandise not specifically mentioned. The extent of the harassing litigation growing out of the license system can be seen in the above table. One hundred and eighteen persons have been prosecuted during the past year for following legitimate trades without taking out a license. The present system of licensing establishments for the sale of liquor requires revision. For purposes of regulation and of revenue it is a failure. Although seventy-four convictions have been had during the year, it is notorious that the unlicensed saloons are more numerous than the licensed; and the revenue raised does not equal the tithe of the expenses incurred in the prosecution and punishment of the misdemeanors and crimes caused by the sale of liquor. No improvement need be expected in this matter until the license-tax is greatly increased, and the same power to seize proofs of illegal sale given to the police as in the case of gambling-saloons. I take pleasure in bearing testimony to the efficiency of the police court in enforcing the laws and ordinances. In the last year it has disposed of Municipal cases United States misdemeanor cases.. 5,088 3, 463 Total...... 8,551 In the District cases, only sixty-one appeals were taken. A similar court for petty civil cases would be a desirable substitute for the present most unsatisfactory system of fifty justices and numerous constables. The whole amount of money collected during the year in municipal cases, and paid into the District treasury, is $25,068.34. The difficulties in the legal methods of enforcing the rights of the public in regard to nuisances merit mention. Certain powers in this respect are conferred upon the Board of Health, chiefly by section 26 of the act of February 21, 1871; and upon the Metropolitan Police, chiefly by sections 380-385 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia; but the language in which they are conferred is so vague as to cause wide differences of opinion as to its meaning. The legality of the ordinances of the board of health, and the jurisdiction of the police court for their enforcement, are constantly disputed. Under the present laws nuisances pronounced at the common law injurious to health can be reached; but it is almost impracticable to effect the abatement, within the city limits, of offensive and unwholesome trades, and quite so to effect summarily the abatement of nuisances dangerous to life and limb. It is within the power of the board of health to make and enforce regulations to prevent domestic animals from running at large in Washington and Georgetown; but no power is vested in either the board of health, the board of police, or the District Commissioners to prevent persons from driving herds of cattle through any street or avenue, or to prevent cattle from running at large in our populous suburbs. Nor is there sufficient provision of law to secure the draining of lots in the vicinity of sewers, or the filling of vacant lots made offensive by stagnant water. In the case of nuisances existing on property belonging to a non-resident, when no agent can be found on whom to serve process, there is no recourse by the public against the owner for the recovery of the expense incurred in abating them. But one litigated case has arisen under the personal-tax law for the current fiscal year. In that one the equity court sustained the law by ordering a trustee to return his schedule under it. A few months ago a citizen of Georgetown, on behalf of himself and other users of aqueduct water in that locality, filed a bill in the equity court claiming a right to use that water, rent free forever, by virtue of an alleged contract to that effect with the United States, and praying an injunction against the District Commissioners to restrain them from executing that part of the law of July 12, 1876, which extends the water ordinances of Washington City over Georgetown. On full argument the injunction pendente lite was refused. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Barnes case, (see 91 U. S. Reports,) that the District is responsible for damages caused by the neglect of the board of public works to keep the streets and avenues of Washington in repair, will cost the District some heavy sums. In the Barnes case damages and costs amounted to nearly $4,500. (To recover this sum I have brought suit for the District in the name of the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Company, which made the excavation into which Barnes fell.) In the case of Dant the jury gave a verdict of $5,000. Several similar suits are pending, in some of which $25,000 damages are claimed. In view of the great extent of the avenues and streets of Washington, the inequalities of its surface, and the number of streams which intersect and bound it, the application to the District government of the doctrine of responsibility for all accidents caused by non-repairs will compel the levy of a large tax to meet the verdicts for damages. If the responsibility is to extend to all the roads of the District and the streets of Georgetown it may become oppressive. This subject deserves your careful consideration. The building regulations made by the late board of public works have. been sustained by the equity judge in the case of The Commissioners, &c., vs. Davis & Medler, on demurrer to the bill. These regulations, being imperfect in some respects, were, in 1875, referred by you for revision to a committee consisting of practical builders, the inspector of buildings, the engineer, and assistant attorney. This committee did its work thoroughly and reported the result. I respectfully recommend the adoption by you, under the powers conferred in the 37th section of the organic act of 1871, of the building regulations as revised; and I would suggest that you ask Congress to ratify them, and give to the police court and the District supreme court power to enforce them in a summary manner, on rules to be adopted by the latter. This is a matter which is of importance to the architecture of the capital, the preservation of the avenues and streets from encroachment, and the personal safety of the inhabitants in their dwellings. The laws regulating assessments for street improvements have given rise to litigation in numerous suits, which are still pending. The longestablished method of assessing by frontage often operates inequitably; in the case of the triangular lots, made by the intersection of avenues with streets, it sometimes amounts to virtual confiscation, the assessment exceeding the value of the lot. The question is often raised whether the assessed property is "especially benefited" by the street improvements, it not being enough, under the law, that it is adjoining. The exemption from assessment of "churches and school-houses, and all buildings, grounds, and property appurtenant thereto and used in connection therewith," is a large factor in the lawsuits about assessments. On one side, it is claimed that, under the 147th section of the Revised Statutes and similar provisions of law, parsonages near the church or distant from it, extensive church-yards or school-grounds, vacant lots or lots covered with business or dwelling houses, if owned by a church society or used for school purposes, and all furniture used in churches and schools, are exempted from all taxes or assessments, national or municipal. Proprietors who rent buildings for use as churches or schools claim that this property is exempt. On the other side, it is claimed by citizens that their burden of assessments is greatly increased by the exemption of church and college and school property aggregating several millions in value; that the churches and colleges sometimes extend in frontage over the greater part or the whole of a square, and that their proportion of assessments, sometimes amounting to several thousand dollars, is thrown upon their neighbors; that lots held for rise in price are shielded by church ownership from taxation; that speculators put cheap church or school buildings upon vacant lots, rent them at a good price, and escape their share of the public burden; that many other frauds are perpetrated under cover of this exemption; and that the compulsion of citizens to pay the share of taxes which ought to be paid by the owners of church property is a species of indirect legislation for religion and is unconstitutional. These questions are involved in cases now pending either in general or special term. It is certain that litigation on this subject will continue so long as Congress shall exempt from taxation the large and rapidly increasing real estate owned or oc cupied in this District by churches, and that there will be delay and loss in the collection of the taxes. The whole subject of assessments for local improvements needs re-adjustment on equitable principles. A system tolerating no exemptions whatever, except of public cemeteries, would be of comparatively easy administration. The case of Columbus Alexander vs. The Commissioners was a suit in equity to enjoin the sale of a lot belonging to the complainant, for the purpose of satisfying an assessment made by the late board of public works for special improvements. The points made for defendants were as follows: 1. The legislative assembly had power to make taxes and assessments a lien on land. 2. The act prescribing the mode of assessment is valid, and its valid ity has been repeatedly recognized by Congress. 3. The objection that the amount expended in front of the lot was greater than the sum appropriated by law, if true, admits a benefit greater than the law designed. Complainant asks, therefore, that he be relieved from paying anything whatever as a contribution for the benefit to his property. This is not ground for equitable interference. Besides, the law was not exceeded in the making of the improvement or its cost, and equity ought not to interfere on the score of errors or irregularity in the assessment. This case was argued several weeks ago in general term, but has not yet been decided. The decision in this case will probably govern the action of the court in a large number of similar suits. In the case of William J. Murtagh against the District, the plaintiff, proprietor of the Daily National Republican, sued for publishing in that paper a list of the taxes and the property upon which the same were assessed, said publication being alleged to have been made twice a week for four successive weeks. The defendant demurred, on the ground, substantially, that various acts of Congress authorized the publication of a list of various taxes in arrears on June 1, 1875, and no other list, and the Commissioners had no other authority to contract for the publication of any different list. Section 13 of the act of March 3, 1875, authorized that said list of taxes in arrears should be published only twice a week for two successive weeks, while the plaintiff declared on eight insertions in three weeks. This demurrer was sustained in the court below, and an appeal was taken by the plaintiff to the general term. This is the second time that a demurrer to plaintiff's declaration has been sustained. It is believed, moreover, that there exists also a good defense by the District on the merits. In the case of the Washington and Georgetown Railroad Company against the District, the plaintiff sued the District for laying a sidewalk, &c., from First street to New Jersey avenue, on B street, in pursuance of a circular-order from the board of public works; counsel for the District demurred, mainly on the ground that section 6 of the act of Congress of May 8, 1872, (17 Stat. at L., page 83,) enlarged the public grounds around the Capitol, and included the portion where the plaintiff laid its sidewalk. The sundry civil appropriation act of March 3, 1873, (17 Stat. at L., page 519,) appropriated for grading and paving around the Capitol. The law provided that the streets should be improved, not by the municipality but by the United States. The board of public works had therefore no authority of law for charging any portion of the expense to the District or to assess any portion of it on private property, and the subject-matter was beyond the contracting power of the board or the municipality. The court sustained the demurrer. In the case of Adolf Cluss, for the use of the commissioners of the Freedman's Bank, against the District, plaintiff sued to recover the value of his services for plans, specifications, and services furnished and rendered upon and on account of the buildings for 'colored schools in the District. The demurrer was overruled on the ground that the board of trustees for colored children were subordinate municipal officers. This decision followed the principle of that of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Barnes against the District; a good defense exists, however, on the merits of this case. In the case of F. P. Sawyer against the District, plaintiff sued for the violation of two contracts, in both of which the contracting parties were the board of health of the District and F. P. Sawyer. Both instruments were signed by the plaintiff and by C. C. Cox, president of the board of health. The plaintiff made these contracts a part of his declaration. Counsel for the District demurred on the ground that the contracts did not purport to be made by or on behalf of the District of Columbia, but by and in behalf of the board of health, and that the contract of that board is not in law a contract of the District. The court below sustained the demurrer, and on appeal of plaintiff to the general term the demurrer was again sustained. In several of the late cases brought against the District, the legal powers of the Commissioners and their relations to the corporation will necessarily be passed upon by the court. Also, the nature and extent of the powers of the late board of audit, and whether its jurisdiction over the classes of claims committed to it for audit for settlement was exclusive and its decision final. If this should be held by the court, an immense amount of litigation will be saved to the District. There are two classes of claims whose legal status has not been precisely defined, either by statute or by the courts; the first for work done under contracts with the late board of public works, in which final measurements were made, but which were not audited by the board of audit; the second, in which certificates were issued by that board, but not converted into 3.65 bonds before the act of March 14, 1876. Most of these claims are meritorious. The only question is who shall pay them. Definite legislation on this point would prevent numerous suits. The suit against James A. Magruder, and against the contractors who failed to repair the pavements, have not been reached for trial. They were promptly placed upon the trial calendar. The sum of $47,285.76 will be demanded from the defendant, Magruder, as suggested in a report made to the House of Representatives. Certain fraudulent payrolls, mentioned in the testimony taken before the House Committee on the District, have been obtained by me from the files and are held for production before the grand jury. I have so notified the United States attorney for the District. A balance of $10,041 and some interest is due on the accounts of the late District treasurer. I expect to be able to report, in a few days, that this amount is either paid or amply secured. The "wharf cases" are still pending in the courts. If litigation on this subject is to be ended, there should be definite legislation for the purposes of testing in the courts the validity of the patent issued for what is known as "Kidwell's Bottoms;" for conferring upon the District executive full and clear authority in regard to the wharf-front on the Potomac, and private and public wharves, and for securing to the national capital free wharves of ample extent for its future commerce. At present the Commissioners have no legal power to make the regu lations required for the extensive wharfage adjoining the public streets on the Potomac, or for that created by the recent improvements on the James Creek Canal. Respectfully submitted. WILLIAM BIRNEY, Attorney for the District of Columbia. X.-REPORT OF COMMISSIONER OF WASHINGTON ASY LUM. OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE WASHINGTON ASYLUM, GENTLEMEN: I respecfully submit the following report in reference. to the Washington Asylum for the year ending November 15, 1876: |