1862. ing and preserving the national authority throughout CHAP. VIII. the Union." Meanwhile the Democratic minority in the House, joined by the pro-slavery conservatives from the border slave States, lost no opportunity to oppose emancipation in every form. On the 11th of December Representative George H. Yeaman of Kentucky offered resolutions declaring the President's proclamation unwarranted by the Constitution and a useless and dangerous war measure. But these propositions were only supported by a vote of forty-five, while they were promptly laid on the table by a vote of ninety-four members. The Republicans were unwilling to remain in this attitude of giving emancipation a merely negative support. A few days later (December 15), Representative S. C. Fessenden of Maine put the identical phraseology in an affirmative form, and by a test vote of seventy-cight to fifty-one the House resolved: "Globe," Dec. 11, 1862, p. 76. That the proclamation of the President of the United States, of the date of 22d September, 1862, is warranted by the Constitution, and that the policy of emancipation, as indicated in that proclamation, is well adapted to hasten the restoration of peace, was well chosen as a war measure, and is an exercise of power with proper regard for the rights of the States and the perpetuity of free gov- 1862, p. 92. ernment. With the proclamation thus heartily indorsed by nearly every free State governor and nearly twothirds of the loyal Representatives, Mr. Lincoln, who had accurately foreseen the danger as well as the benefits of the critical step he had taken, could well afford to wait for the full tide of approval, for "Globe," Dec. 15, CHAP. VIII. Which he looked with confidence and which came to him from that time onward with steadiness and ever-growing volume, both from the armies in the field and the people in their homes throughout the loyal North. CHAPTER IX TH THE REMOVAL OF MCCLELLAN HE latter part of September wore away in CHAP. IX. resting the exhausted Army of the Potomac, and beginning anew the endless work of equipment and supply work which from the nature of the case can never be finished in an army of 200,000 any more than in a city of the same size. But this was a lesson which McClellan appeared never able to learn. So long as a single brigade commander complained that some of his men needed new shoes it seemed impossible for him to undertake active operations until that special want was supplied. When that was done some company of cavalry was short a few horses, and the vicious circle of importunate demand and slow supply continued forever. On the 23d of September General McClellan discovered symptoms of heavy reënforcements moving Vol. XIX., towards the enemy from Winchester and Charlestown. The fact of the enemy remaining so long in his front instead of appearing to him as a renewed opportunity only excited in him the apprehension that he would be again attacked. He therefore set up a new clamor for reënforcements. "A defeat W. R. Part I., p. 70; Part II., p. 346. W. R. Part I., p. 70. CHAP. IX. at this juncture would be ruinous to our cause.. General Sumner with his corps and Williams's (Banks's) occupy Harper's Ferry and the surrounding heights. I think," is the doleful plaint with Vol. XIX., which the dispatch closes, "he will be able to hold his position till reënforcements arrive." Four days afterwards he writes again in the same strain: "This army is not now in condition to undertake another campaign. . . My present purpose is to hold the army about as it is now, rendering Harper's Ferry secure and watching the river closely, intending to attack the enemy should he attempt to cross to this side." He is full of apprehension in regard to an attack upon Maryland and prays that the river may rise so that the enemy pp. 70, 71. may not cross. Ibid., 1862. The President, sick at heart at this delay, resolved at the end of the month to make a visit to McClellan's camp to see if in a personal interview he could not inspire him with some sense of the necessity of action. The morning report of the 30th of September showed the enormous aggregate of the Army of the Potomac, present and absent, including Banks's command in Washington, of 303,959; of this 101,756 were absent, 28,458 on special duty, and 73,601 present for duty in Banks's command, Vol. XIX., leaving 100,144 men present for duty under McClellan's immediate command. This vast multitude in arms was visited by the President in the first days of October. So far as he could see, it was a great army ready for any work that could be asked of it. During all his visit he urged, with as much energy as was consistent with his habitual courtesy, the necessity of an immediate W. R. Part II., p. 374. employment of this force.1 McClellan met all CHAP. IX. his suggestions and entreaties with an amiable inertia, which deeply discouraged the President. After a day and a night spent in such an interchange of views he left his tent early in the morning and walked with a friend to an eminence which commanded a view of a great part of the camp. For miles beneath them spread the white tents of the mighty hosts glistening in the rising sun. Mr. Lincoln gazed for a while in silence upon the scene, then turned to his friend and said: "Do you know what this is?" He answered in some astonishment, "It is the Army of the Potomac." "So it is called," responded the President; “but that is a mistake; it is only McClellan's bodyguard." He went back to Washington taking little comfort from his visit, and after a few days of painful deliberation, getting no news of any movement, he sent McClellan the following positive instructions: WASHINGTON, D. C., October 6, 1862. MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN: I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him South. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington and cover the latter by your operation you can be reënforced with thirty thousand men. If you move up the Valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 1 In his "Own Story" McClellan tries to create the impression (p. 627) that the President was satisfied with his delay at this time; but his private letters printed in the same volume leave no doubt of the contrary. He says (p. 654), referring to the President's visit, October 2d, "His ostensible purpose is to 2 The Hon. O. M. Hatch of |