Positive be based on nation. respective domains of observation and imagination in politics. This investigation will complete our sketch of the general spirit of the new politics. In truth it is necessary to distinguish between two sorts of operations. The first, constituting properly speaking political science, aims at forming a system suitable to the present period, the second concerns its propagation. In the first class of operations, it is clear that the imagination ought aid of Imagi- only to play a subordinate part, remaining at all times under the guidance of the observing powers, as in the other sciences. The study of the past, can and should be employed to assist the discovery of means for provisionally coordinating facts, until their definitive relations can be deduced from the facts themselves, the point always to be kept in view. Even this use of the imagination should only embrace secondary facts, any other being manifestly erroneous. In the second place the determination of the system according to which society is, in our day, destined to effect its own reorga nisation should be almost wholly inferred from observation of the past. Its study will determine not only the ensemble of the system but its most important portions, with a precision which will probably astonish the savants when they commence the work. It is, nevertheless, certain, that the degree of precision obtainable by this method, cannot reach the point at which the system could be confided to the leaders of industry for actual use by them in practical combinations as indicated in the preceding chapter. Accordingly under this latter aspect also, imagination should play a secondary part in scientific politics. This will consist in conferring the necessary degree of precision on the outlines of the new system, the general plan and the characteristic features of which have been determined by observation. There is however another sort of operations, equally indispensable for the definitive success of the grand enterprise of social reorganisation, though subordinate to the preceding, where the imagination finds full scope for its exercise. In ascertaining what is to be the new system, it is necessary to put aside its advantages or inconveniences. The principal, indeed the only question should be: what is that Social System indicated by observation of the past, which the progress of civilisation must establish. To occupy our thoughts about the excellence of that system, would be to confuse everything and even to miss our goal. We should confine ourselves to the simple conception that, inasmuch as the positive idea of goodness and that of harmony with the state of civilisation are identical, we are certain to obtain the best system now attainable, if we discover that which is most in harmony with the present state of civilisation. The idea of goodness having as a positive conception no separate existence, and becoming positive only when connected with the state of civilisation, we should apply ourselves to the latter as constituting the direct object of our researches, and alone capable of rendering politics positive. To point out the advantages of the new system and its superiority over the antecedent states should be regarded as merely secondary and not allowed to exercise any influence in guiding our labours. It is incontrovertible that by proceeding in this way, we shall found a polity truly positive, and in harmony with the grand wants of society. The new system should be thus ascertained; but it is clear that to ensure its definitive adoption by society, it ought not to be presented under a shape which is very far from being the fittest to determine a social adhesion. In order to establish a new Social System, just conceptions will not suffice. It is necessary that the mass of society should feel attracted by it. This condition is not merely indispensable to overcome the obstacles, more or less serious, which this system must encounter among the classes who are losing their ascendency. It is needed above all for the satisfaction of the moral craving for enthusiasm inherent in man when he enters upon a new career. Without such enthusiasm he could neither overcome his natural inertness nor shake off the powerful yoke of ancient habits; without which it is impossible to secure the free and full development of all his faculties in their new occupation. Since this necessity always manifests itself even in the least complicated cases, its absence would involve a contradiction in the most complete and important changes, in those which must most deeply modify human existence. Accordingly all history testifies in favor of this truth. It is therefore clear that the right mode of conceiving and presenting the new system under a scientific polity is not at all fitted to fulfil this indispensable condition. The mass of mankind will never be inspired with a passion for any system, by proving to them that it is one which the progress of civilisation has prepared and now demands for the guidance of society. A truth of this nature is accessible to a very limited circle and for them even demands too long a series of mental operations, to allow of its inspiring an attachment. It can only produce among savants that profound and tenacious conviction, the necessary result of positive demonstrations, which offers a stronger resistance, but, for that very reason, is less active than the lively and captivating persuasion of ideas that excite the passions. The only way of obtaining this result consists in presenting a vivid picture of the ameliorations which the new system should bring about in the condition of mankind, regarded under all points of view, and apart from its necessity and opportunity. Such a perspective alone, can induce men to effect the moral revolution within themselves, essential for establishing the new system. This alone can repress that egotism, now rendered predominant by the dissolution of the ancient system, and which, after our ideas have been enlightened by scientific labors, will remain as the only serious obstacle to the triumph of the new social organisation. This alone can draw society from its apathy, and impress on it that active devotedness which is demanded by a social state destined to maintain all the human faculties in constant action. Here then we find a sort of work in which the Imagination should perform the principal part. Its activity can produce no bad effect, since this will be exerted in the direction pointed out by scientific labors; and it will aim, not at inventing a new system, but at spreading one which has been determined by positive polity. Thus set in motion the imagi nation ought to be entirely left to itself. The more open and free its attitude, the more complete and salutary will be its indispensable activity. Such is the part specially reserved for the Fine Arts in the general work of social reorganisation. Thus this vast enterprise will obtain the cooperation of all the positive forces; that of the savants to determine the plan of the new system; that of the artists to cause its universal adoption, that of the industrial chiefs to put it into immediate execution by establishing the needful practical institutions. These three great forces will lend Review of the chief efforts to found Positive Polity. Montesquieu each other a mutual support in founding the new system, as they will do to ensure its daily application, when established. In determining, then, the social system suitable to the present epoch the positive polity invests observation with the supremacy now accorded to imagination. At the same time it confides to the imagination a new and more perfect office than that which the theologico-metaphysical polity assigned to it; for since the human race has advanced near the positive state the imaginative faculty, though supreme, has revolved in a circle of obsolete ideas and monotonous pictures. Having sketched the general nature of positive polity it is useful to cast a rapid glance over the chief attempts heretofore made to raise politics to the rank of the sciences of observation. We shall thus gain a twofold advantage; that of demonstrating the opportunity of such an undertaking, and of throwing light upon the spirit of the new polity by exhibiting it under several points of view differing from those already indicated. Montesquieu must have the credit of the earliest direct attempt to treat politics as a science of facts and not of dogmas. Such evidently is the true aim of the Spirit of Laws (l'Esprit des Lois), as all who understand this work will concede. The admirable Introduction where the general conception of law is presented would alone suffice to establish this aim. It is clear that Montesquieu mainly aimed at ranging, as far as pos sible, under a certain number of heads all the political facts known to him and at exhibiting the laws of their connexion. Were it our task to appreciate such a work, its merits should be judzed relatively to the period of its execution. We would then perceive that the Spirit of Laws decisively establishes the philosophic superiority of Montesquieu over his cotemporaries. To have emancipated himself from the negative spirit at the time when it exerted the most despotic power even over the greatest intellects; to have profoundly felt the worthlessness of a metaphysical and absolute polity; to have appreciated the necessity for departing from it at the very time when, in the hands of Rousseau, it was assuming its definitive form; these are decisive proofs of Montesquieu's mental superiority. But in spite of the supreme ability evinced by Montesquieu, as will be, more and more, acknowledged, his labors are far from having raised politics to the rank of a positive science. They have not in the least, satisfied the fundamental and indispensable requisites for attaining this object as above stated. Montesquieu did not perceive that great fact which regulates all political phenomena, the natural development of civilisation. Hence it follows that his researches can only be employed as materials, as a collection of observations and hints towards the creation of the positive system of politics. For the general views which he employed to connect the facts are not positive. Notwithstanding the manifest efforts of Montesquieu to disentangle himself from metaphysics he did not succeed in doing so. From metaphysical considerations he undoubtedly deduced his principal conception. This conception has a double fault. Instead of being historical it is dogmatic; in other words it does not sufficiently regard the necessary succession of the different political states. In the second place it attributes an exaggerated importance to a fact, which is altogether secondary,—the form of government. Accordingly the preponderating influence which Montesquieu has given to this idea is purely imaginary, and contradicts the best established facts. In a word the political facts have not really been coordinated as they should be in every positive science. They have merely been grouped under hypothetical ideas, contrary, for the most part, to their true relations. The only important portion of the theoretical works of Montesquieu possessing a truly positive character, is that which concerns the political influence of outward and local circumstances, acting continuously, designated by the term Climate. But it is easy to see that, even in this respect, in consequence of the general error of his method, the ideas put forward by Montesquieu can only be employed when they shall have been entirely recast. In truth it is now clearly recognised by all observers that Montesquieu has in several respects greatly exaggerated the influence of climate. Such exaggeration was unavoidable. No doubt climate exerts over political phenomena a real action which it is very important to understand. But such action is only indirect and secondary. It is confined to accelerating or retarding in a certain measure the natural progress of civilisation; but this cannot in itself be affected by these modifications. In truth this progress is identical, in all climates, except as regards its rapidity; because it springs from more general laws, those of the human organisation, essentially the same for all localities. Since then the influence of climate over political phenomena merely modifies the natural course of civilisation, which maintains its predominance, this influence cannot be studied with advantage and properly estimated until the fundamental law has been ascertained. If the indirect and subordinate cause were studied before the direct and principal cause, such a violation of the laws of the human mind would unavoidably give an entirely false idea of the influence of the former and lead to its being confounded with that of the latter. This is what happened in the case of Montesquieu. The foregoing reflexions on the influence of climate manifestly apply to all other causes which, without essentially altering the course of civilisation, can modify its rate of advance. This influence can only be determined with precision when the natural laws of civilisation shall have been established, by eliminating all such modifications. Astronomers in commencing their study of the laws of the planetary movements omitted all consideration of the perturbations. After these laws had been discovered, the modifications could be determined and finally even reduced to the general law which had only been established with reference to the principal movement. If the attempt had been made, in the beginning, to account for the irregularities, it is plain that no precise theory could ever have been constructed. The case is exactly the same as regards the subject in band. The inadequacy of the political system of Montesquieu can be clearly verified in its applications to the wants of society. The necessity for a social reorganisation in the most advanced countries existed as truly in the time of Montesquieu as it does now. For the bases of the feudo-theological system had already been destroyed. Subsequent events, by completing the destruction of the ancient system, have only rendered this necessity more evident and more urgent. Montesquieu, however, did not propose the creation of a new social system as the Condorcet. practical aim of his labors. Since he had not coordinated the political facts by a theory fitted to render evident the necessity for a revolution at the stage which society had then reached, and at the same time to exhibit the general character of the new system, he could, as in fact he did, only confine himself to indicating improvements in detail suggested by experience, which simply constituted modifications, more or less importaut, of the feudo-theological system. Montesquieu no doubt showed a wise moderation, in confining his practical suggestions within the limits which the facts as imperfectly studied by him imposed, when, on the other hand, he could so easily have invented utopias. At the same time, he clearly evinced the inadequacy of a theory which was uufitted to meet the most essential demands of practical life. To resume, then, Montesquieu felt the necessity of treating politics by the same method as the sciences of observation; but he did not form any conception of the general operation needed to effect this purpose. His researches, nevertheless, were of the utmost importance. They facilitated the intellectual combination of political ideas, since they presented a mass of facts coordinated by a theory which, though far removed from the positive state, approached it much more nearly than all anterior efforts. Condorcet it was who grasped the general conception of the operation fitted to raise politics to the rank of the sciences of observation. He first saw clearly that civilisation is subject to a progressive course, every step of which is strictly connected with the rest by virtue of natural laws; discoverable through philosophic observation of the past, and which determine, in a positive manner for each epoch, the improvements adapted to the social state as a whole, and to each portion of it. Not only did Condorcet thus conceive the method of impressing on politics a truly positive character, but he endeavoured to demonstrate the theory in the work entitled 'Sketch of an historical view of the progress of the human mind;' of which the title and introduction alone should suffice to secure for its author the eternal honour of having created this great philosophic conception. If this capital discovery has hitherto remained wholly barren, has, as yet, made hardly any sensation; if no one has pursued the track pointed out by Condorcet; if, in a word, politics have not become positive, we must attribute this, in great part, to the fact that the sketch which Condorcet traced was executed in a way quite at variance with the scope of his undertaking. He completely misconceived its most essential conditions, so much so that the work needs to be entirely recast. It is necessary to prove this. In the first place the Distribution of Epochs constitutes the most important portion of the plan in a work of this nature, or, to speak more correctly, it alone constitutes the plan considered in its greatest generality: since it determines the principal mode of coordinating the facts observed. Now the method of distributing the facts which Condorcet adopted is absolutely erroneous since it does not fulfil even the most obvious condition, that of presenting a homogeneous series. We see that Condorcet by no means felt the importance of a philosophic distribution of the epochs of civilisation. He did not perceive that this distribution should itself be the object of a preliminary operation, the most difficult of those which the formation of positive politics demands. He imagined that he could ade |